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Abstract 
This study examines how the state, through its main agencies, responds to and controls horizontally 
planned transgressive 'alter-globalisation' protest movements organised against two international 
summit meetings in the UK (being the 2009 G20 summit protest in London and the 2014 NATO in 
Wales, although I draw briefly on the 2013 G8 summit). These dissenting groups set out to challenge 
the state and the established political order and increasingly employ direct action and civil 
disobedience to make their protests seen and heard by global elites. Analytically, I take a critical 
human rights based approach as well using the strategic and tactical perspectives of Jaspers (2015) 
and Scholl (2012) viewing counter-summit movements and the authorities as 'players' in a strategic 
relational interaction with each other to gain advantage over the opponent. Methodologically, I use 
an ethnographic approach embedding myself within anti-globalisation protest groups as well as 
drawing opportunistically on a range of other primary and secondary data sources. My findings 
reveal that the state and its coercive arm, the police, do much to modify, delimit, and repress 
protest action. There has now been a transformation in summit policing (and public order policing 
more generally). The broad components of recent policing innovation includes the following key 
strategies: (1) careful selection and fortification of summit sites and establishing 'no protest zones' 
(2) the intensive (overt and covert) use of police surveillance practices to intimidate protestors, 
reduce anonymity at protest spaces and increase transparency and real time intelligence gathering;  
(3) the disruption and/or smashing of protestor critical infrastructure, including (but not limited to) 
convergence centres; (4) using non-lethal weapons against unarmed protestors to incapacitate 
them, enacted  clandestinely as a method of dispensing 'street justice' and increasing the costs of 
participation, officially allowing police to control and retake any protest spaces; and (5) pre-emptive 
legal repression (including legal tools such as, banning orders, permits, and mass pre-emptive 
arrests, etc.) all of which distracts activist leaders and aids demobilisation These tactics are 
strategically adapted to the prevailing conditions imposed by each particular summit, and interact 
dynamically, although not always incrementally, to protestor's own tactical repertoires.  
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1. Introduction: Incapacitating Political Protest 
Why study the social control of political activism and dissent at international summit meetings? 
Summits are by their very nature rare events in the life of any nation. Typically, they bring together 
a small number of political, military or economic elites for a few short days. Security operations are 
mounted to keep dignitaries and other internationally protected persons (IPPs) safe and to prevent 
terrorist attack or violent 'trouble makers' from disrupting the smooth running of the summit. 
Selected members from the world's media are permitted restricted access to the site and they are 
provided with media briefings which are scrutinised and relayed to the wider public. Peaceful 
demonstrations far away from the summit site are usually permitted although with heavy 
restrictions. Once the summit closes, delegates leave and life returns to normal. This encapsulates 
the official account of proceedings, but as an account, it is woefully inadequate and misleading.   
Visit any summit event and one is presented with an arresting set of images. Heavily fortified 
summit sites, phalanx's of heavily armed police with non-lethal (and lethal weapons) exclusion 
zones in what had been open public space, and intensive overt and covert surveillance practices by 
state agencies. At the same time almost any international summit of any importance has seen mass 
protests and counter summits, some of which have resulted in high levels of violent conflict 
between the police and protestors.  
Necessarily any analysis needs to consider the actions of that key coercive agency of the state, the 
police, in protest policing. The value of studying protest policing is that it forces one to think outside 
of the fashionable and supposedly benign 'community policing' paradigm and to consider the 
significance of protest policing in an age of transgressive anti-globalisation movements that 
challenge the state and the established political order. What does policing look like under these 
circumstances is a keener test, in part because it is not limited to state agencies interventions on the 
street during protest actions but now extends to lengthy preparatory operations encompassing an 
increasingly wide range of state and non-state actors. Such events provide a near unique laboratory 
to study contemporary transformations in disciplinary institutions.  
England and Wales has had an extensive history of what is termed 'public order policing', or the 
policing of large, and from the authority’s perspective, potentially rebellious crowds. This stretches 
in contemporary terms from the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament marches in the 1960s and the 
anti-Vietnam war marches to the inner city disturbances in the 1970s and 1980s, to a host of 
industrial disputes, notably the bitter year-long miner's strike of 1984-85 and the later Wapping 
dispute (1986-87), as well as the anti-Poll Tax demonstration in Trafalgar Square in 1990. The 1980s 
in particular were a time of neoliberal economic restructuring, and in respect to urban disorders, 
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embedded institutional police racism and deteriorating police and minority community relations. 
The lessons learned from these now symbolic ‘public order events’ was not that heavy handed 
policing can provoke violent protest and is consequently counter-productive when dealing with 
public grievances and social division, but rather its opposite, a turn to a more paramilitary policing 
response. During this time major changes occurred in how demonstrations were policed, both in 
terms of the police's strategy and tactics, and the utilisation of more weaponry, armour and other 
offensive equipment. Changes that were at odds with the supposed tradition of British policing, 
rooted in its Peelain principles; where the police operate with the consent of the community, do not 
impose order on an unwilling populace, and use only the minimal force to achieve compliance. 
Writing in the late 1980's, Uglow (1988:38-9) summarised this new policing landscape: 
"The weakening of local influence ... the strengthening of police autonomy and national 
political control ... special squads ... the re-equipping of the force with a modern arsenal and 
riot control equipment, and the willingness to deploy them ...[ increased] resources ... deeper 
level of surveillance." 
Despite a period of ‘normalisation’ in police protestor confrontations, public order policing policy 
has continued to evolve and now encompasses a wider range of specialist policing units and security 
actors who employ deeply contentious overt and covert methods of control and coercion. In large 
part this has been a result of policy development by the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) 
a non-statutory, non-elected body delegated by the state to make these decisions.   
Britain, and its colonies from where these tactics emanate, also has a darker history of what has 
been termed ‘political policing’ (Broduer, 2007) conducted by a raft of secretive state agencies 
working in hand with and alongside clandestine specialist policing units. It is a history which reveals 
widespread and protracted surveillance, coercion and deception, sanctioned at the highest echelons 
of government, and deployed against a wide range of individuals and organisations. Its function has 
been to frustrate, disrupt and eliminate dissent which challenges political and economic elites and 
the status quo in Britain (Connor, 2018a/b). This political policing continues apace, more recently 
under the latest legitimating guise of ‘counter-extremism’, the tactics of which are based upon 
counter-insurgency doctrine. Indeed, the Police's National Intelligence Model (NIM)1 emphasises 
pre-emptive 'disruption' and 'network demolition' (Swain, 2013) and is being increasingly deployed 
as a mode in the governing logic of policing. As with much public order and security policy, 
boundaries for coercion and disciplinary control are removed from public view, consultation and 
                                                          
1 NIM is a co-ordinated strategy on the collection, analysis and use of intelligence and is produced by the 
National Criminal Intelligence Service, being a Home Office Policing body and part of the Serious Organised 
Crime Agency (Swain, 2013).  
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oversight. These larger questions between the role of the police organisation, its practices and the 
functioning of democracy animate this study and have only received, at best, uneven scholarly 
attention (Manning, 2010:39-40). 
1.2 Research Aims and Objectives  
The purpose of this study is to examine how the state, through its main agencies, responds to and 
controls contentious political protest taking place at international summits in the UK. My focus is 
upon those 'transgressive' protest groups and organisations who refuse to enter into 'negotiations' 
with the police, and by doing so challenge the limits of what some scholars view as the now 
dominant 'negotiated management model' of policing protest. I am centrally concerned with how 
the control of this political activism is achieved, through what means it is achieved, and what the 
impacts are for protestors and social movement activism more generally.  
The often made accusation from the perspective of protestors, as well as much criminological 
scholarship, is that police efforts at controlling such protests is better conceived as a form of 
'political repression'. The subject of political repression is one that is charged with emotion, and one 
that appears no doubt somehow out of kilter to many who live in a Western liberal democracy. It is a 
truism that all states attempt to control political dissent by restricting freedom of expression and 
organisation, including Western liberal democracies whom also advocate the principles of human 
rights, the rule of law and due process, and (a highly qualified) right to protest. This leaves open the 
question of when does this form of social control become recognisable as political repression? Here 
I build on others work (Marx, 1979; Boykoff's, 2006; Earl, 2011, 2003; Starr et al 2011) and explore 
mechanisms of repression, if it is taking new forms, and how such threats affect political 
opportunity structures. I examine these questions from the perspective and at the level of the 
protestor group, and study whether this leads to social movement suppression and demobilisation.   
Whilst there is now a growing body of research about how the state and its agencies have reacted to 
transgressive social movements, particularly at protest and demonstration events, we understand 
far less about the ways in which activists have provoked, absorbed, and resisted social control and 
repression, and how these proactive processes differ across various cohorts of social movement 
actors. The overarching question here is whether policing has entered a new era of increased 
repression? Restated, the primary intent of this study is to provide a synthesis of findings across a 
range of data sources to come to a determination about the nature and form of state repression and 
its effects on protestors and protest movements, thus this thesis offers a combination of political 
theory, policing studies and social movement analysis. 
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This concern with state repression matters because the consequences of political repression can be 
profound in constraining, subverting, delimiting and ultimately disempowering political protest 
(Opp & Roehl, 1990, Starr, Fernandez & Scholl, 2011). At the same time the study of repression and 
the threat of repression on social movements has been under explored in the social sciences 
(Boykoff, 2006) although there is a growing body of 'repression research' emerging (for instance, 
Earl, 2003, 2011).  Goldstein's magisterial study of political repression in America (from 1870 to the 
present - here the late 1970's) similarly argued that social scientists have neglected the role of 
government through its coercive apparatus in suppressing dissent and enforcing orthodoxy, 
particularly at times when radical criticism of the existing order threatens established power. This 
issue is of particular relevance within the UK, where the political and security apparatus of the state 
has been undergoing incremental change and developing new policies and practices to crack down 
on the activities of campaigning groups (the activities of several of these former secretive police 
units are now the subject of an official inquiry - the ‘Pitchford Inquiry’).  
At this point it might also be helpful to say something about what I am not doing. Throughout my 
focus has been on the interactional dynamics between the authorities and the dissenters on the 
ground (in 'meat-space') and I have not examined, except in passing, the online ('virtual-space') 
environment in any depth. Not because this is not valid, quite the opposite, as information 
technologies provide an especially fertile site for policing activity, one which offers near 
unparalleled surveillance opportunities not previously feasible. Online state surveillance also 
reflects the more general impetus by the authorities away from 'reactive policing' to pro-active and 
'pre-emptive policing' strategies and 'risk management' approaches, the parameters of which have 
been significantly enabled and enshrined in wide-reaching legislative tools (notably the 
controversial Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, 'RIPA') (Akedeniz et al., 2001). There is 
also considerable evidence in the UK and other Western states that social movement organisations 
and actors’ online activity is the subject of intense police interest (both 'open access' and invasive 
intercept surveillance) (see for instance, Scholl, 2012, also evidenced in official sources, HMIC, 
2009).   
1.3 Analytic Approach 
In addressing these questions my analytical strategy is two-fold. Firstly, I take a critical human 
rights based approach to political dissent, one which takes seriously the liberal claim that the states 
coercive arm acts not only to maintain social order but also to protect the rights of activists seeking 
political, economic and social change. I hold that the litmus test of this dual mandate will lie in its 
facticity, here, the extent to which political dissent can mobilise, take place and make itself heard in 
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the charged atmosphere of an international summit meeting by the world’s political and economic 
elites. This requires evaluating the way that state power is exercised against protest movements 
directly before, during and directly after protest events. In doing so I catalogue the various forms of 
state action employed at the case study sites, ranging from the use of direct violence, harassment, 
intimidation, spatial 'zoning' control and legal repression through to more covert measures 
(principally surveillance, infiltration, agents-provocateurs and the destabilisation of activist groups). 
I also examine indirect methods, which include the control of information and the manipulation of 
the mass media.  
In order to understand what occurs on the ground at street level between protestors and authorities 
I also take an analytical approach which borrows from both the strategic and tactical perspectives of 
Jaspers (2015) and Scholl (2012). This is to view counter-summit movements and the authorities as 
'players' in a strategic interaction, one where protest groups innovate tactically to achieve their 
goals, and state agencies respond with countering moves, provoking in turn another cycle of 
tactical innovation. The resulting 'repertoires of action' (Tilly, 1986:4) are played out in a number of 
different structured arenas between these two principle players (most usually at the street level 
between protest groups and the police) but in reality subsume a more diverse number of sovereign 
and non-sovereign sub-players. These prominent players can be meaningfully grouped into forming 
three core clusters; the social movements engaged in the conflict and their allies (constituting a 
range of players); their adversaries (which includes an increasingly complex matrix of state agencies 
as well as national and local government and corporate interests); and the principle audiences for 
each other's actions (the media, interest groups, experts and intellectuals, bystanders and wider 
publics). Players engage in strategic action with 'some goal in mind' be they individuals ('simple 
players') or groups of individuals ('compound players') whereas 'aggregate players' such as the 
media can actively intervene and shape political battles (Jaspers, 2015:109). This last point is 
especially pertinent to the media reporting of the G20 policing operation 'Glencoe' (discussed in 
Chapter 4; 4.5.1, and Chapter 7; 7.2.1).  
Seeing the actions of both protestors and authorities through this relational approach explains why 
each act and react as they do on the ground. It helps to explain the co-evolution of the respective 
targeting strategies and strategic shifts in protestor and authority actions which have evolved at 
summit protest events. This is the case both during the lifespan of a particular individual summit 
protest as well as over the course of the longer protest cycle, from the earlier protestor summit 
success with direct action tactics in Seattle and elsewhere, through to their eventual eclipse by the 
authorities own extensive counter-moves (discussed in chapter 2, below). Viewing protest and its 
policing in tandem also provides important insights which may otherwise be lost if the players were 
Page 10 of 407 
 
viewed singly. It reveals how strategic decision making and strategic action unfold together 
between the key players and in different settings in what Ellefsen (2018: 752) calls a type of 
‘strategic dance’, one of action, reaction and interaction. It focuses on how opposing groups 
attempt to outwit and out manoeuvre each other, how they can ‘push and pull’ each other in 
unpredictable ways and to unforeseen outcomes. A process which has shaped and re-shaped the 
summit protest landscape, resulting in different opportunities for successive campaigns (Tilley, 
2008). Such a perspective acts to highlight the significance of strategy, not only for social 
movements but also for the authorities, and I will argue later that it also acts to problematise the 
claim that the authorities do indeed pursue the dual mandate that they make claim to.  
Strategic interaction unfolds within different arenas, each governed by formal and informal rules, all 
of which are open to being bent or reinterpreted, as well as ignored or broken (Jaspers, 2015:9-10). 
These arenas can be directly observed and allow for empirically founded claims as they contain 
people who are in the middle of 'doing something', people developing lines of activity by seeing 
how others respond, adjusting their actions to mesh with what others have done and likely will do 
(Jaspers, 2015:29). Consequently, such players are continually presented with a number of choices 
in adapting their capabilities and positions to each arena, and in doing so each player is also 
presented with a number of strategic decisions, dilemmas, choices and ‘tricky trade-off's' (Ekblom, 
2003) in accomplishing their respective objectives to win advantage. As Jasper’s (2015: 22) notes, 
these costs, benefits and risks for players emerge and shift during engagements, with opposing 
players adapting to each other’s moves, with each presenting a moving target for the other. What 
follows, whether the mass phalanx's of heavily equipped riot police typical of summit 'policing 
operations' move in to violently disperse protestors (with perhaps the occasional arrest) or to kettle 
them for many hours, or to hold back in reserve, depends upon how this tactical battle is played out 
on the streets.  
Taking a strategic perspective of players and arenas also puts the focus on the organisation of 
struggle, how people cooperate in struggle and the tactics and repertoires they use rather than 
giving primacy to the ideas or the frames that they hold. It also refracts and reflects the antagonistic 
nature of politics, one which foregrounds what Tilly (1995) and Scholl (2012) call ‘transgressive 
contention'. Social movements do far more than making political claims, they reflect a 
'prefigurative politics' where activists forge connections, build networks and construct a self-
identity that can transform the lives of their participants (Meyer, 2004:166). In doing so they offer 
vehicles to mobilise discontent, to organise, contest and resist circumstances which activists view as 
being unacceptable, but in ways that differ from the more institutional activism of mainstream 
interest group politics. These groups are usually characterised as being 'outsiders' (Tarrow, 2005) 
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and therefore distinct from normal institutionalised politics which occurs through the machinery of 
political representation (political parties, elected leaders, voting, petitions, lobbying, etc.).  
The methodological compliment to this analytical approach has seen me adopt a mixed methods 
design to undertake the study. It carries the advantage of keeping a flexible design, whilst being 
capable of advancing theoretical understanding (Hesse-Biber, 2010). This approach also allowed me 
to integrate a wide range of different data sources, including the analysis of official documents and 
official complaints data with the rich data from the ethnographic and observational elements of the 
study. Doing so ensures the findings are grounded in the experiences of protestors.  
In undertaking this work one should also pay one's intellectual debts. I follow in the footprints of 
other critical scholars working in areas such as political policing, (Brodeur, 2010; Neocleous, 2000, 
2014; Bunyan, 1983; Scraton, 1985, 1999, 2002, Turk, 1982); in social movement research (della 
Porta, 2006; Jaspers, 2015; Scholl, 2012; Starr et al 2011) in socio-legal studies (Ashworth & Zedner, 
2014; Mead, 2010) and in philosophy (principally Foucault, 1977, 1979).  
1.4 Plan of the Thesis 
This thesis is contained within eleven chapters, seven of which are empirical. Chapter Two outlines 
the substantive empirical and theoretical literature concerning how the state and its agencies 
control and restrain political activism and dissent at international summit protests. In the early 
sections of the review I dedicate considerable attention to theoretical debates, but justified 
empirically, in order to situate and understand how a 'relatively autonomous' state, and its coercive 
arm, the police, can function as a means of repression and social control. This requires considering a 
number of inter-related issues; the notion of 'constabulary independence' and the role of police 
governance arrangements, law as a constraining force on 'policing policy', and the role of 'political 
policing', leading to a discussion of the dual function of policing in maintaining a specific order. The 
second substantive section of the review provides a comparative historical analysis of anti-summit 
protests, my focus is principally in the UK, but I also draw on some of the experiences in other 
similar Western democracies hosting international summits (in North America and Western 
Europe). In doing so I aim to highlight the wider trends in the evolution of police and state strategies 
to control protest movements and some of the consequences that these strategies have for the 
continued exercise of fundamental democratic freedoms and civil rights.   
Chapter Three outlines and defends my methodological approach. I indicate the contribution that a 
mixed methods design brings to the findings of the study as well as providing a critical reflection on 
this approach. I also discuss the unique difficulties and benefits of undertaking this type of research 
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in the field. In doing so I address some of the main ethical questions raised in respect to conducting 
aspects of covert research, as well as how my methodological approach has impacted answering my 
research questions. 
I then move on to discuss the first case study in Chapter 4, the 2009 G20 protests taking place in 
central London. I dedicate four chapters (Chapter 4 – 7) to this summit due to the complexity and 
significance of the event and the considerable amount of data that it generated. The first of these 
chapters uses participant observation to examine protestors and the authority’s preparations for 
the summit. Chapter 5 then reports on the main ethnographic data, bringing together observations 
of the G20 protests events and the tactical interactions between the two key players, and how the 
authorities suppressed political dissent during several of these decisive encounters. The level of 
police violence and other forms of repression resulted in a considerable number of protestor injuries 
and lead to a large number of official complaints. Chapter 6 considers these aspects of the policing 
operation, principally by interrogating IPCC data, and goes on to show how the complaints process 
failed to hold the police to account. What proved more troubling for the authorities was the 
disturbing images of heavy handed police tactics being used against protestors. This resulted in 
widespread public criticism and led to a raft of inquiries into the policing operation. Chapter 7 
critically examines this dimension of the aftermath of the G20 protest. Here I draw upon a 
combination of academic scholarship, medical expertise, Freedom of Information requests and 
discourse analysis to problematise such inquiries, and argue that they are best viewed as state 
attempts to rebuild tarnished police legitimacy.  
The second case study concerning the NATO summit in Wales is examined in the next three 
chapters. Chapter 8 looks at both the authorities and protestors different preparations for the 
summit and in particular, why the chosen location of this part of Wales played such a critical role for 
the authorities. Chapter 9 builds on these insights and explores some of the inventive pre-emptive 
methods that the authorities used to undermine dissent and propagate pro-NATO values and 
beliefs amongst local people and the wider region.  This chapter also examines how the political 
economy of the summit is similarly constructed as a core element in this propaganda exercise, one 
used to disguise the exorbitant costs of hosting the event. Chapter 10 picks up on some of these 
themes and reports on the main ethnographic account of the protest events taking place over the 
summit period. This includes the respective tactical interactions between police and protestors, and 
how the dominance of the authorities spatial control and pre-emptive strategy outmanoeuvred and 
drained the protest players own efforts to build a critical Anti-NATO mass. My observational study 
also reveals some of the debilitating impacts that police and security agencies infiltration practices 
has had on protestors' ability to plan, organise and mobilise mass dissent.      
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The final concluding chapter of the thesis draws out the key themes of this study in responding to 
my research aims and objectives. I also provide an account of the achievements that I believe this 
thesis has made and point to some fruitful areas for future research arising from this study. Finally, I 
provide a Technical Appendix which supplies contextual details for the evidence collected which is 
referenced throughout this study. This includes itemised research tools and materials used in the 
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2. Literature Review: Protest, control and policing - trends and patterns 
2.1 Introduction 
Over the past several decades there has been a proliferation of horizontally planned 'alter-
globalisation' protest movements that bring together loosely organised heterogeneous groups to 
undertake innovative direct action on the streets in Western Europe and North America. Whilst they 
are diverse, a central organising theme to this civic dissatisfaction centres on aspects of 
neoliberalism, notably the increasing financialisation and globalisation of the economy as well as 
the perceived democratic and legitimacy deficits of global governance, itself seen as 
overshadowing elected governments (Fisher et al, 2005). These movements act to emphasise the 
gap between the political elite and the people, not only at the international institutional level where 
there is no sufficient participatory democratic element available to restrain or veto official action, 
but also at the national level where institutional arrangements reduce citizens to voting for one or 
two competing elites without being able to take any other decisions.2 These calcified mechanisms 
and institutions (including the courts) that once made reform and democracy possible are 
increasingly being abandoned in favour of more radical alternatives. A number of critical observers 
have more eloquently termed these arrangements an 'elective aristocracy' (Ankersmit) 'incomplete 
democracy' (Arblaster, 1987) 'elite-managed democracy' (Wollin, 2008) or 'thin democracy' (Barber, 
1990).  
The resulting outpourings of public anger and frustration can be seen within a wider framework of 
internal challenges faced by nation states. Observing political developments in Western Europe 
from the 1970's to the mid-1980's, Offe (1985:817) has argued that we are witnessing a 'fusion', 
blurring the boundaries between political concerns and modes of action from citizens private (moral 
and economic) ones. As public policies create more direct and visible impacts on people, so people 
then try to win more immediate and comprehensive control over political elites, generating a cycle 
"incompatible with the maintenance of the institutional order of the polity" (Offe, 1985:817).  
It is these 'counter-publics' (Dhawan, 2015) which place new energised actors onto the political 
stage, a mass of people who are hostile to conventional forms of politics and the 'liberal economic 
consensus' and want to reshape the terms of the state-civil society relation. When mobilised in the 
form of concurrent anti-summit protests they present a generalised challenge to existing structures 
of power and provide an opportunity to express a wide range of political and economic grievances. 
In this sense 'alterglobalisation' movements can be thought of as 'carriers of conflicts' who sit 
                                                          
2 See Paul Lucardie's (2014)  'Democratic Extremism in Theory and Practice: All power to the people', Routledge 
Press for an erudite discussion. 
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outside of and distinct from normal institutionalised politics which occurs through the machinery of 
political representation (political parties, elected leaders, voting, petitions, lobbying etc) (Tarrow, 
2005). This is to draw upon Tilly’s (197852-54) influential schema of social movements as 
'challengers' to polity members as opposed to more established interest groups which have access 
to the polity or have gained its acceptance (Gamson, 1975:28-37). Challengers, by default, are least 
able to win advantages or gain concessions, and find themselves expending far more resources in 
their claim making (Tilly, 1978). Indeed, alterglobalisation movements shun existing bureaucratic 
structures and are inspired by the conviction that forms of representative democracy are too weak 
to defend social justice and pluralism, rather it is seen as a blockage to democracy. A more radical 
vision is often demanded and practised in the form of direct participatory democracy. Whilst such 
efforts at popular sovereignty operate only at the margins of society, they can be seen as 
constituting 'laboratories for democracy' (Wainwright, 2003).  
These efforts to oppose and resist some features of political economy and globalisation has seen a 
range of 'transgressive' protest groups adopting unconventional means in order to try and make 
visible challenges to, and expressive claims on, international institutions and individual states, and 
then relay this to a wider audience. These resistance efforts can take many forms, including 
demonstrations, pickets, boycotts, as well as more controversially, direct action and civil 
disobedience. For at least some of these protest players there are times when there is a duty not to 
obey the law, a duty to disobey in resisting conditions of injustice, even in near legitimate Western 
states such as the UK. This is what Delmas (2017) refers to as 'principled lawbreaking' or 'uncivil 
disobedience' (covert, evasive, violent or offensive acts of lawbreaking) one that also puts the 
challengers on the edges of political legitimacy. This is why large social movement protests at 
international summits can capture our attention. They challenge the dominant social and political 
order by "revealing the stakes to announce that a fundamental problem exists in a given area" 
(Melucci, 1985:797). They also provide moments where tactical innovations break with trust in prior, 
often highly ritualised protest behaviour. Predictable conventions such as walking in a long slow 
police escorted march to an agreed rallying point are relinquished in favour of more 'explosively 
visible' actions, as witnessed in Seattle and Genoa, what Peterson (2002; 2004) has described as 
'dispersed political behaviour'. Tarrow (1995:110-111) argues that such 'moments of madness' carry 
a broader long-term influence by creating new opportunities and models for others to emulate in 
challenging the dominant social and political status quo. This is to see popular resistance and 
protest having been 'transformed', resulting in greater disruptive potential to the respective 
authority players, and in doing so, making those protestor bodies more vulnerable to state coercion 
and violence.  
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A number of more conservative analysts from the 1970s onwards view these developments  in the 
changing dynamics of political life as dangerous, regarding their cumulative impact as eroding 
political authority, if not the capacity to govern3 (Offe, 1985:818). This is because social movements 
carry the potential to threaten the dominant state-enforced social relations by fracturing, 
undermining or denaturalising them, irrespective of whether the protest group expresses explicit 
'revolutionary' or 'subversive' aims or not. State legitimating symbols, emblems and sentiments and 
their signifying practices that unite diverse individuals can be mocked or attacked, radical rhetoric 
can be expressed, authority, even coercive authority, can be openly challenged on masse.   
How such challenges have been responded to by an array of state actors at several international 
summits is the subject of this study, but as Marenin stressed as far back as 1982 in discussing the 
role and function of police players more generally; police actions must be investigated to adjudicate 
the point at which they indicate domination or suppression, not assumed a priori from the simple 
existence of police agency. That said, it needs to be recognised that a host of state actors actively 
manage dissent, they do not simply respond to mass public demonstrations in a disinterested 
fashion. This is true even of the justifying discourse in which these state actions are couched, what 
is termed 'threats to public order', 'politically motivated disorder' or 'subversion'.  
State and state-allied players are in a position to either facilitate or damage social movements. This 
is because states are able to draw upon an extraordinary level of resources and have ample 
incentives to inhibit, block or destroy what Connor (2018) has recently termed 'deep dissent’ (from a 
US perspective see Marx, 1979). The core interlockers in controlling and indeed suppressing this 
type of social opposition are the police. Typically, this will take the form of mobile police patrols as 
well as mass deployments at the scene of the public assembly, combining uniformed officers and 
phalanx's of heavily armoured riot police with an array of less than lethal and lethal weaponry, held 
in 'reserve' or as a prominent 'show of force'. This constitutes only one, if not the most visible layer 
of the state’s protective armoury. Less well known are the more sophisticated secret intelligence 
and police agencies and their tactics of surveillance, infiltration and disruption towards a very broad 
net of political activism, mainly on the left (for instance, in the UK, see Bunyan, 1983; Connor 
2018a/b; Gill, 1994, Lubbers, 2102, Smith & Chamberlain, 2015) (discussed in more depth in section 
2.24 below).  
What is termed 'public order policing' in Western liberal democracies is always presented by states 
and the police themselves (and some academics), in neutral, if not idealistic terms, for instance 
                                                          
3 For instance, writing from a US perspective, Huntington (1975), in M. Crozier et al, The Crisis of Democracy, 
New York University Press. 
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Lint's (2005:180) formulation as the use of police authority and capacity to "establish an equilibrium 
between governmental and societal, collective and individual, rights and interests in a mass 
demonstration of grievance". The idea that the police act primarily as value neutral protectors of 
that vague referent 'public safety' sits uneasily with the reality of their activities in monitoring, 
infiltrating and disrupting a wide range of political activity (Bunyan, 1983; Connor, 2018a/b; Gill, 
1994; Lubbers, 2102; NETPOL, 2009, 2011; Smith & Chamberlain, 2015, Vitale, 2017). This raises at 
least two interlinked issues, the function of the police as an organisation and the relationship 
between the police and the state more generally. I turn to this relationship between the state 
players by first examining the unique position the police hold constitutionally, and then their 
relationship to the wider state, next I examine the 'dual nature' of policing, before discussing the 
wider research literature examining the international dynamics between authority player’s and 
social movements activism, and how this has developed over recent decades.  
2.2 " Who's Calling the Shots? 
2.21 The Relative Autonomy of the Police   
The police are the personalisation of state authority, the contact point between the citizen and 
government as well as the means by which democratic procedures are ensured. Whilst the police 
are the arm of the executive branch of the government, they simultaneously claim autonomy from 
it, within England and Wales, under the doctrine of 'constabulary independence'. This is justified by 
the orthodoxy that in order to enforce the law in an impartial manner Chief Constables must be 
independent of any political pressures that might otherwise be brought to bear upon them by 
partisan interference. Such an assertion flies in the face of modern history though. Up to about 1930 
the Home Secretary issued detailed instructions in how law enforcement was conducted to the 
capital's metropolitan police force for the first hundred years of their existence (Lustgarten, 1986) 
with what would now be construed as 'political interference' going unchallenged. By contrast, the 
borough forces were directed by local watch committees who exercised a high degree of local 
democratic control (Williams, 2003) only changing to an 'independent constabulary' at the time of 
the 1930s depression. The timing of this shift is significant and not mere happenchance. Jones et al's 
(1994:12) analysis of policing policy argues that it was a direct response by governing elites to 
working-class enfranchisement, trade union militancy and fear about socialism taking hold, all of 
which meant it was considered too dangerous to leave the police under local control (Jones et al., 
1996:12). Some fifty years later in the 1980s, which similarly saw periods of widespread urban 
unrest and trade union activism, the autonomy of the police to decide for themselves matters of 
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operational policy was further reinforced by a series legal judgments.4 These acted to extended and 
embed constabulary independence still further, quashing attempts by the then Labour-controlled 
metropolitan Police Authorities to restrain increasingly authoritarian and paramilitary policing 
operations to deal with growing political and economic strife. The upshot of these judgements was 
to further blur the lines between 'operational' and 'policy' matters, and in practice allowed Chief 
Constables to "exert strong control over general policy matters as well as individual cases of law 
enforcement" (Jones et al., 1994:14-15). Indeed, Jones et al's (1994:7) recounts how up until the 
early 1980s chief officers even resisted conceding the existence of 'policing policy' at all, insisting on 
the fiction that the police merely 'enforced the law' without 'fear or favour'. 
Whilst these denials reflect the desire of senior officers to defend their autonomy, there is, and 
indeed must be, such a thing as policing policy.5 As Jones et al (1994:6-7) argue, policy (both formal 
and informal) can be reliably deduced from a pattern of behaviour, and what determines the 
pattern of policing within broad limits can be called 'policing policy'.6 Policing policy, or the style of 
policing does much to determine policing strategy when interacting with protest groups. Indeed, 
Manning (2010) argues that a great deal of police policy is verbal (not written down) and hence 
informal in nature, exacerbating the challenges of police governance. The permissively wide 
parameters of action which result from being able to largely decide how policing is undertaken, its 
operational practicalities and what (and whom) are targeted for which type of police attention 
carries very significant implications, particularly in the sphere of 'political policing' and raises a host 
                                                          
4 In particular Denning's judgement in R v Metropolitan Police Commissioner ex p Blackburn which extended the 
doctrine of constabulary independence beyond a police officer's discretion in individual cases. A later 
landmark decision in R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex p Northumbria Police Authority ([1988] 
2 WLR 590) further weakened the role of Police Authorities in respect to exercising budgetary powers over 
their police forces, here in respect to preventing the said force from purchasing centrally from the Home 
Office supplies of CS Gas and plastic bullets whilst the force was not permitted by their Police Authorities to 
purchase them (in anticipation that they would use these weapons against local people). The judicial review 
found in favour of the Home Secretary on the basis of the statutory power in preserving 'the Queen's Peace' 
by supplying 'common services' and 'promoting police efficiency' (Jones et al, 1994:16-17). Jones et al (ibid) 
argues that the decisive issue in the judgement concerns the potential of 'public disorder' transcending local 
force boundaries and hence sits outside of the local Police Authority's judgements. This is in contradistinction 
to Reiner's (1992:240) argument that the case evidences the 'impotence of local Police Authorities .. making 
them a fig leaf of local influence.' Whilst technically Jones reading of the judgement is the more accurate, the 
direction of travel remains the same, the increasing marginalisation of any meaningful local control over 
policing.  
5 Policing policy is a sensitive matter for good reason, as the Policy Studies Institute authors themselves 
discovered when they wanted to include in their study the policing of major 'public order events' (such as the 
miners' strike during 1984/5 and the inner-city 'riots' in 1985) rightly considered an 'obvious' and fast-moving 
area of policing policy due to the far reaching implications recent changes were having for the exercise of 
protest and dissent. Tellingly, ACPO never granted approval for this element of the proposed study, 
effectively blocking it (Jones et al., 1994:10). 
6 For instance, an historical example (before 1980) would be disbelieving women's allegations that they had 
been raped despite no-one inside or outside the police force stipulating that such cases should be conducted 
in this manner (Chambers & Millar, 1983, cited in Jones et al. 1994:6). 
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of civil liberties concerns. Bringing the discussion right up to date, one area (of many) being the 
police's development and deployment of technologies which involve intrusive real-time mass 
dataveillance, for example, the current trailing by the Metropolitan Police of facial recognition 
software at some busy intersections in the capital through an extensive CCTV network (Deardon, 
2018; Big Brother Watch, 2018). As with earlier technological developments like automatic number 
plate recognition (ANPR) systems (and here as a prelude to its eventual national roll-out) a 'new 
penology' of generalised suspicion prevails, one which has in effect, in this instance, ended 'location 
privacy'7 (Haines, 2009:53). Large groups of people are monitored and tracked for 'social sorting' 
(Lyons, 2003) purposes, one where everyone is treated as a suspect for state interest, reversing the 
common law assumption of innocent until proven guilty. This police initiated practice is a particular 
cause for concern for activists because police controlled surveillance systems collect information on 
individuals on the basis of a series of police constructed categories which are several steps removed 
from the institutions more legitimate interest in the activities of 'known offenders'. For instance, 
'association with a known offender' (for ANPR see Haines, 2009:53) or more expansively still, simply 
being a 'person of interest' to the police, or a 'potential offender' (see Swain, 2013), Information 
Reports on 'nominal records'8 (Purshouse, 2015:242) or at the EU level the creation of a cross-border 
information exchange database for suspected 'trouble-makers' or alleged 'violent trouble-makers' 
being directed at political protestors (Bunyan/Statewatch, 2009). All of these 'categories of 
suspicion' enshrine value judgements and "vague categorisations of supposed criminality presented 
in intelligence reports and officer training, which are then presented as evidence and grounds for 
detention" (Monaghan & Walby, 2012:12).  
Each of these eminently pliable pseudo-criminal official labels can capture political activists as a 
legitimate target of police interest, investigation and interference. This is but one feature of the UKs 
                                                          
7 In an important sense each individual ANPR contact constitutes an 'investigation' as each and every vehicle is 
formally and systematically examined and assessed in light of information held on a number of aligned 
databases, where upon a response is provoked above and beyond the logging and archiving of the vehicles 
time and place (and hence journey).    
8 Police 'Information Reports' refer to attendees and incidents of interest to the police (such as persons 
attending a peaceful demonstration) here particular individuals ('nominals' is the policing term) details (date 
of birth, address, information about presence at an event, including activities, associates and appearance [re 
police photographs]) are collected and retained on the National Special Branch Information System. This 
practice came to wider public prominence when a 91 year old peace activist (Mr Catt) in Brighton, following a 
s. 7 DPA request discovered that he appeared on a number of Information Reports (including being 
categorised as a 'domestic extremist') and claimed his Art. 8 ECHR rights had been violated, with the finding 
of the court dismissing the police's later appeal claim that deleting such files placed too heavy a 
administrative burden upon them (Purshouse, 2015:242). Whilst many of the records mentioning Mr Catt 
were deleted, reduced from 60 (logged from 2005 to 2010) to 2, the judgement that the state should not keep 
records on a 'citizen's lawful activities' unless it is in 'the public interest to do so', in effect retains considerable 
latitude for the police to  continue just such practices, notwithstanding the issue of who decides what 
constitutes the 'public interest'. Even following this critical judgement, records remained of Mr Catt.    
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'intelligence-led policing' model, which collects and collates large volumes of personal data from a 
host of sources, constructs profiles and assigns categories of risk and worth, all at a distance (and 
often without the subject’s notice) using sophisticated network analysis (Swain, 2013). These 
decisions and developments are exercised by the police and are one of many examples of police 
policy in action – here one which operates in an expansive but ‘grey area’ of legality. The 'lawfulness' 
of this and many other police activities can only be determined through lengthy and extremely 
costly legal challenge through the courts, a remedy beyond the reach of practically every citizen.  
This brings us to the present institutional arrangements for police democratic governance 
throughout England and Wales. These comprise the Home Secretary, City Mayors (notably in 
London), Police and Crime Commissioner's (PCC's)9 (introduced in 2012, replacing the old Police 
Authorities) and various forums such as 'police-community consultative committees'. The 
introduction of PCC's were supposed to be a 'radical departure' that addressed the widely perceived 
democratic deficit in policing oversight, in part by determining police priorities in consultation with 
the Chief Constable (Stenson & Silverstone, 2014:435). It remains the case that despite this 
refreshed tripartite arrangement now including a directly elected 'local'10 incumbent (the PCC) the 
significant democratic deficit of the past remains unaltered. As was the case with the old Police 
Authorities, none of these bodies has any legal entitlement to direct a Chief Constable in their 
policing responsibilities. Indeed, constabulary independence is specifically designed to preclude any 
such type of democratic control (Oliver, 1987). Consequently, all operational policing decisions are 
made by the Chief Constable. As Loader (1996:10) notes, the only democratic element in the 
current institutional arrangements involves Chief Constables 'retrospectively accounting' (Brogen et 
al., 1988:152) to the other democratically constituted bodies (by issuing reports etc.).11 The style of 
accountability has been described by Marshall (1978) as 'explanatory and cooperative' in contrast to 
'subordinate and obedient', with elected institutions being unable to issue direct orders, rather they 
are limited to requesting information and asking for explanations which are then, potentially at 
least for what the authorities consider to be 'non-sensitive' matters, open to public discussion.  
Despite this formal impotence by the elected bodies, police forces maintain the somewhat 
rhetorical claim that they 'police by consent', although what this means is rarely spelt out in any 
detail. If it is supposed to carry a contractual meaning, then there are two dimensions to consider; 
                                                          
9 PCC's are elected in forty of the forty three territorial police forces in England and Wales, with elected 
mayors being classed as constituting the PCC in both London and Greater Manchester, whereas the 'Court of 
Common Council' substitutes for the PCC for the  City of London Police, being one of many anachronisms 
proffered upon the city mile.  
10 Considering the sheer size of PCC jurisdictions it would appear highly improbable that the PCC could deal 
with what most people would define as a 'local issue'. 
11 Even here it is a matter of judgement by the Chief Constable of a force to issue a report.  
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legal and political (Morgan, 1989:218) each of which is found wanting. In respect to legal consent, 
the police are established, governed, regulated and empowered by statute. They are required to 
enforce the law of the land which is approved by an elected Parliament. However, the difficulty lies 
in that laws do not determine key aspects of policing policy, and neither, directly, do elected 
politicians (Morgan, 1989:218; Jones et al, 1994:29). In fact, the law provides little if any guidance to 
how policing is conducted (i.e. what priorities the police should pursue, what methods they use or 
which of the many legal options to select) (Morgan, 1989:218; Jones et al, 1994:29). So whilst the 
police have a duty to enforce the law, it has long been recognised that in practice this only sets 
broad limits on the possible patterns of policing. In addition, a wider number of offences (such as 
'obstructing a police officer in the execution of their duty') is framed deliberately vaguely in order to 
provide the police with a flexible resource to achieve some other objective (maintaining 'social 
order') (Jones et al, 1994:7).  
Legal rules alone then are insufficient to regulate police practice. As Loader (1996:10) notes, when 
individual constables exercise their discretionary judgement in encounters with the public, they "are 
placed in a position akin to that of chief officers." At the organisational level, the police are 
"stewards of delegated and independently exercised general policy responsibilities", relegating 
political consent to being realised, if at all, through "a delicately balanced mystery of influence 
brought to bear by politicians locally and nationally on what officers decide and on ex post facto 
accounting by the police" (Morgan, 1989:218). As Morgan notes, this state of affairs is only possible 
because of the near unique political arrangements for the governance of the police, with consent 
being used in a social (i.e. the attitudes of the public towards police legitimacy and their ensuing 
cooperative or non-cooperative behaviour in assisting them, or not, and/or deference towards 
them) as well as a contractual sense. Neither is there any requirement for the police to abide by the 
wishes or recommendations of forums such as consultative committees, indeed, some scholars 
argue they are used by the police to provide a 'sheen of legitimacy' on police actions, leaving the 
real decision-making process unaffected (Bull & Stratta, 1995; Jones et al, 1994:23).  
This is not to suggest that there are no occasions in which the law can exact a controlling influence 
on police officers, only that such circumstances rarely obtain (Grimshaw and Jefferson, 1987:15-18; 
Loader, 1996:9) as there needs to be a clear legal provision to be enforced, as well as an "objective 
and honest application of a rule or standard of conduct" (Lustgarten, 1986:164). Such conditions are 
very far removed from political protest situations where officers are able to exercise very 
considerable discretion in defining the legality of protestors behaviour (Jefferson, 1990).   
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2.22 Parking Tickets, Public Order and Class Repression 
Standard Marxist accounts see the police ostensibly as 'servants of the state', who uncritically carry 
out its directives. Such a perspective views the role of the police as a purely repressive and a political 
force aimed at silencing actual (or potential) challenges to the established order. Policing is thus one 
of many 'defence mechanisms' (along with other structures in the criminal justice system and false 
class consciousness) which satisfies the continuance of the state, and in doing so, the reproduction 
of the established economic order (Marenin, 1982:241). The most visible vanguard of which is an 
increasingly 'tooled up' paramilitary 'public order' police force prepared to use violence in the 
interests of maintaining and reproducing the formal structures of capitalism (O'Connor, 1975 in 
Marenin, 1982).  
At first blush constabulary independence would appear to fly in the face of this formulation, as does 
the long recognised difficulty that not all policing is repressive, here the many social service 
functions of policing (i.e. preventing domestic violence or drunk driving etc.). Nevertheless, the 
content and scope of this claim to independence from political control and direction in respect to 
public order policing is much contested, no more so than because there are degrees of 'control' as 
there are degrees of 'independence'. The claim to independence becomes more tenuous still when 
considering political surveillance and the subsequent deceptive and clandestine action of 'political 
policing' or what Brodeur (1983, 2011) has termed ‘high policing' as opposed to 'low policing' 
(routine, domestic police functions such as traffic stops etc.) conducted by a number of highly 
secretive police agencies that belong to the 'intelligence community' (see Table 1, below for an 
outline of these).  
Writing from a Canadian perspective, Brodeur (1983; 2007:27-29) identifies four features of high 
policing: 1) having the primary mandate of protecting the state apparatus and the existing political 
institutions; 2) being 'absorbent' by casting a wide net to gather information into intelligence (not 
necessarily directed at building a criminal case as in actionable 'criminal intelligence' but for threat 
assessments and as a need-to-know 'intelligence product'),12 3) conflating legislative, judiciary, 
executive or administrative powers; now resurgent in the post- 9/11 era, and, 4) the widespread use 
of informants as the primary surveillance tool (this despite having a 'massive arsenal' of 
technological tools available). Five further characteristics were added to this formulation which 
took into account new developments in the field, being: utilising known criminals, secrecy, deceit 
and extra-legal measures in these effort as well as viewing the state as a victim (Brodeur, 2007, 
2011).  
                                                          
12 This in part explains why such agencies exercise considerable resistance to the use of such intelligence in 
open public court proceedings, lest this absorbent nature be revealed. 
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Whilst high policing is not new (it dates back to at least 1880 and the early Special Branch) (Bayley & 
Weisburd, 2009:90) its distinctive actions of intelligence collection, disruption and apprehension 
(Bayley & Weisburd, 2009:91) result in a 'skewed policing', one tilted towards preserving the 
dominant political regime rather than protecting the individual citizen (Brodeur and Leman–
Langlois, 2006:179). That said, these high policing practices operate on a continuum, and O’Reilly 
and Ellison (2006:647) argue, do not exclusively operate in favour of the state. By way of similar 
qualification, Brodeur (2007:34-35) stresses that neither are they necessarily (sic) contradictory with 
democracy - despite the tendency to conflate powers which are required to be separate. For 
Brodeur, the fulcrum point rests on the distinction made between protecting a nations 
constitutional and institutional framework from that of perpetuating a particular regime which 
might otherwise be rejected. Such a distinction allows us to hold onto some meaningful 
demarcation between a 'policed society' to one more closely resembling an authoritarian 'police 
state'. Nevertheless, trying to maintain any hard and fast division here is difficult, not the least 
because of the broadening of the high policing mandate, amplified in modern Western liberal states 
by its concern with the domestic activities of ordinary citizens (rather than external threats) and the 
increasingly systematic, organised and specialised nature of its agencies. As Marx (2014:2067) has 
recently argued, whether high policing is construed neutrally as the policing of politics, or more 
contentiously as political surveillance and regime protection, the goals and means of high policing 
remain a 'pillar of social control'. This point leads to a helpful distinction made by Marenin 
(1982:258-9) between two types of order that the state has an investment in; a general order ("the 
capacity of the state to guarantee public tranquillity and safety") and more problematically, a 
specific order ("the use of state power to promote particular interests" [...] i.e. "domination by the 
state"). Clearly states can legitimately pursue an interest in the general order against challengers, 
be they ruled or ruling groups, although its irreducible minimum can be constituted in a number of 
different ways.  Sparks (1980, cited in Marenin, 1982:259) puts the required distinction aptly;  
"between prohibitions aimed at protecting the essential conditions of organized existence, 
without which group life would be impossible, and prohibitions necessary for particular forms of 
social existence, e.g., those dependent on a particular economic system."  
This raises several questions, firstly, whether protecting the institutions of the state (of which the 
police are an integral part) equates to also protecting broader civil society rather than that of 
entrenched privilege; and secondly, a broader issue concerning the scope and future orientated 
focus of possible sources of presumed threat to what is expansively termed as 'national security'. 
These are vital questions and raise many important practical ramifications, not least because what 
national security means is defined in the way that the state chooses, resulting in state organisations 
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operating in a self-serving tautological vacuum (Lustgarten & Leigh, 1994).  This matters because 
we are left with methods appropriate to external threats impinging upon the domestic arena. The 
other difficulty here is that the representatives of the state will typically place national security 
issues above issues of citizens individual or group freedoms (Lustgarten & Leigh, 1994:326).  This 
brings the state back in to prominence in a manner far removed from other institutional actors such 
as the Labour municipalities and their lost battle for police accountability during the 1980s.  
One of the other central difficulties with high policing as a method and a practice is that its remit 
secretes itself far beyond the (broadly defined) domain of 'national security' into a myriad of social 
control settings, ones that attend to, anticipate and orchestrate a wide range of domestic contexts, 
action and persons perceived as 'internal threats'. In doing so high policing methods are capable 
(intentionally or otherwise) of sapping democracy by incapacitating all manner of dissent.  
2.23 The Relative Autonomy of the State 
Despite its centrality to political thinking, the state defies simple definition (Hay & Lister, 2006:2) 
and can be construed in a number of different ways; by its constellation of different institutions, its 
internal operations, declared aims and functions, its coercive capacities, its legal form, or its place 
within the broader international system, to name some of its key dimensions. Jessop (1990:341) 
offers a 'broad cluster' definition with these generic features in mind: 
 "the core of the state apparatus comprises a distinct ensemble of institutions and 
organisations whose socially accepted function is to define and enforce collectively binding 
decisions on the members of a society in the name of their common interest or general will." 
[my emphasis].  
The state is thus a specific form of macro-political organisation. As Jessop notes, what 
differentiates a state from mere political domination or violent oppression is the somewhat 
rhetorical claim to be pursuing the common interest or general will of the people. This assertion of a 
general interest is however 'illusory' (Jessop, 1990:342) as "any attempt to define them occurs on a 
strategically selective terrain and involves the differential articulation and aggregation of interest, 
opinions and values." Hence the general will is always 'asymmetrical', privileging some interests 
while marginalising others. These are not just theoretical questions but also empirical ones, notably 
the degree to which this partiality of state practice reflects the situationally motivated strategic 
concerns of the state, both to the changing role of social movements in regard to organised political 
power and the state as an object towards which social struggles are directed.  
Contemporary neo-Marxists raise doubts as to the extent that state institutions can ever mediate 
social conflicts that arise between corporate interest and popular legitimacy (for instance, Miliband, 
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1969; Poulantzas, 1969, 1973; Offe, 1974). They argue that there is an inbuilt bias which favours 
capitalist interests, one built into the policy-making process and protected by having occupants in 
key positions within the state apparatus (Hay et al. 2006:45). Poulantzas (1973) following Marx, also 
regarded the state as structurally integral to capitalism, but not a simple instrument in the hand of 
capitalists, rather he stressed the relative autonomy of state institutions. Indeed, there is a more 
recent contemporary convergence between Marxist and elitist theories of the state which posits the 
existence of a reasonably cohesive 'ruling class' who have shared interests in Britain13 (Scott, 1991 in 
Hay et al. 2006:46). This is not to deny that the state has some autonomy from dominant classes, 
only that the existing regime of accumulation places structural constraints on state agency (Hay et 
al. 2006:47). Policing is necessarily embedded in these socio-historical contexts irrespective of the 
claims to independence and carries a dual function, one of 'parking tickets and class repression' to 
cite Marenin's famous formation:  
"The police, a priori, are neither repressive nor deserving of support as defenders of a universal 
consensus on the public good. What the police defend depends on the concrete situation in 
which they work and the degree of control, through ideology or power, by the state over them." 
This is to view the state as both relatively autonomous but also functioning as a web of interlinked 
and aligned sub-players, of which the police form its chief coercive component, such that the state 
acts both as an opponent to as well as a judge of protestors who strategise to gain influence on the 
polity (Jaspers, 2015:11). This is to grasp the broader relationship between the state and social 
movements and the extent to which the key state players pursue the same goals; the police, 
officials and government. A recent example illustrates aptly just such a relationship, despite long 
held official denials. South Yorkshire Police (SYP) had long claimed they were providing fair and 
impartial policing of protests in Sheffield against the needless felling of thousands of roadside trees 
by Sheffield City Council (SCC)14 and their highways contractor Amy. However, SYP had secretly 
devised a joint 'media strategy'  (between them, Amy and SCC) whilst deploying scores of officers 
(called 'operation Quito') to quash the growing protests,15 including using a range of legal repression 
                                                          
13 Scott's (1991, cited in Hay et al., 2006:46) work at the interface of elite and critical theory concludes in 
answering the question as to 'who rules Britain?'; "Britain is ruled by a capitalist class whose economic 
dominance is sustained by the operations of the state and whose members are disproportionately 
represented in the power elite which rules the state apparatus. That is to say, Britain does have a ruling class." 
14 Sheffield City Council had originally claimed up to 5,000 roadside trees were earmarked for removal and 
that they were not targeting healthy trees, only dead or 'dangerous' trees (a point much disputed  by residents 
who had formed themselves into a non-party political action group 'Sheffield Tree Action Groups' (STAG 
https://savesheffieldtrees.org.uk/) whereas later a secret document revealed that the number could actually 
be as high as 17,500, accounting for half of the cities trees (Noor, 2019b;  STAG, 
https://savesheffieldtrees.org.uk/key-facts/).  
15 As the expose by Yorkshire Post revealed, citing a confidential media strategy document and covert tape, of 
Superintendent McCurry ‘COMMS is key. Really, really key because I don’t want things to get messy." 
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aimed at activist leaders.16 This tactic sucks vast amounts of time and money from a cause, as the 
protest organisation is diverted into fighting lengthy legal proceedings in order to support activists 
and those that rely upon them. This is but one recent example of co-ordinated, here local state 
action, against a growing local protest movement, despite the repeated claims of police impartiality 
(similarly echoed falsely by the South Yorkshire Police and Crime Commissioner). 
Neo-Marxist theorists such as Neocleous argue that the central role of the police is to 'fabricate 
order' which includes the use of repression (although not simply the repression of the lower classes) 
and to hide the fact that society contains profound insecurities. For instance, market system 
stability is parasitic on the economic insecurity of an impoverished class of economic actors 
(Marenin, 1982) accelerated by increased labour market flexibility which transfers greater risk and 
insecurity onto a growing frustrated and angry 'precariat' class (Standing, 2011). This necessarily 
shapes the police's primary role, which is the emergency maintenance of order achieved through 
their monopoly of force (Reiner, 2013) with crime control (and prevention) constituting only a 
minority of police work (Bittner, 1990; Brodeur, 2010; HMIC, 2012; Manning 2010; Karn, 2013). As 
Stenning (2007:184) concludes in reviewing international experiences (including that of the UK) on 
this question of political independence of the police, "governments have been reluctant to concede 
to police any right to complete immunity from political influence or direction with the respect to the 
handling of major public order challenges, such as political demonstrations."   
Bayley's (1982) analysis of the organisation of actual police work similarly draws out its political 
nature, with its primary function lying in "the suppression of collective unrest and the regulation of 
populations, what might be called 'state centred policing'." So far from being a neutral term, 
securing order implies the state’s “interest in suppressing mass dissent that threatens insurrection” 
but in order to maintain the veneer of legitimacy this needs to be conducted “under the guise of 
neutrally enforcing the law and keeping the peace” (Waddington, 1999: 65). This is particularly the 
case in moments of perceived crisis, where the police act as the agents of ‘specific domination’ 
rather than as guarantors of a ‘general order’ (Dixon, 2013). Although the case of Sheffield STAG 
indicates that even local, small scale agitation by respectable 'middle-class' residents can just as 
easily result in repression and suppression.     
Policing then carries contradictory 'expressive' and 'repressive' functions, being the maintenance of 
general order and the 'dirty work' of real policing, one which needs to be hidden by presenting a 
semblance of impartiality (Cohen, 1997; cited in Jeffery et al, 2015:120). This is to challenge 
                                                          
16 South Yorkshire Police held seven tree protestors on false grounds who were later given a £24,300 out-of-
court settlement by the force.  (Noor, 2019a). 
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conventional ideas about the role and function of the police (its law enforcement, crime prevention 
and 'service' functions) and to understand policing in a wider role, one closely orientated to the 
ordering of society. In this the police do not act alone, and political policing brings into view a wider 
state apparatus, all of which act as a force of governmental social control which is far from being 
neutral (Black, 1976).  
2.24 Bringing Other Players In; Political Policing and the Secret State 
Some near four decades after Marenin's earlier formulation of this dual function of policing, we now 
understand far more about the work of the political police than we have before. In part, due to the 
'spy-cops' scandals and the ensuing public inquiry which has allowed some limited insights into the 
various agencies work (notably that of the now disbanded Special Demonstration Squad, SDS and 
NPOIU's surveillance net).17 The undercover policing units are but one aspect of an entire state 
apparatus, Table 1 (below) identifies the key institutions and their activities.  
Whilst this secretive covert world is almost totally removed from both public knowledge18 and 
accountability19 and not so constrained by the need for popular support as say is the highly visible 
uniformed policing or public order policing, there is still much that remains unknown about its  
                                                          
17 The Pitchford Inquiry is due to report in 2023 (https://www.ucpi.org.uk/) (a timeline which has been 
described by Mitting as ‘ambitious’) and is examining 40 years of undercover policing operations, now headed 
by the presiding judge John Mitting (after Pitchford's unexpected death). However, the Inquiry has been 
plagued by conflict between those spied on and those tasked with undertaking the inquiry, notably on the 
much contested remit of the inquiry (victims want a wide remit whereas the Metropolitan Police want to 
restrict the inquiry to a very narrow one), and the level of secrecy of proceedings (for instance victims being 
denied knowing undercover officers cover names and names of targeted groups, which would allow others 
who were spied upon to come forward and give their version of events rather than being reliant on the police's 
version - a principle accepted by the authorities for not withholding the identities of alleged perpetrators of 
sexual offences such as rape) as well as Mitting holding some hearings in secret and considering anonymity 
for undercover officers. These developments, and Mitting's background as an establishment figure (being a 
judge in the controversial Investigatory Powers Tribunals, a court which has been described as ‘Kafkaesque’ 
by critics, dealing with state surveillance cases and alleged abuses of state power) all of which are held in 
secret. The combination of Matting's decisions and background have led victim groups and their lawyers to 
walk out of the Inquiry court as a vote of no confidence in the inquiry.  
18 In 2018 the high street cosmetics chain 'Lush' ran a poster campaign displayed in the windows of each of 
their 104 shops called 'Paid to Lie #spycops' in order to highlight the misconduct of undercover police officers 
who had infiltrated political groups. The posters depicted a model dressed as both an activist and a police 
officer with the slogans 'Paid to Lie' and 'Police have crossed the line'. This rare example of a corporate 
enterprise highlighting alleged police wrong-doing came to an end less than a week before it started, with 
Lush citing “intimidation of our shop staff from ex-police officers and unhelpful tweets from those in high 
office” (Evans, 2018).  It is unclear whether this was a co-ordinated campaign with active involvement by the 
police or not. 
19 This includes not just external accountability but also internal (to the organisation itself, for instance the 
HMIC's first ever inspection of undercover policing in England and Wales discovered that there were 1,229 
undercover officers operating across the country, whereas the official 'national undercover index' lists 568 
officers (46.2%), less than half of the true number, and consequently “renders the database unsuitable to the 
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Table 1: Elements of the British Political Policing and Secret State20 
Agency Extant Territory Intelligence 
Type 
Activities 
Special Branch21 1883 - 
Present 
 








public order policing 
The National Extremism 
Tactical Co-ordination Unit 
(NETCU) now rebranded as 
the National Domestic 
Extremism Unit(NDEU) 
The Welsh Extremism and 
Counter-Terrorism Unit 
(WETCU) 
2004 - 2011 Britain Human 
intelligence 




The National Public Order 
Intelligence Unit (NPOIU) 
now  rebranded within the 
National Domestic 
Extremism Unit (NDEU) 
1999 - 2011 Britain Human 
intelligence 




Association of Chief Police 
Officers (ACPO) 
Now: National Police Chief's 
Council (NPCC) 







national policy across 
all police forces 
MI5 (Security Service) 1909 - 
present 
The UK and 
British imperial 





































     
 
operations, technology and methods. That said, past and more recent history attests to the way 
that the British police have regularly engaged in the surveillance, disruption and subversion of 
domestic political movements (Bunyan, 1983; Connor, 2018a/b; Gill, 1994; Lubbers, 2102; NETPOL, 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
task for which it was created” (HMIC, 2014:125) and "in no way" can it be "termed 'comprehensive'" (HMIC, 
2014:124). 
20 This table is partially based on ' Elements of the British Secret State' in O'Connor (2018a:4) 
21 Most police forces maintain a Special Branch, although this picture has been complicated of late with the 
development of 'regional counter-terrorism units' (NCTPN) which number twelve including 'counter-terrorism 
command'. The Metropolitan Police's own Special Branch (previously the largest in the country) in 2006 was 
merged with the Metropolitan Police Anti-Terrorism Branch (S)13) and re-branded to form 'Counter-terrorism 
Command' (SO15).  
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2009, 2011; Smith & Chamberlain, 2015, Vitale, 2017:199; see Monaghan & Walby 2012 for a 
Canadian perspective; Boykoff, 2006 for a US perspective). The class element in the police role 
remains pertinent, as witnessed in the history of industrial disputes and political demonstrations, as 
well as recent causes celebres (such as the fabrication of official accounts in the 1989 Hillsborough 
tragedy (Reiner, 2007; 2013; Hillsborough Independent Panel, 2012). The year-long miner’s strike in 
1984-5, was on the back of a decade of intensifying political conflict in Britain and represented a 
crisis moment for the British state. According to Milne (2004) the state employed a dual strategy 
(one secret and one overt) in order to achieve its intended goal of defeating the miners; "The 
government unleashed the full force of the state: a militarised police occupation of the coalfields, a 
commandeered and manipulated criminal justice system, mass sackings and jailing – and the use of 
MI5, GCHQ, the NSA and Special Branch to bug, infiltrate, smear leaders." During the strike, Special 
Branch had at least one agent (‘silver fox’) operating inside the NUM, Connor (2018a:20) cites a 
senior South Yorkshire police officer as to its purpose and utility: 
“That information we got from Special Branch [from Silver Fox] I think beat the strike, there’s 
no doubt about that. And without that information I don’t think we could have managed it.”  
It has also been alleged in parliament that MI5 had an agent (the NUM’s chief executive from 1983-
1989, Roger Windsor) who had been tasked with ‘disrupting and undermining’ the NUM’s activities 
(Connor, 2018a:21). This was not merely to spy on the NUM but also to use a series of 'dirty tricks' 
(including false allegations, slush funds, forgeries, agents provocateurs and multiple secretly 
sponsored legal actions) to break the union (Milne, 2014). The massive policing operation which was 
launched, including a co-ordination system in respect to the creation of the National Policing centre 
(NPC) had no statutory basis, and as (Wallington, 1985:147) notes, left its relationship to the 
government unclear, despite the then Home Secretary taking ministerial responsibility for it. 
Excessive use of force was the other method that the strike was crushed by the police, with 
orchestrated pitched battles using baton charges (on foot and by horse mounted officers) and mass 
beatings at the decisive 'battle of Orgreave' in South Yorkshire in 198422.  As Wallington's (1985:159) 
notes, "the police were the agency by which the strike was contained and eventually broken." The 
extraordinary level of resourcing co-ordinated through a system of 'mutual aid' between police 
forces in England and Wales (established by the National Reporting Centre at Scotland Yard) 
enabled the police to make the operational decision on 'preserving order' by choose curtailing the 
striking miner’s activities, including lawful activities.   
                                                          
22 In its coverage of this decisive event, the BBC admitted that it had reversed the order of footage to falsely 
depict that the miner's had provoked the police into baton charging the striking crowd (O'Connor, 2018:20).  
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Further examples of state agencies and the political police working in harmony to achieve political 
ends concerns 'The Consulting Association' who maintained an illegal blacklist of over three 
thousand workers deemed to be 'troublemakers' (for instance those who raised health and safety 
concerns, or who were considered to have left-wing political affiliations) who as a result were 
repeatedly denied work (Smith & Chamberlain, 2015; Smith, 2019). The political police, including 
Special Branches nationally,23 and the security services supplied information to the Association, and 
the undercover police officer Mark Jenner infiltrated the construction union UCATT and gathered 
intelligence on over three hundred individuals, although the full extent of the police's collusion with 
the blacklist remains unclear.  
Trade Unions were not the only target of political policing.  Police undercover units from at least the 
1960s and 1970s targeted and infiltrated peace organisations, universities, environmental, animal 
rights and political groups, and later, family justice campaigns, in order to pressurise members for 
information, surveil and disrupt their activities.  
Deep inter-agency collaboration at international summits is also reported from a Canadian 
perspective by Monaghan & Walby (2012) who show how arrangements for convening 'mega-
events' (the G8 and G20 summits and the Winter Olympics) led to the establishment of Integrated 
Security Units (ISUs) and an Integrated Threat Assessment Centre (ITAC). The result was the 
'unprecedented'24 fusing of major federal agencies (local /municipal), regional /provincial and 
national police (RCMP) and the Canadian intelligence Services (CSIS) and the Canadian military) 
into multi-agency domestic security units.25 This brought about transformations within the 
'knowledge network' which blurred more conventional threat categories such as distant 'terrorist 
threats' towards those engaging in political dissent which the ITAC reconceived as 'multiple-issue 
extremism' MIE). As Monaghan & Walby (2012:148) note, this 'reimaged' threat category was used 
strategically against activists to "rationalise domestic spying campaigns" and to target grassroots 
social movements. 
Within the UK, one of the most comprehensive and recent overviews of British political policing is 
Connor's (2018a/b) two companion reports which analyse its structural and political-economic logic. 
What it reveals is how the extensive undercover infiltration of political and campaigning groups was 
                                                          
23 The Metropolitan Police's Special Branch even had 'Industrial Unit' that specifically monitored union 
activists (Smith, 2019). 
24 When interviewed, a senior military commander of Canadian Forces (CF) Lieutenant-Colonel Pat Koch, the 
senior planner in the ISU remarked: "The Games have created an evolutionary change in the Canadian Forces 
(CF) and RCMP in terms of how we work together. The results are permanent adaptations of collaborative and 
institutional policy and procedures that set the conditions for future domestic security events" (Thomas, 2010 
cited in Monaghan & Walby (2012:148). 
25 This formation is similar to intelligence 'fusion centres' in the USA. 
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both sanctioned and funded at the 'highest levels' of the Metropolitan Police and Home Office, 
continuing for over 40 years. These were not 'rouge' squads but rather:  
"part of a vast, long-running anti-subversion apparatus in Britain: for over 100 years, 
significant time, resources and organisational effort has been put into monitoring, containing 
and disrupting political actors challenging the status quo. The scale was industrial – over 1,000 
organisations were caught in the SDS’s and NPOIU’s surveillance net alone." (Connor, 
2018b:2) 
As Connor (2018b:2-3) notes, the official discourse used to maintain legitimacy by claiming to be an 
impartial arbiter of the social order, neutrally enforcing public order or protecting parliamentary 
democracy from internal threats of dangerous subversive elements "fail to account for the breadth 
of the surveillance, its consistent patterns, and the statements of secret state officials themselves." 
Moreover, the state's own justifying official discourse, such as 'subversion,' which accounts for a 
substantial component of MI5's and Special Branches raison d'être has no concept in constitutional 
law, and the term lacks any generally understood meaning in political and legal theory, rather in 
constitutional law an 'abuse of liberty' requires a criminal offence to be committed (such as for 
instance, a breach of the peace or an act of violence, riot or incitement to do so) (Spjut (1979:254). 
This leaves us with only a publicly stated definition of subversion, here (and somewhat reluctantly in 
parliament) supplied by the then Home Secretary in back in 1978, by which the Home Office still 
monitors subversive activities:  
"Subversive activities are generally regarded as those which threaten the safety or well-being 
of the state, and which are intended to undermine or overthrow parliamentary democracy by 
political, industrial or violent means."  (947 H.C. Debs., ser.5, col.618, 6 April 1978, cited in 
Spjut (1979:254). 
Whilst Rees was not blind to the lack of legal substance such a construction carries, and conceded at 
the time that whilst definitions were "not sufficient" it would "be wrong to argue about definitions", 
as he knew what he meant when he had duties to perform in connection with subversion (Spjut, 
1979:254). This leaves us with a somewhat curious self-justifying tautology, a fictional term which 
has no legal standing, but one which mobilises a considerable part26 of the secret state's 
surveillance and monitoring operations. The ex-MI5 agent Annie Machon's (2005:44) expose of the 
British intelligence services demonstrates quite how elastic the operationalisation of subversion was 
for MI5. One did not need to belong to a denoted 'subversive organisation' in order to have an MI5 
file as a subversive, rather in the view of MI5, having or having had 'sympathies' with these or other 
                                                          
26 Machon, (2005:36) the ex-MI5 agent, contests to just this, that MI5 devoted 'significant resources to 
subversive groups' from the 1940s to 1993, whereupon subversion was downgraded as an agency priority, but 
still remains an area of activity.   
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groups was sufficient to be worthy of MI5 investigation.27 Similarly, at the organisational level, MI5 
investigated 'legitimate non-subversive organisations' (such as Trade Unions, CND, the NCCL and 
the Greenham Common Women28) on the basis that it was investigating 'subversive penetration of 
these groups' (Machon, 2005:46), illustrating the elasticity of the concept and the versatility by 
which MI5 evaded its own rules. Indeed, by the 1980s MI5 reportedly stored one million personal 
files, with the 'vast majority' [...] being 'permanent files on subversives' (Connor, 2018a:18).  
As a number of commentators have concluded, through their operation these agencies present a 
threat to liberal constitutional government (Spjut (1979:254; Evans & Mason, 2015).29 These 
activities have continued apace, also under the guise of the equally vague 'domestic extremist' 
label, as highlighted by numerous cases of political surveillance directed at environmental 
campaigners (including Green MPs and other representatives) and peace campaigners which have 
come to the public's attention.30 Such cases illustrate how the police act to construct classifications 
of 'legitimate protestors' qua a host of 'illegitimate' ones, not on the basis of wrong-doing, but on 
the basis of their own epistemology, a policy which citizens are unable to directly challenge. These 
are not mere semantic niceties, effectively applying such a label can bring forth a range of police 
actions.  
One such mode of operation in the political policing tool-kit is disruption, rather than the more 
traditional 'prosecution-directed mode' (Innes & Sheptycki, 2004) (i.e. identification of a suspect, 
arrest and prosecution, which would require building a case to satisfy a criminal evidence standard). 
                                                          
27 MI5 also had a file called 'Subversion in contemporary music' which included music groups such as Crass, 
UB40, and the Sex Pistols (Machon, 2005:45). 
28 This included extensive records with MI5 gathering 10 'thick volumes' on both the Greenham Common 
Women and CND (Machon, 2005:46). 
29 The extent of this surveillance included elected members of parliament, with Special Branch officers 
conducting extensive covert spying operations on a string of Labour politicians, according to the former SDS 
undercover police officer turned whistle-blower Peter Francis, with the Special Branch files often being “very 
extensive” in which they typically described the subject’s political beliefs, personal background (such as 
parents, school and finances) and demonstrations they attended, with some containing “some personal and 
private matters” (Evans & Mason, 2015) possibly a reference to information that could be used to discredit or 
besmirch their public reputation, indeed the ex-MI5 agent Machon (2005:55) recalls how MI5 kept "deeply 
embarrassing personal material on influential figures." Francis reported that his superiors in Special Branch 
were “certainly very grateful” if he passed on information involving MPs (Evans & Mason, 2015).  
30 Examples include in 2013 that the District Green Councillor Ian Driver had been spied upon for over two 
years by the Metropolitan Police, resulting in 22 entries due to his involvement in campaigning to stop live 
animal exports in Ramsgate (Barnes, 2013). Similarly, a Green party politician (the peer Jenny Jones) was 
tracked and monitored over an 11-year period, recording her political activities (including recording a tweet 
she sent about police tactics at a pro-cycling protest and details of presentations she gave at public meetings 
where she spoke on issues such as police violence and Conservative party cuts to public expenditure), Jones 
had been placed on a 'domestic extremist' database (Evans & Bowcott, 2014). 
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This tactic is built into the Police's National Intelligence Model (NIM)31 which identifies a 'control 
strategy' (for 'intelligence, prevention and enforcement') and emphasises pre-emptive 'disruption' 
and 'network demolition' (Swain, 2013). Disrupting a network (or market) is an eminently more 
pragmatic objective, and according to research (Innes & Sheptycki, 2004:2; Innes et al, 2017) is 
being increasingly deployed as a mode in the governing logic of policing.32 This 'disruptive turn' is a 
mode of 'preventative behaviour management' is also increasingly being used under the banner of 
the Prevent strand of the UK's counter-terrorism policy to overtly disrupt and dismantle 
infrastructure (Innes et al, 2017:256).  
Reviewing the past and present activities of this state apparatus, Connor's (2018a:2) firm conclusion 
is that far from being a noble enterprise to protect the nation and its people, the secret state's 
concern is with dissent (be it in the guise of counter-subversion, counter-extremism or public order 
policing) and to "bind, constrain and delimit the acceptable parameters of political dissent." In doing 
so the real purpose of political policing is to: 
protect the dominant hierarchical social relations which order British political and social life; 
social relations of racism, patriarchy and class. The secret state protects these social relations 
from ‘deep dissent’: ‘dissent that seriously or fundamentally challenges the existing 
apportionment of wealth and power in society’ 
One critical area to appreciate is the interconnectedness of the state apparatus despite their 
respective claims to ‘independence’. For instance, there was significant state collusion in the 
criminal justice system concerning the work of SDS officers. The Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) 
withheld vital evidence in the trials of environmental protestors whose organisation had been 
infiltrated by the SDS undercover officer Mark Kennedy. This resulted in an attempt to pervert the 
course of justice and ensuing that the undercover officers who had formed sexual relationships with 
eight women 'targets' would not be prosecuted, ruling that prosecutions would not be in the ‘public 
interest’ (UndecoverInfo, 2015).  
As Davies (2010:29) notes, there has been little effort in understanding how intelligence agencies 
(MI5, SIS GCHQ) form part of the wider functioning of processes and mechanisms in the machinery 
of government despite the 'palpable impact' of such institutions. What we do know is they "interact 
continuously by feeding intelligence horizontally to working level officials in the policy departments 
as well as vertically to senior civil servants and political decision makers", an 'interagency joinery' 
                                                          
31 NIM is a co-ordinated strategy on the collection, analysis and use of intelligence and is produced by the 
National Criminal Intelligence Service, being a Home Office Policing body and part of the Serious Organised 
Crime Agency (Swain, 2013).  
32 The authors note that the number of 'disruptions' is a 'key performance indicator' for the National Crime 
Squad's 'National Service Plan' (1999/2000). Indeed, the Plan calls for a five percent increase in the number of 
'criminal organised disruptions' (Innes & Sheptycki, 2004:2). 
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where the "overt and covert aspects interlock and interweave" Davies (2010:42). Indeed, the 
establishment of the National Criminal Intelligence Service (NCIS) and accompanying legislation 
has increasingly allowed the involvement of the security services to take part in investigations 'in 
support of the prevention and detection of serious crime'. Whilst it is envisaged that this will 
primarily be an intelligence gathering function, it could lead to a more active investigatory role, a 
development viewed with alarm by some owing to the "largely unaccountable nature of secret 
service activity (Maquire & John, 1996: 318).  
Thus far I have discussed the irreducibly political nature of policing, the relationship between 
different state players, and some of the tactics and strategies they employ to control and repress 
political dissent. The issues raised thus far are important because the ongoing changes in policing 
and security involve principled changes to the relationship between the citizen and the state 
(Loader & Walker, 2007) and any explanation of the state's response to summit protests needs to 
account for the range of ways authorities (police) inhibit these political challenges.  
2.3 Transnational protest: the story of a movement   
The late 1980s and early 1990s saw a growing trend of protests and activists targeting meetings of 
international governmental organisations (IGOs) including financial institutions such as the World 
Bank (WB), the World Trade Organisation (WTO), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), as well as 
multilateral regimes such as the Group of Eight (G8) and Group of Twenty (G20). Much of the work 
of these organisations had been undertaken in relative seclusion but this dramatically changed in 
1999. An eruption of mass demonstrations drawing a new (and largely unwelcome) public scrutiny 
to their work. A number of prominent scholars now argue that the authorities are confronted with a 
significantly different form of protest from recent past, with new type of more militant activists 
challenging the established elites. Indeed, this represents a 'new paradigm' of activism, (Hurt, 2014) 
'globalisation from below' (della Porta & Diani, 2006:2) or the arrival of a 'global civil society' 
(Wapner, 1996, Schechter, 1999, Clark, Friedman, and Hochstetler 1998; also, Edwards and Gaventa 
2001; Florini 2001; Gaventa 2001; Gemmill and Bamidele-Izu 2002; Glasius, Kaldor, and Anheier 
2002; Naughton 2001; Said and Desai 2003; Sassen 2002 in Fisher et al, 2005).  
Whilst these claims have been the subject of some debate amongst social movement scholars, 
there are some distinctive features which constitute a shift in activist’s organisation, strategy and 
tactics. Activists are more networked internationally, uniting an otherwise highly diverse group of 
actors and progressive movements (Edwards and Gaventa 2001; Keck and Sikkink 1998; Smith 
2001; Smith, Smith and Johnston 2002; Tarrow 2002); the pivotal role that new communication 
technologies and social media increasingly play in transmitting ideas and organising disparate 
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groups, and the resulting emergence of the 'horizontally networked activist' (Almeida and Lichbach 
2003; Langman and Morris 2003 in Fisher et al, 2005; Myers & Schaefer, 2004; Rheingold 2002); and 
the increasing detachment of this form of protest from more conventional institutional politics 
(della Porta, 2011:163). This has resulted in a distinctive raft of new 'transgressive' protest tactics 
and strategies in challenging the established hegemonic elites, including being prepared to use 
direct action methods and civil disobedience (for instance, della Porta, 2006; Smith 2001). These 
developments have resulted in transnational organisations experiencing a period of sustained, 
large-scale and well-organised protests loosely based on social justice issues (della Porta & Tarrow, 
2004:223-4). These developments have generated a more potent and generalised global challenge 
to the neo-liberal orthodoxy as the only possible path to development (Arrighi, Hopkins, and 
Wallerstein 1989; Brecher, Costello, and Smith 2000; Walton and Seddon 1994; Fox and Brown 
1998; Pianta 2001b; Wieviorka 2003; della Porta, Andretta, Mosca, and Reiter, H., 2005; Wood 2004; 
Tarrow 2005 in Della Porta & Diana, 2006). These developments have primarily taken place in 
Europe (including the UK) and North America due to the simple fact of this being the location where 
the majority of these conferences and meetings take place.   
This is not to suggest that this discourse of a 'global justice movement' unites spatially dispersed 
protestors into unitary homogenous actors, far from it. The forms this dissent takes is also highly 
varied and in this sense the global justice movement is more of an 'imagined political identity', one 
often enacted in a performative space which brings together a multitude of  grassroots groups and 
organisations. It is the manifestation of this movement though which carries the potential for a 
generalised global challenge to business and usual.  As della Porta and Dani (2006:2) caution, what 
is referred to as the 'global justice movement' should not be considered as a unitary homogeneous 
grouping. The anti-globalisation initiatives are heterogeneous and address a wide range of issues, 
ranging from opposing child labour exploitation to climate change, from opposition to military 
interventions by Western powers to human rights abuses. What constitutes a social movement then 
is a matter of some debate (McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 1988; Oliver 1989). One widely accepted 
definition views social movements actors as "engaged in political and/or cultural conflicts, meant to 
promote or oppose social change. By conflict we mean an oppositional relationship between actors 
who seek control of the same stake - be it political, economic, or cultural power - and in the process 
make negative claims on each other- i.e., demands which, if realised, would damage the interests of 
the other actors" (della Porta and Diani, 2006:21).  
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2.3.1 Seattle and the Spectre of Global Dissent 
Whilst international summits are the most visible sites attracting 'alterglobalisation' protest, it 
wasn't until what became known as the 'Battle in Seattle' in 1999 that they became widely reported 
by the international mass media. The Seattle protest has been described as the 'coming out party 
for the global justice movement in the USA' (Noakes and Gillham, 2007:335). What is so notable 
about World Trade Organisation's (WTO) Third Ministerial Conference in Seattle is that through a 
series of direct-action demonstrations the anti-globalisation movement succeeded in forcing the 
WTO to cancel the opening day of the summit. This remarkable 'tactical win' was achieved by an 
estimated 14,000 to 30,00033 activists forming a 'human chain' to encircle the downtown stadium 
(aimed at symbolising 'chains of debt' in support of international efforts at debt relief for the third 
world) in doing so the protestors prevented most of the delegates from attending the lavish 
opening event (Smith, 2001:1). The Seattle police respond with a considerable degree of violence, 
with 'non-lethal’ weapons as well as mass indiscriminate arrests in an effort to take back complete 
control of the downtown streets (Noakes and Gillham, 2007:336). 
Such was the significance and impact of the protestors efforts in disrupting the summit and the 
scale and intensity of the authority’s response, Seattle is seen as a 'turning point’ for street-based 
'contentious politics', at least within North America (della Porta, Andretta, M., Mosca, L. and Reiter, 
H, 2006: 1). Describing the events as 'five days which shook the world' (Cockburn, Sekula, and St. 
Clair, 2000:1) the significance of Seattle lies in its symbolism in the minds of activists. Indeed, 
summit demonstrations can be thought of as either before or after Seattle. What followed in future 
waves of protest was the adoption of a more transgressive model of activism by the global justice 
movement in Europe and throughout North America (Hurl, 2014:2). This development has been 
characterised as the brief "flowering of a new radical movement" (Cockburn, Sekula, and St. Clair, 
2000:1).  
Seattle had an equally momentous impact on the authorities, who conceived it as “parallel to Pearl 
Harbor to some degree” (Fisher, cited in Cockburn et al., 2001). In an effort to prevent any 
reoccurrence the police 'retrained and retooled' (Gainer, 2001), embracing an increasing 
paramilitarism in police tactics and equipment (McPhail et al, 1998; Kraska and Kaeppler, 1997; 
Wood, 2014; 2015) although this was already well established in the UK from the 1980's onward 
after a series of inner-city disturbances (cf. Jefferson & Grimshaw, 1980; Scratton, 1985). 
Nevertheless, Seattle had set the trend and established a new base line for future summit protest 
                                                          
33 The lower estimate refers to the Police estimate of protestor numbers whereas the higher estimate refers to 
activists own estimate (Smith, 2001). 
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actions in both North American and Europe, where the new direct action tactics were used to good 
effect (cf. Wood, 2014; Neale 2002; Kahn 2000). 
The significance of Seattle also lies in the reversal of a long term trend from the 1960's onwards, 
away from oppressive and coercive policing of protests to one of more negotiated management 
style, embracing a greater level tolerance by the authorities to demonstrations (cf. McPhail & 
McCarthy, 2003; King & Waddington,2005). Prior to Seattle, the police’s use of 'negotiated 
management' techniques had been increasingly refined as a strategy for public order policing, 
starting in the 1980s, although this ebbed and flowed and important national differences remained 
(della Porta & Reiter, 1998, 2006:14). On this view negotiated management is a more partnership 
and consultative based process, where prior to a protest police and protestors negotiate and agree 
on the route and conduct of a demonstration and liaise throughout the period of protest via open 
channels with specialist police officers (IPO's) on the ground. Table 2 (below) sets out the main 
dimensions of these three protest policing strategies (escalated force, negotiated management, 
and selective incapacitation) which are presented as ideal types, and Table 3 (below) the different 
styles of policing interactions with protestors.  
Table 2: Protest Policing Strategies34 






Low High Selective 
Communication Low High Selective & one-way 
Use of arrests Frequent Last resort Selective & proactive 
Use of force High Last resort Selective & less lethal 
Surveillance Moderate Low Extensive and real 
time 
Information sharing Moderate Low Extensive, cross 
agencies and media 
conscious 








                                                          
34 Based upon della Porta & Atak's Protest Policing Strategies Table (2015:124). 
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Table 3: Styles of Policing Interaction35 
Dimension of Interaction                   Policing Style 
Degree of force Brutal Soft 
Number of prohibited behaviours Repressive Tolerant 
Number of repressed groups Diffuse Selective 
Respect for law Illegal Legal 
Timing of intervention Reactive Preventive 
Communication Confrontational Consensual 
Adaptability Rigid Flexible 
Rules of the game Informal Formal 
Preparation Artisanal Professional 
 
The logic of the negotiated management approach is that both parties gain advantages (i.e. Baker, 
2014; Gorringe, et al, 2012; Gorringe & Rosie, 2013) no more so than the police guaranteeing the 
right to peaceful demonstration. If the police do use force (for instance kettling or more violently, 
baton charges into the crowd) it should be restricted to those deemed to be 'violent groups' who are 
separated from the wider protest and stopped without endangering others safety (della Porta & 
Reiter, 2006:14). Such negotiated management approaches are favoured precisely because they are 
seen as less coercive than the older escalated force model and more tolerant of protestors minor 
legal breaches (Waddington, 2011) as well as curtailing indiscriminate and intrusive information 
gathering practices.  This is often contrasted with the more traditional style of 'escalated force', 
which is more hostile to protests, frequently coercive, particularly when faced with innovative 
protest tactics and transgressions, as well as being legalistically punitive, and can involve police 
recourse to illegal methods (della Porta & Reiter, 1998:4; Starr et al, 2011; Scholl, 2012). Selective 
incapacitation, as the name suggests, targets police labelled 'transgressive' protestors who are not 
willing to enter into negotiations with the police or to comply with their wishes, but in practice 
tends to effect all protestors in the surrounding area (della Porta & Atak, 2015:124). The approach is 
an incremental resort to “surveillance and information sharing, proactive policing, and the elaborate 
control of space” (Gillham and Noakes, 2007: 350). Selective incapacitation employs measures 
which often extends the scope of police players and entails involving other authority players in 
these efforts, this can range from imposing stricter border controls preventing entry by activists to 
extra-legal regulations to prevent protest actions and/or detain activists (della Porta & Atak, 
2015:125). 
                                                          
35 Based upon della Porta & Atak's Styles of Policing Table (2015:121). 
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These protest policing strategies can be thought across a number of dimensions (see Table 3) 
although those presented are not exhaustive, and are presented as ideal types. Neither are they 
mutually exclusive, as they can be employed in combination depending on how they are selectively 
applied to different protest groups (della Porta, 1998). What strategy is used and how it is used is 
also dependent on police first-hand knowledge and experience of the particular protest group, as 
well as what police may consider to be 'episodes of failure'. As is the case with protestors, each 
encounter provides a learning process, and can contribute to tactical innovation, for authority 
players promoted through manuals, trainings, and conferences (national and international (della 
Porta & Atak, 2015:123; Wood, 2015). 
2.4 Police Violence and Wrongdoing 
Any analysis and theorising of policing will also need to extend to police wrongdoing, for our 
purposes here, police excessive use of force, illegality and malpractice. This brings into sight the 
relationship between the formal rules of the law and the working rules of police conduct. In other 
words, how police culture and situational exigencies and organisational sanctions transform the law 
in the books to the law on the street. As Reiner notes, there are two broad schools of thought here. 
Integrationists focus on the importance of police subculture and see legal rules as having little effect 
on actual police practice, and hence from this sceptical perspective legal rules are largely 
presentational and act to justify conduct (Manning, 1979, Fielding, 1989, Reiner, 2010:209). This is 
not to say that formal rules have no impact, formal controls do limit rank and file autonomy, but the 
more difficult question is to what extent, when, and in what way?  
Grimshaw & Jefferson's (1987) earlier ethnographic case study of English (London) unit beat 
policing offers one of the most detailed and theoretically rich frameworks for understanding police 
work. The authors reject many of the prevailing theories such as 'sociological liberalism' and 'class 
functionalism' as inadequate as they fail to explain the empirical reality of much policing. Similarly, 
approaches which view police behaviour as a result of occupational subculture and in-group norms, 
or the product of policy making (through formal command and control structures), or as a 
consequence of legal rules and the wider interaction between environment and police organisation 
are also seen as deficient. They offer a structural model which they view as more faithful to actual 
routine uniform police work, one which retains three elements, being; law, work and democracy.  
Each requires some explanation in turn. The authors note that the police have considerable 
discretionary powers, and that depending on the situation, the higher the discretion the less 
constraining will be the law, and vice versa. Therefore those tasks where the legal structure is 
"limited or permissive will allow work related values to prevail" (in contrast to a precisely articulated 
legal structure, for instance within a custody suite) (Grimshaw & Jefferson's (1987:26). Moreover, 
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these tasks cut across the police management and rank and file divide and the task related value 
systems will similarly follow. Again, much police scholarship has recognised the disjunction 
between 'law-in-books' and 'law-in-action' on the streets or the 'ways and means act' (Collinson, 
1995) in achieving police aims and objectives. This question is, even more, pressing in what is 
defined as 'public order' situations. Police scholars such as Reiner (2010:10-11) acknowledge that 
there is often 'noble-cause' corruption and rule-bending, of which police culture widely tolerates 
such malpractices, including physical violence, "Police lawlessness has always been rife." Reviewing 
British police oral history provides some important clues here, for instance the former Met 
Commissioner Sir Robert Mark's autobiographical account of youthful 'indirections' as a pre-war 
Manchester constable breaking a drunken navvy's leg with an illegal truncheon, as well as 
documenting 1940's the meteing out of brutal summary justice to anyone who assaulted the police 
(Mark, 1978:28-9).  
Whether the trend for police deviance has declined or is much the same is unknown, the largely a 
'dark figure', one which would in part reflect changing mores and attitudes regards what constitutes 
intolerable police behaviour. However, it is important to recognise that within the UK, the last 
several decades have seen a vast expansion of police powers and a dilution of previous Police and 
Criminal Evidence (PACE) safeguards over their abuse (Reiner, 2010:211). Whilst this is concerning, 
the problem of police malpractice is most acute at times of moral conflict and change in society. 
The emergence of the alterglobalisaiton movement is one such time. Furthermore, many of these 
protestors constitute 'police property', they are regarded as alien and disreputable and in such cases 
the constraining influence of communal morality which otherwise acts as a check on police 
subcultural notions of justice and desert becomes inadequate. This at least is one plank in 
explaining the scenes that unfolded in Seattle, Washington and Genoa.  
2.5 The Multifaceted Nature of Dissent 
Much of the work on the social control of summit protests has concentrated on the policing 
operations at the event. Whilst this is a critical dimension in the authorities’ control of dissent 
because the quest for 'public order' can entirely jeopardise political liberties and neutralise protest 
activity, it remains only one dimension of social control. Starr et al's (2011) study of anti-global 
(‘alterglobalisation’) movements alerts us to the wider continuum of dissent of which active protest 
constitutes only its most public, visible and rare manifestation (i.e. the act of going on a 
demonstration). This is to recognise dissent as a process and the importance of the wider social 
climate of associations that nurture and sustain it, what the authors term the 'submerged 
resources', such as social networks and "cultures of resistance’. Accordingly; “Dissent is a large and 
diffuse arena of contemplation, talk and action” (Starr et al, 2011:14). On this account dissent is a 
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process that has collective dimensions, it can also take many forms, including writing graffiti or a 
blog post as well as facing off riot police on a demonstration. This is to offer a broader account of 
dissent, and a model of concentric zones of political involvement set within these wider structures 
of resistance (see Figure 1 below). Elaborating the model, ‘resistance’ is defined as dissent involving 
some kind of transgressive act. When this is scaled up into collective action it becomes a social 
movement, which can express varying degrees of organisation and mobilisation. The more 
organised social movements can launch and sustain ‘contentious campaigns’ and mobilise other 
networks, wherein which the final expression, ‘protest’ may emerge from campaigns or projects or 
in some other more independent manner.   
Figure 1: Contextualised Diagram of Dissent: Showing Concentric Zones of Political 
Involvement36 
 
Starr et al (2011) concede that ‘alterglobalisaiton’ is new in degree rather than kind, with its 
transnational scope, non-hierarchical structure and ability to draw in wide diverse networks 
conjoined with employing tactics of direct action and civil disobedience as the most distinctive 
features. Prominent here is a tactical repertoire which reflects a ‘Do-It-Yourself’ (DIY) cultural form 
which rejects mediation by representatives in favour of people self-organising in an autonomous 
manner. The claim Starr et al (2011:18) make is that for dissent to be expressed and for it to develop 
requires different kinds of social spaces. Logically, then, the protection of protest requires 
protecting these multifaceted social movements and networks if the wider diffusion of contention 
and modularisation of collective action is to be realised (see also Tarrow, 2005; 1995; Tilly, 1995; 
McAdam, 1995). 
                                                          
36 Starr et al. (2011:15). 
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This also means there are many opportunities to disrupt and redirect them for authority players 
who are intent in doing so. This last point is critical when considering the rather brittle nature of this 
form of dissent, with Seattle a case in point. For instance, Murphy and Pfaff's (2014) empirical 
analysis of the Seattle protests cautions against overstating the role of a transnational dimension to 
social movement activism. What was decisive for success, at least in the case of Seattle, is better 
captured by Tarrow's (2002) notion of a 'rooted cosmopolitanism'. 
This is to emphasise the relational (over cognitive) links to one's own society and to bring to the fore 
the importance of local activist constituencies as the key building blocks for large-scale 
mobilisation. Murphy and Pfaff (2005:169) found that whilst there was an international component, 
and one they consider constituting a genuine shift in the social movement field, the 'critical factor' 
lay with the role of pre-existing local activist communities and domestic movements. Seattle 
demonstrates that "the basis of collective action in social movements remains primarily local, and 
that the key to large-scale transnational action is appealing to domestic interests" (2004:153). In 
fact, transitional social movements may actually require extensive domestic support which cannot 
be provided by looser transnational advocacy networks. The clashes that occurred on the 
downtown streets were only one small visible part of a far larger but submerged campaign, one that 
was reliant upon the resources, institutional access and personnel of local movements and NGOs. A 
loose coalition of SMOs and national NGOs worked together to frame social justice issues to 
common concerns, and in doing so they facilitated greater cooperation between what were 
otherwise diverse organisations and activist groups. To a lesser extent, those operating on a 
regional level were successfully harnessed to wider transnational causes.  
Peterson's analysis of summit protests in Gothenburg in June 2001 and Copenhagen in December 
2002 also found that on closer inspection the 'rainbow coalition' of protests groups were deeply 
divided, combining protestors who were opposed to the EU and challenging the Swedish state as 
well as new protestors in an emerging global justice movement. The distinguishing feature was the 
lack of a traditional organisational structure to these different groupings and its reliance on the 
internet to organise and mobilise protests (Peterson, 2006:45).   
Seattle saw direct action with street blockades by protestors to frustrate the intentions of the WTO 
Ministerial meeting. Both direct action and civil disobedience are controversial as they contain a 
central tension between legitimacy and legality. This is a complex discussion which involves the 
problematic character of political obligation, namely why anyone has a duty to obey the law, and 
the related problem of when political authority is legitimate (re the challenge of philosophical 
anarchism in respect of advocates such as Wolff, 1970). Civil disobedience is a technique for 
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challenging unjust laws or government policy, and whilst it can violate the law, it is often a symbolic 
gesture where advocates justify such measures on moral grounds (rather than selfish ones). 
Blackstone (1971-6) adds two other defining criteria; that activists do not seek to avoid 
apprehension or punishment and that the civil disobedience is non-violent. Hence civil disobedience 
falls far short of rebellion or revolution advocating the overthrow of political authority because it 
presupposes the concept of 'legitimate political authority'37 (Wolff, 1998; 1969). Lord Hoffman’s 
discussion of civil disobedience adds to the sincerity of the belief a corresponding sense of 
proportion by protestors to avoid excessive damage or inconvenience on behalf of the protestor. 
Direct action, on the other hand, can be ‘symbolically disruptive’ (Fenwick & Phillipson in Mead, 
2010:11) with only a short duration or impact, or is easily remedied. This is in contrast to direct 
action which causes significant disruption with the attendant risk that a group succeeds in its aims 
outside of the democratic process. Wenz (1974) puts forward the notion of ‘civil disruption’ to 
describe the US ‘campus unrest’ in the 1970’s and the Chicago riots of 1968. He views this as a 
category of political activism midway between civil disobedience and revolution. Civil disruption has 
been used by environmental campaign groups such as 'Extinction Rebellion', seeing activists on 
mass blockades of major road junctions and thoroughfares with 'sit-down' (or more often 'lie-down') 
protests to block public transport hubs in major cities in order to gain media attention and thereby 
publicity to showcase their environmental cause. This last tactic is an adaptive response to authority 
players use of strategic incapacitation, notably using police kettles (police cordons tightly and 
forcibly containing the group of protestors in one location for hours until fatigue, hunger and the 
other demands of life result in protestors being willing to give up and go home upon release - in 
theory at least). By occupying a strategic central location to maximise disruption to the normal 
rhythms of the city, the authorities kettling becomes redundant as the protestors are already where 
they want to be, and being kept there merely aids their strategy. Moreover, removal from a lie-
down protest is designed as a labour intensive challenge for the police38 (but only if the police abide 
by their own procedures of which there is no guarantee) and hence  deterrent, as it takes four 
officers to remove each prone protestor (one to each limb) and then each must be carried to police 
vehicles, ferried to be processed at police cells, and detained, of which there is a finite capacity.   
However, as several studies of UK public order law testify, domestic law and Strasbourg decisions 
under ECHR have proved to be nearly totally intolerant of any disruptive or obstructive forms of 
                                                          
37 Although see Blackstone for the difficulty in distinguishing the two when civil disobedience involves 
violence (1971:5). 
38 Smaller number of protestors using elaborate bolting and locking devices to objects (be it street furniture or 
imported vehicles to the scene) or being glued to other objects requires time consuming and careful removal, 
again draining police resources. 
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protest, less so civil disobedience (Mead, 2010; Thornton QC. et al 2010). Despite almost complete 
legal intolerance of the tactic, disruption is important for effective dissent as it raises costs of ‘elite 
projects’ and hegemonic norms (Star et al., 2010). Piven and Cloward (1977) argue that it is only and 
precisely through disruption that social movements can win, the mechanism of raising costs to a 
point where it then becomes in the interests of the elites to comply with dissenters. Clearly, the 
changing nature and form that protest takes is an important one as it raises questions of whether 
social movements subvert or supplement what has traditionally been thought of as the democratic 
process.  
After Seattle, policing of International summits became increasingly militarised, securitised and 
confrontational. There was a shift in emphasis to repressive hard line approaches in dealing with 
these new transgressive protestor tactics. For instance, the Italian police's response in the 2001 G8 
summit in Genoa was notoriously brutal, non-selective and at times illegal. The Italian police fired 
over 6,200 tear gas grenades over 2 days, ignoring their own circular from the national police chief 
to exercise maximum caution and care in using truncheons or teargas (Hearing 8 August 2001). 
More excessive than this was firing over 20 pistol live ammunition rounds, one of which killed an 
unarmed demonstrator Carlo Giuliani (Report III, 145). Police also used repeated baton charges into 
the crowd including peaceful demonstrators, and more worryingly, armoured vehicles were driven 
at high speed against the crowd on the instructions of senior police officers present at the scene 
(della Porta & Reiter, 2006;). Estimates of the numbers of injured at the hands of the police were 
over 1000 (Gubitosa, 2003:177). Perhaps the most infamous incident was the police's attack the Diaz 
Pertini school building where ninety-three young demonstrators were sleeping. First-hand reports 
recount sustained sadistic and systematic brutality with police officers viciously beating practically 
every occupant39 (Davies, 2008; Berra, 2011). Sixty-two were hospitalised,40 the remaining 
protestors joined some 222 held at the Bolzaneto detention centre and were subjected to a regime 
later described by public prosecutors as 'torture', including being forced to stand in stress positions, 
being beaten, humiliated,41 kept in freezing conditions with little or no food as well as being denied 
their legal rights (Davies, 2008). Attempts by senior police officers at charging the occupants of Diaz 
Pertini with aggressive resistance to arrest and conspiracy to cause destruction were all dismissed 
by Italian courts.    
                                                          
39 A small number of protestors managed to flee the building  
40 The prognosis ran from between 5 days to indeterminate (della Porta & Reiter (2006:21) 
41 Davies (2008) reports that those detained men or women with dreadlocks were forced to have their hair 
roughly cut off to the scalp. Another protestor, Marco Bistacchia, was taken to an office, stripped naked, and 
forced to get down on all fours and told to bark like a dog and to shout "Viva la polizia Italiana!". There were 
other complaints by several women about being threatened with rape. Furthermore, one (unnamed) police 
officer told the Italian newspaper La Repubblica that he had seen brother officers urinating on prisoners and 
beating them for refusing to sing Faccetta Nera, a Mussoliniera, a fascist song. 
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At Genoa, summit space also became increasingly securitised, with a series of spatial exclusionary 
zones introduced on a RAG basis by the police as a strategy to counteract previous protestor tactics. 
The summit site itself was heavily fortified and denoted a 'Red Zone' and barred to all 
demonstrators, encircled with an eight-kilometre perimeter barrier, and 13 'access portals', which 
also enclosed a major commercial sector covering several city streets. This was encircled by a buffer 
'Yellow Zone' which saw restrictions on freedom to demonstrate (della Porta, 1996). This denotes a 
central feature of summit policing, the terrain of 'reconnaissance battles' (Bauman, 2002) fought 
out between activists trying to temporarily occupy this contentious (and previously public) space 
and police tactics and strategies to control and deny these territorial tactics. Protestors try to 
challenge this authority by use of mass actions such as 'swarming', a tactic that is at best ephemeral 
as they lack any means of fortification (Peterson, 2006:45). So-called 'hit and run' tactics by small 
groups of 'militant' activists are not aimed at occupying space but rather aim to disrupt the 
domination of space that authorities exercise (Peterson and Oskarsson, 2002; Peterson 2001). 
This exclusionary geography was also operative transnationally at the EU border with the Italian 
authorities temporarily suspending the Schengen Agreement, conducting 140,000 border checks, 
with 2,093 people being rejected (only 298 were alleged members of the 'black bloc' anarchists).  
Internally, 'expulsion notices' were used to keep some Italian social-centre militants from Genoa 
(barring any return for 3 years to the city). Other internal measures included searches of private 
houses and social centres where protestors congregated (under Article 41 of the Penal Code, itself 
restricted to exceptional cases of urgency and necessity in searching for weapons) and hence of 
questionable legality. della Porta & Reiter (2006:18) cite the former head of UCIGOS (central 
political police), Arnaldo La Barbera that this was a deliberate tactic of 'preventive pressure' by the 
police to intimidate protestors. Protestors were also spied on, including telephone taps and the 
monitoring of online communications (ibid., 2006).  
In trying to understand these actions, della Porta and Reiter (2006) attribute what they term the 
police's 'heavy handed' response to both internal aspects of the Italian police (such as lack of co-
ordination in command, poor training with an over reliance upon voluntary draftees, as well as 
permissive legal powers enhancing the potential for arbitrary actions) and the relatively closed 
nature of the Italian political system to the type of claims-making challenges by the global justice 
movement. What the otherwise comprehensive analysis of Genoa protest omits is fully recognising 
the role of malevolence and malice of the Italian police as a causal factor driving police violence, one 
which first-hand accounts reported by Davis (2008) and others highlights. I shall develop this point 
later when examining my own case studies that too often policing scholars sideline this particular 
motivation.     
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The repressive nature of the summit policing operation at Genoa can be contrasted with Peterson's 
analysis of transnational summits in two Scandinavian countries; Sweden (Gothenburg in 2001) and 
later in Denmark (Copenhagen in 2002). Despite both countries being considered to have more 
open state institutional structures to new political challenges, Peterson also found that police forces 
in both countries responded with different degrees of repression, jeopardising guaranteed political 
and civil liberties. Peterson describes the three days of massive riots at Gothenburg by borrowing 
Rodney Stark's (1972) earlier description of a 'police riot'. In large part being attributed to 
deficiencies in the policing operation; a 'dysfunctional police strategy', poor training and 
communication, as well as a police culture that 'demonised' protestors. Bjork, (2004 cited in della 
Porta, Peterson & Reiter, 2006) has attributed an important role to the contrasting legal 
frameworks operating in the respective countries in explaining the greater level of violence and 
disorder with the Gothenburg policing operation. In contrast to Sweden's more legalistic one, the 
Danish legal systems embrace of a codified 'legal opportunism' was seen as allowing the police 
greater flexibility in calibrating their response to disorder. So whilst militant activists used 
uncertainty of action to retain the offensive tactically, Danish police also used uncertainty in when 
to intervene (i.e. when to be lenient) as an instrument of police power.  
This is not to suggest that all summit protests result in violence and disorder, some pass off 
relatively peacefully. The Copenhagen (2002) summit is one example. Peterson (2006) attributes 
this outcome to a process of negotiation between the police and some sections of protestors, in 
addition to the police having in reserve a large paramilitary operation to maintain 'the initiative' 
against any potential protestor actions. In short, the police ensure they always had the upper hand 
on the streets. It is this, broadly conceived, two-pronged model, combining a consultative and 
communicative element and a militarised and potentially overtly offensive and escalatory public 
order strategy which appears increasingly to be the favoured approach by many police forces in 
both Europe and North America.  
King and Waddington’s (2006) analysis of protest events in Canada from 1997 to 2002 (including the 
2002 G8 summit in Kananaskis) tends to confirm this later trend for a two pronged model. What is 
instructive however is that despite this emphasis on police negotiation with protestors, as Peterson 
reports from the Copenhagen (2002) summit operation, 'encroachments' on protestors civil liberties 
very much persisted, often achieved through subtler forms than the open police violence and legal 
repression so evident in Genoa and Gothenburg.  Indeed, King and Waddington (2006) identify a 
mode of policing they describe as 'superficially soft-hat'. The Canadian summits were openly 
coercively policed when internationally protected persons (IPPs) were present and trade and 
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economic interests were being discussed, but more covertly coercive when IPPs were not present, 
this despite police adopting a negotiated management with protestors.  
The post-Seattle picture of how summit protests are policed appears to be evolving in response to a 
cycle of previous summit learning by both police and protestors, in particular, the strategic and 
tactical moves and counter-moves between both parties (della Porta, 2006:10; Noakes & Gillham, 
2006). Reflecting on three US experiences of summit protests, including Seattle and the 2000 IMF 
meeting in Washington and the Republican conference in Philadelphia, Noakes & Gillham (2006) 
argue that the police have shifted to a form of coercive 'selective incapacitation' in order to prevent 
transgressive demonstrators from having any disruptive impact of summit proceedings.  The 
strategy of negotiated management, which is in part supposedly designed to guarantee 
demonstrator rights, only applied to already contained demonstrators (della Porta, 2006:11). This 
puts a question mark over the utility of entering into negotiated management for protestors and 
explains the reluctance of some protestors to do so. A number of studies have examined the 
process and outcomes of negotiated management. Whilst there is some evidence that channels of 
open communication can lead to the de-escalation of violence and also maintain a limited 
opportunity for protest (Wahlström and Oskarsson, 2006;) there is an asymmetry of power in favour 
of the police which tempers any notion of 'negotiation'.  
della Porta (2006:12) draws out a number of common elements characterising policing of global 
social movements post-Seattle. These are an emphasis on forceful control and a sidelining of 
demonstrators rights, with police control being deepened and extended through a greater 
emphasis on intelligence and communication technology. There is also a tendency for selective 
exclusion of some activists, including at the EU level with specific measures to monitor and control 
movement across EU borders of global justice protestors (Reiter and Fillieule, 2006). It is also likely 
that international summits present particular problems for the police and authorities, with IPP's and 
VIPs presenting attractive targets for terrorists (King and Waddington, 2005) and any form of 
challenge to them or the summit perceived as internationally delegitimizing the host government. 
In addition to this, characteristics of the global justice movement such as its heterogeneity of 
different participants, its wilful unpredictability, tactics of direct action, all conceived as a 'high 
threat' for police and authorities (della Porta and Reiter, 2006; Noakes and Gillham, 2006; and 
Peterson, 2006). The history of 'on the job trouble' (Waddington, 2000) at international summits 
also increases mutual mistrust and discourages negotiations (Wahlström and Oskarsson, 2006; 
della Porta and Reiter, 2006). This is the obvious justification for having heightened security 
measures, but summits also involve dimensions of state organisation previously unseen at non-
summit protests (Starr & Fernandez, 2009). Nevertheless, what is instructive about Seattle, as with 
Page 48 of 407 
 
Noakes and Gillihan (2006) report on the Miami summit, is the internal contradiction which Turk 
back in the 1980's observed, that "the US legal system embodies a strong emphasis on political 
freedom whilst at the same time a vast intolerance of actual political diversity" (p. 58).  
2.6 Violence, law and the exception 
Much of the sociological attention towards new social movements has focused on the 
organisational or structural level explaining their emergence, how they mobilise to participate and 
gain support, and why they succeed or fail in their political aims and objectives. The more 
criminological orientated work has examined the policing of this transnational activism in order to 
explain why some protest events can result in violence or remain mostly peaceful, as well as the 
changing nature of social control exercised by the authorities including the militarisation of policing 
thesis (King & Waddington, 2004; 2005; Jefferson, 1987; 1990; Kraska, 2011; 1997; 1996; 1994; 
Kraska et al 1997a; 1997b; Reicher, 2011; 1996; 1997; 2001; 1984; Reicher et al,  2004; Reicher et al, 
2007; Sttot, 2011; Waddington, 2007; 1992; Waddington & King, 2007). In brief, the paramilitary 
thesis, particularly as it relates to protest policing, calls into question what Gidden's (1985) considers 
a central feature of the modern nation state, a clear delineation between internal security 
conducted by the police and external security carried out by the military. It often functions 
pejoratively and denotes through weaponry, dress, hardware, operational tactics and organisation, 
ideology and language. This trend of increasingly paramilitary operational capacity in 'public order' 
policing has occurred throughout Europe and North America, particularly developing tactical 
mobile units but also for large scale protest actions orientated to the rapid achievement of control 
(della Porta 1998:230; Wisler and Kriesi 1998:98–9; P.A.J. Waddington 1998, 1994; Kraska, 1997a; 
1997b; 1997c) but practiced in the UK supposedly adhering to the tradition of impartial policing by 
consent (which I have critiqued earlier). Critics argue that the normalisation of paramilitarism 
introduces a militaristic mindset and subculture within public order policing which has a disturbing 
potential for net widening unlawful police violence, detracting from protestor safety and escalating 
problems it aims to minimise (Jefferson, 1987; 1990; King & Waddington, 2005; 2006; Kraska, 2001). 
A number of unintended consequences can flow from this more coercive approach, and research 
since the 1960s suggests that the police actions often play a major part in causing and amplifying 
crowd disorder (for instance, Jefferson, 1990; Skolnick 2002; Reiner 2000; Reicher, et al, 2004; 
Reicher et al, 2007; della Porta 1998; Critcher and Waddington 1996; Skolnick and Fyfe 1993).  
Whilst it is often difficult to exactly determine who is responsible when violence erupts at prtoests, 
as Peterson (2006:52) notes, responsibility is often assigned to protestors. It is frequently forgotten 
that the police also constitute a crowd, and that violence is the result of an interaction, usually 
under very emotive and stressful conditions. This last point draws on several UK studies of 'riots' 
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such as Waddington's 'flash points model' and Jefferson's 'amplificatory spiral model' of public order 
policing, each which points to the deficiencies of increasing paramilitarism (Jefferson, 1990; 1993; 
Waddington, 1992, 2005; 2007). It has long been recognised by policing scholars (and conceded by 
some senior police ranks) that once disorder breaks out, things can quickly get 'out of hand'.  Senior 
officers find it difficult to maintain command and control over rank and file officers, especially when 
they make forays into the crowd such as baton charges to 'disperse' a crowd. As PAJ Waddington 
notes:  
"Policing civil disorder engenders fear, anger and frustration amongst officers who are often 
too close to the action to understand what is occurring. The feeling that one has lost control 
and is at the mercy of unpredictable events only heightens anxiety. The opportunity to take 
forceful action allows not only for the expression of these emotions, but is exhilarating in its 
own right. For all of these reasons, it is essential that officers engaged in public-order 
situations are carefully supervised and controlled, for internal controls on behaviour are 
unlikely to prove reliable." (P.A.J. Waddington 1991, 137). 
Whilst the 'paramilitarism thesis' has been much debated, and is contested by a small number of 
scholars (notably Heyer, 2014; PAJ Waddington, 2007; 1999, 1994a; 1994b; 1993a; 1993b; 1987;) the 
nub of the matter turns on the analytical purchase of 'paramilitary policing'. This is not a binary 
distinction, as Kraska argues, but a continuum between the military and an unarmed police force. 
The key distinction is that unlike the military the police do not (or should not) aim to kill an enemy 
but to apprehend suspects lawfully. Despite most protest events not resulting in violence, I will 
argue later that even this most fundamental of distinctions is breaking down and arguably no longer 
tenable, but the key point in this debate is that the boundary between the police and the military is 
changing or blurring, as is the less than lethal technology they employ (Haggerty & Erickson, 1999; 
Sheptycki, 2005). The other key implication of this type of policing is the danger that such police 
tactics and strategies act to intimidate people out of actively protesting. If paramilitarism is denying 
this area of citizenship, even if the police mostly rely on 'non-lethal' or less than lethal' violence or 
the ever-present threat of that violence, be it primarily directed at marginalised and non-
institutionalised activists, this can have a deleterious impact on democracy.  
2.7 Defining and Operationalising Repression 
Much previous research across a range of jurisdictions has been concerned with how and why states 
use coercive power domestically towards existing dissenters (Davenport, 2007) including the use of 
direct violence to suppress social movements. Far less attention has been given to the myriad ways 
in which dissent is proactively channelled through what has been described as 'soft repression' 
(state surveillance, monitoring, cataloguing, infiltration and disruption activities). Whilst I have 
discussed earlier the different authority players, particularly in terms of political policing, I now want 
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to focus upon the methods available to them to control, delimit and defeat a range of social 
movement activism. This matters because the consequences of political repression can be profound 
in constraining, subverting, infiltrating and ultimately disempowering political protest (Opp & 
Roehl, 1990, Starr, Fernandez & Scholl, 2011). At the same time the study of repression and the 
threat of repression on social movements has been under explored in the social sciences (Boykoff, 
2006) although there is a growing body of 'repression research' emerging (Earl, 2003, 2011).  
Goldstein's magisterial study of political repression in America (from 1870 to the present - here the 
late 1970's) similarly argued that social scientists have neglected the role of government through its 
coercive apparatus in suppressing dissent and enforcing orthodoxy, particularly at times when 
radical criticism of the existing order threatens established power. The policing of global economic 
governance meetings is particularly important here because it involves dimensions of state 
organisation that have not been considered in earlier studies of state repression. The academic 
literature has generally failed to keep up with the complex relationships of repression and creative 
resistance which have emerged post-Seattle (Starr and Fernandez, 2009). This is to move away 
from an analysis of protest policing to consider the wider social control of dissent by the state, 
elements of which I have touched on above, and which I pick up on later in successive chapters. 
The subject of political repression is one that is charged with emotion, and one that appears no 
doubt somehow out of kilter to many who live in a Western liberal democracy. The conventional 
thinking is that democratic societies cannot use open coercion (police violence, mass arrests) on a 
routine basis to quell dissent because to do so would result in losing too much legitimacy. Social 
control must be maintained through other, subtler ways. The FBI's COINTELPRO domestic 
'counterinsurgency program' in the 1960’s which had the explicit aim of discrediting and disrupting 
social movements through covert means, here; infiltration, psychological warfare, legal harassment 
as well as resort to more direct violence is one such example (Churchill & Wall, 1990). In Britain, 
where Senate Intelligence Committees are in shorter supply, covert policing practices and 
undercover policing operations have been aimed at monitoring and undermining a broad swath of 
political activism (for instance, see Evans, 2013; and Lubbers, 2012; 2015; also Monaghan & Walby 
2012 for a Canadian perspective).  
Notwithstanding definitional problems, repression is difficult to study empirically. Repression is also 
a normative term, and as such defies precise definition. Most accounts view repression as involving 
the actual or threatened use of physical sanctions against an individual or organisation, within the 
territorial jurisdiction of the state, for the purpose of imposing a cost on the target as well as 
deterring specific activities and/or beliefs perceived to be challenging to government personnel, 
practices or institutions (Goldstein 1978, p. xxvii). A definition of repression common to social 
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movement research is provided by Stockdill (1996:146) “any actions taken by authorities to impede 
mobilisation, harass and intimidate activists, divide organisations, and physically assault, arrest, 
imprison, and/or kill movements participants.” Earl (2003) is critical of this conception and has 
argued that existing explanations of social movement repression fail to account for different types 
of repressive activity. Most obviously, more authoritarian states will differ from democracies, or 
where policing is more decentralised (as in the USA). Neither are state authorities the only actors 
that can serve as repressive agents (Bromley and Shupe, 1983) as recent work in the UK on private 
corporate actor’s attests (Lubbers, 2012).  
Earl (2003) has offered a multi-dimensional typology of repression, one which takes into account 
the identity of the repressive agent (identifying a tight or lose connection between state agents and 
political elites), the character of the repressive action (whether direct coercion such as rubber 
bullets or more toward channelling restrictions on social movements), and whether the repressive 
action is observable (overt or covert). As such this represents a more refined and complex 
understanding of repressive forms and one useful for this study.   
Marx (1979) has reviewed decades of (primarily US) research and whilst somewhat dated now, has 
detailed the broad strategies that have been used by authority players (and their allies to damage 
social movements, as has Boykoff's (2007) later work in detailing what he terms the ten 'Action 
Modes' of state repression. Table 4 (below) sets these out and maps both typologies fitted against 
each other on the basis of similarity.  
Table 4: Strategies and Practices for Inhibiting a Social Movement42 
Inhibiting Strategy  Action Modes of state Repression 
 Direct violence 
Direct energies of movement to defensive maintenance 
needs and away from pursuit of broader social goals 
Employment deprivation 
Create unfavourable public image and counter ideology 
(labelling) 
'Black propaganda' 
Mass media manipulation 
Mass media depreciation 
Gather information on movement Surveillance and break-ins 
Inhibit supply of money and facilities  
Inhibit capacity for corporate action   
Apply legal sanctions Extraordinary rules and laws 
Harassment and harassment arrests 
Public prosecutions and hearings 
                                                          
42 Based upon Marx, G. (1979) 'Some General Strategies for Facilitating or Inhibiting a Social Movement' 
External Efforts to Damage or Facilitate Social Movements: Some Patterns, Explanations, Outcomes, and 
Complications in The Dynamics of Social Movements, M. Zald and J. McCarthy, Windrop Publishers; Boykoff 
(2007) Limiting Dissent: The Mechanisms of State Repression in the USA, Social Movement Studies, 6(3) 281-
310.  
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Inhibit freedom of movement, expression and action; 
create myth and fact of surveillance and suppression. 
Infiltration, ‘badjacketing’, and the 
use of agent provocateurs 
Damage morale 
De-recruitment  
Network demobilisation  
Destroy or displace leaders (leadership 'decapitation') 
Destroy infrastructure (premises and meeting spaces) 
Encourage internal conflict 
Encourage external conflict with potential allies and 
opponents  
Inhibit or sabotage particular actions 
 
It should be added that this tabulation represents the perspective of the outside organisation who 
constitute the subject of these strategies, not the authority players implements them who employ a 
different nomenclature. As Marx notes, the strategies can be pursued by multiple means (for 
instance using agent provocateurs who can serve a number of ends) and whilst analytically distinct, 
are inter-related. Whilst some of the strategies that Marx and Boykoff's itemise are fairly self-
explanatory, others are deserving of some elaboration.   
Reviewing Marx's contribution first, 'image damaging information' can be supplied by a range of 
authority actors (though typically 'police media liaison officers' or through the intelligence services 
to trusted or co-opted journalists) and in anticipation of a protest action. Such information is open 
to fabrication or exaggeration, or if more accurate, containing selective but privileged information 
from surveillance activities (i.e. informers, 
wiretaps, or online monitoring) but only in a contrived sense, for instance, as a result of  authorities 
own covert actions in deliberately creating reputational damage (i.e. provoking movements into 
illegal actions or association with such individuals43 ) (Marx, 1979). The movements publications 
may come under attack from black propaganda, misinformation or disinformation campaigns 
(arguing they conflict with 'British values'), as well as discrediting celebrities aligned with the 
movements.44 The CIA's foreign activities appear to have gone further still, not simply manipulating 
                                                          
43 A case in point would be the SDS undercover police officer Bob Lamberts' who infiltrated an animal rights 
campaign and allegedly planted of an incendiary device in Debenhams in Harrow, causing £340,000 of 
damage (Evans, 2017). 
44 In the US the FBI ran extended propaganda campaigns to try and discredit the New Left and its adherents in 
the eyes of wider public opinion, FBI agents were told that "every avenue of possible embarrassment must be 
vigorously and enthusiastically explored," this included selecting  photographs that depicted of New Left 
leaders in the most obnoxious manner, sending articles to student newspapers or the 'underground press', 
university officials, donors, legislators and parents to discredit them (professing advocating of illicit drug use 
or sexual vice)  (Marx, 1979:2; see also, Boycoff, 2006; Churchill & Wall, 1990). 
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or influencing news stories but becoming news services themselves in order to supply this 
disinformation and misinformation.45  
The most often used strategy is information gathering through various surveillance techniques, 
although most of this information is of questionable validity and Marx (1979:3) argues is not actively 
used beyond a 'harassment function'. This can aid counter-intelligence functions or make social 
movements less open and democratic movement as well as deter participation (by inducing fear 
and apprehension in potential joiners). Other methods to indirectly damage a movement involve 
inhibiting the supply of resources and facilities. This can take many different forms and can bring in 
a range of other aligned authority players, for instance, the tax authorities auditing a movements 
funding, (or their contributors) or their charity status on political grounds, encouraging those 
renting meeting spaces or offices to a movement not to do so, denying employment to known 
activists (or attempting to get them sacked,46 or 'blacklisted' (in the UK, see Smith & Chamberlain, 
2015).  
Other methods are used to damage recruitment to the movement by keeping potential recruits 
away, impeding movement growth and weakening morale and commitment amongst current 
active members. This includes creating an unfavourable public image of the movement, or once 
activist identities are known, contacting their employers, teachers, parents, friends, neighbours or 
spouses in an effort to encourage them to dissuade the person from activism or to threaten them 
with negative consequences of pursuing this path.47 This can include ‘pressure sales’ using direct 
appeals and warnings from police (often Special Branch in the UK) sometimes relayed (almost 
always unexpectedly) at their homes ('door-stepping') who emphasise the risks and costs they may 
face, or give them damaging information about others in the movement (Marx, 1979:3).  
Targeting social movement leaders due to their symbolic or instrumental value to the organisation 
can also weaken social movements, as it weakens the group of organisational expertise and 
presents leadership succession problems (Donovan & Coupe, 2013:116). This can include a variety of 
legal sanctions to prevent activism (i.e. injunctions against demonstrating, Banning Orders in 
                                                          
45 This includes the CIA supporting two European news services used by US newspapers, and in 1976 the CIA 
had about 50 US journalists or other news organisation employees employed and planted stories to help 
shape 'American public opinion' (Marx, 1979:2-3). 
46 During the McCarthy era over 490 people lost their government jobs on 'loyalty' grounds despite no cases of 
espionage being uncovered (Marx, 1979:3). 
47 This tactic used by the FBI has parallels in the UKs 'counter-terrorism' strand 'Prevent' through the Channel 
scheme, which also brings together agency actors and draws on parents, spouse, and teachers in an effort to 
dissuade and deter young people from being involved in what the state describes as 'domestic extremist' 
organisations (including environmental, peace and political organisations which advocate peaceful direct 
action).  
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vicinities or with other activists etc.), 'image damaging' efforts, harassment, a range of covert 
action, threats and assaults. A leadership 'decapitation' strategy (a leadership 'arrest strike' 
arresting and removing all leaders from the organisation  was used against the animal rights activist 
group, Stop Huntington Animal Cruelty (SHAC) by Special Branch.48 It appears from Donovan & 
Coupe's discussion, (2013:128) that the aim of the prosecution was to remove SHAC's campaign's 
organizing, planning, liaison and coordinating centre, and in addition, that the authorities were 
aware of the groups vulnerability of having all key leaders in a single hub  (although not SHACs 
deficiencies in succession planning). Targeting and destroying an organisations infrastructure 
through violent police (including armed police) raids and evictions as a deliberate strategy by 
authority players at international anti-summits protests has also been noted by Scholl (1921:131-2) 
but here as a pre-emptive social control tactic.49 Donovan & Coupe's (2013) paper is significant in 
that it would appear to be a rare public admission that the UK political police do indeed 
intentionally use this tactic in an effort to destroy a social movement.50   
Other methods can include co-opting leaders or displacing them, as when authority players 
infiltrate an organisation who become leaders (or lead players) or build rival movements. As Marx 
(1979) notes, one major aim of counterintelligence activities has been to create and drive internal 
conflict within social movements (with undercover agents encouraging personal conflicts or 
animosities or exacerbating tensions with opposing factions within the organisation (over tactics, 
goals etc.), including falsely accusing members of being informants to sow discord and distrust. 
Similarly, encouraging external conflict between movements and groups (especially ideologically) 
or taking action to prevent coalitions forming, or a related tactic is creating alternative social 
movements to complete with 'the target group'.51  The intention was to "cause disruption of both 
groups by having each expend their energies, time, and money attacking each other" (Donner, 
1976:19).  
Social movements are particularly vulnerable to sabotage and disruption, especially when they take 
large protest actions. This is because they seek to expand their base and draw on the wider 
                                                          
48 A 'special unit' was devised for this, combining officers from Special Branch and CID using a range of covert 
methods and a 'diverse' range of NETCU data using "sophisticated intelligence-based approaches to identify 
offenders, build a prosecution case and arrest those who led and organized the campaign". Six leaders were 
charged with 'conspiracy to blackmail' (the prosecution strategy devised by the police investigation and CPS 
teams working 'collaboratively') (Donovan & Coupe, 2013:127).  
49 At the 2000 IMF/WB summit in Prague; the 2001 G8 summit in Genoa, the 2003 G8 summit Geneva summit, 
the 2005 G8 summit in Gleneagles, Scotland and the 2007 G8 summit in Heilgendamm Scholl, 2012:131-3). 
50 The co-author Donovan is a serving Metropolitan police officer, although no details are provided as to 
whether he works for Special Branch, CID or NETCU.  
51 For instance, the FBI created a right-wing ‘Secret Army Organisation' in the 1970s in San Diego, that 
physically attacked leftist (Viorst, 1976; Marx, 1979). 
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concentric 'zones of dissent' (Star et al, 2011) (as discussed in Section 2.4), with that broader 
population of sympathetic but non-activist members as well as entering into 'interest coalitions' 
with other organisations. This brings unknown persons into the fold, requiring cooperative activity 
based on trusting relations but without being able to verify identities (for instance, people may need 
to be accommodated, fed and briefed etc.), offering a rich field of opportunity for disruptive 
intervention measures by a range of local and national authority players (including encouraging 
counter-demonstrations).52 Most often these measures can include social control activities 
restricting protest activity (sometimes under the guise of 'no protest zones') and routes (the 'march 
to nowhere'), or police provocation and violence towards activists.  
Whilst both Marx and Boykoff are writing very much from a US perspective, many of these same 
strategies find resonance in the UK, and are directly applicable to later social control methods 
employed by authority players at international summits (Scholl, 2012; Starr et al, 2011). What is 
helpful about both Marx and Boykoff's work, and that of later UK counterparts (such as Bunyan, 
1983; Connor, 2018a/b; Scratton, 1985 etc.) is the reconfiguration away from a legitimising official 
discourse of criminality ('crime and disorder') and its nomenclature ('subversion', 'domestic 
extremism' etc.) to reconceive what is actually occurring as a struggle for control over contested 
political space between state players and non-state challengers. The strategies and practices 
('Action Modes') thus far outlined do not constitute an exhaustive list and are dynamic, rarely 
operate in isolation (and most often overlap) working in various conjunctions and sequences 
(Boykoff, 2007:288) but do provide some insight into authority players willingness to monitor, 
intervene and incapacitate domestic social movements affairs. These issues are important because 
these types of ongoing changes in policing and security involve principled changes to the 
relationship between the citizen and the state (Loader & Walker, 2007).  
2.8 Conclusion 
Thus far I have argued that broad social, economic and political cleavages have been conducive to 
the emergence of 'transgressive' social movements and that these counter-movements have 
(perhaps briefly) occupied the political stage as new, and from the perspective of international and 
                                                          
52 Marx (1979:5, citing Wise, 1976:318-19) recounts one somewhat comical example of the imaginations at 
work here, which saw the Newark FBI suggesting an action to sow 'confusion and suspicion' at the Black 
Panther Party convention by sending a telegram warning that the convention food contained poison (with 
symptoms being stomach cramps) with the FBI laboratory planning to "treat fruit such as oranges with a mild 
laxative-type drug by hypodermic needle or other appropriate method." Ultimately this injecting of fruit did 
not occur, not due to any legal or moral inhibitions on behalf of the authorities but rather due to the FBI's lack 
of control over the fruit during shipment. Nevertheless, as Wise (1976) noted, Hoover had felt that the idea 
had "merit", indicating that the FBI's disruptive clandestine tactics operated with the approval of the highest 
tier of government. 
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state institutions, unwelcome agents of history. The movements goals have been to engender 
change, and they have devised a range of new and innovative strategies to achieve them, methods 
that are also contentious such as direct action and civil disobedience. This and their less 
institutionalised form mean they are more likely to be viewed as threats to the authorities who are 
tied to maintaining the political and economic status quo which they directly challenge. These 
methods and strategies interact across a range of different arenas with authority players, principally 
the police, who represent the primary state player tasked with controlling and suppressing 
manifestations of political dissent. 
The police are not a single player however, rather they comprise a multiplicity of players, who 
pursue different purposes, have different norms as well as different degrees of agency (della Porta 
& Atak, 2015:114). This is not obvious to the casual observer (or perhaps even the seasoned activist) 
who infers from that most directly accessible aspect of superficial appearance, the uniform - a 
costume designed to harmonize each and all - to present the misleading facade of a unified 
institution. This is aided and abetted by official discourse which frequently references a similar claim 
whilst denying or cloaking internal authority discord. In fact, Manning (2010:50) argues that the 
most important problem that the police face is the tension between high and low policing. The 
weight of past and recent historical evidence demonstrates that the police are also politically 
embedded, despite their claims to being neutral parties in all of their frequent encounters with 
contentious players on the streets.  
Other recent scholarship and scandal attests to the role that a range of authority players, including 
the state's security services, all play in monitoring, deceiving, inhibiting and disrupting these 
political challengers. As early as 1977, Bunyan's study of British policing reorientated a focus to this 
political role of the police. It revealed the extent to which the British state has developed a 
formidable domestic overt and covert coercive apparatus aimed at repressing political protest and 
dissent, itself deriving from Britain’s colonial past (Bunyan, 1981; Connor, 2018a/b; Scraton, 1985; 
Sabir, 2017). These measures mostly operate unseen and under the guise of crime prevention, but 
are justified as both a noble enterprise as well as a legitimate response to a wide range of state 
sanctioned 'categories of suspicion' and political offences, most usually termed ‘public order’, 
‘subversive’, or 'domestic extremist' threats.  This includes a growing number of specialist police 
units and agencies that have been created for the detection and suppression of political dissent, 
many of which are frequently deployed at counter-summits. In so doing, within the UK context, the 
co-ordinated nature of state players appears to challenge the proposed internally conflicted model 
of the state outlined by Jasper's (2015) and other 'strategic interactionists' as heterogeneous and 
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multi-interested. For instance, Jaspers (2015:1) argues that “in almost no cases does 'the state' act 
as a unified player."  
The broader point here is to grasp the relationship between the state and social movements and the 
extent to which the key state players pursue the same goals, the police, officials and government. 
Moreover, there are now a number of summit protests which have demonstrated how the forms 
and methods of policing operations have exceeded legal limits in what are Western liberal 
democracies to those who are labelled internally by the authorities as representing political threats, 
although the precise construction of this threat can take a number of forms.  
There has been little research which has examined how regular uniformed policing relates and 
compares to political policing. Another way of asking the question is the relations of political 
policing to the state and wider society. I have been arguing, along with others, that political policing 
is part of the larger exercise of political power, indeed it is interesting to note that similar 
techniques are used in political policing in both totalitarian and also democratic societies (Turk, 
1982). Political policing is employed for defining and controlling resistance to the political system, 
this is because political order and authority can never be completely realised by the authorities, and 
the actions of resistors become 'political criminality'. 
Writing in the 1980's and considering Western modern states, Turk predicted somewhat 
prophetically an increase in political policing, one which would be more concealed, more reliant on 
surveillance measures, and which was more dependent on subcontracting out some of these 
functions to the private sector. These developments were seen as increasing the struggle between 
resisters and political authorities, and when examined further, acts to undermine the liberal claim 
that the police are autonomous from state control. Bringing this discussion right up to date,  
domestic counter-terrorism measures have accelerated in the UK (and throughout other Western 
liberal states) this has increasingly resulted in a 'pre-crime' shift in criminal justice, "one which links 
coercive state actions to suspicion without the need for charge, prosecution or conviction" [...] and 
expands "the remit of the criminal law to include activities or associations that are deemed to 
precede the substantive offence targeted for prevention" (McCulloch & Pickering, 2009:641). This 
changing security and policing landscape has crucial implications for those wanting to dissent 
politically and to organise political protest actions. 
Whilst I have discussed at some lengths the rationale, logic and architecture of political policing, the 
traditional method of state repression has been far simpler - that of police violence (using a range of 
non-lethal and lethal weaponry). In one sense this is a complex topic, because the police enjoy 
considerable discretion in defining a 'public order' situation to intervene in, and then in any 
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application of force. This is true legally as well as operationally (in respect to devising police policy 
re ACPOs 'public order manual') and practically (a lot of police violence takes place away from public 
view making accountability and governance that much more difficult). The prevailing scholarly view 
has been to see a successive shift in how the police react to political mobilisation and protest. By 
and large the story presented over many decades is one of increasingly 'humane' policing or the 
civilising of policing, where the police show a more tolerant and consultative approach - meaning a 
reduction in the use of state violence and legal repression.  However, the reality is more complex 
and nuanced than this simple linear progression would have us believe, particularly when 
considering international summit events where there has been a resurgence of coercive and 
authoritarian policing. Any assessment also needs to fully consider the entire spectrum of measures 
directed towards controlling political dissent, as well as all the state and non-state players involved 
















In this chapter I will outline my research approach and describe the methods used in this study.  I 
will explain the fundamental principles behind the research and how the different strands of the 
study fit together, or perhaps more accurately, came together. I will then discuss how the research 
was conducted, the contribution of the chosen approach to the preparation for the fieldwork, 
including its unique benefits, difficulties and limitations. I will rehearse (but not resolve) the ethical 
issues which emerged and provide a reflexive account of undertaking the research, including its 
covert aspects. I feel this last element is worthwhile because one of the key methods, ethnography, 
is itself a reflexive process (Hammersley & Atkinson, 2014) and is a commitment to deliberating on 
observations, reflections, and records. 
In the introduction, I identified that my central concern was to understand the social control of 
dissent taking place at international summits in the UK, and not simply of protest 'events'.  My 
approach to this research is to view summits from a broadly ethnographic point of view. Over the 
course of the study, I've spent a lot of time attending, marching, chatting, sitting, squatting, 
running, dodging police lines, standing around or simply gazing at the summits and the many 
protests activities around them. The simplest question that I have been trying to understand is; 
what is going on? It is this that I have tried to make sense of, why the summits take the form they 
do? What unwraps and explains them? I draw conceptually upon Foucault (1977) and acknowledge 
the growing number of other researchers intellectual contribution working in the social protest field   
(della Porta, 1995; della Porta & Tarrow, 2012; Starr et al, 2012; Scholl, 2014, to mention a few). I 
devote analytic attention to describing these sites of struggle during summit protests, how 
protestors saw the police and reacted to their social control tactics, and the tactical interactions 
between the parties. What I offer is an empirically generated theoretical discussion of a number of 
concepts which illustrate these particular forms of 'biopolitical' power, and crucially, how it is 
changing and evolving in response to activists own tactical repertoires. 
It might be helpful at this point to say what it is that I am not doing. This thesis is not an attempt to 
provide a full blown account or indeed ethnography of transgressive protest movements or its 
policing, it is not possible to provide any such 'complete ethnography' where one knows and tells 
the whole story. Whilst this is a work of social science which draws on empirical research, I have not 
aimed to systematically test ideas as with quantitative data as one would say, a reconviction study, 
to gauge the impact of an intervention (i.e. did the measure work?). This is because the arguments I 
put forward are largely the product of observation and not amenable to a tight theoretical 
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statement that leads to easily testable propositions. Even where I have sought 'hard data' for 
instance on protestors complaints against the police or protestor injuries at the hands of the police, 
I am more concerned with explaining and describing a phenomenon and developing theory than 
with testing a hypothesis. Rather, I am starting from an empirical topic that is politically and socially 
compelling and then inductively generating concepts from it. This is to take a more grounded 
theory type approach, where one generates concepts and theoretical propositions from 
observations rooted in empirical data, not from a priori assumptions. Glaser (1967) argues that 
conceptualisation is at the core of grounded theory, where emergence or 'sensitivity to context' 
play an important role. Such an approach lends itself to the investigation of identities, perceptions, 
and emotions, as well as cultural dimensions within social movements (della Porta, 2014:11). 
Whether one can actually free oneself of all preconceptions in collecting and analysing data as 
seemingly proposed by Glaser's position is an extraordinarily complex issue, but I doubt anyone 
really can. I do not resolve this issue, rather I try to avoid the pitfalls of ignoring it. Suffice to say that 
in making sense of my data I attempted to think with and through the data (Hammersley & 
Atkinson, 2007:168.) in order to engage with others findings, itself provoking why type questions 
and producing fruitful ideas. Throughout the emphasis is on' middle-range theory', rather than 
grand theory or empiricism, and here focused on a conceptual area of inquiry (formal theory)  
Finally, I should add that there is a slight of hand or perhaps 'retrospective falsification' in writing a 
methods chapter which purports to reconstruct a neat logical story represented in a formal doctoral 
outline. Some serendipity played a role, whilst other parts of the research have taken the form of a 
relatively unstructured opportunistic format. I did not undertake formal in-depth interviews with 
protestors, with pre-prepared questions digitally recorded, then transcribed, thematically coded 
and analysed and written up, as is routine in much qualitative study. I discovered that such an 
approach did not lend itself to the situations and constraints that I was so often in, especially 
activists fears over police infiltration. So I used lightly structured or 'controlled conversations' 
skewed towards the interests of the research which allowed me to continually talk with a wide 
range of people quickly and concisely (see Appendix 13. for a detailed breakdown of protestors 
across the respective case study sites).  This is not an exhaustive list of protestors that I spoke to as I 
had many casual conversations to gather information (opportunistic meetings or walking alongside 
protestors).  Otherwise I would observe and overhear protestors (at protest planning meetings and 
protest events) and follow a lot of people around to collect and collate 'ethnographic incidents' 
(Glaser, 1967) then integrate this with a range of other data sources. This means that the research 
problems are constructed partly during the fieldwork and one which allows for the emergence of 
new concepts, here being capable of addressing the research questions (della Porta 2014:6).  
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3.2 Contribution of the Research Design to the Research Study 
There are three main methods the social scientist uses to understand human behaviour; observing it 
in process, viewing written accounts of it from records, or asking questions about it and listening to 
the answers (Deutscher et al 1992).53 In this study, I have used all three, but very much veered 
towards qualitative methods because studying transgressive social movements does not lend itself 
to quantitative methods. 
Social control, or more critically, political repression is difficult to study, at least in its subtler covert 
forms, so my strategy has been to press into service every source of information of relevance that 
has been accessible to me. In fact, it is an irony that the organisations that have the most detailed 
insider knowledge about social movements, particularly transgressive ones, and the array, scope, 
and penetration of control measures taken against them, is also the most impenetrable for any 
researcher - being the National Public Order Intelligence Unit (NPOIU), NETCU (National Extremist 
Tactical Co-Ordination Unit)54 and the UK intelligence services (MI5). It is they who are eagerly 
gathering information any way they can, including across national borders, and could write the 
most authoritative and enlightening account. However, it is not my intention to assist them in any 
such venture (I provide a discussion of research ethics in section 3.7). 
Due to this diverse range of information in this study I use an integrative mixed methods design 
(MMD) combining a range of primary and secondary data sources (detailed in Table 1, below). The 
method attempts to concurrently integrate these data sets to build up a complete picture of how 
the state policed three international summits taking place in the UK. These act as a series of six case 
studies or 'workhorses of description' (Boykoff 2006:44) to illuminate what mechanisms and 
processes occur, here based on the protest locations; two in London (the G20 and G8) and two in 
Wales; Newport and Cardiff (G7).55  
The summits took place over a five-year period (see Table 1 below). As several of the summits saw 
protest action at other locations in addition to the actual summit sites, I have treated each as an 
individual case study (n=3) to form a multiple case study. The choice of the number of case studies 
was in part dependent on very practical considerations such as the external resources, capacity and 
self-funding available to me as a part-time doctoral researcher with a full-time position as a 
                                                          
53 This is not exhaustive as one thinks of 'sneaky measures' used in criminology such as conducting visual 
audits etc, where counting incidents of shattered glass on the pavement in a neighbourhood Indicates a 
break-in and theft from vehicles even though this may not result in a documented crime report. 
54 Later rebranded in 2010 as the National Domestic Extremism Unit (NDEU) but still run by ACPO. 
55 I also conducted field research in two further case studies areas for the G8; being in London and also in 
Northern Ireland (Belfast and Enniskillen (G8), however, I have concentrated this thesis to a discussion of the 
G20 and NATO summits. 
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Research Fellow. Whilst this provides a modest number of case studies, each case is of intrinsic 
interest and shows how social control of political dissent exists within particular cases. They can be 
conceived by what Stake (2005:445) terms 'instrumental case studies' (as opposed to 'intrinsic') 
where the case study plays a supportive role in facilitating understanding, here in how the state 
controls political dissent and its implications. It is less a question of the typicality of the case, but 
rather whether the case advances understanding and theorising. Studied jointly, they provide 
sufficient depth and number to be able to inform my research questions. Moreover, case studies are 
a commonly used method when examining violent repression of protests, one which allows 
theoretical development about the conditions that result in state-based violence (Poulos & Haddad, 
2016) although the theories cannot be tested (Adeola 2000; Roberts and Ash 2009; Downey et al. 
2010).  
Table 5: Summits Directly Observed by Author, Split by case Study Site 





Case Study Sites  
(n=6) 










NATO Wales  
 
2014 Newport  
 Cardiff 
 
The rationale for using an MMD conceptualisation is based on triangulation for convergent 
validation and operates rather like a cross tabulation in addressing the research aims and 
objectives. The research design was also sequential (Creswell et al, 2003) with data being collected 
in an initial stage, followed by the collection of the other data types during subsequent stages, in 
large part following the occurrence of the summits which acted as my unit of analysis. Time is hence 
a variable in the research, so, for instance, do summit control strategies vary over time and in ways 
that are theoretically significant - is there temporal variation in response to the G20 in London and 
the recommendations which flowed from the various official inquires into the policing operation? 
Has this witnessed an impact on how authorities control dissent in other ways? Having a sequential 
temporal order also has the benefits of learning as one goes along and refining research tools and 
practices in light of this. For me this included some very practical lessons that had to be learned 
retrospectively. For instance, I brought a (rather old) camera to take stills pictures of different 
players street tactics and use of space on the first G20 summit case study, particularly the police's 
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methods of spatial control.56 I quickly realised that this was pretty hopeless as it was difficult to use 
when in situations where there was up close confrontations with the police (in order to make a 
record of events). I later substituted this for a small compact 'press and record' single strapped 
hand-held video camera with a good zoom lens and angled viewing screen, plus a monopod.57     
3.2.1 The Benefits of an Ethnographic Orientation to the Research Study 
As I have been investigating how the state controls political dissent and the relationship between 
two principle types of players (state actors and protestors) I have chiefly been concerned to provide 
a fully contextualised approach, one which generates a rich detailed account of human experiences 
encompassing emotions, beliefs, and behaviours, whilst also examining narrative accounts located 
within the original context in which my observations occur. This all lends itself to a broadly 
qualitative method (Guba & Lincoln, 1994) informed by ethnographic traditions.  
A further concern is to draw conclusions based on people's actions, not simply on what people say. I 
am interested in how people actually behave on protest actions, and how they respond to the 
control repertoires of the authorities. Jerolmack, et al (2014) argues that many sociologists who rely 
on interview and survey approaches often end up conflating self-reports with behaviour and in 
doing so commit an 'attitudinal fallacy'. This means they falsely infer situated behaviour from a 
verbal account of it. Social psychologists have long recognised that people's attitudes and 
dispositions provide only poor predictors of their behaviour in comparison to situations they find 
themselves in (Ross and Nisbet, 1991). This is a methodological health warning for anyone who 
privileges verbal accounts when explaining social behaviour. The corrective is to study naturalistic 
interaction in order to escape the attitudinal fallacy (Jerolmack, 2014:186). Consequently, I have 
given priority to the ethnographic data because of its richness but attempted an integrative mixed 
methods approach where there is a degree of triangulation and parallelism in the study design. As 
long as one is aware of the assumptions underlying different approaches such that they are not 
incompatible, this is a viable approach. As della Porta & Keating (2014:8) notes, "This means 
challenging a vision in which each method necessarily belongs to a certain epistemological and 
ontological pillar, and instead presenting each method within the deferent conception to which it 
has contributed."  
                                                          
56 At the time I was still in that small minority of people who had not seen fit to buy a smart phone, a decision I 
came to bitterly regret.  
57 I found that this equipment is ideal as it allows you to work all aspects of the camera with one hand only 
whilst being able stay agile (including full sprints) without dropping the camera. Combined with a small and 
very light collapsible monopod and the retractable angled viewing screen (pointing down to show the 
operator what is being filmed) allows the camera to be elevated to capture what is taking place ahead of you 
but difficult (or dangerous) to access, notably when in confined spaces such as a police kettle or where one's 
view is obscured (being kept behind police lines). 
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My research questions initially arose from previous protest activities, and what I saw (and read). I 
had been dissatisfied with much previous work in the area, seeing it as too focused on  presenting a 
neutral arena of 'protest policing' (for instance in the work of Waddington, 1992; King & 
Waddington, 2004; Reading & Waddington, 1987; Della Porta & Dani, 2006; Gellner & Toch, 1996; 
Sklansky, 2008; including the more critical voices such as Jefferson, 1987; Jefferson & Grimshaw, 
1984). As Scholl notes (2014:52) such an analysis too readily proceeds on a normative assumption, 
viewing disruption as invariably undesirable and public order policing as the necessary response. 
'Pacified protest' becomes the undeclared but desirable outcome, itself the unacknowledged 
standpoint of liberal democracy. This position sidelines the consideration that ‘public disorder' is 
socially and politically constructed. As Lacey (et al. 2010:135) counsels, we need to remember 
whose view of order, 'public order’ is. The focus of much of this previous work concerns the 
relationship of this harder edge policing to ('a representative') democratic order, one which 
continually asks how we make public order policing more democratic. What gets submerged are 
both the explicit state interests in maintaining a particular public order and the subtle and less 
visible forms of social control which are enacted to uphold it. This is to look beyond those features 
most recognisable from a protestors perspective as repression, namely the most extreme acts of 
police violence and the proliferation of a host of statutory provisions and criminal regulation, to 
consider a wider view. Hence Starr (et al 2011) argues for a broader analysis of the social control of 
political dissent. Scholl (2012:54) goes further still, asserting that public order policing scholarship is 
"complicit in the ruling regime of social control" because it reifies the social processes behind 
concrete repressive acts and "reproduces the assumption of necessary control in its analytical 
categories." 
Finally, the feasibility of accessing senior police who declined to be involved in the research and 
their 'partner agencies' (primarily national and foreign security services and their various 
contractors) and my concern to examine the impacts of state repression, naturally led to a focus on 
'the policed', rather than the agents of social control. This also points to a basic problem of 
organisational sociology, that security organisations have no interest in becoming an object of 
research unless it serves the organisations own purposes (Ullrich, 2018). Whilst they are not entirely 
hermetically sealed - one can observe their actions and tactics on the ground - they control access 
to the field internally, and as many other policing researchers have discovered, the secrecy interests 
of such organisations and desire to avoid any reputational damage preclude access.  
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3.3 Data Sources 
Data sources for this study comes from a combination of primary sources: an ethnographic study 
(including photographic records), interviews, freedom of information requests, online media 
forums, and secondary sources: official and NGO reports, court records, newspaper accounts, and 
academic literature. I had attempted unsuccessfully to obtain NHS accident and emergency data 
(A&E) (discussed further in 3.5.1 below). Table 2 (below) details these data sources along with the 
data requirements of each. I now discuss the primary and secondary data sources in turn below, and 
provide a further rationale and consider their problems and limitations.
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Table 6: Data Collection and Data Source Chart 





 Case study sites (n=6)  Behaviour, attitudes and beliefs of protestors. 
 Behaviour of police and other authorities 
 Tactical interactions: 
o Social control repertoire of state authorities (textures of control) and 
adaption by police and protestors 
 Spatial dynamics and interactions in controlling dissent: 
o Police strategy 
o mobile blockades 
o reduction of anonymous and safe space 








 Political and economic dimensions to summit 
 Tensions and collateral costs to the locality 
 Medical personnel  Potential for head injuries from Police impact weapons 
 Information on potential delayed complications 
 Police officers - Public Order 
Unit 
 Details of police public order training, weapon handling, and operational tactics; 
 Details of command structure and supervision during public disorder events 
Newspaper  and 
News Media 
Accounts 
 Local, national and 
international press  
 Online news organisations 
 Behaviour, attitudes and beliefs of protestors. 
 Police perspective Details of security operation and accompanying justifications 
 Behaviour of police and other authorities (including spokesman) 
 Tensions and collateral costs to the locality 
 




Retrospective chart review of 
individuals: 
o Presenting to A&E 
o Paramedics stationed at scene 
of conflict 
o Transported by Emergency 
 Number of injured crowd members; 
 Injury pattern and extent of trauma; 
 Level of force used against protestors/ crowd; 
 Use of LL impact weapons and zone of impact (Red; Amber; Green) 
 Type of weapon used 
 Anatomic Impact Sites: pattern of injury 




 Number of hits received 
 Injury Pattern 







 Officer use of force and other 
critical incident reporting (by 
individual officers); 
 Fellow officer reporting of 
police misconduct and 
brutality; 
 Details of MPS’s investigations 
and disciplinary actions 
against officers; 
 Other police investigations 
that could have a bearing on 
detecting police misconduct;  
 Details of external oversight 
mechanisms and/or early 
officer intervention systems 
(how these function, their 
scope, 
 Formal complaints by alleged 
victims of police misconduct 
and brutality made to MPS 
 The nature and level of both police force and citizen resistance; 
 Account for multiple uses of both force and resistance; 
 Description of temporal sequencing—the behaviours as they occurred and which 
were prior to others (e.g., a citizen struggles to evade an officer, the officer applies 
a pain compliance hold, the citizen strikes the officer, and the officer uses their 
baton). 
 Frequency of Police misconduct 
 Number of Officers accused of misconduct 
 Nature of misconduct 
 Weapons used by the officer 
 Unauthorised/excessive force complaints 
 Percentage of arrests resulting in excessive force complaint 
 Discourtesy complaints 
 Removal of Police identification tag 
 Sustained complaints 
 Legal cases filed 
 Claims filed 
 £ paid out 
 Legal cases closed or settled 








 IPCC police complaints data 
 IPCC investigations 
a. case notes*  
(in discussion with 
IPCC for access) 
 
 Formal complaints by alleged victims of police misconduct and brutality; 
 Outcomes of IPCC decision regards formal complaints  
 Disciplinary action against officer/group by relevant Police Forces 





Video footage:  
 
 Mainstream media news 
reporting; 
 Indi-Media clips and postings 
of footage showing policing of 
the case study demonstrations 
and disorder. 
 
 The nature and level of both police force and citizen resistance; 
 Account for multiple uses of both force and resistance; 
 Description of temporal sequencing—the behaviours as they occurred and which 
were prior to others (e.g., a citizen struggles to evade an officer, the officer applies 
a pain compliance hold, the citizen strikes the officer, and the officer uses their 
baton). 
 Description police escalation of force in “small increments” in reference to the level 
of resistance encountered. 
 Use the: Resistance Force Comparative Scale (RFCS) to provide a series of Force 
Factor Scores no resistance (level 1) and a verbal command (level 2) would fall 
within the continuum (i.e., commensurate force); verbal resistance (level 2) and a 
'takedown' manoeuvre (level 4) would indicate a higher level of force than the 
continuum provides (i.e., more force); defensive resistance (level 3) and verbal 
force (level 2) would indicate a lower level of force than the continuum provides 
(i.e., less force). The entire string of sequences is examined and a determination is 
made as to whether the continuum is followed as a whole. 
 Whether level of force used is commensurate to the level of citizen resistance 
encountered. 
 Justifiability of level of force used. 
 Measure how officers respond to various levels of resistance with similar levels of 
force: 
o Determine whether an incremental approach is used when applying force.  
o Determine if an officer  
(Identify potential illegal police violence 
 Action of Supervisors and/or line officers - did they intervene when another officer 
is using excessive force against a subject. 
 The RFCS will also be used in conjunction with video clip evidence of strike area 
hits in respect of the RAG criteria. 
Official Reports 
and Inquiries into 
the policing of the 
G20, Anti-Cuts 
 Judicial Inquiries; 
 Think tanks and independent 
research organisations; 
 Police Organisational Reports 
 Behaviour of police and other authorities 
 Behaviour, attitudes and beliefs of protestors. 
 Details of operational police plan and intelligence; 
a. Timeline of Events and police control actions 
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demonstrations 
and inner city 
‘riots’: 
 
(HMIC. ACPO etc.) 
 Parliament and other 
associated Governmental 
Reports (i.e. Taylor Review 
into Police Disciplinary 
Arrangements, 2005)  
 Academic papers; 
 
 Details of command structure and supervision during public disorder events; 
 Eye witness testimony 
 Expert witness testimony 
 Formal complaints by alleged victims of police misconduct and brutality; 
 Number of Officers accused of misconduct 
 Nature of misconduct; 
 Weapons used by officers; 
 Outcomes of decision regards formal complaints;  
 Disciplinary action against officer/group by relevant Police Forces  
 
Court Records 
pertaining to the 
case studies: 
 
 Court documents pertaining to 
Criminal proceedings taken 
against the police;   
 Court documents pertaining to 
Civil actions against the Police. 
 
 Type of weapon used 
o Only blunt weapon 
o Only sharp weapon 
o Blunt and sharp weapon 
 Anatomic Impact Sites: pattern of injury 
 Number of hits received 
 Injury Pattern 
 Injury pattern and extent of trauma; 
 Level of force used against protestors/ crowd; 
 Use of LL impact weapons and zone of impact (Red; Amber; Green) 





 Information provided by 
observers on the ground 
o Independent legal 
observers  
o Legal Defence and 
Monitoring Groups.  
 The nature and level of both police force and citizen resistance; 
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3.4 Primary Data Sources 
3.4.1 Ethnographic Data 
The ethnographic elements of the fieldwork took a total of nearly four months across the six case 
studies and constituted the most intensive period of fieldwork. The advantage with ethnography is 
it directly observes behaviour, including the before and after events of that behaviour. This allows 
an understanding of the significance and consequences that state control has on protestors 
themselves, their adaptive tactics and mindsets. To do this meant embedding myself within the 
protestor camps in the run up to summits as well as during and after the summit. There was a 
number of reasons for this. Participating in the everyday life of the camps allowed a unique insight 
into a 'hard core' of protestors, their action plans but also their deliberations and concerns across a 
range of issues (security arrangements, media liaison, organisational structure etc.). It furnishes 
more information on how people define a situation, their face to face encounters, what Goffman 
(1961) called the 'interaction order'. It also presented opportunities to directly view the front-line 
work of Police Liaison Officers (PLO's) their attempted and successful contacts with protestors, in 
addition to the substantive wider event policing operation to control the protest camp as it was 
being set up and during its short lifespan (i.e. intelligence gathering, liaison, harassment, and a 
range of enforcement practices etc.).  
3.4.2 Pre-field Preparation  
My desire to study the states control of political dissent and protestor movements stems primarily 
from my past activism.  In my student days, I had been involved in a range of left-wing and anarchist 
political movements. I had helped establish and run the Exeter Anti-Poll Tax Federation and was an 
active member of an activist network in East Oxford, including taking part in Anti-Fascist Action 
(AFA) events and a range of social justice issues locally and nationally. After being out of the activist 
scene for over a decade, I became involved in the Northern Police Monitoring Group (NPMG) and 
some other campaigning and direct action groups.   
These combined experiences had sparked my academic interest in public order policing and police 
violence gained from attending demonstrations and actions and mobilisations. During this time, I 
had closely followed earlier summits protests in North American and continental Europe and felt an 
affinity to the protest movements taking place there. In 2005 I followed the G8 Gleneagles protest 
in Scotland as a 'complete observer' (Gold, 1958) by reading forum posts of different networks and 
following the more mainstream media coverage as well as the alternative sites such as Indymedia. 
Several friends attended the summit protests so I later gained those direct accounts of proceedings 
(but was not able to attend myself due to my own work commitments). What I learned about the 
Page 71 of 407 
 
policing operation and how protestors had been treated fed my desire to study how the state 
controls political dissent at summit protests as a doctoral thesis.  
All of this meant I was not a novice to the field role. If anything the danger lay in suspending my 
preconceptions, whether these derive from social science or from everyday knowledge to ‘fight 
familiarity’ (Delamont and Atkinson 1995, in Hammersley & Atkinson, 2007:80). I devised a 
shopping list of issues that I was interested in, that and the nature of the summit settings shaped 
many of the research questions (the 'foreshadowed problems'). The topics ranged from authority’s 
covert forms of social control, the 'hierarchical micro-management of demonstrations' (Vitale, 
2005), the pre-emptive measures aimed at intervening downstream well before any protestor 
(including disruptive) behaviour takes place, as well as examining any acts of police violence in 
response to protest events unfolding, as well as how protestors reacted to all of this.  
Practical preparations involved buying some basic equipment, a small rucksack which would allow 
me to take my belongings if need be on protest actions but not be too bulky to slow me down. I was 
aware that I may need to remain agile and be able to run. Aware of impression management and 
the need to establish good field relations, I 'dressed down' less personal appearance get in the way. 
This meant wearing old jeans and scruffy t-shirts to facilitate rapport 'in the field' and reduce 
differences. Other aspects of self-presentation. such as speech and demeanor I adjusted to 
conditions and who I was speaking to. None of this was difficult or especially contrived to achieve.  
3.4.3 Gaining Access 
The pre-fieldwork phase along with my reading of the literature had given me some insight into the 
formulation and clarification of research problems, and my previous experiences of being a 
protestor had provided a number of hunches and concerns that I knew I wanted to focus on. My 
initial strategy was to gain a deep connection to activist communities and thereby allow me to do 
the qualitative research. The actual gaining of access to the protests and the protest sites was in 
many (but not all) cases relatively easy but very much depended upon which particular protest 
group I was accessing and where I was intending to go. Anyone can, in principle, of course, enter 
public domains, attend open meetings, and take part in a march or demonstration. No process of 
negotiation is required for that. Nevertheless, gaining access to some planning meetings (both 
before and during summit protests) and to several convergence centers posed more difficult 
problems. Activists communities, especially the more transgressive elements face a dilemma, on 
the one hand, they want to politicise a wider population and build a broad-based movement to 
more effectively challenge hegemonic power structures, at the same time they need to keep some 
particulars of targets and tactics secret from an all too interested police force. This is complicated 
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by groups often endorsing a form of radical democratic decision making where tactics and actions 
are openly discussed, at least within affinity groups. In practice, this meant instigating a number of 
security procedures to try as best they could to ensure that this information was not easily 
obtainable to the police.  
Negotiating access here also threw up some ethical considerations as I was very much aware that 
academic researchers were rarely held in high esteem amongst the protest groups I was most 
interested in. This was learned in part from the previous contact I had, but also came across from 
my reading of some remarks on the protest chat rooms and comments lists in the preparation 
phase of the research. My concern was not to alienate myself from the protestors by declaring that 
my main purpose was to 'study' the social control of political dissent and hence the protest activities 
taking place over the duration of the summits, although when I did discuss this I typically indicated 
that my research interests lay in police activities and the wider security apparatus making up the 
central objects of study. I also emphasised that I was a protestor as well but who was also 
undertaking a Ph.D. in the area. However, this wasn't helped by turning up alone and having been 
out of the protestor world for some time. I was also now a white middle-aged (middle class) male of 
conventional demeanour, the hallmarks of an off-duty policeman, at least to some!  
Certainly, some of the protestors at each of the convergence centres were suspicious of my 
intentions, there were times when several openly questioned me and raised the issue that they 
thought I might be an undercover police officer or infiltrator on behalf of the police or intelligence 
services. This, of course, is hard to refute! How does one prove that you are not an undercover 
copper sent to spy on protestors? Whilst causing me at times some serious difficulties, negotiating 
access at some of these critical points did generate some important knowledge about the level of 
suspicion in the minds of protestors. They were acutely aware of police infiltration into the 
convergence centres and actively guarded against it. So whilst I had gained access, the problem of 
access was not resolved once I was inside. Not everyone was willing to talk, and even some of the 
most willing weren't always prepared to divulge all the information available to them. So whilst I 
remained sensitive to issues of access at different domains this restricted what I could do. That said, 
negotiating access generated some important insights about the field (I discuss the wider 
implications in further detail in my findings chapter 7). There is nothing that I could do in this 
difficult situation but to carry on as best as I could. To try and build trust and rapport I got to know 
as many people as I could. As I shared many of the views and was broadly sympathetic to the goals 
and ambitions of the movements, for instance, I didn't support NATO and found it relatively easy to 
speak at length about sustained criticisms of the organisation. The financial crash of 2008 and 
ensuing global recession at the hands of a financial elite was another easy entrance point and 
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conversation piece. This helped putt some people at ease and I would ignore some protestors gripes 
about ‘academics’. However, there is no doubt that the rather stark question of being a potential 
undercover police officer stuck with me throughout the fieldwork phase. 
3.4.4 Entering the field. 
My aim was to be at the centre of the protest action where ever possible. As I was also interested in 
the form that the authority’s security operations took and its evolution, this meant visiting the sites 
and surrounding area at least a week prior to the actual summit event taking place, living at the 
various convergence centres for the duration of the summits or where protest events were taking 
place (as in Belfast and London) and taking part in as many protest events as I could feasibly 
manage. The locations of convergence centres were advertised on the web, and through 
Indymedia, and there would be an indication of the planned protests activities.  
3.4.5 The Fieldwork and Field Relations  
My primary concern was with eliciting information rather than with documenting perspectives, so 
sampling was less important here. When I spoke to people it was usually one at a time and on a one-
to-one basis, thereby providing greater confidentiality. Other times I listened in on group 
discussions which could provide considerable insight into protestor culture and thinking. These 
discussions took place in and around convergence centres, on key headline and officially authorised 
demonstrations (where there would often be a lot of waiting around) and at some protest events, 
but more usually on downtime periods. Most of the time I would be on the protestors 'territory' 
which allows them to organise the context in a way they want - this usually took the form of 
informal chats which are by their nature less threatening than say a formal interview. Throughout I 
used active listening to what is being said in order to assess how it relates to the research focus. 
I made efforts to try and ensure a wide coverage of protest and dissent activities rather than just 
singling out the superficially interesting event. Here the categories of gender, race, and ethnicity 
were less important. Age, on the other hand, was important. At the risk of gross generalisation, the 
transgressivie majority of the protestors who were most active and in the convergence centres were 
younger (under 30) although by no means all. 
Detailed field notes were taken throughout the ethnographic study days and were a central 
research activity. These were recorded in a notebook at opportune moments throughout the day 
and evenings when events allowed. When to record my observations certainly presented me with 
some problems, largely because of the sense of suspicion if seen busily jotting down notes in a 
notepad - these were justified concerns about police spying that many protestors had. This left me 
with a dilemma, I had told others about my study, but still felt self-conscious writing field notes in 
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view of other protestors. I was eager not to generate distrust or distraction. Considering the level of 
suspicion I felt that note taking was not congruent with the setting I was often in. Because of this, I 
had to make jottings, snatched in the course of observed action, sometimes just a few words as a 
marker for an important point for me to come back later to, an aid memoir if you like. I would then 
wait for a more opportune time to work these up into a more detailed concrete account developed 
from the earlier jottings, filling in the gaps later on.  
I found that the days usually provided me with some openings to do this. Sometimes I would simply 
need to remove myself to the periphery of the setting (away from the convergence centre) to 
record what had occurred and details of the policing operation. I needed to be opportunistic here, 
so I would grab any down time to write notes, often I would do this late at night, when others were 
sleeping or in the day, in a quiet space out of view.  Despite these limitations, note taking was 
carried out with as much thoroughness and detail as I could manage. Where ever possible I would 
aim to make notes as soon as feasible after the observed action to avoid details getting muddied or 
lost in the passage of time.  
Where I was uncertain about something, either what happened or what was said, I would highlight 
this in the field notes. I was also careful to distinguish my own descriptive accounts from what was 
said to me - the 'voices' - in the notes both the accounts provided by participants and my own 
descriptions of actions and situations, on the other (I placed analytic notes in squared brackets to 
differentiate this material in the fieldwork journal). Whilst this was necessarily a selective process in 
what I recorded, I aimed to capture as much as possible. I followed the maxim ‘if in doubt, write it 
down’. I had my topic guide and key research questions in mind but recorded anything I thought 
significant.  
Field notes were also used to record data from conversations and informal interviews. In order to 
make this manageable.  I used headings to indicate the context of the particular note, so, time 
points and settings to record who was present, where, at what time, and under what circumstances. 
On some of the case studies, information about the research setting was also added to by the 
photographic record, especially around protest actions and the wider security operation in place at 
summits. I did not use any audio recording whilst engaged in the ethnographic element of the 
study, only in the more formal interviewing that took place at other times during the data collection 
period (i.e. local councillors for the area). The field notes were transcribed more or less soon after 
the observational element ended to maximise detail and concrete descriptions and provide the best 
quality data I could.  
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3.4.6  Leaving the field 
Leaving the field rarely presented any particular difficulties for me, in part because 'the setting' 
itself disintegrates quite rapidly and usually within about a week of the summit formally ending. 
There is a natural ebbing away of protestors as people pack up and leave and the massive security 
operations wind down. This was relatively easy and did not require any negotiation. Much of the 
time this was just saying goodbye to a few people who I had gotten to know and exchanging 
contact details in order to chase up leads and feedback data and findings or exchange views. This 
was also a nice way of smoothing the departure. I often left the field with mixed feelings, some 
sadness, but also with a little relief that I would be returning to my 'normal life'. 
3.4.7 Limitations of Ethnography 
The weaknesses of ethnography are well known and relate to the generalisabiltiy of ethnographic 
work beyond those actually studied, or because only a single or a small number of cases are studied. 
Nevertheless, generalisability is not my primary concern as the case studies were of intrinsic 
interest in they allowed a close study of the mechanisms and techniques of social control at 
international summits. As my overarching aim is about theory development, I followed a more 
theoretical sampling approach (Glaser and Strauss 1967) where a small number of cases, were 
designed to highlight properties of a particular category.  
The choice of taking a broadly ethnographic approach also raises some difficult epistemological 
questions. I found myself continually returning to this and never fully resolving it. On the one hand I 
have wanted to embrace a 'critical social science perspective', one which explicitly acknowledges 
that all social inquiry necessarily participates in regimes of power/knowledge, and as such is well 
suited to understanding modern institutions that exercise power in society or ideological 
dominance, thereby linking interpretive and explanatory interests to normative concerns. This is to 
disavow the model of a detached neutral and disinterested observer and take a position as an 
activist.  
3.4.8 Photography and video recording  
As I noted earlier this evolved over time from lessons learned in the field. After the combative 
events of the G20 I adopted a small handheld digital camcorder which could also take digital stills to 
record elements of the various policing and security operations. Some 500+ still photographs were 
taken and 9 hours of video were shot throughout the fieldwork. The video recordings were indexed 
and filed. This digital photography was used to record aspects of the policing operations, not 
protestor actions or what occurred in the protester camps due to the need (where ever feasible) to 
keep protestor identities confidential.  This is probably somewhat futile as an effort due to the 
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authorities overbearing surveillance they were continually under, nevertheless, diplomacy and 
respect for activist sensibilities dictated I took no recordings here. Doing so would also have further 
reinforced some protestors hunch that I was indeed an undercover police officer.  
Images acted as both an aide memoir to field-note taking and a record of the physical security 
structures and technologies of control, this included 'protection' measures such as barriers, fences 
and other physical target hardening and social control features located both at the summit 
perimeter and their encroachment into previously open civic spaces (i.e. city centre shopping areas, 
parks, and streets). Part of my aim here is to display social practices and power relations visually - a 
'critical visual methodology' (Rose, 2012) if you like, one which visualises technological structures, 
infrastructure, and institutional power and maps how territorialisation and deterritorialisation affect 
the boundaries of physical spaces and social order. This is to focus on temporary structures and 
institutions, and I have tried to depict and logic and a practice, one which emphasises the 
connections and visual co-existence between security and surveillance. Here I am interested in 
documenting the boundaries between security and the every day as it is imposed at summit 
locations. In fact there is an emerging genre of this type of photography practiced by artists such as 
Trevor Paglen and Simon Norfolk58 which aims to 'visualise' securitized environments (Anderson & 
Moller (2013:204) which has some relevance for my own efforts. I am also interested in how the 
assemblages of this security and surveillance infrastructure manifest itself, how it is controlled and 
institutionally legitimised, and well as acts of resistance or contestation to it (if at all). A further 
concern is to capture any techniques of normalisation, in other words, were any efforts made to 
soften or disguise some of these militaristic measures by the different authorities. Anderson & 
Moller (2013:217) in their discussion of photography, security, and surveillance, argue that 
"photography can serve as encouragement for resistance to taken-for-granted and increasingly 
invisible forms of security governance ..."  This does not, of course, capture those security practices 
that are purposefully hidden, either by their remote distance from any interested viewer or what is 
obscured by other means. 
The other reason for using digital photography was to capture the more traditional repression 
practices, being incidents of police violence as well as police deployments, tactics, and procedures.  
Atkinson and Hammersley (2014:148) note that photography has only been employed more 
recently, for the most part, in sociology and some other disciplines (Collier and Collier 1986; Ball and 
Smith 1992, 2001; Harper 1993, 2000, 2006). Such data can also be illuminating in making sense of 
how participants consume spaces and objects, or how they move in given environments. Using such 
                                                          
58 http://www.simonnorfolk.com ‘Ascension Island: The Panopticon (ECHELON for beginners)’  
Page 77 of 407 
 
visual materials helps to further understand social action and social organisation. The photographs 
and the video recordings were then incorporated into some elements of the fieldwork to inform the 
ethnography. The main omission here is that I did not have video capture at the G20 protests when 
it was most needed. 
3.4.9 Interviewing 
Other primary data includes conducting a small number of interviews with Police (MPS Public Order 
Unit)59 and Medics (n=3). The opportunity to speak directly with a senior officer responsible for 
policing public order arose from one of my earlier detailed FoI’s. It was simple good fortune that the 
officer contacted me by telephone and was prepared to address my FoI verbally (thereby saving 
time is responding in writing) allowing me the opportunity to ask a number of follow-up questions 
and clarify both matters of legality with officer’s use of less than lethal weapons as well as 
operational police policies. This was the only formal interview that I conducted with any senior 
police officer for this study.  I also conducted three telephone interviews with two consultants and 
one registrar at two large NHS hospitals in Yorkshire. The medics had significant experience in 
diagnosing and treating head traumas and worked in neurology services as well as Accident and 
Emergency medicine. Participants were selected on this basis, and from a snowball sample from my 
original neurology contact (see Appendix 1 for copies of the interview schedule)   
More generally I have had informal 'chats' with serving police officers on duty at summits where I 
have discussed policing arrangements and practices (approx n=25). These have all been frontline 
officers rather than more senior personnel (i.e. bronze, silver, gold commanders60) and I was 
interested in  garnering their views of the summit arrangements in respect to the proportionality of 
the operation; the cost of the operation; their views on protestors tactics and police tactics and 
measures. Whilst I have  subsumed this under 'interviewing' it would more accurately be considered  
opportunistic 'controlled conversations'. The mass police presence at these events meant that there 
were many periods of inactivity offering chances to 'chat'. Those that were willing to engage (many 
were not, only offering the standard stock responses; 'above my pay grade mate'; 'the bosses don't 
tell us what's going on'; 'no idea mate, I'd have to ask the boss man') some would be prepared to 
engage in a less guarded fashion. This is not to suggest that I have a representative picture of police 
officer’s views on these matters, far from it, only that some comments from officers can be 
revealing. 
                                                          
59 This was not specific to any summit policing operation but rather police use of force practices in public order 
policing more generally. 
60 This refers to the command structure which operates in policing and found for large events policing. 
Page 78 of 407 
 
I also conducted a small number of interviews with councilors and other representatives in Wales to 
further my understanding of the governance and political economy of summit social control. More 
specialised data was gathered from key informants, here people from advocacy networks such as 
Fitwatch and Netpol, several of which were taking part in the demonstrations, allowing me to 
converse with them at different touch points.  
The formal interviewing used a series of semi-structured interview schedules designed around the 
different parties. Each interview lasted between 30 minutes and up to an hour. This was deemed 
suitable for the various duty holders such as councilors, MP's as they were familiar with their use. 
The analytic design of the interview schedules often required the use of prompting and probing 
skills to elicit the richest data and cover relevant issues.  
3.4.10  Freedom of Information Requests 
I have made extensive use of Freedom of Information (FOI’s) requests to obtain more specific 
information from a range of statutory agencies such as the Home Office, Ministry of Defence, the 
Metropolitan Police (MPS), and the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI). My FoI strategy reflected 
my wider data source strategy in the early stages of the research, what Larsen and Walby (2012:23) 
aptly call 'muckraking sociology'. I requested from MPS, Gwent Police (and local and national 
government agencies) all submitted FOI's which had applied for information on any aspect of the 
three summits, which I submitted at least six months after the said summits in order to maximise 
the capture of relevant requests.61  
As Brown (2009:88) argues, FOI's are a 'potentially powerful research tool' for criminological 
researchers but underused by the research community. This usefulness is echoed in the Canadian 
context by Hewitt (2012:195) writing in the UK, who notes that his historical research on the 
Canadian security state “would not have been possible” without the Access to Information Act 
(ATIA).62 Interestingly, Hewitt is one of the several authors to note a considerable tightening of 
information release from ATIA's since the events of 9/11.  
Having used FOI's previously as a researcher, I was aware that they could act as an important lever 
in dealing with what are otherwise highly secretive organisations. Moreover, even refusals and the 
public interest tests they sometimes invoke could provide some interesting clues on the subject at 
hand. This wasn't without its frustrations, though, experience with FOI's for this study has generally 
confirmed the argument that agencies find ways to protect sensitive information and thereby 
                                                          
61 I owe this tactic to Kevin Walby, Associate Professor of Criminal Justice, University of Winnipeg, Canada, 
after a skype chat having earlier delved into his and Mike Larson's excellent 'Brokering Access: Power, politics 
and Freedom of Information Process in Canada' (2012) UBC Press, Vancouver, Canada. 
62 The Canadian Access to Information Act is similar to the UK's Freedom of Information Act. 
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undermine the right as well as the spirit of the FOI Act. Grossly inflated costs estimates for the 
work, delays in response and provision, and refusal notices were routine.  This reflects the long-
established cultures of secrecy in government and other public bodies bolstered by the large 
number of absolute exemptions available to responding authorities, notably any information 
regards what is considered to be 'national security.'63  
I did have some successes in gaining information however, although there was some variability by 
the agency. I found that MPS were especially intransigent when it came to FOI's. The most blatant 
example of this was a very detailed FoI I submitted (see Appendix 13) regards officer reporting of 
fellow officer malpractice and other associated issues during the G20 policing operation. It took me 
over one year to obtain the requested data and this was after several interventions on my behalf by 
the Information Commissioner's Office (ICO) to require MPS to relinquish the information. The 
statutory time limit to respond by a public agency is a maximum of twenty working days, and if 
there is a public interest test, a further twenty days is applicable. As there was no public interest test 
that MPS could legitimately require, my inordinate wait for the rather revealing data is that much 
more reprehensible, as was the ineffectual interventions of the ICO.64 My conjecture was that MPS 
recognised they had no legitimate grounds in which to deny me the data, so they prolonged my 
wait in order to reduce the potential for reputational damage to the organisation. Officer 
malpractice was a particularly sensitive issue for them as their policing operation had been widely 
criticised in a number of official reviews. Delaying the release of the information was thus a tactic to 
dilute its impact as information coming so far after the event is diminished in its news value.   
Moreover, and unlike Brown's experiences, I found that my when my FoI requests were met with 
conditional exemptions which required the application of a public interest test, each was either 
entirely (or less frequently) very largely found against me by the 'independent reviewer.'65 Likely 
this was due to the sensitive nature of the material I was requesting which often concerned 
procedures and practices of the various security operations at the summits which officials define as 
within a national security context, whereas Brown's was also researching within the criminal justice 
system but examining state responses to anti-social behaviour. 
                                                          
63 What constitutes 'national security' is a moot point, when invoked, national security is a broad, sweeping 
concept and tends to be treated by the judiciary as  an undifferentiated term but is a at heart a political 
concept. 
64 In personal discussions with the ICO they admitted to the difficulties they faced in getting obstructionist 
public authorities to comply with FoIs and that they were largely reliant upon the good will of the 
organisation, with naming and shaming and imposing a fine being an absolute last resort option when all 
other appeals had failed.  
65 Such independent reviewers are members of the organisation one is asking information of, which does 
some considerable violence to the notion of 'independence'. 
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The FOI's legislation can be conceived in a Foucauldian (1971) sense as a 'system of exclusions'.  So 
whilst FoIs are far from being a cure-all to this culture of secrecy, they are a useful method for 
extracting some very limited information where it would otherwise not be available (see Appendix 
13.3 which details my FoI applications).  
3.5 Secondary Data Sources 
A number of secondary data sources are used to provide a complete picture of the policing 
operation at these summits. 
3.5.1 NHS Data 
The original intention in this study was to obtain NHS Reception Hospital Accident & Emergency 
Data (triage) and Emergency Vehicle Data & on-site paramedic data) to gauge the number of 
injuries to protestors and hence a measure police violence. This is only particular to the G20 where 
there was widespread police violence. I was not attempting to account for all 'use of force' by the 
police but only to gain a more accurate picture of the most serious and potentially life-threatening 
injuries caused by 'non-lethal' weapons, principally when violence does occur, a baton blow to 'high 
risk' areas of the head, face or cranial area.66 These are of particular interest not only because as 
state violence is the most recognisable form of repression against unarmed protestors, but the 
doctrine of minimum force and respect for human rights puts some constraints on when and how 
police weaponry can be used, itself central to the police's organisational legitimacy. However, the 
very lengthy procedures to obtain this data meant that this element of the study could not be 
completed in time for submission and had to be suspended.  
3.5.2 Complaints Procedures 
Other indicators of violence and police malpractice can be found in  organisational records such as; 
IPCC Police Complaints Statistics and Disciplinary Proceedings; Police Force Complaints Statistics 
and Disciplinary Proceedings; Officer use of force and other critical incident reporting (by individual 
officers); details of MPS’s investigations and disciplinary actions against officers; Court Records 
pertaining to the case studies: and other police investigations that could have a bearing on 
detecting police misconduct. I say this regards to individual officer recording of each 'use of force' 
incident holds in theory, whether officers do indeed complete these documents is an empirical 
question, as is the accuracy and completeness of the log books, as is the extent to which they are 
                                                          
66 Police public order training employs notions of 'green' 'amber' and 'red' target zones for baton use: green 
zones refer to fleshy primary target areas (such as upper legs or arms) whereas amber areas denote where a 
fractured bone would likely result if struck by a baton (i.e. forearm), and finally red areas are those such as the 
cranial region that constitute areas of 'last resort' (personal communication; Home Office, Public Order Unit). 
Baton blows to red areas can risk severe head injuries. These 'red' target areas are clearly more difficult to 
justify regards the doctrine of policing by consent and the legitimate use of minimum force. 
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reviewed by officer’s immediate superiors (I answer some of these questions in section 7.9). I had 
prolonged contact with the IPCC to obtain protestor complaints data (through Freedom of 
Information requests (see Appendix 13.3 and 13.3.1) 
3.5.3 Media Footage 
This is supplemented with analysis of disorder events using Media Video footage and reports and 
information gathered by various campaigning and interest groups (such as Liberty; Statewatch; 
Fitwatch; Editorial Photographers United Kingdom and Ireland, Independent legal observers, Legal 
Defence and Monitoring Groups etc.). I also examine activist Internet forum discussions from online 
alternative media sources as a data source to gain a fuller understanding of activist’s perspectives 
and to garner information on planning arrangements and security concerns. There is a considerable 
amount of natural data here in respect to posted opinions, some with detailed responses (which is 
also closely monitored by the police) so the sheer volume of material can present problems for 
analysis. There can also be a tendency for some users to make extreme statements due to the de-
individuated nature of the internet, one which can feed into and justify state repression. However, 
my main use of this data was often to gain some practical information (monitoring any changes to 
meeting locations) and to gain a sense of anticipated numbers for meetings and actions, and to get 
a sense of some views on tactics (see Appendix 13.1 for my topic guide). 
3.5.4 Documents and Newspapers 
I have used documentary sources to provide information about the summit operations, this includes 
official reports and inquiries into the policing of summits (principally the G20) as well as information 
from legal firms and Chambers that specialise in Public Order Law and criminal and civil cases 
against the police.67  This is one means to garner some information on the police and authorities 
perspective and the wider security context. Unfortunately, this information was not available from 
other sources because my attempts to interview senior police (gold, silver or bronze commanders) 
were continually declined or went unanswered.  
Examining these various reports had the additional benefit of stimulating analytic ideas and 
informed the generation of concepts throughout the study. I do not treat information from official 
sources’ at face value, however, rather I treat it as a social and political product to be examined and 
which reflect bureaucracies’ practical concerns. Whilst such records have considerable importance 
in such official bureaucratic settings, it constructs a ‘documentary reality’ and is constrained by 
‘information control’ (Burton & Carlen, 1979). As such it represents one amongst other situated 
                                                          
67 In fact Binman’s Solicitors distributed a call out to advise protestors who might be considering legal action 
against MPS. 
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perspectives but provides an important clue into the purposes they are written for, what they take 
for granted and what they omit.  
Finally, I make use of newspaper accounts of summits along with the work of other academics 
(including personal correspondence) as well as restricted or secret state documents pertinent to this 
study which are now in the public domain through efforts by whistleblowing organisations such as 
Wikileaks, The Intercept, and Spycops. 
3.6 Data Analysis and Integration Strategy 
As I had collected quite a large amount of data across a range of very different sources I needed to 
find a way of integrating this information in a logically coherent way that would inform my research 
questions.  In doing this I looked for relationships, themes and patterns across the different sources, 
some of which I had already noted in the ethnographic field notes. This meant drawing together 
classifications generated from a combination of general common-sense knowledge and personal 
fieldwork experiences as well as adapting existing concepts and categories from the research 
literature. My position is to side with (Hammersley 1992:163) rather pragmatic approach that the level 
of precision in data to a particular claim will depend upon the nature of what is being described.  
3.6.1 Ethnographic data analysis 
I organised all the field notes in chronological order and transcribed them into word documents. 
This had the advantage refreshing my memory of the details of events and 'voices' and aided 
identifying categories and the emergence of analytic themes. It also allowed a sufficient level of 
searching within the documents.   
As a starting point in the process of analysis, I re-read through all of the data and started thinking 
about what concepts and classifications to made sense of it. In part, this meant using existing ideas 
from the literature as a 'resource' but did not rely on any set of existing ideas. Earlier on some of 
these were more 'sensitising concepts' (Blumer, 1954) more suggestive than definitive, taking the 
form of germs of the overall analysis as I worked towards defining via recontextualisation more 
closely.  I looked to identify any patterns in the data and for anything surprising or puzzling on the 
basis of common sense knowledge and existing theory, and if there were any inconsistencies or 
contradictions. This was done by assigning broad categories to the running notes, and then some 
further coding after that. The back and forth of this iterative process between the data and a 
running set of ideas allowed some new theory generation. 
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3.6.2 Interview analysis 
I used a variation of content analysis for the formal audio-recorded interview data, partly because 
the interviews were quite open-ended 'topic category' formats with a loose question structure. The 
focus questions provided the response codes, and the participants the cases. The verbal answers 
given create one or more response codes, and these are derived from thematic categories on the 
basis of labeling with functionally equivalent meanings (i.e. 'open coding'). This left me with a series 
of named categories and thematic variables. I used descriptive analysis to examine associations 
among the qualitatively constructed thematic variables. 
3.7 Ethical issues 
3.7.1 Informed consent 
Undertaking research into rights based activists and transgressive protestor groups is fraught with ethical, 
legal and practical challenges. My study threw up a number of these points of tension which I discuss here in 
more depth, principally issues of (1) informed consent, (2) privacy, (3) harm, (4) exploitation, (5) 
researcher safety, and (6) consequences for future research. I do not claim to fully resolve any of 
these, but want to avoid the pitfalls of ignoring them.  
Any study that involves observation of large groups of people as a method will involve some degree 
of deception due to the practical constraints of consent (Dewalt, Dewalt, & Wayland, 1998). Neither 
do overt and covert research methods present a simple binary choice, rather they sit on a 
continuum between fully overt and fully covert observation (Routlet et al., 2017:488). My approach 
was not entirely one of covert participant observation, rather I tried to be open and honest with 
protestors that I spoke to and observed and to tell them that I was undertaking a PhD. in 'how the 
state represses political dissent'. This means I did not give a full account of my purposes rather I 
emphasised that I was primarily concerned with the authorities’ actions, not that of the protestors. 
This presents the subject matter as non-threatening and in a way that facilitates the research. I 
would volunteer this information and be open about those purposes whilst adding that I was 
supportive of protestors aims and objectives (which was broadly true) and discuss my activist 
background. This was less of a problem for me as my own political attitudes did not differ markedly 
from those of the people being studied, in fact, most of the time they broadly aligned. I was also 
concerned to present the information about my research in a way that would not influence the 
behaviour of protesters and activist and thereby risk invalidating the findings. I should add here that 
at no point did I feel I was engaged in any acts of gross deception, it was rather a case of employing 
tact and some degree of impression management and 'interaction ritual' (Goffman, 1989).  
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This approach falls short of how many see the requirements of fully 'informed consent', where the 
researcher spells out the purposes and implications of the work to everyone concerned from the 
start, allowing people to decline if they should so wish. This was neither practical nor desirable due 
to the constraints of the setting such as a protest camp. I found that it is simply not feasible to gain 
consent from all those subject to being observed (and the throughput) without making the research 
highly disruptive. This is generally the case with naturalistic settings. Moreover, over the course of 
the fieldwork, some of the research questions also changed further problematising the pursuit of 
fully informed consent.  
When undertaking the ethnographic study, I did not conduct formal interviews with any protestors, 
this was only done later at their agreement, and with a small number of campaigning organisations. 
I rather had a series of opportunistic informal 'chats' and undertook observations when in the field.  
If people wanted to withdraw or not speak, I respected those wishes. For police roles, I take the 
position of Rainwater and Pittman, 1967 (cited in Attkinson & Hammersley, 2007:212) that those in 
public office do not have the right to refuse to be researched and therefore their consent does not 
need to be sought.  
3.7.2 Privacy 
Privacy is a complex concept and the distinction between private and public can be difficult to draw.  
The nature of the research undertaken in the protester camps did on occasion involve overhearing 
and taking part in private conversations and private group conversations (i.e. protest planning 
actions and other affinity group meetings). This was generally private to a specific legitimate 
audience, that of trusted fellow protestors, with the major concern being infiltration by undercover 
police or police informants by those present. Such information could be argued as belonging to its 
participants (and in principle so could observational data) but to take this view would make this type 
of research impossible to conduct in practice. Where discussion reached into legal gray areas or 
illegal acts (planned, contemplated or recounted) I stayed neutral, and to the best of my knowledge 
took no active part in active law breaking.68  
3.7.3 Harms  
Throughout I attempted to follow a 'do no harm' principle and to minimise any possible negative 
repercussions from my work. This covers the research process and the presentation of my findings. I 
was not interested in writing a manual for the security and police which would assist them to more 
effectively to repress activists.    
                                                          
68 The law on public order and protest (notably trespass) is complex and technical such that it is not always 
clear if planned or considered acts are lawful.  
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My aim was to conduct the research discretely along with ensuring the security of research 
materials by anonymising findings in a way that retains specificity but does not expose individuals 
or groups. Most obviously I was wary about publishing anything that would identify activists. This 
meant that I did not document events through film or photography at protest sites in order to 
protect the privacy of activists. This was not a difficult decision as visually documenting anything 
inside any of the camps which I attended would have been met with consternation from protestors. 
This did not overly hamper my study. Much of the time it was not necessary to include activist 
identities, so this did not prevent me from introducing context and nuance when discussing the 
themes of the research. There are limits to this, though, and the case study approach did not always 
allow me to aggregate findings and talk about several groups experiences in order to lessen the 
chances of identifying a specific group (as others have Ganesh et al, no date). 
The principle of doing no harm is, however, exacting, and can make research very difficult or at 
times practically impossible to do. Invariably undertaking research requires some compromises. 
Tensions abound and I found myself being forced to make a series of judgment calls. Nevertheless, 
it is not perceived that this research study through publication or dissemination will have damaging 
or harmful consequences for protestor groups. Institutional and statutory agency actors have been 
identified unless confidentiality had been agreed. 
3.7.4 Exploitation  
Whilst costs and benefits of being researched are difficult to calculate, the relationship between the 
researcher and the researched were not considered to be exploitative.  
3.7.5 Ethical Guidelines 
Covert methods involve some form of deception, a practice which is generally frowned in research 
ethics. Having said that, several research bodies ethical guidelines, including the British Society of 
Sociology's (BSC) ‘Statement of Ethical Practice' (2017) and the Economic & Social Research Council 
(ESRC) 'Framework for Research Ethics'  (2015)  recognise that the use of covert methods can be 
necessary and justified in some delimited circumstances. For instance, the BSS (2017:5) cite an 
example where social life is 'closed to researchers by powerful or secretive interests', or the ESRC 
(2015:31) guidelines where seeking informed consent is 'impractical or meaningless such as research 
on crowd behaviour [...]' both constituting circumstances that arose for this study. Moreover, the 
ESRC (2015:31) continue that: 
"Covert research may be undertaken when it may provide unique forms of evidence that are 
crucial to the research objectives and methodology or where overt observation might alter the 
phenomenon being studied. The broad principle should be that covert research 
should not be undertaken lightly or routinely. It is only justified if important issues are 
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being addressed and if matters of social significance which cannot be uncovered in other 
ways are likely to be discovered." 
My research design conforms to these guidelines considering its concern with groups engaging in 
contentious activities such as direct action. My research also safeguards the anonymity of all 
research participants, in particular where informed consent has not been obtained prior to the 
research. Identifying such people could pose a risk to them or make them subject to unwanted 
attention of the authorities (see BSS, 2017. 16:5).  In addition, I was acutely aware that some 
protestors would be unlikely to participate consensually in the study as they are hostile to academic 
scholarship, seeing academics in the same negative light as the mainstream media.  
Any form of deception in research should not be entered into lightly. Throughout my overall 
approach to these vexing issues is to steer a path between Kantian ethics (where individuals cannot 
be considered a means to an end, thus rejecting practices such as concealment, deception, and 
falsehoods, irrespective of one's final aim) and utilitarianism (where it is permissible to hide one's 
identity and publish confidential information when advancing a higher aim such as building 
knowledge or exposing injustice). I take a middle road, as Kantian ethics places the bar too high (in 
keeping with many philosopher’s views on Kant) making field research on social movement groups 
nigh impossible in practice, whilst taking the objections to deception seriously by minimising any 
harm where feasible.   
3.7.6  Researcher Safety 
Engaging in demonstrations, protest actions, and social movements can present dangers to a 
researcher, either from the authorities (such as becoming a victim or unintended victim of police 
violence; police harassment; kettling; arrest and malicious prosecution) or from protestors or hostile 
onlookers (violence and intimidation) although such dangers should not be overstated. As Lyng 
(1998:221) argues, many important problems in the social sciences require the researcher to place 
themselves in situations that can compromise their safety and security. Protest policing is one of 
these situations. I wanted to be where the action is and to observe firsthand what was taking place, 
warts and all, this was my 'edgework'. Whilst I had previous experience of being on all sorts of 
demonstrations as well as being involved in quite violent protests, and was knowledgeable as to the 
hazards, I was never entirely sure where the research would take me.  
In an important sense this part of the fieldwork simply saw me join public demonstrations as well as 
a myriad of smaller protest actions which on the basis of previous experience, mass violence is rare. 
However, I took a number of precautions which were largely based on common sense and years of 
experience in attending such events. This meant being aware of police formations and tactics and 
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the unfolding dynamics of protest actions and crowd tensions. If violence did flare up, keeping a 
safe distance so as not to be the direct target of police attacks but still being able to view and record 
events was my strategy. In such situations using non-confrontational posture and stance also assists 
in preventing being subject to police aggression. If you stand still, with your hands up, palms facing 
out in a ‘surrender posture’ it is that much more difficult, even for the most aggressive officer, to 
justify striking you with a baton. There are no guarantees of course, as previous experience had 
taught me from the Anti-Poll Tax demonstrations in London in 1990, where the police 
systematically batoned the heads of confined protestors who were desperately trying to escape this 
fate.  
I also carried an old charged mobile phone69 (without any sensitive data) at all times, and a 'bust 
card' with contact details of trusted legal representation should I be arrested. Being conscious of 
police data gathering techniques, my field notes did not contain any personal details or useable 
operational intelligence. As a precautionary measure my other intended preparation was to equip 
myself with some protective clothing, some police style body armour for my arms (to be discreetly 
worn) which would be effective in blocking a police baton blow directed at me, as well as a NATO 
style helmet (either police or BBC journalist style). I had naively thought this a relatively 
straightforward matter, find a supplier, order and await delivery. I contacted 'MLA Police/ Prison 
/Equipment' (who as the name suggests, are the major UK and international government supplier of 
'protective equipment'). At once they wanted to know whether I was a police or prison officer and if 
not, my purpose. Appealing to respectability I used my official university research 'criminologist' 
title and informed them I would be undertaking 'field research' about public order policing. I 
emphasised that I wanted to 'keep myself safe' with some protective equipment as I could, on 
occasion, find myself in 'vulnerable situations'. In the ensuing exchange of emails I was told that 
MLA would not supply any of the equipment to me because "it could be used against the 
government". Querying this response and emphasising that the items I had asked for were being 
sold by MLA as 'protective equipment' (and hence not offensive equipment - I had not requested 
any weapons) I was simply informed that this "was company policy for such items".70 I was therefore 
forced to abandon that early plan, but noted that MLA's actual policy belies its own advertising 
messages. Interestingly, this turned out to be somewhat of a leitmotif for the entire study.  
                                                          
69 On the G20 case study this was not a ‘smart phone’, but an older basic phone which had the advantage of 
storing little data. For later case studies I did have a smart phone, but apart from some carefully selected 
numbers the phone was kept at ‘factory settings’ as I was aware that the police routinely data mine protestors 
phones as an intelligence gathering technique.   
70 Personal correspondence with Helen Creswell, MLA: Michael Lupton Associated, Halifax House, Seaton 
Ross, York, YO42 4LU (helen@mlaltd.co.uk) 
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3.7.7 Future research 
Care was taken in conducting this research not to 'spoil the field' for future researchers. Having said 
that protest camps exist to build political and social movements and are inclusive by nature, as is 
participating in public demonstrations.   
3.8 Researching the Policing of Contentious Protest Groups  
I now turn to discuss my own critical reflections on the ethnographic study and the role of the 
researcher in the study. I feel it is important to reflect on my personal feelings and experiences of 
doing the work and the problems that I faced. At the back of each field journal I kept a record of 
processed notes and the reflexive monitoring of the research process. This recorded an internal 
dialogue, or 'internal conversation' (Archer, 2003) where my experiences of that day became the 
subject of reflexive evaluation and deliberation. Here I recorded what I thought were of analytic 
significance, really my anxieties and concerns, any surprises to shock, or indeed revulsion, even my 
level of personal comfort. I knew that how I felt would invariably have some bearing on the nature 
and balance of what I wrote in the fieldwork journal, as well as my 'comfort zone' would influence 
what I got involved in and how far I would go in any protest action I was caught up with. In addition, 
the lengthy periods in between the case studies, a natural result of the summit times, left me with 
plenty of time for reflection on the significance of the data and the implications for collecting 
further data. I also became more aware of own values, beliefs and background and how these may 
influence the research, my relationships with protestors and my accounts of the state players.  
3.8.1 Researching Violence and Disorder 
There is a certain sort of emotional intensity, danger, fatigue, and frustration that came along with 
undertaking this type of fieldwork. There is an emotional toll which brings with it a weariness from 
witnessing the sheer ugliness of violence when it happens, and from accounts you hear of it, and 
when it is meted out by those who claim legitimacy and authority, there is outrage. Studying the 
interactions taking place between protestors and police, particularly the outbreaks of violence 
meant having (and maintaining) close proximity to confrontations. I wanted to observe the actual 
violence as close-up as I could manage (and hence the justifiability of police violence) in relation to 
the ‘Resistance Force Comparative Scale’ which meant putting myself at risk of being struck by a 
police baton or shield or being arrested and prosecuted for involvement in what I was observing.  
This did weigh on my mind as there were many genuinely frightening moments when I realised I 
could be bludgeoned by a baton with life changing results. Like every other protestor I saw, I had no 
protective equipment, and was more or less defenceless in these settings. No amount of planning 
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‘strategies for protection’ can overcome this problem if you want to directly observe these crucial 
episodes.71  
One of the most trying element in undertaking the fieldwork was being continually faced with what 
I considered to be institutional injustices that degrade, demean and manipulate people. There is 
also something distinct about spending time in the oddities that are the summit locations. I found 
them to be so objectionable as spaces. The civic nature of what had been public space was 
transformed into highly securitised pens, with massive police and security presences, where a 
dizzying array of restrictions abounded.  For me it was a vision made real of living a mini police 
state, and to add insult to injury, at the tax payers' expense.   
3.8.2 Saying What Happened or Choosing Sides? 
My knowledge is ‘situated knowledge’, my position and my perspective was from that of a 
protestor. I was contained behind police lines in kettles, or within police serials on marches, or 
evading police kettling tactics and hurriedly chased by officers. I spent a lot of time with protestors 
in planning meetings, convergence centres, and on protest actions, and was subject to police 
violence, surveillance and intimidation tactics. Indeed, there were many moments in the fieldwork 
setting, in that particular and peculiar transformed and deeply securitised summit space, when I felt 
as if being under siege from the mass of state players. At times I literally was. Often I felt a certain 
esprit de corps with protestors, especially in the face of police violence and intrusive surveillance. In 
addition, my background has been one of a (admittedly lapsed) activist, one who adheres to a long 
tradition in philosophy that recognises the permissibility of civil disobedience even under broadly 
just political conditions.72 In this sense my identity intertwines and overlaps with the research study, 
it also provides a ‘rewarding intersection’ as I share many of the concerns of the protest players 
whose interaction with the authorities I studied.  
All of this leaves me open to the risk (as well as the accusation) of ‘going native’ during the fieldwork 
by abandoning the role of being a researcher, forgetting the research task and becoming the 
researched. This risk also holds true when analysing the data as well, by not establishing sufficient 
distance from it by overly adopting the perspective of protesters (Wahlstrom, 2011).  For instance, 
how could I claim impartiality for the fieldwork under circumstances when I was being attacked by 
the police, irrespective of how the police would construe those actions, and when I saw fellow 
protestors being similarly treated? In those situations, what I felt was the raw emotions of anger, 
                                                          
71 If I had been able to obtain protective equipment such as the extensive body amour worn by the police and a 
NATO style helmet then I would have been all but invulnerable to baton and shield strikes.  
72 The most compelling philosophical statement of this position has recently been outlined by Delmas (2018) 
‘The Duty to resist: When Disobedience Should Be Uncivil’ OUP.   
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outrage and some considerable sense of helplessness. How could anyone not get emotionally and 
morally involved in a way that jeopardises the claim to objectivity? More pointedly, my previous 
activism had shown me that police violence towards protestors considered ‘troublesome’ could be 
brutal and vindictive, particularly when conducting baton charges to break-up and ‘clear’ areas of 
any protestors. Such circumstances can provide a free for all to dispense ‘street justice’ as the 
officer sees fit.  Did I admit into the research frame my own subjective experiences, and if so, how 
can I claim that my findings are creditable? Indeed, the results of ethnographic research can often 
be considered as contaminated with biases and hence unreliable. Would other researchers in my 
position have generated the same findings (external reliability) or matched the data in the same 
way (internal reliability)? Did my conclusions accurately and authentically represent the reality of 
the social phenomena under study? Let me try and attempt to address these questions.  
I had not set out to undertake what Gouldner (1968) terms a ‘sociology of the underdog’, although 
there are a number of ethnographic authors who make the case for openly partisan research. Penny 
Green (1993) sided with the miner's when studying the 1984 strike, and Scholl's ethnographic study 
of transgressive protestors explicitly asks us to choose sides, as announced in the title of his book, 
‘Two sides of a Barricade’. Nevertheless, it is rare to find explicit value arguments in ethnographic 
research. More often the goals of research 'who side you are on' is assumed rather than made 
(Hammersley, 2000:11). I did not set out to engage in advocacy research, which I was wary of, or to 
give voice to marginal or subordinate groups. This gave me some distance from proceedings and 
throughout I felt able to maintain a critical stance whilst conducting the fieldwork. Being conscious 
of these types of bias provides some corrective to being engulfed in protesters lifeworld. I also tried 
to validate the subjective data across a number of different levels and by speaking to as many 
different people as opportunities arose.  
These constraints on ethnographic methods constitute a long-standing concern in qualitative 
research, as is the ability to remain objective and impartial when conducting sensitive research into 
highly politically charged issues. Simply by being present in a setting affects it in some way 
(LeCompe & Goetz, 1982:52) and as a partially covert researcher, there was a sense in which I was 
participating in that which I was observing. However, my observer role was one of an ‘observer as 
participant’, not a ‘complete participant’ or a ‘participant as observer’ (Gold, 1958). So despite some 
emotional toll from undertaking this type of fieldwork, I was aware of my own emotions. As 
Pickering (cited in Liebling & Stanko, 2011:429) found when researching policing in Northern 
Ireland, the experience of strong emotions such as outrage can be harnessed to inform 
understanding about the realities of policing, and an aid to removing myself from the research 
subject. Simply because a shared experience is shared does not mean it is invalid. Indeed, I agree 
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with Pickering that questioning shared experience in this way can be a form of betrayal of the 
research process. As Pickering notes, emotionality is a 'critical way of knowing' (cited in Liebling & 
Stanko, 2011:429). 
I continually returned to these questions of bias and partisnaship during the length of this study 
whilst being mindful that no research design can obtain absolute validity and reliability. My 
conclusion was all that I could do, as I did, was to try and provide a faithful and accurate rendition of 
what I observed, whilst trying to remain continually reflexive about my role and positionality.  This is 
not to endorse ‘campaigning research’, rather that there is a moral duty to tell the truth as best as 
one can, no matter how inconvenient it is, and over and above any other professional obligation.  
3.8.3 Are you a spy? 
My initial strategy was to gain a deep connection to activist communities and thereby allow me to 
do qualitative research and to document how activists plan, adopt practices (or don't) innovate and 
react to state players. This was only partially successful and leads me to another profoundly difficult 
issue that I had which was the level of protestor suspicion and fear of police infiltration.  I might 
have expected that such suspicions would dissipate as contact increased, but this did not happen. In 
part because some of the core activists (unsurprisingly) traversed numerous anti-summit protests, 
were made up of relatively self-contained communities, many of whom were organisers and often 
known to each other and would recognise me from past actions. The same questionable person 
arising again and again only acted to reinforce their suspicions, and whilst I was able to build trust 
amongst some people, other groups were either aloof or much more guarded towards me. For the 
latter case studies after the dramatic G20 convergence centre raids, I was identified by several core 
activists as being an undercover police spy. Given the nature of the research, it was difficult to 
distance oneself from such labels. This made the research effort that much more difficult and at 
times this carried some important consequences for the subsequent course of the research. So that 
whilst my physical presence was not immediately problematic on marches and at convergence 
centres, my parameters of action was more constrained. Some of these groups operated a little like 
cliques and several were wary of me post-G20, indicating the limit of my acceptance by some 
protestors at least. These informant choices hindered me from gaining a broader coverage of 
affinity groups, forfeiting some information about their experiences. Any gathered knowledge is a 
function of who gives it! Despite this, I constantly tried to cross-check my understanding of events 
and terms with different protestors and with what I directly observed.  
Having been suspected of being a police spy lead to other difficulties. My attention to what would 
be going on of interest could more easily lead to infringements, the ‘civil inattention’ styles 
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(Goffman, 1971) of social interaction became that much more delicate. Certainly making any field-
notes in these spaces became too difficult, even pursuing some lines of inquiry or trying to strike up 
a causal acquaintanceship could be laboured, at least for some. This made the experience of 
undertaking fieldwork that much more waring, and at times, sheer frustrating. I remember trying to 
talk to half a dozen protestors against the G8 summit directly after the convergence centre raid in 
London. I was trying to team up with those that I recognised earlier, but that had been inside at the 
time of the raid (I had not on this occasion) and was desperate to get more first-hand accounts. I 
wanted to find out precisely what had happened but was doing this whilst on a protest action that 
next morning, at pace on the streets in London. We were being shadowed by a large number of 
police as we made our way to the next location and pressing the point with different people who 
just weren’t willing to speak in any depth about the topic. One young female protestor would say 
nothing more than:  
‘Oh you know, just the usual Met police violence’, and other words to that effect; ‘You know 
what their like? ... Their the Met ..’ (Field Notes, G8) 
Then only to run off ahead, and that’s it.  Whilst I caught up with her again later that day and 
managed to gain a little bit more information, it was continually hard going to get any sort of 
detailed account of what had occurred. I simply cite this as one example of the increasing difficulties 
I had in developing rapport with some protestors as the study progressed. Whether that was 
because the label had stuck or just the casual nature in which some protestors brushed off violent 
police encounters is hard to say. As a result, at times I found I was becoming more worn down and 
dispirited.   
3.8.4 The Limitations of Direct Observation 
The study is partial in another sense. Whilst the fieldwork was often intensive, it is not possible to 
give an exhaustive account of the protest activities and tactical interactions which took place at 
each summit (and proxy summit sites). The constraints of time and being only one lone researcher 
forced me to select what I observed and draw inferences from it. For instance, different affinity 
groups may organise quite small protest 'actions' and one would be forced to choose what to attend 
and where or alternatively whether it was more useful to stay in the convergence centre as there 
was more interesting things taking place there, or I suspected that other developments were afoot. 
Neither was I always privy to what was taking place, some protest actions were highly secretive with 
only a few trusted individuals being notified and selected. This was due to fear of police infiltration 
and losing the element of surprise.  
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Observation is also rendered difficult in large crowd events simply because a great many things 
happen very rapidly over a large area, and not all of it is easy to anticipate. It is also frequently loud, 
chaotic, cramped and at times totally confusing. As a single researcher it was easy to find myself 
ending up in the wrong place to get an overview of important incidents. I would then need to try 
and shift to another nearby street where an important episode was occurring. At other times in 
large demonstrations, protestors tactically splinter and disperse to evade police containment 
manoeuvres, and it was a matter of dumb luck where I ended up and what I saw. I was able to 
anticipate some events though, especially when tensions rise, from provocative and aggressive 
police action signals threats. This type of observation is haphazard by its nature unless one has a 
team of co-ordinated researchers (Adand, 2016:766). 
3.8.5 Covert Research 
The use of covert research has a strong tradition in criminology, particularly when researching 
difficult to access or secretive groups. My research role sat in a 'grey' area between the two poles of 
a continuum of overt and covert research. At the outset I would tell people I was undertaking a PhD. 
in how the state represses political dissent and would volunteer this information on an individual 
level and be open about my purposes, but also add that I was supportive of protestors aims and 
objectives (which was also true) and discuss my activist background. However, in a protest camp as 
in many other naturalistic settings, it is not feasible to gain consent from all those subject to being 
observed (and the throughput) without making the research highly disruptive. In a number of 
planning meetings, and for many in the convergence centres and other venues, my professional 
identity was not known, and here I was in effect operating in a covert manner but not at its most 
extreme form. 
This carried a number of methodological advantages, it minimised reactivity to issues of gaining 
access and provided more spontaneous access to protestors lived experiences. Neither did I feel 
that I was being ‘interactionally deceitful’ (Ditton, 1977:10) even though at times I was 
eavesdropping on conversations, surreptitiously listening in and simulating friendships, as I shared 
many of the protestors objections to the political elites and the massive security apparatus 
mobilised in their favour. Neither did I think that my findings would harm any protestor.  
3.9 Summary 
My approach to this study has been to combine micro and macro methods across primary and 
secondary data sources as a way of buttressing the validity of the research. The core of the study 
has been at a ‘high resolution’ using an ethnographic ‘observer as participant’ role by embedding 
myself within anti-globalisation protest groups. Mingling with protestors at demonstrations and 
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actions, and spending extended periods at convergence centres and other protestor spaces allowed 
me to gain an insider's view on anti-globalisation activism. It focused on how some anti-
globalisation groups planned and strategised, how they reacted to, absorbed and resisted, 
disbanded or de-mobilised in response to state social control and repression. I was also able to 
observe the actual interactions themselves of protestors and authority players on the ground and in 
the streets at summit locations, including being in close proximity to violent confrontations. 
Combining participant observation with some controlled conversations with protestors, recorded in 
field notes, and supplemented by digital photography, enabled access to a greater amount of richer 
and finer quality data on protestors experiences of anti-summit activism than other methods would 
have allowed (such as questionnaire surveys, which also suffer from being retrospective, or 
newspaper accounts or internet conversation threading). This approach yielded data that cannot be 
obtained by other means and that is crucial to understanding anti-globalisation protestors dynamic 
interactions with authority players.  
The relatively small number of telephone interviews I undertook with political representatives, 
medics and a senior police officer (specialising in public order policing at the Home Office) yielded 
an understanding of the local political context of the summit or provided some specialist technical 
knowledge from experts as to the use and consequences of using some police non-lethal weapons. 
This proved invaluable as a lot of police practice and policy is oral (it is not written down or codified) 
(Manning, 2010) and is otherwise not publicly available. In a similar vein, there is remarkably little 
publicly available scientific research concerning the likely medical implications of police baton 
strikes and other non-lethal weapons. These avenues remain a critical blind spot in research into 
police violence, as the level of discussion remains too general and fails to be fully cognizant of 
protestors unique vulnerabilities to serious injury.   This Home Office interview and the casual chats 
with officers at summit sites, was the only direct primary data capturing the perspective of the 
police73 as no police or security persons were willing to take part in this study. To try and capture the 
perspective of the authorities I used direct quotes contained in numerous media interviews and 
strategic, tactical and operational justifications contained within official documents (notably the 
G20). Discussing the local political and political party context of the respective summits with a small 
number of representatives informed a wider understanding than the observational or other 
secondary data sources such as newspaper reports would have allowed.  
A wide range of secondary data sources provided a macro picture of the summit events, including 
police complaint's data (IPCC), official inquiry reports, Freedom of Information requests, academic 
                                                          
73 The officer was seconded to the Home Office. 
Page 95 of 407 
 
studies, newspaper articles and financial costings data. Some of these data sources offered a 
revealing treasure trove of information and at a fine granulation of detail that was otherwise not 
publicly available.  
Researching how the state manages and controls political dissent at anti-globalisation summits 
protests provides a host of difficult research challenges.  Taken together, an integrated mixed 
methods approach provided the most suitable means to address my research aims and objectives.  
The MMD conceptualisation also allowed for some triangulation for convergent validation, and 
acted to further buttress the validity of my research findings.   
 
  
Page 96 of 407 
 
4. CHAPTER FOUR: The Lead up to the G20 Summit Protests 
4.1 Introduction 
I start this chapter by detailing my observations of transgressive protestors preparations for the 
G20. These groups were important because they had not, at least publicly, been co-opted74 by the 
security apparatus and hence were freer to innovate tactically. My aim in attending these various 
planning meetings was to gain an insight into the extent of tactical planning amongst activists and 
the forms it took. I wanted to learn why some forms of collective action were chosen or preferred 
over others, what were the accepted forms of collective action within the group and how these were 
decided, was there any overarching continuity in how these choices were made, and what was the 
transferability of recognisable forms of collective action for these groups? I also wanted to learn 
how the anticipated actions of the police would provoke further activist tactical innovations, if at all. 
I also wanted to know if and to what extent any ostensibly violent actions were pre-planned and 
intentional, or whether this was the result of more spontaneous or expressive interactions on the 
day and/or resulting from the actions of the police themselves. In addition, I wanted to use these 
meetings to gauge activists concerns about conducting political dissent, whether the threat of 
repression acted to discourage (and demobilise) protestors from taking part in protest actions. This 
is because repression on political dissent can take manifest forms, internal (i.e. self-censoring) as 
well as external (i.e. overt or covert state action).  
I then go onto to critically examine the pre-summit developments employed by MPS, and how 
these act as ‘pre-emptive dissuasion' devices (Emer & Opel, 2008). Indeed, I argue that these 
measures operate as a form of information warfare, directed at de-mobilisation and de-motivation 
of alterglobalisation movements. After which I present my observational study of the G20 protests 
themselves. Here I argue that 'spaces of contention' are increasingly organised and securitised, 
which in turn shapes collective action and its repertoires, most obviously for the protest players, but 
is not limited to them, the same dynamics also holds for the state players. I also examine why the 
G20 resulted in such high levels of police violence. My argument will be that the official explanation 
from MPS (i.e. responding to protestor violence) is simply not creditable and is a falsification of 
events. The tactics used and level of force employed was entirely disproportionate to the 
eventualities they faced. I will argue that the key to unlocking and understanding the interactions 
between police and protestors during the case study summits is to view them principally as a 
struggle over space and the visibility of contestation. At the street level, the evolving tactical 
repertories dynamically adjust to cycles of tactical innovation and their various countermeasures. 
                                                          
74 This does not mean that the various groups hadn't been infiltrated by the authorities, I discuss state spying 
in chapter 6. 
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Throughout I am concerned with exploring the broad contours of protest development, the shape 
and form of 'antagonistic interaction' between these two principle players, and how protestors’ 
tactics and practices are selected, adapt and change over time. Moreover, how do the authorities 
work to control collective protest action and whether the policing operation acted as a means of 
repression against these collective forms of political dissent? Which strategies, tactics and actions 
of the police indicate repression in the policing of international summits? How does one recognise 
those specific acts of the police which concretely show domination and repression and those which 
do not? If not all actions of the police are repressive, then at least some actions would seem to be in 
the interest of the dominated - but why do these actions occur? This is not simply an empirical 
question, but it does concern explicitly what happened on the ground, the actions, tactics and 
strategies employed by the police and the credibility of the justification for them. In doing so I have 
produced a narrative account of being involved in the G20 protests from the protestor perspective.  
A further useful way of conceiving this strategically is as a tactical 'arms race' between protestors 
and the authorities. The notion of arms races have been used to conceive the interplay of adaptive 
responses between ‘attacker’s and ‘defenders’ in volume crime (Ekblom, 2008) and counter-
terrorism (Ekblom, 2016; Christmann, 2017). Such arms races result in a continual disruption in the 
balance of advantage between authorities and their adversaries. The winner of the race is 
determined by who out-innovates the other and deploys the adaption faster, with the authorities 
traditionally playing catch-up. Innovative capacity - creativity in the generation of new ideas and 
deploying them on the streets - has been with the anti-global activists. In this sense this entire study 
is one of examining the loop of co-evolution and adaption of candidate innovations and their trade-
offs. From the authority’s perspective understanding arms races (and their avoidance) involves 
fostering a variety of strategic approaches in preventive interventions as well as being prepared to 
invest in innovative capacity (Ekblom, 1998:1). At least some of this they have done, and the way 
they now deal with protest and dissent has changed markedly, even from the mid 1990's. 
Consequently, the G20 was one of the most significant public policing events in the UK for some 
time. In the next chapter (Chapter 5) I will report my observational study of the G20 protests (what 
happened on the ground) and then the aftermath of the policing operation (Chapter 6), before 
considering the raft of official inquiry reports which the policing of the G20 generated, why this 
occurred, and then submit the findings from these official accounts to critical examination from 
mine and others accounts of protestors’ experiences (in the final G20 case study chapter, Chapter 
7).  
In addition, there has been little empirical research examining the police’s use of excessive force, 
particularly at the organisational level (Walker, 2005; Punch, 2009). This study aims to fill this gap 
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and apply any evidence from the case studies to form a wider backdrop to discuss the role of 
accountability in police governance and reform. If the case studies do indeed demonstrate high 
levels of citizen injury, and by implication, police malpractice and excessive or unlawful use of force, 
then the current internal and external control mechanisms and procedures intended to prevent 
malpractice may be inadequate, or worse, inoperative, and will need to be re-examined in light of 
the findings. 
In undertaking this next element of the study (Chapter 5) I do not intend to try and provide an 
exhaustive account of everything that happened on the G20 summit protest in April 2009. That is 
not possible to achieve considering the scope and chaotic nature of the protest events across entire 
parts of central London. The protests were very much multi-site demonstrations, rambling and 
roaming events, and where ever possible I moved around and within the different demonstrations 
to gain the best vantage points to observe police and protestor actions. I also have drawn on a wide 
range of other eye witness sources in order to interrogate the official accounts and hold them to 
scrutiny (in Chapter 7).  
4.2 An Overview and Timeline of the G20 Protest: Selecting Defensible Locations 
The G20 summit was hosted in London early in April 2009 and brought together leaders and 
dignitaries from around the world. The site base for the talks were located in the Excel Centre in 
Docklands, in East London's Canning Town. The various delegations were hosted in fortified 
locations in embassies and hotels, with co-ordination of arrivals and departing entourages 'secured' 
and escorted by home counties police forces outside the M25 motorway, although the most 
important VIPs (i.e. the US president) made the trip into central London via (then presidential) 
helicopter. As is the case with such events, much of the 'security arrangements' were shrouded in 
secrecy and under the all-pervasive invocation of 'national security'. Many of the details regarding 
such arrangements are thus a state secret, which leaves open the question as to whether ordinary 
citizens benefit from the maintenance of national security as conceived, notably the compatibility 
with a functioning democracy. As Buzan (1983:58-59) has argued, this undifferentiated concept 
used by the institutions of the state allows governments to "exploit the linkage between their own 
security and that of the state in order to increase their leverage over domestic politics." 
Nevertheless, some elements of the physical layout are visible upon observation and some other 
elements can emerge from the media.  
The authority’s preparations for the control of space starts months before any demonstrations 
appear on the streets, beginning with the selection of the geographical location for the summit 
meeting (Fernandez, 2005). This was similarly the case with the G20, although MPS made much of 
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the relatively short lead in time of being given three months notice to 'plan' for the summit, itself an 
indication of the extensive contingency planning arrangements entered into. Whilst the policing 
operation (controversially) named 'Glencoe'75 had the official aim to 'protect the summit and 
prevent disorder', in reality the authorities’ efforts were directed at controlling space to enable the 
undisturbed movement of internationally protected persons (IPPs) and their wider delegations, the 
provision for selected journalists, and the movement of their own security apparatus. The aim was 
to prevent any protestors or sign of dissent from penetrating these fortified temporary global 
hegemonic spaces and to challenge the legitimacy of global power relations (Starr et al; 2011; 
Fernandez, 2005). Therefore, venue choices are carefully selected in order to maximise defensible 
space and avoid the possibility of protestor disruption. Doing so presents a number of dilemmas in 
the level of spatial control that can be exercised however, as well as the financial costs incurred, and 
the complicated logistics of transport and infrastructure (Scholl, 2012).  
This is the only actual summit site I examine which was held in a capital and this has important 
implications in how the spatial dynamics of street conflicts are played out. Choosing a capital city 
also bucks the trend in summit locations of moving from metropolis to more isolated and fortified 
rural sites, all of which carry the advantage of being hard to access for protestors and which afford 
little if any activist subculture or resources for mobilisation, or where the local population are not 
supportive of alter-globalisation movement’s activities. This is evidenced by police in the past 
publicly admitting to selecting remote venues on this very basis, such as the G8 in Gleneagles in 
2005, followed two years later by holding the G8 in Heiligendamm in 2007 (Starr et al, 2011:33).76 
This was not an option in London where oppositional political cultures and activist networks are well 
established. The capital also offers a range of alternative protest targets from that of the summit 
site, themselves sites of symbolic and political importance, so other means needed to be sought to 
subdue the level of protest with a range of other tools open to the authorities (I pick up and 
elaborate on these themes later on in my observational analysis in the next chapter). The 
importance given to site selection also results from lessons learned by the authorities in dealing 
with what is considered 'protestor disruptions' and indicates the extraordinary level of significance 
attributed to it. 
Whilst scholars have started to analyse the spatial analysis of protest policing (Starr et al, 2011; 
Fernandez, 2008; Noakes et al. 2005) following Scholl (2012:110) I present the very extensive state 
                                                          
75 'Glencoe' was the scene of a notorious massacre in February 1692 in the highlands of Scotland. Some thirty-
eight men were killed by government forces who also burnt their homes, an act which resulted in the deaths 
of a further forty dependent women and children. 
76 In order to do this the authorities would need to research the social history and profile locations, although it 
is not clear how this is accomplished.  
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preparations for the summit and the ensuing dynamics of the different street conflicts and how 
these affect the interactions between police and protestors. The occupation of symbolic space, or 
the symbolic occupation of space, as well as the disruption of spatial routines characterise the more 
recent repertories of protestors. What unfolds on the streets cannot be understood outside of this 
and the struggle to define and control this space. This is to embrace a more relational and symbolic 
understanding of space in protest activity (Fernandez, 2005; Dikec, 2005; Starr, 2006).  
Summit sites are selected on the basis of being easily defensible in order to control and manipulate 
concentric space. In this sense it is calculated and pre-emptive in its nature as the technological and 
physical infrastructure at the G20 summit represents extrapolations of ongoing trends at previous 
summit sites, ones which have the recent history of disruptions of spatial routines very much in 
sight. Examples include the blockading repertoire, which came to prominence in the 1999 WTO 
summit in Seattle, where protestors blockaded all the intersections for the conference centre and 
shut down the conference for the first day. The same successful tactic was swiftly adopted again in 
2000 in Prague at the IMF annual meeting, this time preventing delegates from leaving the 
conference centre. Whereas the 2001 Gothenburg EU summit saw delegates changing hotels when 
the outside streets had ongoing violent confrontations between police and protestors. The way that 
the authorities now deal with protest and dissent has changed in response to such tactics. 
Consequently, the G20 was one of the most significant public policing events in the UK for some 
time. Over 5,500 police officers from seven different forces were deployed on April 1st and 2,800 on 
April 2nd, with the 'security' operation estimated to cost being £7.5 million (HMIC, 2009a:22). This 
capacity was complimented by new capabilities, reflecting a 'diffusion of innovation' (Wood, 2014) 
to incorporate new tactics and military style methods, one which brings into play how globalised 
policing has now become. In turn this has ushered in a 'new economy of security' (Gheciu, 2012:311) 
where we witness a blurring of boundaries between the traditionally separate categories of military 
and policing methods and technologies. The decentralised, but organised, timely and networked 
events in Seattle became a subject of study for police forces and the Rand Corporation, who 
developed counter tactics to minimise any such future occurrences (Fernandez, 2005:245; Armond, 
2001). Wood's (2014:19-20) analysis of this diffusion process outlines three recognisable conditions 
for its uptake.  
Firstly, adoption of an innovation is more likely when a crisis is perceived in the police's modus 
operandi (for our purposes, principally protestor's tactical successes in previous summit protests - 
notably in Seattle).
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Picture 1: Barriers with Attendant Officers Blockading off Road Access 








Picture 2: Police Snipers (see highlight) and Surveillance to 
Photograph Protestors Who Try to Approach Excel Centre 
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Secondly, the increasing transnational integration of knowledge transfer, in part driven by the 
global integration of policing networks and their ability to act as a forum to spread information on 
'best practices' and their merits and drawbacks. Lastly, the development of an internationally 
shared policing identity, where adopters see an alignment between themselves and their working 
contexts with earlier innovations. This last condition is facilitated by the integration of professional 
bodies which increasingly cut across organisational boundaries, integrating defence industry 
lobbyists and corporations, resulting in a drive towards militarised strategic incapacitation on the 
streets. This is not to suggest that the transmission, incorporation and use of these tactics does not 
vary across jurisdictions. They are in turn shaped by nations political systems, police organisations 
and organisational culture, and filtered by police epistemology, itself a product of an evolving 
history of protestor interactions. For instance, the 'epistemology of black' was seen most explicitly 
when G8 protestors travelling to Germany were sent back from the border because black clothes 
were found in their luggage (Scholl, 2012:98). Hence the notorious Black Bloc signifies a 
confrontational attitude and an association with a riot, demonstrating how the police use 
identification with a dress colour to differentiate 'disobedient bodies' from 'docile bodies'. 
Thus far I have stressed the importance of the spatial dimensions of control and the development of 
tactical innovations by protestors and the authorities to achieve their divergent aims. However, the 
police's ability to successfully dominate and manipulate space to ensure their strategic advantage 
still leaves open the question of why the G20 demonstrations resulted in considerable police 
violence. In saying this there is much to unpack on this point, no more so than because any 
discussion in attributing what is loosely termed 'police brutality' involves a series of difficult legal, 
definitional, practical and situational issues. At this juncture I merely want to flag this issue without 
long digression (as I pick up on it later in the ensuing chapters). Suffice to say that previous policing 
scholarship on police use of force identifies the importance of police officer characteristics, police 
organisational characteristics, as well as the effects of situational characteristics (for a review of the 
empirical research see Worden, 1996). That said, this is incomplete. The other part of the answer 
lies in (ostensibly) senior police epistemology and the securitising moves that have increasingly 
secreted and congealed at international summits. It is the role of the securitising actors, and what 
lies behind their thinking that needs further analysis. 
The 'fortress architecture' and the principles of defensible space used to ensure territorial control 
saw the Excel centre area become a 'sterile environment', with protestors entirely geographically 
removed from the location. These zoning practices and the associated fortifications appear many 
weeks before the arrival of summit delegations, sometimes they are several months in their 
construction. Moving out from this concentrically was a series of security cordons constructed for 
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the police to coordinate the transfers of delegations and to monitor the area for any incursions from 
protestors. These sector grids allow for easy surveillance and the immediate reporting to a central 
Operations Centre, thereby minimising the chance of successful incursions from decentralised 
protest actions. This protective umbrella of security arrangements were reported to be so 'rigorous' 
that Newham City Council had warned some local residents that they may find it difficult to get into 
their own homes. An order (of dubious legality according to Liberty) issued by the Metropolitan 
police required that those affected residents would need to carry two forms of identification (a 
proof of address and one photographic ID) to pass through the outer security zones. Furthermore, 
three Docklands Light Railway stations were closed along with the roads nearest the centre, 
severely restricting any pedestrian access.77 Whilst these are temporary transformations of urban 
space, very often involving public property, they introduce a unique type of land use which 
negatively impacts on surrounding neighbourhoods and the lives of residents. They are solely 
designed to enhance the exclusiveness of the visiting global elite. It is urbicidal in nature and aims at 
displacing and disciplining resistance, the complete erasure of visible (or audible) dissent. Few if any 
concession are made to local people (MPS stated that it 'regretted' any inconvenience caused). As 
Hollander & Whitfield's (2005:254) analysis of the US's experience of security zones note, often the 
creation of security zones leads to 'marginal spaces' which detract from their neighbourhoods 
rather than act as assets.  
This securitisation of what were previously the spaces of everyday urban life can be seen as part of a 
'new military urbanism', where if only temporarily, we see a blending of military, security and 
commercial practices (Graham, 2012). A further way of understanding the practices of planning and 
administration for international summits and the resulting spatial interactions is to invoke Bauman's 
(1989) notion of the modern state as a 'gardening state'. Here the population is split into "useful 
plants to be encouraged and tenderly propagated” as opposed to the weeds “to be removed or 
rooted out” (Bauman, 1991:21). The rule of order stands against the insistent danger of disorder in 
the social field, and hence the garden must be orderly and neat. On a practice level this means 
segregating to enforce uniformity, setting apart those useful elements allowed to flourish from 
threatening or harmful elements that must diminish. Gardening policy is also biopolitical policy, and 
Foucault's (1979) analogy of social control as disease control is similarly instructive.78 Foucauldian 
                                                          
77 Casciani, D. 30th March 2009 ‘The challenge of policing the G20’. BBC News 
78 Louis Fernandez (2005) and later Christian Scholl (2012) have used Foucault's analogy of disease control to 
understand spatial control of dissent. 
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biopolitics79 alerts us to the extension of state power via techniques and technologies of governance 
(a form of political rationality) to the physical and political bodies of the population or 'global mass'.  
For Foucault this has produced a 'profound transformation' of the mechanisms of power. It is one 
which operates through dispersed networks (the dispostif) and works alongside repressive and 
disciplinary power to produce more docile bodies by aiming to control an entire 'milieu', such that 
protestors internalise their own normalisation as a population.  
The logic underlying securitised sterile spaces is similar then to disease control, where the 
occurrence of political disturbance has to be isolated and contained in order to stop it spreading. As 
Scholl (2012:111) observes, "spatial disruption is the disease targeted by [the] authorities." Its 
visibility to the global hegemonic forces cannot be countenanced. This is achieved through a 
process of separation, containment and strict boundary maintenance, itself constituting a 
governing logic in which the police are committed to 'die in a ditch' in order to preserve and protect 
its sanctity. This logic also acts to shift the emphasis to pre-emptive action by the authorities in 
order to checkmate the spatial repertoires of protestors. Consequently the tactics of partioning 
(resulting in separation) and isolating (leading to containment) are central features of Operation 
Glencoe. This doctrine and practice underscoring the precious micro-ecology of the summit allows 
for no exceptions in the realm of secure borders. This is why the G20 saw considerable police 
violence, due to the symbolic importance of the occupied spaces as well as ‘forward panic’ (Collins, 
2008) by the police.  
4.3 Preparing the Summit Site 
A great deal of activity on both police and protestor sides occurs before any demonstrations take 
place on the streets. This happens in a phased manner as the summit approaches. Anecdotal 
evidence suggests that a range of covert measures, including attempts to recruit paid informants 
and infiltration of social movements occur months in advance to aid state pre-emptive actions. My 
observations also indicated that the authorities undertake an intense phase of spatial control just 
over one week prior to the main protest taking place (here the 'Put People First' demonstration).  
An MPS marked police land-rover with three uniformed police officers sat inside routinely 
cruised by the protestor convergence centre. The small number of protestors stood outside 
stare blankly in unison as the police vehicle slowly passes by, their looks being returned by 
the officers sat within. ‘Look .. their com’in round again, they keep coming round now .. I 
reckon their gonna try and get in.’  (G20-A10; G20 fieldnotes) 
 
                                                          
79 Despite its wide application and usefulness in the social sciences, It is debateable whether Foucault's work 
gives us a coherent theory of biopolitics, it is somewhat speculative and sits within his broader 
conceptualisations  of governmentality.  
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This same practice occurred at all of the case study sites, and took the form of intensive visible 
(using marked police veichles) police patrolling in the protest areas, particularly in the vicinity of 
convergence centres and other locations where arriving protestors were congregating. Sweeps of 
these areas would happen as often as once every fifteen to twenty minutes, designed to send a 
message that you are under scrutiny, we are watching. In the ensuing days this attention would 
become even more direct, with pairs of Evidence Gathering officers appearing outside of 
convergence centres to undertake surveillance with digital camcorders in order to reduce activist’s 
anonymity in their organising space.  
4.4 Protestors early planning preparations 
Numerous organisations had been planning for several months to take part in protest actions to 
coincide with the G20 summit. I attended the early planning phases for several which I observed 
from the protestors perspective. In total I attended some twelve meetings by several different 
activist groups. Throughout I prioritised those transgressive groupings who had not entered into 
notification arrangements with MPS, a controversial requirement brought in by the Public Order 
Act (1986). It should be noted at the outset that here I am concentrating on a rather limited number 
of people who will be, all other things equal, the more committed activists to this form of public 
political involvement. As Starr et al (2010:14-15) have argued, protest action is that rather rare 
manifestation of political dissent and only constitutes one subset of a wider continuum to include 
contemplation, talk and action often existing within wider 'structures of abeyance' (echoing Tarrow, 
1998). Following these authors, I wanted to consider the wider field of dissent, and to look beyond 
any static, decontextualised notion of an organisation or social movement and consider its 
development and sustenance in today's 'information society' which can shape people's 
subjectivities. Therefore I also monitored the framing of the wider media coverage leading up to 
and during the G20 summit regards the interplay between police and protestor as another 
dimension of this reportorial action.   
Most of the meetings I attended took the form of pre-planning meetings ('gatherings’) what were in 
the main, core activists and groupings in the run up to the summit. These were of variable size, 
sometimes just a dozen to more occasional larger meetings of fifty plus. Discussion orientated upon 
protest ideas, tactics and strategy, as well as protestor training and communication and media 
strategies.  
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Table 7: Timeline and Categorised Protest Events at the G20, London, 2009 




Police/Authority Response Notified or Un-
notified 
28/3/2009 
Put People First March for 
Jobs, Justice and Climate 
TUC and affiliated civil 
society organisations 
(Protest groups 
ActionAid, TUC, Save 
the Children, Stop 
Climate Chaos 
Coalition, Savation 
Army, WWF, CND, Stop 






35,000 Police facilitated march on pre-
arranged route. 'Anarchist tinged' 
protestors segregated by police 
Notified 
1/4/2009 
Campaign Against Climate 
Change Iceberg Protest 
 Demonstrative  'Facilitated' march on pre-arranged 
route. 
Notified 
Stop the War Coalition 
March 
Stop the war coalition; 
Palestine Solidarity 
Campaign;  The British 
Muslim Initiative; CND 
Demonstrative 200/300 'Facilitated' march on pre-arranged 
route. 
 
Four Horsemen of the 
Apocalypse 
Anti-capitalists,  




 Protest was kettled, police used batons 
and dogs against protestors 
Un-notified 
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Climate Camp at the 
European Climate 
Exchange 
Number of protests 




2000/3000 Protest was kettled, police used batons 
and dogs against protestors 
Un-notified 
G20 Meltdown - Banquet 





5,000 4 separate processions, each led by the 
4 horsemen of the apocalypse, to meet 
up at the Bank of England  
Un-notified 




Demonstrative  Protest outside of RBS Un-notified 
Critical Mass Event Other SMO's Confrontational
/repression 
>100 Protest by cyclists, some attempt was 
made to block/clog  roads by cyclists by 
slow peddling 
Un-notified 
Alternative G20 Summit Academic/Student; 
Anti-capitalsit 
 200-300 East London University, venue for the 
alternative G20 summit, announced it 
would close for the duration of the G20 
summit on 'safety grounds', announced 
the Alternative Summit is cancelled, 
withdrawing permission for its premises 
to be used. A hastily arranged summit 
event went ahead outside in university 
open space. 
Un-notified 
Rising Tide Protest     Un-notified 
2/4/2009 
Youth March for Jobs  Demonstrative 500+ 'Facilitated' march on pre-arranged 




 Demonstrative 200 Facilitated demonstration within the 
police's 'designated protest area' 
Notified 
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vicinity of ExCel centre 
Crash the Stock Exchange  Confrontational
/repression 
 Protest action in City of London Un-notified 
Giant Game of Monopoly  Demonstrative 300 Protest action outside London Stock 
Exchange 
Un-notified 
G20 Meltdown Protest  Confrontational
/repression 
1000-2000 Protest action at hotels around ExCel 
centre 
Un-notified 
Ian Tomlinson vigil  Confrontational
/repression 
400 Protest vigil against MPS violence and 
killing of Ian Tomlinson 
Un-notified 
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4.4.1 The Climate Camp Meetings 
The climate camp had a New Year meeting and a series of local group meetings followed. Whilst a 
number of ideas were raised the overall strength of view orientated to learned patterns of 
contentious behaviour which allowed for tactical flexibility. Direct action and forms of civil 
disobedience which could be confrontational in nature were openly discussed in a 'bargaining out' of 
the ground rules for collective action, and whilst civil disobedience was accepted as a legitimate 
tactic by some, no one proposed any form of violent protest, either towards property or people. As 
one activist summarised the situation:  
‘Yes, it has to be fun, but as everyone knows here we’ve got to a point now that we have got to 
go a bit further to make things happen […] I’m up for it.’ [reference to acts of civil 
disobedience] (G20-A12, Field notes).  
It was the group’s prior history of contentious action and its reputation to strict non-violence which 
appeared to be the restraint on the choices of action deemed available. Any resort to violence was 
eschewed both ethically and as a viable action alternative at the group discussions as well as with 
almost everyone I talked about the matter with.80 It was considered counter-productive leaving 
them open to inviting overwhelming violent repression from the 'tooled up' police. As one activist 
put it, 'The state does violence better than anyone else.'81 Neither did participants believe any resort 
to violence would help to build a wider coalition amongst other organisations or indeed immediate 
bystanders or a potentially sympathetic but distant general public. Indeed, a claimed moral 
superiority was itself a weapon the activists wanted to use for the economically and publically 
disruptive activity they were to embark upon, potentially putting the authorities at a moral and 
political disadvantage in how they responded. 
Throughout discussion was openly democratic in decision making, although the more experienced 
activists (and confident speakers) were most influential. After some lengthy discussion and debate 
(not all of which I had been privy too) over meetings it was decided to hold four key protest actions 
(provocatively dubbed the 'Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse') under the banner the ‘Climate Camp 
hits the City'. The central plank of the protest was to include a one day and one-night 'camp out' in 
central London on the eve of the G20 summit. There was some meticulous planning and 
preparations which were to be put in place, including reconnoitring the locale so that activists could 
rehearse tactics in the Square Mile. This was to be enacted by a game (‘capture the flag’ was 
proposed) which would allow different groups to effectively mimic state and protestor players to 
rehearse the feasibility of the camping plan and its vulnerabilities.   
                                                          
80 CCM G20-A09, G20-A010, G20-A12, G20-15. 
81 CCM G20-A10 
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There was some concern raised about how the anticipated heavy police presence would react 
towards protestors, particularly the targeting strategy, but such concerns did not override the key 
plan. Nevertheless, thought was given to providing training so that activists would be able to defuse 
and de-escalate any confrontational situations that might arise with any inconvenienced members 
of the public, or indeed, with the police - itself a further indication of the non-violent intentions of 
the planners and attending cohort of protest players.   
The overarching aim was to attract the mainstream media's attention to a political message - the 
perceived failed economic system and from then a range of subsequent aligned environmental 
issues - by way of a highly visible form of dissent located in a very busy part of central London. This 
was in one sense defensive (a camp) as well as an act of self-exemplification (McAdam, 1995) 
involving living one's principles. The aim was not merely a publicity stunt, although the goal did 
include gaining international media coverage of the issues, but needs to be seen as a tactical 
innovation to a conventional protest cycle. Climate camps are not entirely new, and the activists 
had used this approach before with some success which was the primary reason why it was chosen, 
but it had not before been sited in the middle of a capital city. This 'modularity' (Tarrow) also 
increases mobilisation by reducing start-up costs, as the activists were already well acquainted with 
organising and running these types of climate camps. Reviving and recycling known forms of 
contentious action in this way avoids learning entirely new techniques with all its attendant burdens 
and risks. More than this, the insurgent activists were also more comfortable with the 'scenario of 
conflict' such camps ensue from the authorities. It fitted to what Farge and Revel (1995) have 
termed the 'rules of rebellion' which in the minds (and mutterings) of the attendees, the pattern of 
dissent was thought to likely follow a ritualised rather than volatile and violent form between 
contenders and the various agents of social control (state, local and corporate, partly in light of the 
mixed land ownerships). This represents an incremental modification as well as an experimentation 
at the edges of an existing form of protest, one which rejected increased militancy or any brash new 
invention during exceptional circumstances of the summit. Indeed, these field observations offers 
some support for Tilly's (1986) argument that rather than being the result of deliberate choices by 
collective actors, the chosen repertoire owes more to the loose interplay between challengers and 
authorities, where this form of protest is seen as more feasible and attractive than other 
alternatives.  
In brief, the idea was to disrupt the smooth flow of the summit by making dissent visible, awkward, 
and inconvenient, as well as utopian, showing a model of democracy and community that is 
possible outside of formal institutions. So for instance, the plan for the camp was to pitch tents in 
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the street, set up a kitchen to make tea and cook jacket potatoes on stoves, conduct teach-ins and 
run a variety of workshops, as well as music and street theatre, all acting as educational and 
inspiring components to the camp. This was all to take place in a rich tapestry of collective action. 
As one activist remarked,  
‘The G20 leaders have taken power from us, our labour organisations are smashed, 
environments pillaged, we need to show this tiny minority that we have better solutions, here, 
now, not them.’ (G20-A04, fieldnotes). 
The key strategy then fits with two of the three elements of Rochon's (1990:108) idea of a 'social 
movements power', namely novelty and size (here hoped for) with the third, militancy, more 
sidelined. Large mobilisations can more effectively call into question authorities policies and 
advocate different solutions. Novelty carries the advantage of being able to attract media attention 
whilst also potentially shifting the strategic advantage by introducing some unpredictability to 
proceedings, itself provoking insecurity about the consequences of the protest for authorities 
(Tarrow, 1989).  This last point does carry its own risk at summit events, (as I discuss in section 4.7.3 
below).  
There was at least two ways that success was viewed by the activists; firstly, shifting government 
policy through increasing popular support for the climate camps demands, including garnering 
support from the media for those demands, later translated into electoral pressure to produce that 
change, what Gamson (1990) terms as 'acceptance'. Secondly, and irrespective of policy change, 
having more ordinary (i.e. non-activist) people become politically involved in this deliberative 
process, thereby building the social movement, what Kriesi et al 1995:207) terms 'procedural 
influence'. This last element was very much linked to the running of teach-in's and other educational 
forums throughout the brief life of the camp.  
These initiatives were loosely organised through a network of local groups and promoted by social 
media (the 'Climate Camp website') with the aim of attracting as many people as possible to attend. 
Individuals were encouraged to 'invite a friend' (a strategy to double attendance) and help build the 
goal of a mass mobilisation. The conclusion of the climate camp planners illustrated the importance 
activists put on what Scholl (2012) has termed 'transgressive contention'.  
The success of the various actions was seen as being dependent upon disrupting established 
routines in one part of the city of London. As others social movement scholars have argued, 
(notably, Tarrow, 1998:96-98) this form of contentious politics requires some form of disruption of 
the everyday routines for the event to become visible. In order to achieve this the planners were 
aware of the importance of innovation in their 'tactical repertoire' (Scholl, 2012) and of spectacle, as 
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well as the dangers of routinisation and ritualisation. It was recognised that acting predictably, for 
example as with the organised march on a pre-arranged route such as the planned TUC's 'Put 
People First March' in the lead up to the summit enables the authorities to learn how to respond and 
thereby too easily facilitates social control (Tarrow, 1995:107). However, the protestors use of 
online media in the need to publicise convergence points, maps and protest activities also acted to 
hand the tactical advantage to the police, who once forewarned, were able to strategise a range of 
scenarios and plan counter measures accordingly.  
At the outset the protestors were acutely aware of this, they knew that their web-pages, postings 
and forums were being closely monitored and mined as 'open source' operational intelligence for 
the authorities which would later feed in to a tactical game of cat and mouse to be played on the 
streets. This lesson had been learnt from previous actions. Consequently, the strategy employed 
was to restrict communication to outlining only the broad plan (camping in the square mile and a 
convergence time) but not the specifics of where, which would be released at the last feasible 
moment by subscribed text alert. Otherwise, the plan was only to use text messages if the original 
plan changed, in effect, if the camp was successfully prevented. This included a hit-list of protest 
sites including the provocatively titled 'climate criminals' locations in central London. This was to 
function as an alternative set of actions if the climate camp was thwarted. This way the protestors 
hoped to retain some of the initiative and an element of surprise thought vital to achieving their 
aims. They feared not to do this would simply check mate them on the day, on the streets. This was 
also the reason why entering into 'notification' arrangements with the police was firmly rejected.  
In the context of summit mobilisations, the police were seen as an antagonistic adversary, whose 
primary purpose was not, as the official discourse proposed to 'facilitate' protests, but precisely the 
opposite, to negate them, to make them as ineffective as possible, achieved through a combination 
of legal, and where necessary, illegal (including violent) repression (and what Collison, 1995, terms 
'the ways and means act' rule bending and rule breaking). This was the general view amongst many 
of the seasoned activists present at the planning meetings for the climate camp and also for the 
G20 Meltdown, and one gained from their own shared recent history of protest struggles.82  
This last point is important in considering what would have been in the forefront of the minds of 
police operational planners, specifically the implications and reputational risks of their plans to 
handle the un-notified protests. Thought was also given by protestors to a 'decapitation strategy', a 
pre-emptive strike by police to arrest the more central actors, so protestors were to be encouraged 
                                                          
82 G20-A09; G20-A10;  G20-A11; G20-A12; G20-A13; G20-A14; G20-A15. 
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to have phone numbers of friends and other groups to keep the communication network as 
decentralised as possible.  
The key tactic was to co-ordinate a 'swoop' with many different groups of protestors (encouraged 
to be loosely organised into 'friendship groups') converging to an assigned spot, but who would first 
meet up at pre-arranged places within easy reach of the Climate Exchange. A similar tactic was used 
for protests in Prague in 2000, seeing activists swarming from multiple directions (and colour coded 
by level of intended militancy and hence risk to themselves from police violence) towards the 
convention centre. To aim was to overcome what Scholl (2012:124) terms 'rendering disruption 
unlikely', by making this event difficult to police, here synonymous with prevent. 'Decentralised 
swarming' grew out of previous street interactions between police and protestors when trying to 
overcome restrictive spatial zoning by the authorities and to create tactical dilemmas for the police.  
The plan was for protestors to converge in from many different directions through a variety of 
different means and within minutes of each other. The logic was that many people moving 
confidently en-masse from lots of different directions would make it difficult for the police to use 
disruption tactics such as bogus 'stop and search' powers and to confiscate camping and other items 
and thereby frustrate the camp. Once people arrived the camp could be hastily set up and having 
been established, would be difficult to dismantle. This would require a degree of military precision 
to achieve (protestors were encouraged to synchronise watches) as there was real concern that 
those missing the swoop would be denied access to the camp by the police as a means of wrestling 
back the initiative. Physically these tactics are difficult for the police to stop without putting entire 
public spaces into lockdown. However, the concern was that once the 'swoop' began mobile police 
units would respond by trying to kettle recognisable groups, most likely at some tube stations 
(Liverpool Street and Bank were the key ones of concern). Protestors were to be forewarned of this 
possibility, and advised that once they notice a kettle forming, to move out and encourage others to 
move out also before it can close. As the G20 Meltdown was also occurring at noon at Bank, it was 
thought kettling would also be more difficult to achieve. Arming people with downloadable and 
printable maps of the city with grid reference points would also allow a last minute change of 
intended venue and shifting to an alternative plan. Detailed advice was to be provided, including 
wariness of police subterfuge such as being 'invited' into any 'protest pens' (cordoned spaces) rather 
to refuse and keep moving. As Hurl (2005:52) argues, "the segmentation of the space-time of the 
event" enables multiple tactical preferences to be deployed. This spatial division of various tactics 
and its unpredictability and fluidity was to be one of the camps main resources. 
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Protestors were also to be encouraged to use their phones to act as mobile intelligence agents 
(reporting police actions on the ground) providing 'sousvillance' (or inverse surveillance from below 
by the surveilled) in the heat of the action, as well as 'spreading inspiration' by uploading reports, 
picture and audio to platforms such as Indymedia.   
Particularly noteworthy here is how extensive the protest groups preparations were, despite their 
limited resources. I now examine the LARC's preparations.  
4.4.2 'Anarchos': The London Action Resource Centre Planning Meetings 
The second set of meetings I attended was at the London Action Resource Centre (LARC) (located 
in central London) in the months running up to the G20. This brought together what could loosely 
be described as anarchists and those with broadly anarchist but more predominantly anti-capitalist 
political sympathies, some of whom belonged to the 'Whitechapel Anarchist Group' (WAG). Whilst 
this was their most distinctive trait (many would accept the label of being 'anarchos', although not 
all) more profitably, these can be thought of as 'high risk activism' (McAdam, 1986). Incentives to 
participate in the group were more concentrated in close-knit personal networks of friends, here set 
within the political opportunity model (Tarrow, 1991:15) offered by the summit and the gains an 
onset of a wave of mobilisation clearly offered. At this point it is important to stress though that this 
was not a clandestine group (and none were fugitives), despite its underground appearances and an 
aura of secrecy at meetings. This identity was in part a reaction to past experiences and conditions 
of continued police attention and harassment, who tend to see the easily identifiable black clothed 
anarchists as entrepreneurs for political violence, something akin to urban guerrilla warfare. That 
fed into the militant identity, status, and counter-culture. A more accurate description would be a 
grassroots insurgent protest group who endorsed self-organised direct action and anti-capitalist 
politics structured on non-hierarchical grounds.  
As with the climate camp meetings, many of the participants had shared memories of similar 
protest events and actions, often having been involved in other aligned social movements and 
struggles such as 'Reclaim the Streets' and 'Carnival against Capitalism' (notably the J-18) and hence 
had seen 'front-line action'. This demonstrates the fluidity with which activists move between 
congruent causes. As such they were immersed in contentious protests, and carried shared 
meanings, requisite knowledge and a shared pre-history of antagonistic relations with the police. 
These collective memories structured and shaped this prior history of contention and directed much 
of the discussion about planned actions and tactics in how to confront the G20 summit, itself 
absorbed within a narrative of radical political struggle. It was these identities (anti-authority) and 
interests (a range of grass-roots interest and radical groups) as well as direct experience of police 
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aggression and rights violations which also structured much of the hostility and intransigence to the 
authorities. No dialogue with the authorities was entertained or entered into, although this would 
have been exceedingly difficult given the lack of any identifiable (or willing) leadership to negotiate 
with, even if there had been some trust in the police to genuinely facilitate their planned protest 
actions, which there wasn't.  
Again, these were primarily planning meetings with discussion taking the form of both reactive 
claims (defending threatened rights) and proactive (claiming rights yet to be enjoyed) (Tilly, 1978). 
As Tilly (1981) notes, all repertoires of collective action are circumscribed by the material, 
organisational and conceptual resources and collective prior experience of the group. Whilst 
attendees were relaying information back to many other loosely associated coalitions of co-
operating groups in the region and further afield, the core group meeting was generally quite small, 
amounting to 15-22 people. There was awareness and excitement that the G20 offered a rare and 
potent opportunity to (re)mobilise and broaden and widen dissent and to take direct action to 
achieve their ends. As one remarked: 
Bring it home! Awesome .. all these capitalist rulers in one place at one time that screw the 
workers, let’s have some fun! (G20-A03, Fieldnotes).  
 
There was a restricted number of performances that the group chose between, and these included 
mostly non-violent legal 'conventional' (Tarrow, 1994) demonstrative actions, such as joining 
marches, performative and carnivalesque (public theatrical stunts in costumes) as well as more 
militant action (than was planned by the climate camp) involving non-co-operation and intervention 
strategies. This included the symbolic penetration of 'red zone' no-go areas, targeting the financial 
district and the symbols of banking with the acceptance by some of limited forms of movement 
initiated violence or what Koopman (1993:640) categorises as 'light violence' or 'performative 
violence' such as breaking windows and throwing objects at the police during a demonstration (as 
opposed to Koopman's 'heavy violence' involving more severe conspirational violence which can be 
directed at property including; arson, bombing, and sabotage, or people, involving; political 
murders or kidnapping). The smashing of windows to mark disapproval of the buildings occupants 
was used by the Black Bloc in Seattle (although this tactic has older pedigree, dating back to 1700's 
in London) and has been revitalised at some summit protests but in more limited form. However, it 
needs to be stressed that the soft violent tactics were more incidental discussions than constituting 
a formulated plan. Several spoke approvingly of 'bricking' the banks’,83 although it was difficult to 
                                                          
83 G20-A07; G20-A08. 
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gauge the extent to which this was idle chatter in the wider context of the ensuing discussions. In 
the main, discussions more often focused on acts of civil disobedience.  
Shortly after, the group were subject to an 'expose' by the Daily Mail newspaper84 who 'infiltrated' 
several meetings and protest actions outside the Bank of England in a sensationalised and one-
sided attack piece. It was indeed the case that many of the attendees were interested in 
undermining the state's claim to legitimacy and rejected the authority of the state and its agents, 
the police, a rationale which hardly lends itself to gaining permission to protest. Whilst this position 
begs a number of complex questions which go to the heart of political philosophy; how one grounds 
legitimate political authority, the attendant question of an obligation to obey the law, as well as the 
relationship between law and morality, it is not my purpose here to interrogate (philosophical) 
anarchist thought. Rather I restrict my remarks to emphasising that for many of the attendees, if 
you do not recognise the legitimate political authority of the state then distinguishing between the 
legitimate and illegitimate uses of force becomes a question of moral philosophy (regarding 
justified and unjustified uses of force) and one's attendant theory of value and obligation (as Wolff 
discussion of violence notes, 1969:607). It should be added that as Flyghed (2002:23) reminds us, 
state violence through the use of police force is equally political in nature as its objective is 
maintaining the order and security associated with a particular power structure.  
Whilst the Mail's piece acted to demonise the anarchist as spectre, strands of anarchist thought are 
a common philosophy to much of the wider alter-globalisation movement (for instance rejection of 
hierarchies in favour of voluntary association and co-operation; direct forms of democracy; 
embracing direct action; dismantling of oppressive institutions etc.) although alter-globalisations 
are not always explicitly anarchist. One of the key differences between the climate camp meetings 
and the LARC was differing positions on the role of violence in protest. The doctrine of non-violence 
(where violence is understood in a strict sense and in the context of these meetings, as the political 
use of force) depends on the assumption of an existing legitimate state for its coherence. Moreover, 
many of these protestors did not accept the legal boundaries inscribed in the status quo, rather they 
wanted to conspicuously challenge it through transgressive protest actions and civil disobedience. 
That said, my interest here lay in understanding the tactical repertoires at summit protests, and the 
interaction and dynamic interplay between protestors and authority players (law, order and 
government) as well as how protest actions come to be adapted, especially in light of these 
                                                          
84 Martin, A. (2009, 2nd April) 'Undercover with the anarchist mob: How the mail infiltrated the group at the 
heart of the violence.' 
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interactions. The most significant feature of the group is their collective refusal of regulation and 
negotiation beforehand with the authorities on any protest action, rather the strategy is to rely on 
surprise as a tactic, including staging confrontations to make visible antagonisms what are 
otherwise left invisible. As Scholl (2012:98-99)  notes, "the unpredictability of black bodies places 
them outside of any anticipatory regime of police control." 
Throughout my attendance at these meetings (and afterwards in the pub) it was notable how the 
groups collective protest memory shaped their perceived opportunities for future actions (as well as 
that of their self-identities).85 In the ensuing conversations, and between banter, these were often 
intertwined, bringing some continuity to the group members (Gongaware's 2010, ethnography has 
found similar processes). These activists often used the language of war when describing previous 
campaigns (which featured prominently in the Mail's account, and was alluded to in MPS's media 
briefings (see below section 4.5.1). Whilst many felt that violence towards the police and the 
institutions of authority was entirely justified, their deliberations were more tactical than 
ideological, orientated on how to overcome their basic powerlessness. As Adams (1983) has noted, 
this is the key problem facing any small insurgent group. Other discussion centred on maintaining 
unity with other participating groups that would be protesting during the summit, notably how to 
avoid conflict when pursuing a diversity of tactics. This issue was at its keenest when endorsing 
property destruction and whether corporate financial symbols should be targeted. Whilst both 
groups had rejected co-operation with the authorities when planning their protests, this remained a 
stark contrast, and it was left up to individual participants own choosing.    
Because of the location and the group’s political commitments, these meetings were of a more 
furtive and closed nature (with entrance facilitated by me knowing a fellow attendee who vouched 
for me). The group were alert to being infiltrated and provocateur action by undercover police 
officers (and journalists) in order to disrupt planned actions by the group or to discredit their cause. 
Undercover surveillance can be thought of as an interference strategy, although the extent to which 
it is coercive will depend upon how the information is acted upon regards disruption tactics. This 
last point is of note, because many were already conscious of this form of repression prior to the 
first thread emerging the following year (in October 2010) of what was one of the most closely 
guarded secrets in British policing, that of a clandestine unit of undercover police officers infiltrating 
'subversive' activist groups. Attendees knew that the LARC would be known to the authorities as a 
venue for direct action, and that they themselves would be 'anarchist tinged' from the police's 
perspective, sitting outside the 'institutionalised negotiation and accommodation spectrum' (King, 
                                                          
85 G20-A01; G20-A02; G20-A 03; G20-A07; G20-08. 
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2006). So it was recognised that this would lead to 'categorical suspicion' (Marx, 1988) with the 
group anticipating surveillance and other 'disruption' tactics. In short, they were aware that they 
constituted the 'opposition', a badge of honour for some. Hence the group were openly suspicious 
of any new faces during these early planning meetings.  
Precautionary actions included a pervasive attempt at a 'security culture' to try and minimise any 
infiltration or surveillance, ostensibly employing loose security measures in the venue, usually in the 
form of a few minders on the door vetting those going in on the basis of being 'a known entity'.  
These security measures were a double edged sword for the organisation. Whilst they provided a 
degree of protection they also posed some obvious difficulties for widening the support at the 
planning phase, effectively restricting participation to a tighter knit grouping of 'known' and trusted 
faces.  For instance, questions were asked (discretely) about me to my contact on numerous 
occasions, and some people were clearly suspicious about a relatively new member arriving a few 
months before the summit. This acts to show the impact of police covert tactics, it induces 
suspicion (and at times some degree of paranoia) damaging the development of trust between 
activists and making outreach activities that much more difficult. Who wants to be an object of 
suspicion on entering a new group? Moreover, foreknowledge of being a likely object of 'police 
interest' raises the cost of participation as well as the risk of the anticipated dangers from engaging 
in this particular forum (legal, financial, physical, social etc.) as a direct result of police action. As 
McAdam (1986) notes, most studies of social movement recruitment tend to focus on 'safe' forms of 
activism, not high-risk/cost activism. Building a sustained organised challenge to the authorities 
whilst trying to guard against state intrusive surveillance bedevilled the group’s efforts.   
Other preparations included establishing a 'convergence centre’ which was to be organised from 
28th April, to allow people to stay in central London for the climate camp event, and if desired, to 
attend the 'Put People First' march by the unions and large NGOs. The pre-summit preparations by 
the authorities were also well underway, including a legitimation strategy. I now examine a very 
public site of struggle, MPSs strategy for influencing the mass media and the resulting content, one 
which the Mail's coverage of LARC dovetails with. 
4.5 Pre-Summit Developments  
4.5.1 Massaging the Message: G20 Protest Media Briefings 
In February 2009 MPS released a series of press briefings stating that the police were preparing for 
"a summer of rage" from protestors due to the economic downturn, and that with the impending 
G20 summit banks were "viable targets" of this anger as well as headquarters of multinational 
companies and other financial institutions in the City. The media were informed that MPS 
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intelligence reports showed activists were planning protests in an "unprecedented" way, likely 
making reference to newer protest tactics employed in northern hemisphere summits such as 
Genoa, Toronto and Seattle.  These dire briefings were widely reproduced throughout mainstream 
newspapers and news media. The Guardian newspaper provided the most comprehensive verbatim 
account of one such briefing, where Superintendent David Hartshorn (the head of the Metropolitan 
police's public order branch) announced that 'MPS intelligence reports' suggested that known 
activists" were re-emerging to the streets to foment unrest.  
"Those people would be good at motivating people, but they haven't had the 'foot soldiers' 
to actually carry out [protests].  
Furthermore, "Obviously the downturn in the economy, unemployment, repossessions, changes 
that. Suddenly there is the opportunity for people to mass protest" (Lewis 2009a, 1). Journalists 
were advised that both "extreme rightwing and extreme leftwing" elements were looking to "use 
the fact that people are out of jobs" to galvanise support (Lewis 2009a, 1).  Building on this theme of 
impending violence, the press was told that the mood at some demonstrations had changed 
recently and that activists were increasingly "intent on coming on to the streets to create public 
disorder" (Lewis 2009a, 1). It was also reported that private city firms were also being advised by 
MPS to cancel unnecessary meetings and deliveries, and to beef up building security including 
boarding up and keep a low profile during the G20 protests.86 Warming to this theme of impending 
turmoil, Hartshorn stated MPS had 'tired and tested' and 'flexible' tactics to deal with any violence 
that may occur and that the G20 policing plan was one of the largest, most challenging and 
complicated public order operations it has ever devised.87 
Closer to the G20 protests Commander O'Brien issued an appeal and a warning to activists, "Come 
forward and make contact with us so we can make sure that your [legitimate] aims are achieved," 
whilst also acknowledging that: 
 "There are groups that by their very ethos won't talk to us. The groups which enter dialogue 
with us, we will facilitate [their events]. "We will not tolerate anyone breaking the law, be it 
by attacking buildings, people or our officers. We are looking to police peaceful protest. We 
don't talk in terms of riots. If anyone wants to come to London to engage in crime or 
disorder, they will be met with a swift and efficient policing response."88  
This rather contradictory message, playing up the expectation of protestor threat and violence 
whilst simultaneously giving a nod to denying threatened riots only gained traction with the 
mainstream press in one direction, not helped by other senior officers stating that the force was "up 
                                                          
86 Casciani, D. 30th March 2009 The challenge of policing the G20 BBC News 
87 Casciani, D. 30th March 2009 The challenge of policing the G20 BBC News 
88 Casciani, D. 30th March 2009 The challenge of policing the G20 BBC News 
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for it and we're up to it" an ominous reference suggesting that MPS were relishing the opportunity 
for physical confrontation. 
Cable's (2015:139) content analysis of the resulting media coverage in the lead up to the G20 
summit found the themes and dominant framing of MPS's briefings evoked two particular 
scenarios; firstly, suggesting violent protest reminiscent of the 1990 Poll Tax 'riots' and secondly, 
that activists would be coming out of retirement to cause maximum trouble on the streets. This 
created "a powerful template that resonated in the press" (ibid. 2015:139).  
As activist groups were barred by MPS from attending any of the press briefing events, there was no 
immediate rebuttal available to them. Even if this restriction were not in place, the hierarchy of 
credibility in these instances would still lie very much with the police's own account. Neither can 
detractors refute the police's claims regards their intelligence picture (let alone the police's 
interpretations of it) as such documents are never shared publically or subject to Freedom of 
Information requests, they are in effect state secrets. The result was that the press headlines 
created and promoted the anticipation of violence at the G20 protests in fifty-three out of ninety-
seven articles (ibid. 2015:139-140). For instance, the Sunday Mirror story drew on historic protests 
and the groups involved to enhance its storyline: “Anarchists from the 1990 Poll Tax riots are 
coming out of retirement to plot mayhem,” and “notorious groups such as Class War, the Wombles 
and the Whitechapel Anarchist Group have secretly ganged up” (Penrose 2009, in Cable, 2015:142). 
Whilst the Daily Mirror headline read “Countdown to chaos” in the build-up to the protests (Anon 
2009, 5). The overriding impression left from the police briefings is that the G20 protests would be 
akin to an organised riot, a forecast which proved to be unfounded, at least for the protestors. This 
is not to deny that there were some cases of ambiguity or indeed the occasional challenge in the 
mainstream press to the dominant meta-narrative (such as Hahnel's article in the Times) as well as 
some letters to editors challenging the 'anarchist mob' narrative.   
Is error to blame? In his oral evidence to the ensuing Inquiry into the policing operation by Joint 
Committee on Human Rights (12th May, 2009: Ev4) Paul Lewis of the Guardian argued that Met's 
press team were "really sophisticated" and knew exactly what they were doing in their choice of 
language (i.e. protests being on an unprecedented' scale, protestors storming buildings etc.) in 
ramping up the threat of protestor violence in the days before the protest. Notably, all the senior 
officers were using the same inflammatory words (12th May, 2009: Ev4) itself an indication that 
they had been briefed beforehand in a coordinated effort to do so.  
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MPS claimed that the media had hyped and exaggerated their briefings, but this claim is further 
undermined by successive police scholarship which shows that the police-media relationship is both 
symbiotic and reciprocal (Chibnall, 1977; Lee and McGovern, 2013, 2014; Mawby, 2010; Reiner, 
2008). It is one which benefits both parties, at least most of the time notwithstanding some periodic 
tensions. Ercison et al's (1989:378) analysis of the relationship between sources and the news 
concluded that, "News is a product of transactions between journalists and their sources. The 
primary source of reality for the news is not what is displayed or what happens in the real world. The 
reality of the news is embedded in the nature and types of social relations that develop between 
journalists and their sources, and in the politics of knowledge that emerges on each specific 
newsbeat." Whilst these findings are from a Canadian perspective, studies of the UK domestic news 
in national 'quality' newspapers as well as radio and television news similarly found extensive and 
growing reliance by journalists on such public relations sources (Lewis et al, 2008).89 So journalists 
tend to limit themselves to establishment communications (often pre-packaged) in increasingly 
under-resourced newsrooms as an 'information subsidy' (Gandy, 1982) and in the face of the 
enormous array of other sources. The other side of this symbiotic relationship is the active role the 
police play in creating the news through professionalised media departments. The aim is not to 
provide some window into the largely hidden world of policing, but rather to control information, 
here to pre-empt critique of police repressive tactics and conduct on the day. This is achieved by 
raising the threat level and presenting protestors in a negative light, allowing the police more room 
to respond robustly than is necessary when the summit itself occurs. Like all propaganda exercises, 
some grains of truth needs to be weaved into the story for consumers to suspend their disbelief and 
accept the narrative. The media thus constitutes a site of struggle between protestors and police, 
each of whom desire to influence the prevailing 'margins of understanding' (Hall, 1973). As Scholl 
(2012:160-1) notes, legitimacy is "a weapon for contestation and co-optation", and is played out 
through the respective (and deeply one-sided) tactical legitimation repertoires. 
This tactical pattern of manipulation by the police is reinforced when we consider evidence taken 
from the Leveson Inquiry of police forces and local press co-operating to achieve their respective 
agendas (Leveson, 2012a/b; Mawby, 2017). More damning was the Inquires probing into the 
relationship between the media and MPS, which was characterised by close working relationships 
                                                          
89 Lewis et al's (2008:17-18) findings are damning, summarising their data the authors note that the "picture of 
the journalistic processes of news gathering and news reporting in which any meaningful independent 
journalistic activity by the media is the exception rather than the rule. We are not talking about investigative 
journalism here, but the everyday practices of news judgement, fact checking, balance, criticising and 
interrogating sources etc., that are, in theory, central to routine day-to-day journalism practice. News, 
especially in print, is routinely recycled from elsewhere, and yet the widespread use of other material is rarely 
attributed to its source (e.g. ‘‘according to PA. . .’’ [..]" 
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developed over many years, one which facilitated cosy understandings and exchange of 
information as well as being tainted by suspected preferential treatment towards an inner circle of 
reporters and by lavish socialising bestowed to some senior MPS officers (Leveson, 2012a/b; 
Mawby, 2017:495).90 In addition, media relations and image management have become pivotal 
components of police operations. Police public information officers (PIOs) actively manage crime 
news and information in an attempt to influence the content of media messages relevant to their 
interests (Mawby, 2002). This vested interest in exploiting their relationship with the news media 
will be felt most keenly where the police force's legitimacy comes into question. Public order 
policing is both politically sensitive and has the potential to radically undermine perceptions of 
police legitimacy (Jefferson, 1990, Waddington, 2007). Police behaviour can easily be viewed as 
'heavy handed' when violence breaks out, especially when images show baton wielding officers 
meting out violence against demonstrators.  
With this in mind we need to ask why did the briefings take the provocative form they did? Part of 
the answer has been suggested by Cable (2015) and reflected in HMIC's own report into the G20 
policing operation, 'Adapting to Protest' (2009) (discussed further in Chapter 7 below). Namely the 
way the police interpreted protestor’s online communications and leaflets disseminated by the G20 
Meltdown activists. Cable argues this material played an influential role in how the police 
interpreted the aspirations of the protestors and relayed this in briefings to the press. The use of 
humour and irreverent language,  with slogans such as 'storm the banks' and 'fighting back' as well 
as the central theme of the planned marches, named the 'Four Horseman of the Apocalypse' 
contained militaristic and confrontational overtones and imagery (i.e. 'hanging a banker', 'bringing 
the City to a halt') all of which neatly fed into the police's central assertions (we expect violence and 
disorder) and often mechanically relayed in many of the mainstream press's dominant narrative of 
fear and impending violence. This was despite the Meltdown spokespeople insisting that the 
protests outside of the Bank of England would involve "nothing more violent than dancing, theatre 
and possibly a little nudity” (in keeping with the theme of the Emperor's New Clothes) (Hoskins & 
Tulloch, 2016:113). This stress on the representational importance of these communications is again 
reinforced when the 'Adapting to Protest' report acknowledges that it was indeed the case that 
activist websites and chat rooms functioned as an important information source for police 
intelligence (HMIC 2009, 42).91  
                                                          
90 The originally proposed part two of the Inquiry did not take place, as Mawby notes (2017:498) if it had it is 
likely the findings would have been more damaging for the police. 
91 There is an explicit admission that the intelligence for 'un-notified' protests was garnered from 'open source 
materials' such as activist websites and leaflets (Adapting to Protest, p101). 
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Whether Cable's assertion is true and entirely accounts for the form the briefings took could only be 
answered authoratively by an open and honest response from that small inner circle at MPS and the 
other authority players that devised and delivered these briefings. This concerns the micro-politics 
of meaning and how meaning-contests are strategically managed through what Ericson (1989) calls 
'front region disclosure' in the form of publicity to selected 'inner-core' journalists. In the absence of 
ever gaining this information (occasionally retired senior officers pen biographies which provide 
such insights) we need to consider other explanations which could account for MPS's proactive 
media liaison efforts. I want to argue that the media briefings cannot simply be understood as an 
excessive or detrimental reading of protestors online communications chatter as Cable's (2015) 
analysis would have us believe. At the outset it needs to be remembered that making public 
statements by the police should be seen within the context of its particular bent to secrecy, itself an 
ingrained aspect of police culture (Manning, 2010; Ullrich, 2018). As Westley, writing back in 1950 
(cited in Fassin, 2011:20) has pointed out "secrecy amongst the police stands as a shield against the 
attacks of the outside world, against bad newspaper publicity which would make the police lose 
respect; against public criticism from which they feel they suffer too much; against the criminal who 
is eager to know the mores of the police; against the law which the police to frequently abrogate." 
In light of its secretive nature, any police messaging needs to be scrutinised sceptically with a simple 
question; what is its purpose, and cuibono, who stands to gain? Cable's account never considers any 
ulterior motives on behalf of the police. And yet its long been recognised that police media liaison 
has a number of functions, including news management to protect and promote the force's 
reputation (Mawby, 2007). This would have added impetus in light of the impending largest policing 
operation in MPS's history dealing with a politically contentious summit gathering conducted in the 
glare of the world's press. All such operations by the authorities threaten reputational damage. 
Therefore 'front stage' (and 'back stage') media management offers benefits for policing centred 
around promoting favourable images of policing, of which the media can be influential (Chibnall, 
1977; Leishman and Mason, 2003; Reiner, 2007). As Lawrence's (2000:18) study of the media's role 
in constructing police brutality notes, given the considerable ambiguity involved in police use of 
force (I discuss this issue further in Chapter 5) whether it is understood as a problem of police 
brutality depends greatly upon which voices and viewpoints the media chose to emphasise. 
The flurry of press briefings with its recurrent themes of violence and disorder ably promote a moral 
panic, which serves as a measure to pre-emptively quell criticism of any subsequent police 
malpractice and violence on the day, thereby reducing the risk of reputational damage for the 
forces involved. This assertion has greater credence when recognising that many of the police's 
tactics and contingencies were planned well in advance. It would have been at the forefront of 
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MPS's operational commander’s minds that their tactics in accomplishing their organisational 
objectives would likely involve police violence and hence risks protestor injuries - 'on the job trouble' 
(Waddington, 1991). Their difficulty is that public order policing involves policing citizens, and 
'respectable' people, not criminals (Waddington, 1998:129) and the police are acutely aware that 
their intended actions are communicating 'meanings of policing' (Mawby, 2002). Continued 
legitimacy requires not only the perception that the state's coercive counter-measures (to the 
protestors) in the level of force used or the degree of curtailment of freedom imposed, is not viewed 
as an overreaction (or conversely an under reaction). The usual tactic here would be an emphasis on 
a 'low-key' approach, with event policing taking a 'sensitive', unobtrusive, and restrained manner 
(with officers not responding to any taunts or verbal abuse or acting in a manner to escalate 
tensions, or worse, intentionally provoke them) and not to be drawn into confrontations, rather 
placing an emphasis on facilitating even disruptive protest.92 However, this requires room for 
manoeuvre which fits uneasily with the policing plan which emerged for the G20.  
For instance, the police's prior experience with kettling would have taught them that it invariably 
requires considerable violence to achieve its ends, and in doing so can inflame and frustrate those 
forcibly detained, potentially leading to a spiral of further, but contained, violence. Moreover, police 
managers (at least in private) concede that there is little if any control over rank and file officers in 
some 'riot control' measures, such as baton charges and legal rules have little inhibitory effect on 
the occurrence of police violence in 'public order' situations (Uildriks & van Mastrigt, 1991:177). 
Being familiar with the occupational reality and the 'operational code' where police violence and 
malpractice functions as a type of informal punishment for defying police authority as well as a 
method of dispensing 'street justice' to those who are deemed disrespectful (so called 'diss crimes') 
then successfully labelling protestors as a violent mob in waiting appears increasingly attractive and 
eminently versatile. Any violent 'clashes' on the day can more easily be blamed on the actions of 
protestors (even if just blaming a minority 'intent on violence') whilst more readily portraying the 
police as calm, measured and merely reactive in their efforts to 'regain order'. This can be successful 
even in the face of contrary evidence pointing (as it did) to violent clashes instigated by the police. 
The press narrative also acts to marginalise and de-legitimise actions by protestors, divorcing them 
from the issues behind the protest as well as justifying what would otherwise appear to be 
oppressive policing.  A similar tactic has been used by police in deaths in custody cases where forces 
have engaged in victim blaming via leaks to the media in order to deflect blame from police action 
(see Angiolini, 2017). 
                                                          
92 Mawby (2002:155-164) draws out several examples of this strategy when discussing several South Yorkshire 
Police (SYP) public order 'operations', notably policing a Sheffield Wednesday v Liverpool match at 
Hillsborough - a event which threatened to further embarrass and sully SYC’s image. 
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MPS provided the simple 'news peg', that significant event which met the journalistic practice of 
newsworthiness criteria to hang their intended story, and as is often the case with the media's 
handling of radical politics, the framing acts more to trivialise and distort rather than do justice to 
the complex issues that such movements try to raise. For instance, does Hartshorn's professed 
'intelligence report' amount to anything more than 'people have growing political grievances and 
some people intend to try and mobilise wider support for them in an effort to effect some desired 
political and economic changes'? In other words, pursuing political activism which is the 
cornerstone of all functioning liberal democracies. In addition, saying that activists plan to come 
onto the street and be 'disorderly' studiously ignores that any dissident challengers are almost 
always at a disadvantage due to their limited status and resources. As a consequence, they are 
compelled to continually devise creative, novel and even disruptive actions to gain mass media 
attention. These demands result from at least two central problems they face. Firstly, as McCarthy 
& McPhail, (1998:84) argue, protest has been increasingly institutionalised as a normal part of the 
political process, one which at the same time often results in police and protestors playing out the 
same interacting behavioural repertoires (i.e. tedious 'marches to nowhere') resulting in routinised, 
predictable events of diminishing impact. It is likely that protests generally had become less 
effective as some scholars argue (Everett, 1992) prior to the resurgence of transgressive protest at 
international summits, exemplified by Seattle in 1999. Secondly, as Boykoff (2006:204) observes, 
states have added to this diminishing impact due to their increasing ability to control the timing, 
locale and mode of social movement action. The resulting dilemma for activists is to find 
themselves in an arms race, one where they have to ceaselessly adapt to more exceptional, novel 
and hence newsworthy actions, whilst risking inflating and radicalising their rhetoric and militancy. 
Tarrow (1998:116) dissects this dilemma: "The influence of the media on the perception of 
movements' action is double-edged. On the one hand, a growing 'frame' of the media is that public 
life is corrupt, a point of view that is comfortable for readers and viewers because it justifies inaction 
or demobilisation. On the other hand, the interests of movement-mounted dramatic activities 
quickly fades for the media unless they change or escalate their routines. When protests escalate, 
the media will continue to offer coverage, but are quick to give priority to their violent of bizarre 
aspects." This logic was exemplified in the media scrum when RBS was broken into by a handful of 
protestors (I return to this 'performative violence' later in the ensuing chapters).  
Getting this fine line wrong can come at the cost of media depreciation, and as is the case with the 
G20, leaves them open to powerful oppositional actors re-framing events and being rendered to 
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what Boykoff (2007) terms the 'violent frame' and the 'disruption frame'.93 Neither is the routine 
news frame acknowledged and articulated despite its centrality to the way news media discourse 
constructs social reality, to how events are made sense of (Scheufele, 1999). As Gitlin (1980:7) 
argues in his analysis of the media's role in undermining the American New Left during the Vietnam 
war, media frames are "persistent patterns of cognition, interpretation, and presentation, of 
selection, emphasis, and exclusion, by which symbol-handlers routinely organise discourse, 
whether verbal or visual". Hoskins & Tulloch (2016:117) note the pervasiveness of this violent 
confrontation frame with its insistent focus on discord and confrontation in the press coverage. 
They cite the Times article discussing the entirely peaceful 'Put the People First March' labelled as 
the "unobjectionable face" of the anti-G20 demonstrations. The journalists later go on to talk of the 
“fiery rhetoric of groups such as G20 Meltdown which threatened to hijack Saturday’s event” calling 
on supporters to "invade an office block with lights on and turn them off to coincide with “Earth 
Hour,” a worldwide “power down” (ibid, 2016:117) (part of a worldwide environmentalist campaign 
advocating 'turn the lights off hour', which was joined by public buildings such as Sydney Opera 
House, the Eiffel Tower and London's Millennium Wheel).  
Whilst the traditional assumptions of news treatment regards its technical and organisational 
features (such as the constraints of concision, deadlines, editorial judgement etc.) a significant 
proportion of the resulting stories are attributable to MPS's intervention emphasising violent 
clashes. Such a frame jars with or challenges the 'injustice frame' groups are at pains to highlight 
(Gamson, 1992). Why should this be so? What the police did not know, and admitted to not 
knowing, was the expected size of the various demonstrations on the day. Whilst technically the 
police have a duty to facilitate lawful protests, the larger the presence of crowds, the more 
challenging the task. Measures which erode popular support would surely be welcomed, although 
this is not a sentiment that would be publicly aired, but nonetheless needs to be seriously 
considered as a motivating factor in explaining why the media briefings took the form they did. This 
is to bring the politics of protesting back in, and to question the professed neutrality of the police, 
with the accusation that they act as agents for de-mobilising (as well as disrupting) new insurgent 
social movements (I pick up on this theme later in my discussion). There are parallels here to Gitlin's 
(1980) American study, which emphasised the way the media's amplification of what was often 
symbolic or token violence, and its communication to students (whom likely lacked personal 
experience of violence) acted to frighten and discourage continuation with the Students for a 
Democratic Society (SDS) movement. The same tactic is in evidence in these briefings, one which 
                                                          
93 These were two of five dominant frames (the others being; the 'Freak Frame', the 'Ignorance Frame' and the 
'Amalgam of Grievances Frame') emerging from social movements and mass media coverage at the WTO 
protests in Seattle in 1999 and the World Bank/IMF protests in Washington, DC in 2000. 
Page 128 of 407 
 
supplies a further advantage by acting as a disincentive to those less committed potential joiners to 
attend the protest events. 
Any analysis of MPS's actions has to consider who stands to gain in the context of what is about to 
unfold. MPS would have been aware of the definitional power they hold as an authorative expert 
source in moving issues they view as important onto the public agenda. This plays to an 
informational bias (rather than an ideological one) in journalism for 'authoritative sources' and what 
others have argued is a tacit drive to restore societal order (Bennett, 2002:45-50; Kielbowicz and 
Scherer, 1986:75-6). Having the 'hierarchy of credibility' allowed them to mobilise their key 
messages and play into predictable newsworthiness values of fear and 'violent anarchists', and away 
from richer understandings of social problems such movements were trying to address. This 
because the police have a powerful interest in exaggerating the threat posed by demonstrators and 
depicting imminent danger of dramatic proportions and instigating this particular moral panic. The 
police can and do use the media deceptively to manipulate public perceptions of the perceived 
threat to form a 'crisis consciousness' and enhance their own ideological resources in the 
expectation of consolidating their interests. Under such conditions, expanding and justifying new 
and coercive counter measures out of proportion to the threat posed and at the cost of citizen's 
integrity becomes that much easier. Key events such as such as international summits constitute 
one such opportunity. Under such conditions it becomes easier to 'normalise the exceptional', 
comprising both the perceived threat and the means of response (Flyghed, 2002:29) be it intrusive 
and concealed surveillance of demonstrators, disruption techniques or the militarisation of coercive 
control. Its long been recognised that the internal rationale of large bureaucracies is to preserve and 
legitimise the continued existence of the organisation (Emsley, 1996) and the police are no 
exception here. Presenting new threats in turn also requires new coercive measures and acts to 
further legitimise the police as an organisation and expand their activities (Benyon, 1996:370) here 
by exploiting and facilitating the distorting of the anarchist folk devil. 
I also want to take this analysis one step further, building on Scholl's (2011) and Boykoff's 
(2007;2006) work, and argue that these early skirmishes form one component part of a wider 
strategy which draws on counter-insurgency theory and practices which are being fought against 
new social movements. In this sense the media briefings constitute a form of 'black or grey 
propaganda', achieved by feeding selected material to the press rather than the authorities 
publishing it themselves. This tactic has parallels with the same approach the Ministry of Defence 
Page 129 of 407 
 
used in Ulster (see also Kitson, 1971).94  If this assertion is correct, then it would proceed on the basis 
of classic counter-insurgency theory95 where insurgencies are seen as having three distinguishable 
phases which need to be countered. Firstly, the identification and isolation of hostile elements 
within the target population, secondly; the elimination of those elements and a favourable 
projection of the authorities forces (here the police), and lastly; consolidations of gains, 
negotiations towards amnesty and the winding down of hostilities (Watson, 1978:382). The 
psychops element comes into play at the end of this first phase, isolating the perceived hostile 
element in the minds of the wider populace, as evidenced in the MPSs briefings (Ibid., 1978; 
Gonzalez, 2009).  I aim to develop this line of thought in the proceeding chapters. 
4.5.2 Reflecting on the media landscape 
Much previous social movement research has not explored the repressive role that the mass media 
can perform.96 This is despite recent scholarship elaborating a more multi-dimensional, variegated 
and hence satisfactory concept of repression, one capable of differentiating between different 
types rather than simply focusing on its severity.97 The lack of attention to the social control role of 
the media is an oversight when considering the run up to the G20 summit and the fact that all such 
summits attract considerable levels of national and international news coverage. It is these subtler 
operations undertaken by the various authority players that can be at least as devastating to 
protestors tactics as any other form of direct repression.  Moreover, as a number of other scholars 
have found, the corporate media reinforce a neo-liberal hegemony through the persistent under-
reporting of counter-global social movement actions (Herman & Chomsky, 1988) whilst actively 
defending neoliberal policies and ideas whilst discrediting social movement’s critiques (Juris, 2005; 
Pleyers, 2010, in Scholl & Freyberg-Inan, 2013:622). 
Lee & McGovern (2014) have recently argued that police organisations' media engagement has now 
become a form of operational policing. This can be clearly seen in SYP's 'crucial' media strategy 
mobilised with Sheffield's local authority and their contractor Amy and used to counter local tree 
protestors (STAG) accusations of police partisanship, allowing SYP to maintain the facade of 
neutrality (as discussed in the earlier literature review). The aim is what Carley (1997) terms 'opinion 
control’ through deceptively structuring the media environment as a calculated means of 
facilitating policing purposes. The particular form the G20 briefings took all worked to the police's 
                                                          
94 "Black propaganda" blue pencilled", The Guardian, 26th February; and "The army's secret war in Ulster, 
Sunday Times (London), 13th March 1977, in Watson, P. (1978) War on the Mind: The Military Uses and Abuses 
of Psychology, p382. Hutchinson, London. 
95 I draw on Lt. Col B. R. Johnston's construction of insurgency theory, whom Watson (1978:382) refers to as 
'Britain's then foremost psywar expert.'  
96 Notable exceptions include Boykoff (2007); Gitlin (1980); Hallin (1986); and Kielbowicz and Scherer (1986). 
97 For instance, see Earl (2003;2004); Boykoff (2006, 2007). 
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advantage. A largely complaint and willing corporate media ran verbatim with the story, one which 
coalesced with its own hegemonic routines and biases. It also exploited the transgressive 
movements’ political vulnerabilities and weaknesses, one which was skilfully manipulated at the 
outset by MPS. The result is to suppress political dissent through stigmatising and de-legitimising 
transgressive protest groups, with the added intention to pre-emptively neuter any anticipated 
criticism from protestor, allies and bystander public's reaction to inflammatory police practices 
contained in MPS's contingency planning tool box. This 'mode of suppression' (Boykoff, 2006,2007) 
constitutes a form of 'grey propaganda' to create and sustain an overarching negative image of 
dissident social movements. As Boykoff (2006:200) has argued, the likely affect is to weaken or 
undermine a number of necessary preconditions for collective action and lead to demobilisation; 
not just the morale or commitment of adherents, but more crucially, the support of that far wider 
cohort of sympathetic bystander publics situated on the fringes of collaborative engagement and 
participation. Intimidation is also a complimentary mechanism of repression, which operates at the 
individual and group level, where potential joiners undertake a natural cost benefit analysis and ask 
themselves what could happen to me on the streets if I get involved in dissent? Here, risking 
exposure to mass violence and disorder which has its own deterrent dimension. The same question 
can also be posed at the level, and future, of a social movement.  
This is one element in a catalogue of repressive tactics to increase the costs of social movement 
participation. As Koopmans argues (2005:161) repression also carries important deterrence and 
socialisation components. One of the aims of legal state punishment is both general and specific 
deterrence (deterring the offender from re-offending and the wider public from potentially 
offending). Nagin (1978:96) defines general deterrence as the "imposition of sanctions on one 
person [to] demonstrate to the rest of the public the expected costs of a criminal act, and thereby 
discourage criminal behaviour in the general population." General deterrence is about projecting a 
tangible threat (a sanction) by 'shaping people's perceptions' of consequences should they exceed 
the boundaries of acceptable behaviour (Bahry & Silver, 1987:1067). Boykoff (2007:300) notes the 
resultant shift, away from the external goals of political action to look internally, to a consideration 
of how the state will respond to one's political beliefs, acting as a brake on activism. The more 
effective the intimidation mechanism, so will the need to rely on direct police violence lessen.  
Understandably all of these nefarious motives remain concealed, aided by the arms length distance 
between police media relations offices' and receptive journalists and editor’s regards plausible 
deniability. The police, far from being neutral arbiters in the media environment, are active players 
who work to disempower and demobilise the G20 social movements. This is the case when 
examining Operation Glencoe. However, the later 'struggle over images' took a further and 
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unexpected turn for MPS. They hadn't bargained for the ‘difference a death makes' from the killing 
of Ian Tomlinson at the hand of a riot policeman's baton. This was exposed through 'citizen 
journalism' and today's more complex media ecology of 'vertical communication flows' (Bennett, 
2003; Cottle, 2006) later picked up by mainstream (horizontal) media. The unexpected event was to 
severely disrupted the careful police image management and the establishments master media 
narrative of ‘protestor violence’ shifted over night to ‘police violence’. This brought back in the 
political contestation of the spectacle. It visualised the earlier discursive contention and brought 
legitimacy to the claims making of insurgent groups, one which assumed the durable master frame. 
Most problematic for the authorities, it not only resonated within social movements, but more 
importantly, across sections of wider public sentiment to profound effect (I elaborate on this 
development in the next chapter).   
4.6 Interim Conclusion 
Thus far I have argued that the authority players entered into extensive preparations prior to the 
G20 summit taking place in central London. These preparations were primarily aimed at inhibiting, 
controlling, delimiting and crucially pacifying the much anticipated social movement activism which 
the presence of the G20 summit would bring in its wake. These efforts take a multiple of forms, one 
of which that I have concentrated on is also its most visible aspect, the command and control of 
space through security zoning practices and site selection and fortification. The principle aim here is 
to entirely inoculate the summit proceedings from any visible or auditory impression that there is 
active dissent taking place in opposition to it. This is engineered in by design and to ensure strategic 
advantage when protest occurs, and ruthlessly enforced (with deadly force if necessary). The 
control of space is a central aspect in the social control of dissent at the G20, one designed to try 
and deal with decentralised, non-hierarchical, network based and transgressive social movements. 
I have also argued that the authority’s preparations for the G20 included an active media strategy 
with the explicit intention of creating an unfavourable public image of protestors, one which can be 
considered an integral element of its operational policing plan. Propagating image damaging 
information of protestors through friendly press contacts carried a number of advantages, 
principally the aim of inhibiting recruitment and mobilisation from that far broader pool of 
sympathetic potential joiners by increasing the perceived costs of participation. These highly useful 
tactics also carry the advantage of deniability.  
Other tactics include a significant increase in overt police surveillance of protestors (and their 
infrastructure) in the days leading up to the summit. Whilst the authority player tactics are 
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multifaceted and assertive, they are also 'counter-insurgency infused', and ultimately aimed at 
disrupting and undermining political dissent from challenger groups.  
Relating these early preparatory stages back to Marx's (1979) and Boykoff's (2007) typology, we can 
see that the authority players overtly (and no doubt covertly) surveil and gather information on the 
movement, in part as a harassment function but also to disturb and decrease any sense of 
anonymity. Creating an unfavourable public image of the transgressive social movements and 
counter ideology also aims to damage recruitment and inhibit popular support and damage 
protestor morale. A point which coheres with Boykoff's (2007:292-3) mass media manipulation 
through 'story implantation' (here to a willing audience) and 'mass media depreciation' by  negative 
framing.98 This implies that the depicted radical groups are deserving of punishment, and through 
(here ideological) linking,  makes the group more vulnerable to state repression. 
Protestors also make extensive preparations, which involve strategies which anticipate manoeuvres 
and tactics by authority players in order to try and wrestle the initiative and gain advantage on the 
streets, although this is far from being an equal contest. In the next chapter I discuss my 
observational study of the anti-G20 protests and how they were policed.  
  
                                                          
98 A 'frame' is ‘an interpretive schemata that simplifies and condenses the “world out there” by selectively 
punctuating and encoding objects, situations, events, experiences, and sequences of actions within one’s 
present or past environment’ (Snow & Benford, 1992, cited in Boykoff, 2007:128). 
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CHAPTER 5. Observational Study of the G20 Protests 
Thus far I have outlined some of the early interactions between the authority and protestor players 
in the preparatory stages to the G20 summit. Each of the respective groups are strategising to gain a 
strategic advantage in the forthcoming main event of the protest actions on the streets. This 
includes some of the subtler and quieter ways authority players seek to maximise their control and 
repress political dissent, in part through mass media manipulation and ‘black propaganda’ for 
opinion control early on. The authority player’s efforts were aimed at three principle audiences; 
sympathisers of the anti-globalisation movement, targets of the anti-globalisation for mobilisation 
and the wider public. This next chapter builds on these by focusing on the protest events 
surrounding the G20 and the police and protestor tactics and practices. My purpose is two-fold; to 
give an account of how the policing operation unfolded, the tactical repertoire of the authorities as 
betrayed by their actions on the streets, and my own and others eye witness accounts of police 
practices. I want to throw light on the mechanisms of social control used against social movements 
and the Action Modes (Boykoff, 2007) and other inhibiting strategies (Marx, 1979) utilised to do so 
during the protests themselves. Necessarily this now requires reporting on the protest policing 
practices themselves to identify them, which again take both subtle and unsubtle forms. For 
instance, when they occur, violent beatings are readily observable, but far more problematic for the 
authorities, they are recordable and transmittable to a wide array of audiences. There are a number 
of inter-related issues which arise from these observations, only some of which were examined by 
the raft of official enquiries into the G20 policing operation (examined in Chapter 7).  
Five action modes of state repression were in evidence at the G20 summit and worked through four 
interactive mechanisms: Resource Depletion, Stigmatisation, Divisive Disruption, and Intimidation. 
These action modes were; Direct Violence (by police assault and aggression, aided by police officers 
without ID, including hiding ID); Harassment and Harassment Arrests (including pre-emptive police 
actions, notably at convergence spaces); Extraordinary Rules and Laws (here legal repression and I 
include here obstruction of legal observers and members of the press as well as misuse of legal 
powers including anti-terrorism legislation); Surveillance; Infiltration, and the Use of Agents 
Provocateurs.  
One difficulty for Boykoff's typology is where kettling (often without warning and no provision or 
opportunity for the contained to leave, including destruction of protestor property fits into his 
typology or indeed Marx’s more fine grained account. Considering that partioning and isolation 
served such a crucial purpose in Operation Glencoe, this appears to be a difficulty (I return to this in 
my concluding chapter). 
Page 134 of 407 
 
5.1 Demolishing Protestor Infrastructure: The G20 convergence centre raids 
MPS conducted a series of paramilitary armed raids on protestor convergence centres (places 
where protestors could meet, eat and sleep) being used by activists. MPS did not have a search 
warrant and claimed they were acting under the Prevention of Terrorism Act99. The raided premises 
were an occupied derelict pub in Shoreditch on the 31st; and the Earl Street centre and the Rampart 
Street Community Arts Centre on the 2nd April, (see Map 2) reportedly using 240 police in full riot 
gear with shields and batons, some of whom were armed with laser sighted tasers.100 I was staying 
at the Earl Street G20 convergence centre when the raid occurred at midday on the 2nd April (when 
activists were organising to leave and resume protesting). 
Approximately 70 riot police were deployed, being a similar number to the protestors inside the 
centre. The street was sealed off on both sides with uniformed police in serials wearing high 
visibility vests (but without riot gear) with further reserves held in LDV convoy vans preventing 
anyone from approaching or getting a good view of the proceedings.  Some nine evidence 
gathering police, several with digital camcorders filming congregated in front of the convergence 
centre (although this had been a permanent presence for several days).  A Jankel black armoured 
plated truck was also used to block the other end of the street in keeping with the extreme 
militarised costume of the ranks of riot police below. Fieldnotes detail some of the panicked 
reactions inside the convergence centre to this unfolding scene:  
Several activists immediately spotted them as they started coming down the street, but 
tensions have been high for hours before by more evidence gathering officers appearing 
also heightened police activity in adjacent street. People know something is up […] Lots of 
activists are hanging out of the widow to get a better look. All police are in full riot gear now 
and gathering in serial outside. Sure sign of a raid. Lots of shouting in CC ... 'What the fuck .. 
they must think were fucking terrorists.'  [looking down at street]  .. Everyone is in a panic, 
several voices shouting about what was rehearsed for police raid. (G20-A16, G20 
Fieldnotes). 
The scale of the operation and its militarised form caused further consternation from activists 
looking down on the unfolding scene. As the police ranks in full riot gear amassed outside, several 
activists tried to speak to the police (from the vantage point of the first floor of the building onto 
the street below) 
Several people shouting out of CC to police now, trying to get their attention. 'Are any of the 
riot police willing to negotiate peacefully or are you just going to break into our building and 
evict all of us illegally.'  No response from senior officers or evidence gathers at scene. No  
                                                          
99 Personal correspondence, Bindmans solicitors. 
100 This figure was for the combined operation as reported in the Evening Standard newspaper, I counted 
some 70 riot police backed up a similar number of uniformed police at the Earl Street centre.  
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Map 3: City of London Climate Camp Kettle and Bank of England Kettle Locations 
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officers moving or makes any attempt step back and open dialogue. Serials forming tighter 
outside CC entrance, some with batons drawn [my view partly obstructed]. Appears MPS 
determined to use forceful entry (why?) (G20- A17, G20 Fieldnotes) 
The officers ignored attempts by protestors to open a dialogue. In a vain attempt to protect the 
convergence centre and those inside it, some activists blockaded the main doors, a tactic which 
only forestalled the inevitable.  
Picture 3: MPS Block-off Street and Riot Police Prepare to Storm Earl Street Convergence 
Centre whilst Activists Vainly Try to Negotiate to No Avail 
 
 
Once the scene unfolded there was a restrained panic, protestors were very much aware of their 
impending peril and fearful of being beaten up by the police on the pretence that they were either 
resisting arrest or posed a threat to the officers. This despite none of us being armed with any 
weapons or having any protective equipment which would allow anyone to offer any resistance to 
heavily equipped riot police. Some planning had been discussed in respect of an anticipated police 
raid but it was clear to us what the primary objective of the police was now going to be. There were 
to be no parameters allowed for any negotiation, only an authoritarian response:  
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No invitations to dialogue by MPS, no response to our dialogue, all rejected (not verbally). 
Smashing sounds downstairs, MPS breaking in. Shouting inside CC, 'Down, down, down .. ' 
(unknown activists). Everyone running for first floor option re raid scenario. (G20 
Fieldnotes). 
All but a couple of the protestors including myself congregated onto the first floor (mostly used as 
the main sleeping area) sat down in a circle, then held up our hands in the air, that way we felt there 
could be no excuses for the police to consider us as posing a violent threat which would allow them 
to over react. 
The police smashed the door in using a battering ram, and proceeded to storm the building.  
All protestors gathered on the first floor now. Scores of heavily tooled up police in full riot 
gear with shields and batons run through the building and up the stairs. As they burst into 
the building we were confronted with officers screaming "All of you down, get on the floor, 
get on the floor" conducted with their shields and batons raised to us, faces concealed with 
black balaclavas and visors. This was being screamed to protestors who were indeed sat on 
the floor, arms raised. There were two individuals who were standing (despite 
remonstrations from many to sit down), one positioned close to the door trying to see what 
was happening, another back from it, both with their arms fully raised and hands open in a 
sign of surrender. As first officer enters the room he immediately assaults the young man 
standing the other side of the doorway, striking him several times with a baton until he fell 
to the floor, then kneeling on his back as he was in a prone position, baton and shield raised 
to strike him again. This assault takes place without provocation and is witnessed by several 
other officers who were directly behind said officer. All protestors are shouting complaints 
having witnessed this assault. The next two riot police race into the room with taser guns101 
drawn with red laser sights aimed at us as we sit, again screaming "All of you down, get on 
the floor, get on the floor", then as it (slowly) occurred to them that we were indeed on the 
floor, they shouted 'face down', face down'. (G20 Fieldnotes) 
The practice just described in my fieldnotes is in contravention of police guidelines on the use of 
tasers. It was clear that the overriding police commitment was to smash their way into the 
convergence centre. As more riot police entered the room, protestors who were sat motionless, 
arms above them with open palms, were then needlessly assaulted: 
Protestors who are sat on the floor being physically pushed to a prone position, faces forced 
down onto the floor, limbs outstretched, many with officer’s putting their knees into 
protestors backs whilst holding batons raised ready to strike them. No protestor is 
physically resisting. Protestors are all cuffed with plastic handcuff speed cable tie straps 
whilst in a prone position, then searched, and then questioned. Each is forced to provide 
names, addresses, dates of birth (DOB) and to submit to being filmed by MPS's Forward 
Intelligence Team (FIT) who appear integral to this operation. (G20 Fieldnotes). 
This data gathering exercise at the insistence of officers occurred despite there being no lawful 
requirement to provide a DOB or to be photographed, a point that officers would have been aware 
                                                          
101 A taser is a weapon which delivers a series of 50,000 volt charges when triggered. 
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of. Once MPS had taken control of the convergence centre, the protestors were then marched 
outside:  
All protestors are detained and forced to sit on the pavement curb, stood over by the same 
riot police in the raid. Two people are arrested, and one taken to receive hospital treatment 
from injuries sustained as a result of police violence. (G20 fieldnotes) 
 
Whilst these raids were not a surprise to the activists, who had noticed the overt police surveillance 
taking place for several days, it was nonetheless disturbing to be subjected to such a heavy handed 
police action. From both observing and talking to people after the event it was clear that many were 
visibly shaken from the experience, although the more prevalent emotion was anger.  
Picture 4: Overwhelming Force: Detained Activists (Handcuffed) After Armed Police 








                                                          
102 Image: Steve Butler Photographer. 
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I was not present at the Rampart social centre in Whitechapel, East London or the convergence 
spaces at the old Shoreditch pub.104 My later discussion with four other activists105 who were using 
the Rampart social centre (triangulated with media reports) showed that near identical tactics were 
used by MPS:  
Met raided us, they were well up for it. […] I don’t know how many mate .. [officers]. Usual 
Met .. we were all … everyone was chucked out. Totally illegal, no warrant, nothing.[…] 
(G20-A22, fieldnotes) 
[…] They definitely had tasers out when they bust in, I saw one for sure, and my girlfriend 
did, she was with me in the back […] totally unnecessary , I mean … they just want to do us, 
you know, we’re all getting the treatment. (G20-A23, fieldnotes)  
Armed riot police broke into the centre, again entering with tasers drawn, violently forcing all inside 
to lie on the floor, and with the same information capture procedures by FIT. The police had been 
told that they could enter by knocking if they had a warrant to search the premises, again such 
opportunities were ignored in favour of forcible entry to the building. 
                                                          
103 Image: Steve Butler Photographer 
104 I was not able to speak to any activists who had first-hand experience of this police raid. 
105 Activist G20:  A21; A16;  A24; A15. 
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The police justification for these violent raids was that they were based on 'police intelligence', 
claiming that they had picked out some of the people they viewed as responsible for causing the 
previous day's violence who were using the squats to sleep and returning to the centres.106 On this 
account  the raids were an effort to apprehend these identified suspects, although crucially the 
number of suspects is not provided. In another account which widens the net still further, 
Superintendent Roger Evans (interviewed by the Metro newspaper) said that police had been 
hoping to match photographs of 'troublemakers' and 'ringleaders' from the previous day. As Evans 
noted:  
"We have had officers keeping this building under overt surveillance. Our intelligence teams 
have been watching this [premises] for the last two days. I don’t know exactly how many 
people were inside but it’s around 70 so far. There are all sorts of people inside. People with 
piercings, people without piercings, people with dogs – the sort of people you might expect to 
find at a pop festival."107  
What is not clear from these justifications is the necessity or proportionality of the raids and the 
manner in which they were conducted. It also begs a number of further questions. As the 
convergence centres were under surveillance, and MPS had photographs of suspects, why didn't 
officers simply apprehend said individuals as they were entering and leaving the premises, most 
conveniently surreptitiously in adjoined streets? Alternatively, ask them to come out or have 
uniformed officers enter and arrest them, with backup in reserve if it proved necessary? Why were 
armed paramilitary raids used as a first resort rather than a last option when such raids involve 
subjecting all protestors to a protracted, frightening and dangerous experience, notwithstanding 
the considerable financial costs incurred?  
It took a legal case against MPS by Bindmans Solicitors on behalf of several arrestees, and nearly 
one year later, to prove that the MPS raid had been unlawful on the Earl Street venue. The court 
proceedings revealed that not one of the activists in the centre matched any of MPS FITs 
intelligence photos taken from the previous day, contrary to the original claims of having such 
operational intelligence made by Chief Superintendent Michael Johnson.108 This forced the 
Metropolitan Police Commissioner to concede the operation had been unlawful as no reasonable 
grounds for suspicion existed. He also had to concede that it had been unlawful to arrest, to search, 
and to force activists to be recorded on film. The case resulted in compensation payments of £3,000 
to each of the two claimants. Later civil cases relating to charges of false imprisonment and 
                                                          
106 Chief Superintendent Michael Johnson, who lead the operation, cited in Razaq (2009, 2nd April) Evening 
Standard, 'Riot police raid squats at centre of anarchist meetings'.  
107 The Metro, cited in Hemmings (2009) UK Shock and anger at the violent policing tactics used at the G20 
Summit Part Two, Statewatch. 
108 Channel 4 News (2010, 22nd March) 'Met police to pay G20 protest compensation' 
http://www.channel4.com/news/articles/uk/met+police+to+pay+g20+protest+compensation/3587057.html 
Page 142 of 407 
 
unlawful assault saw a further 66 claimants totalling damages compensation payments by MPS of 
£207,135 (not including costs of £139,051).109 The Earl street raid represented a rare victory for 
protestors, whereas legality of the other raids are in question but were not challenged due to the 
difficulty and costs of doing so. 
What then explains MPSs practice of conducting raids on these convergence centres if it was 
unlawful? Why target this group? Any viable explanation has to consider the role of strategic intent 
and discount the false 'offenders at large' justification. Added to this, even if the operational 
intelligence had been correct, which it wasn't, the scale and violent tactics of the raids created a 
major confrontation and were entirely disproportionate to the supposed threats, as well as 
criminalising all those inside the centres. Neither is it creditable that the many attending FIT officers 
sophisticated intelligence gathering operation simply got it entirely wrong across each protestor 
cohort.  
The real purpose of the raids and subsequent closures of the convergence centres were part of a 
wider concerted plan to sabotage and degrade vital protestor infrastructure in order to frustrate and 
negate the protestor’s capacity to mount protest actions. This only becomes apparent when 
applying the conceptual lens of a tactical repertoire and also conceiving of the summit protest 
region spatially, one mapped more as a frontline arena between two opposing groups, that of police 
and protestors. The stories peddled to the media by senior officer’s function as a convenient cover, 
and one for public consumption, which handily lends an air of legitimacy and legality to violent 
police action. Protestors had publicised maps showing over 138 targets of protest in central London 
(including fifty financial institutions), foreshadowing the possibility of smaller groups peeling off 
from the main body of a demonstration to seek out these sites to mount a protest action. As Scholl 
(2012:112) has argued also, when protestors construct convergence centres they are trying to 
organise alternatives safe spaces to intervene in what are the spatial and security preparations of 
the authorities, whereas the police pre-emptively organise space in the interests of hegemonic 
elites, with the purpose of ensuring that they are entirely free of any form of dissent. That is their 
over-riding goal and raison d'être. Each player has elaborate tactical plans, no more so than those of 
the authorities, and their main agents, the police. These will take the form of extensive pre-planning 
for contingencies as well as adapting to the ongoing dynamics of disruptive challenges from 
insurgent protestors (as opposed to respectable protestors) who as challengers lack any 
institutionalised power.  
                                                          
109 Information derived from personal correspondence with Bindmans Solicitors and also Freedom of 
Information Request Reference No: 2011020002496 'G20 Civil case settlements' WhatDoTheyKnow 
https://www.whatdotheyknow.com/request/g20_civil_case_settlements#incoming-171909 
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MPS would have been well aware that convergence centres function as a centralised organisational 
core to transgressive social movements. It provides essential facilities such as sleeping areas, food 
kitchens, information points, meeting and planning rooms. The premises also hold independent 
media centres allowing protestors to communicate real-time updates to active protest actions and 
to disseminate counter summit arguments to the wider mass media. In addition to these core 
functions, centres can act as training and education centres as well as providing legal support 
facilities. The importance of such convergence centres lies in allowing the flexible co-ordination and 
diffusion of political actions as well as a space for retreat, recovery and to de-stress after actions. It 
also allows activists to network, share ideas and vitally, to align with groups within the larger 
political environment in order to sustain and grow the social movement. Research by McAdam 
(1986) on recruitment to 'high risk/cost activism' shows the crucial importance of these micro-
structural factor for participants (as opposed to 'withdrawals') who have stronger and more 
extensive ties to other participants, as well as more organisational affiliations (and higher levels of 
prior activism) irrespective of people's ideological commitment to a cause. In McAdam's (1986:88) 
words, integration into a supportive network is the 'structural pull' encouraging individuals to make 
good on their strongly held beliefs. In short, interpersonal ties matter more than anything else for 
participation. The tactical status and damage of the raids take on added importance when 
considering this recruitment dynamic. MPS wanted to deprive activists of this capacity to organise 
and grow, importantly from a vantage point situated in central London. 
This disruption and neutralisation process is best conceived as an established tactical adaption 
(McAdam, 1983) by the authorities, which takes two basic forms: (1) Raiding and destroying 
protestor infrastructure, which has occurred at other international summit convergence centres, for 
instance in Prague at the 2000 IMF/WB; at the EU summit at Gotebourg 2001 at the Hvitfeldtska 
School; at the G8 in Genoa 2001 and at the2003 G8 in Evian independent media centre squat in 
Geneva; Or (2) a strategy of containment at convergence centres, as in the 2005 G8 summit in 
Glenneagles, where the camp was surrounded during the night and following day by police, 
requiring activists to find ways out without being snatched by police, and similarly at the 2007 G8 at 
Heiligendamm, (Starr et al, 2011:40). Later, at the G8 in 2013, the London convergence centre was 
similarly violently raided and smashed by MPS on the dubious legal pre-text of searching for 
weapons.110 
Such raids also provide the added advantage of conducting a 'proactive' intelligence collection trawl 
on all of the centres occupants, here pre-planned, to glean personal details which otherwise could 
not be obtained by the existing overt surveillance practices of FIT. Names, addresses and DOB allow 
                                                          
110 I was staying at the convergence centre and observing the G8 policing operation.  
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cross tabulation with PNC and also with other databases on activists. Once the address of the 
Shoreditch convergence centre was made available online, police started stopping and searching 
protestors going in and out of the centre, indicating their close monitoring of protestor websites 
and efforts to harass and intimidate protestors. This included searching protestors wallets and 
pulling out bank and other cards to obtain protestors names as well as searching protestors under 
the Prevention of Terrorism Act: 
We’ve been stopped twice now up by the C, so’s [protestor name], but I’ve heard same from 
others their do’in it … really going into everything, my wallet, the lot, looking for anything, 
pulling my card to ID me, not supposed to, all under PTA. (G20-A18, fieldnotes)  
This practice is a misuse of Sec 60 powers and anti-terrorism legislation more generally but forms 
part of a predetermined policy of de facto identity checks and retention. This provides rich 
corroborated intelligence not just on individuals, but on the social network itself, which feeds into 
MPSs existing data integration and analysis in the National Intelligence Model (NIM) which 
integrates open source, closed source and classified (image and signals intelligence) sources. This 
intelligence provides the raw materials to implement the 'control strategy’ that the NIM identifies 
as an integral component, one in which 'disruption' and 'network demolition' are emphasised 
(Swain, 2013) (I discuss the role of surveillance practices in Chapter 6 below).  
There is a further psychological dimension to the raids, in this sense it represents a psychological 
operation to demotivate, demoralise and disempower activists and to exact retribution. This is the 
reason why the raids took the violent form they did, and why overwhelming force was deployed in 
such an aggressive manner. This is both a product of the institutional policy within TSG operations 
(to dominate the space physically and verbally upon entry and 'neutralise' all within that space) as 
well as the growing militarisation of public order policing which instils a 'warfare mentality', or more 
accurately here, a terrorist mentality. Terrorising protestors inside the convergence centre as 
happened in Genoa (in even more extreme circumstances) was a deliberate act by MPS.  
The postscript to this affair was the call by Binmans Solicitors for the Police Commissioner to 
provide not just an admission of liability (which was unavoidable having lost the case) but a public 
apology for having conducted the raid. This was refused, with the Met stating that admission of 
liability was sufficient. At interview by the Evening Standard, Johnson's opening line was to say that 
"People have a right to lawful protests but we will take action against those intent on violence". Those 
intent on violence were not the protestors, rather it was the state’s own uniformed players. Indeed, 
there is also some anecdotal evidence indicating how some participating officers viewed the police’s 
massive G20 operation as an opportunity to attack protestors. For instance, the Observer 
newspaper (Townsend & Doward, 2009) reported that an MPS officer had boasted in a police blog 
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entry about ‘the unwashed getting a good kicking’ at the G20 protests (posted a day after the death 
of Ian Tomlinson), whilst another (this time identified officer) bragged about how he was going to 
‘bash some long-haired hippies’ at the G20 demonstrations. Such statements of malicious intent 
proved to be ominous.  
5.2 Analysis of the G20 Protest Events:  Isolate and Separate 
5.2.1 Docile bodies: 'Put People First March for Jobs, Justice and Climate' 
The 'Put People First March for Jobs, Justice and Climate' march took place the weekend before the 
G20 summit started. It was heralded by organisers to be directed at the G20 leaders and to give 
'ordinary people a voice' in expressing their anger at the policies of austerity and environmental 
destruction. The 'march' was well attended with an estimated 35,000, made up of a 'rainbow 
alliance' of some one hundred and fifty different organisations being represented, primarily trades 
unions, charities, environmental and church groups. As such it represented the largest single 
demonstration which took place over the ensuing days. The TUC had been one of the organising 
bodies, with the event organisers having liaised with police prior to the march regards the route and 
timing of the demonstration. The event was billed as a 'peaceful, law-abiding event suitable for all 
the family'  (Put People First, 2009) although there remained a large policing presence to ensure 
that no splintering or surprises occurred from the route. In essence, the event involved gathering 
together, marching through the assigned streets, displaying signs of shared commitment and 
making a series of claims on the authorities, mostly by a series of speeches at the end.   
Approximately 200 police identified 'anarchists' and anti-capitalists had joined this demonstration, 
who had been the subject of considerable surveillance activity and monitoring over several weeks 
by police 'Evidence Gathering' officers.111  
The march was allowed with the smaller and somewhat conspicuous (by mostly dark colour 
dress) ‘anarchist orientated’ contingent that moved within it. This subgroup became the 
focal point of police attention, with riot officers walking within the crowd to delineate them 
from the mass of protestors. Stewards made no signs of objections to this [that I saw] who 
continued to urge march forwards, or to PLO’s. (G20 Fieldnotes). 
This dominant style of policing jars with the emphasis on ‘facilitating’ the march. The police tactic 
was to undertake another policing operation within this larger operation, one which engulfed and 
isolated those that also joined the protest within a paramilitary presence. This saw riot police 
inserting themselves within the body of the march where they proceeded to surround those 
predominantly dressed in black garb, physically separating them from the other protestors. Such a 
tactic aims to contain, isolate and separate police identified 'radicals' from the other activists. It is of 
                                                          
111 G20-A25; G20-A26; G20-A28.  
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course unusual to see police officers embedded within a march and in effect marching with 
protestors. The usual practice at such events is to contain the march by using phalanx's and police 
lines along the (here negotiated) route, whilst blocking off side streets and other avenues which 
offer the potential for splintering of the demonstration. As such, it can be seen as an elaboration of 
an earlier police tactic of separating and isolating demonstrations from the larger public, where the 
police surround the march and prevent any intermingling. Fernandez (2005:247) argues that this 
tactic stems from the North American experience of responding to decentralised affinity based 
tactics such as 'snake marches' (where protestors have refused to negotiate a permit and hence an 
approved controlled route) snake in and out of streets. The tactical response is for the police to 
surround the march, separating it from the wider public, and then insert police lines to break the 
march into smaller units, separating protestors from each other. As with the 'Put People First 
March', protestors are both contained and also isolated. This method of spatial social control has 
parallels with Foucault's (1979) writings on disease control, where the identified infectious agent 
must be prevented from cross-contaminating the larger body through the strict control and division 
of space. As such the population is carefully inspected, surveilled, proportioned and channelled. 
This practice of deliberately fragmenting and isolating some protestors, physically excluding them 
from the mass of others acts to inhibit that shared purpose. Such practices cohere with Boykoff's 
(2007) 'divisive disruption' a social mechanism of repression which acts to narrow dissident 
possibilities by fracturing them. Boykoff's typology of repression stems from his work in the USA 
and is not particular to internal summit protests but does concern social movements.112 This 
practice was not met with any resistance from other groupings taking part in the march and 
appeared to be pre-arranged with the event organisers.  
5.2.2 The Climate Camp: Bodies that matter 
The Climate Camp represented the main form of protestor direct action during the anti-G20 
summit, the occurrence of which pre-empted the most violent police instigated confrontation with 
protestors. The camp started at approximately 12:30pm in Bishopsgate moving out from massing 
swoop points around central London with pop up tents being hastily erected to block what would 
otherwise be a busy road, followed by sound systems, a food stall with a kitchen and other 
associated activities that had been planned with teach-in sessions.  There were some one thousand 
plus people attending the camp, many were first time protestors who had taken part in Direct 
Action Training. For the first few hours all was going to plan with the camp being established and its 
activities in full swing. What happened next is worthy of some attention: 
                                                          
112 See Boykoff, J. (2006) The Suppression of Dissent: How the State and Mass Media Squelch US American 
Social Movements. Routledge.  
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At 5pm police in riot gear with batons and shields start to surround the climate camp from 
both the north and south sides. Serials are simultaneously hemming the camp in on both 
sides assisted by using rows of police vans nose to tail (with engines running) and riot police 
several police officers deep, carrying round shields and batons. Protestor movement now 
prevented. No-one is being allowed in or out of camp. Tensions visibly rising as awareness 
of police tactic grows. Camp protestors are either in the camp with others on the periphery 
who are (unwisely) standing up facing the riot police lines. (G20 fieldnotes) 
As the police cordons unfolded, I had many discussions with other protestors on the edge of the 
camp to gather information, one protestor told me that he had asked the besieging officers why the 
climate camp was being kettled, one replied: 
 “I don’t have to give you an explanation because I am acting on information which is not 
available to you.” Another police officer claimed: “There's been violence inside the Camp.” 
states that this was then followed up with a bit of a laugh with him conceding he had lied. 
When challenged as to whether this was an acceptable way to conduct policing the officer 
simply laughed and said "Yes it is."  (G20-A24, fieldnotes) 
[Keetle 1] Reports that several protestors who tried to engage the police in amicable 
conversation, stating they should be free to come and go, have been grabbed aggressively 
and arrested for 'obstructing a public highway.' Appears to be highly antagonistic mentality 
amongst TSG. (G20-A25, fieldnotes) 
Towards the front of the cordon, many police (but not all) were wearing balaclavas under the riot 
helmets which hid their faces from view. From my limited vantage point I surveyed several without 
any identification numbers and reported this to a climate camp Legal Observer, at least one then 
put an identification number onto the jacket during this stand off period. It is not clear how many 
others were without identification, but other protestors confirmed seeing other officers without 
identification. 
The next key development occurred a little later, about 7pm as the police closed the cordon. 
Approximately some 30 minutes after this we learn the police baton charge ('dispersal' is the 
policing term) on the Bank of England protest: 
[7pm] the demonstration besieged by police (6 to 8 deep) and forcibly kettles with stand-
off. Atmosphere in the camp now completely changed, very tense as protestors looked on 
at phalanx's of tooled up riot police. In response many protestors are chanting "this is not a 
riot", holding up their hands to show that they held no weapons. I can see in several places 
the police starting to forcibly advance into ranks of confined protestors with shields and 
batons. Inexplicable? One squad wearing high vis jackets (appear to constitute a distinct 
unit) surge forward at the far end, this is achieved by a combination of pushing protestors 
with their shields and striking people with batons. (G20-fieldnotes) 
Despite the fact that protestors were trying to flee this violent police surge, they were faced with 
little room for manoeuvre as these units continued apace:  
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Baton strikes are taking two forms in this early stage of the high visibility advancing group; 
a minority of officers at the front are wildly striking down, with the baton held high striking 
full arch to low blows aimed at those protestors directly around them, particularly 
protestors arms which were outstretched in efforts to keep distance between themselves 
and this advancing police line. These is also a combination of some protestors standing their 
ground and remonstrating with the police and others falling back in this melee, whilst other 
officers are aiming their batons at the lower parts of people's bodies (midriff and upper 
thighs). (G20 fieldnotes) 
These police actions had a predictable impact, alarming protestors, but also enraging them. With 
the TSG units continuing to carve this path through the camp, several protestors rather uselessly 
kicked out at the advancing police line, only for these token gestures to be more directly targeted 
by baton blows. Police shields were also deployed as offensive weapons in other parts of the police 
lines surging forward: 
Officers are using their shields as offensive weapons [note not defensive], this ranging from 
ramming people with the blunt front of the shield, including several police taking run ups of 
three or four steps back and then repeatedly charging to gain greater momentum to 
increase the impact of the blow, with the effect of sending increasingly penned in 
protestors flying. I see several others turning their shields to use the edge of the shield as a 
cutting weapon on their strikes in arced blows. But minority of officers in this forward 
frontline acting in this way. The side shield strikes are directed at particular protestor’s faces 
that the officer had targeted. This was visible to numerous other officers in that immediate 
vicinity, although I saw none intervening or remonstrating with those responsible. 
Throughout this embattlement, protestors are standing with hands raised, calling out "this 
is not a riot". As the batons blows come down, climate camp legal observers are shouting for 
protestors to take the police ID numbers, whereupon, and on masse, the serial of police I 
saw all covered up their badges and continued apace with baton blows. (G20-fieldnotes)  
The other main tactic employed by officers conducting the kettle saw them using shields as a wall 
to violently push protestors back, both as they advanced, and towards anyone considered too close 
in proximity to their ranks, this interspersed with intermittent baton strikes. This betrays the violent 
nature in which the police kettle is both established and maintained: 
Protestors on facing the police lines were getting badly hurt. I can see several protestors 
with their heads cracked open, one with a broken nose. The other police tactic in evidence is 
kicking and punching protestors, including women. This is happening all around me. I see 
one kicked women in the groin. Some occurrences of small number of protestors throwing 
water or plastic bottles at police lines as an act of symbolic defiance, along with much 
remonstrating. (G20 fieldnotes) 
What the police are met with during this cordon is best described as disobedient bodies, but which 
have their own political grammar, one which takes a form of a civil disobedience despite facing 
overwhelming opposing odds. The resulting shifting mêlée sees many protestors as a collective 
using their bodies and their vulnerabilities as a central tool of protest. But these are not protected 
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bodies, unlike that of the heavily armoured riot police. The protestor’s bodies are inherently 
vulnerable, they have no padding or protection, it is almost through making their bodies visible, 
with raised arms in the air and open palms, men and women, young and old, that the bodies 
become a form of non-confrontational direct action (Scholl, 2012:90). As I observed through my 
own experience, this creates a predicament for the police which is played out at the micro level each 
facing off each.  
This volatility continued as the kettle continues to tighten and the main vanguard of police continue 
to push forward: 
Officers in high visibility jackets using shields pushing protestors in a tightening kettle with 
little space. At this point there are shouts of 'sit down, sit down', whereupon several hundred 
protestors try to sit down, people linking arms in resolve. The tactic momentarily slows the 
police advance, but police then start hauling individuals up and out of the crowd, grabbing 
them by their arms, legs, with one man being yanked up by his ear.113 As the baton charge 
proceeds it now becomes more disorderly, police are charging people and striking people 
faster than they can escape from the blows in the ensuing melee, this includes striking 
people's heads (numerous protestors with bleeding head wounds around me) rather than 
striking the upper parts of their legs and torso's. Panicked crowd, people are screaming and 
shouting, including verbal abuse at the advancing police line. There is a crush to escape the 
oncoming ranks of police leaving others being pushed to the ground, who are in turn more 
vulnerable to being batoned, kicked or punched by the advancing police line. (G20-
fieldnotes)   
The pre-planned nature of the intention to kettle the climate camp was apparent from the far 
earlier deployment of lines of police vans (n=20) parked on the eastside. This acted to create a 
walkway on the pavement, one which was effectively separated from the camp, and allowed an 
easy access route for the police to push on through that side, and then once assembled in police 
lines, to move protestors out from there. This sits uneasily with the police's account (discussed more 
fully in section 5.5) that they were reacting to violent minority threat from within the camp.     
At around 11pm the climate camp was violently evicted, protestor’s tents were deliberately 
trampled, tables overturned and police used bolt cutters to dismantle the bike barricades which had 
formed a barrier between protestors and phalanx's of police. The infrastructure of the camp is 
wilfully destroyed and discarded to be disposed of by the authorities. As with the earlier 
convergence centre raids, the kettle serves several functions, an opportunity to inflict violence on 
protestors in what at times appeared to be a 'police riot' (Stark, 1972) as well as acting as a valuable 
mandatory intelligence gathering tool: 
                                                          
113 This is an old police tactic that I have seen on other demonstrations where protestors sit down and link 
arms. The pain becomes intolerable and the protestor is forced to unlink arms to protect their ear from being 
ripped off or damaged. 
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After a long wait with riot police aggressively maintaining the kettle, protestors are 
eventually released singly or in pairs, (announcement made by MPS people finally to be 
phased released from kettle singly or in pairs after 'giving details to officers.' as a condition of 
release) (some garbled sound from hailer). Each person is being forced to be searched, have 
to provide identification (this is recorded) are then being photographed by FIT, and some 
are being required to delete images of police from their cameras. (I'm viewing this from the 
line, and this appears to be taking place) 'When we were going out they wanted to go through 
my camera, one of the sergeants, otherwise we were told we couldn't leave ... (G20-A28, 
fieldnotes)  
This containment for the information trawl was not as thorough as perhaps MPS had intended, for 
instance: 
Any refusal to comply with MPS's intelligence gathering efforts results in not being allowed 
to leave and being pushed back. The protestors are visibly tired, battered and fed up. There 
is a sense in the crowd of rage and dejection. Everyone wants to leave. Not all going to plan 
for MPS however, seems the intention had been to require every protester to undergo this 
interrogation but I saw that at least some protestors manage to evade this.  
(G20, fieldnotes)  
With members of the climate camp now being slowly released through police serials from the 
cordon in one's or two's, and with camp being destroyed, there appeared to be little appetite for 
any attempt at further protest action, at least that evening. The police's determination to tightly 
manage the phased release, and their overwhelming numbers and the physical threat they 
presented, from my vantage point saw people slowly disperse (G20, fieldnotes).  
These police tactics of violent confrontation and then violent containment for many hours had the 
effect of demolishing the climate camp protest. The wider implications of these policing actions are 
discussed in the concluding section. 
5.2.3 Tactical  Frivolity 
A further example of innovative transgressive tactics by protestors is the staging of events such as 
open parody and mockery to try and embarrass and upstage (here against the police). For instance, 
the 'Space Hijackers' (an anti-capitalist activist group) each in fancy dress wearing faux police riot 
outfits (see picture 1 below) drove an armoured personnel carrier (a Alvis Saracen Mark 1 tank) to 
help assist MPSs policing efforts.114 Whilst eschewing violence the group undertakes direct actions 
"to effect and change the physical space of architecture" in confusing and recontextualsing ways. 
The staging of 'the tank' into the City of London, parking it in Bishopsgate outside the RBS bank 
was in part the attract media attention of course and draw attention to the international arms 
industry as well as the increasing militarisation of policing. These tactics of parody are transgressive 
                                                          
114 The Tank was purchased through local fund raising initiative - 'help arm the Space Hijackers' . 
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as they play with and move beyond what might be considered legally acceptable action. Driving a 
(although street legal) tank in central London with mock police livery (of chequered black and white 
stripes) is asking for trouble. It also can be seen as representing a direct challenge to sovereign 
power of the state through an act of ridicule by comically mimicking the coercive arm of the state to 
the state. Clearly this enraged the authorities, resulting in all eleven protestors being promptly 
arrested and detained by the police. each was charged (by the CPS) with impersonating police 
officers and wearing police uniform with intent to deceive, charges that were later dropped two 
weeks before trial.115  
Picture 6: 'Space Hijackers' Mocking a Police Riot Tank 
 
5.2.4 'You can beat the rap but you can't beat the ride' 
Charges were later dropped due to 'insufficient evidence' to realistically secure a prosecution and 
after seeking legal redress, the Space Hackers were awarded over £60,000 in damages for false 
imprisonment, assault, and breaches of the Human Rights Act by the City of London police.116 
Whilst the police did apologise,117 this is an example of legal tools being used to repress a political 
                                                          
115 Press release: hodge jones & allen: City of London Police Pay-out to G20 protestors but take 18 months to 
remove personal data from national database. https://www.hja.net/press-releases/city-london-police-pay-
g20-protesters-take-18-months-remove-personal-data-national-database/ 
116 Ibid.  
117 The Commissioner of the City of London Police stated: “I accept the Crown Prosecution Service finding in 
discontinuing the criminal prosecution against you that there was no longer sufficient evidence for a realistic 
prospect of conviction. I regret that the standard of the treatment you received from the Force [on 1 April 
2009] did not meet with your expectations and I am committed to continuously improving the service we 
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organisation. This takes several forms, most obviously it increases the costs of mobilisation 
(through incurring lengthy legal procedures, financial costs, disrepute of a criminal record as well as 
the stresses and strains of having to defend oneself against prosecution - irrespective of the 
perniciousness of the charges). It also yields demobilisation (the group are publicly removed on 
mass from the demonstration site and in doing so are in effect punished) itself a warning to other 
activists and bystander publics regards what happens when 'stepping out of line'. Writing from a US 
perspective, Earl's (2005) empirical study of arrest practices found that mass arrests initiate costly 
interactions with the legal system for protestors. These costs do not stop at the unpleasant physical 
reality of detention, but the resulting entanglement with the criminal justice system due to an array 
of costs imposed before any trial, irrespective of guilt or innocence. This can also lead to diminished 
legitimacy as media coverage of arrests can portray protestors negatively as lawless and violent 
whilst police action is justified and measured (Earl, 2005:118). Moreover, there is ample evidence to 
suggest that police forces (and wider law enforcement agencies) often target leaders of protests for 
arrest to drain dissenting movements of leadership and morale (Oberschall, 1978; Jones, 1988, cited 
in Earl, 2005; Connor, 2018). Such legal tools used for political policing ends ratchet up transaction 
and participation costs and form part of 'the process is the punishment' (Freely, cited in Earl, 
2005:130). Writing in the last century and reflecting on the nature of political justice, the legal 
scholar Kirchheimer (1961:46) notes that "The trial involving a common crime committed for 
political purposes and conducted with a view to the political benefits which might ultimately accrue 
from successful prosecution; the classic political trial: a regime's attempt to incriminate its foes' 
public behaviour with a view to evicting them from the political scene; and the derivative political 
trial, are where the weapons of defamation, perjury, and contempt are manipulated in an effort to 
bring disrepute upon a political foe." 
This brings into view the relationship of law and the state, one which in practice contradicts 
Aristotle's delusion that "the law is reason unaffected by desire." What we see is the authority’s 
manipulation of legal procedure to achieve the ends of explicit political goals, where the devices of 
justice are used to repress political dissent, here under the banner of an uncommon crime. As 
Kirchheimer (1961) has noted, the trail is a manipulable technique to repress hostile or disruptive 
groups. 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
provide, to ensure public trust and confidence are maintained.” Press release: hodge jones & allen: City of 
London Police Pay-out to G20 protestors but take 18 months to remove personal data from national 
database.  
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5.3 Financial Fools Day  - Bank of England Kettle 
A broad coalition of some 4,000 protestors had gathered at the Bank of England situated in the 
financial heart of the city (nearby to the Climate Camp protest). This was a sizeable gathering 
despite the extensive negative media hype about anticipated violence. It is a mute question how 
many more would have turned out on the day if the press had been less partisan, but turning 
people's perception of participation into 'high-risk/high-cost activism (Adams, 1986) invariably 
impacted numbers.  
The protestors had arrived from four different directions to their planned destination, with routes 
punctuated by taking in a number of commercial premises on the 'hit list' (i.e. corporate 
headquarters for Caterpillar, Santander Bank, and RBS). This is a tactical innovation similar to what 
Scholl (2012) has termed the 'five-finger tactic', used in Gleneagles and also Evian which has 
functioned as an effective tactic to reach blockading points. These shifting moves like chess pieces 
on a board allowed me to reconnoitre several times between the venues of the climate camp and 
the Bank of England prior to the kettling which started to form at approximately 12:15 at Bank 
Junction (G20, fieldnotes) 
 Picture 7: Protestors Make Their Way to City Mile 
 
The journey with the group of protestors I was attached to towards the Bank of England was not 
uneventful:  
En route, some city workers are waving £10 notes at us from the safety of their office 
windows high above, emphasises the extent to which the fault lines were drawn and 
protestors' stigmatised? (G20 fieldnotes) 
Passersby were stopping and staring at the scenes of large number of protestors making their way 
towards the bank of England. As we turn the corner we see that protestors are being allowed to 
proceed in and are starting to gather in large numbers. There is no obvious likelihood of disorder 
that I can see. However, at this point the primary objective of the police appears to be to 
incapacitate the protest:  
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Police are allowing protestors in but not out (an indication of what they have in mind?). The 
group I'm with are similarly looking around and are realising what is about to happen. 'We're 
gonna get keetled, they've just blocked the Exchange' (G20-A30) and we shift to try and find 
an exit route. Other side streets are being closed off by police lines, and I can see officers 
physically pushing people away from the junction. Reinforcements in the shape of mounted 
police are moving in too, taking the place of some police lines, another forewarning of their 
intention. Shortly, the lines snapped closed. (G20 fieldnotes)  
The justification given at the time for containment was to prevent a breach of the peace, itself blind 
to the level of violence inflicted later that day on protestors to keep them contained. At first the 
mood inside the kettle was good natured with sound systems roaring although many were aware 
that they would be contained very likely until late evening. At first this was a segregated cordon 
however, allowing city workers and families to pass through but not anyone who passed for a 
protestor. Attempts by some protestors to gain an explanation as to why they were being contained 
were mostly ignored, either with stony faced silence from officers  
Protestor: Why are you stopping me from leaving? 
Officer: [says nothing] 
Protestor: Why are you stopping me from leaving? [louder] 
Officer: [says nothing] 
Protestor: Hey, I'm talking to you .. 
Fellow officer: Stand back! [shouts] You're not allowed to leave. (G20 fieldnotes) 
This containment was mostly effective although small numbers did make a break and get out 
(including myself) through police error and confusion: 
Approx 2:30pm: The police line temporarily brakes close by me, with a mass outpouring of 
hundreds of protestors escaping the kettle. One panicked officer shouts "What's the plan"? 
Lots of police on their radios, momentarily unsure how to react to reinstitute the 
containment ... (G20 fieldnotes) 
There is no attempt by the police to facilitate the Bank of England leg of the protest, only to contain 
it. This brief breakaway section of the protest is the only unexpected contaminant now loose,  with 
officers on the ground unsure how to react.  
Police momentarily loose the initiative but quickly regain it. The kettle is closed completely, 
people being aggressively pushed and shoved back, can see some police kicking protestors. 
Mixture of police serials in riot gear, others in high vis vests, some with batons drawn. No 
way back in, all street I can see are heavily blocked. (G20 fieldnotes) 
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Picture 8: Protestor with Head Wound from being Struck With Police Baton Remonstrating 
with His Assailant118 
 
Once the kettle was closed everyone inside was then left without any food, water, or access to 
toilets for some seven hours. As with the Climate Camp kettling exercise, the Bank of England 
kettle was maintained by police lines with officers batoning and kicking (often with steel toe-
capped boots) anyone who either got close to the serials, or who pushed to try and get out in 
growing frustration at being forcibly detained. Eyewitness accounts attest to some of the worst 
police violence taking place (I pick up on this in the next chapter).  
5.4 The Alternative G20 Summit: Talking to ourselves 
So-called 'alternative' or 'counter-summits' are a feature of many summit protest events. Social 
movement scholars such as Starr et al (2011:40) have argued that the authorities 'happily' facilitate 
such counter summits because they act to channel dissenting voices into spaces (often far from the 
actual summit site) as they are easy to control and draw activists away from spaces where 
disruptive actions are planned. The counter-summit in Neath is a case in point, although an entirely 
academic affair and devoid of any younger (transgressive) activists.  
The venue for the 'Alternative G20 Summit' was to be the University of Westminster, a list of high 
profile speakers had been arranged. At the last minute the event was cancelled, at least occurring 
inside the built estate of the university. Not wanting to accept defeat several organisers hastily re-
arranged as best they could on the green outside. Whilst the exact reasons for this have not been 
made clear, the university authorities had very unusually demanded that one of the organisers of 
                                                          
118 Image care of Press Association PA, 2009. 
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the event (a serving academic at the university) would have to take full legal liability for any damage 
that might be done to any part of the university during the event.119 Unable to accept such onerous 
financial liability on one person’s shoulders, and despite attempts by others involved in the 
arrangements to find a way around this obstacle, the university had in effect prevented the event 
from taking place without having to publicly announce they had done so. There is no data 
suggesting that the authorities conspired to prevent the G20 counter-summit occurrence,120 
although this does not mean no pressure was put to bear. Nevertheless, hospitality was afforded to 
large numbers of riot police who were allowed to congregate and use the campus facilities, 
including the cafeteria.  
Part of the explanation for the lack of any support for the counter-summit has been attributed to 
the University of Westminster wanting to position itself in the more lucrative business and finance 
sector of the education market. Distancing the institution in this way prevents contamination with 
what senior management saw as 'radical politics', and the risk of reputational damage, especially to 
a much prized overseas student market.121 This may reflect the increasing risk aversion and 
withdrawal from aspects of civil society and critical pedagogy brought on by pressures of 
globalisation and the continued embrace of neo-liberal doctrines by Vice Chancellors. It was notable 
that in the Belfast case study that Queen's University closed its entire campus during the G8 summit 
event also. 
5.5 The Police Account of Operation Glencoe: Move along now, nothing to see 
here ...  
The police justification for kettling and for their 'dispersal' of the climate camp by a baton charge as 
well as the Kettling at the bank of England and all its associated violence came down to a simple 
straightforward claim. Throughout the police were forced to use these measures due to a perceived 
need to respond to violence from “a small group of protestors intent on violence, mixed with the 
crowds of lawful demonstrators” (MPS, 2 April). Some of the declared 'ringleaders' were followed 
by police helicopter.122 Commander O'Brien (Gold Leader) in charge of the operation stated: 
 "As we went on it was clear there were people within the group that were first of all involved in 
juvenile and puerile behaviour. That started to escalate into quite provocative behaviour 
towards police lines. There were small groups charging forwards and backwards into police 
                                                          
119 Telephone interview with anonymous source who was close to the proceedings at the time.  
120 The university claimed that they possessed no briefing notes, meeting minutes or other documentation 
relating to the event, and neither had they retained any senior management emails regards this matter in 
response to my FOI applications.  
121 Telephone interview with anonymous source who was close to the proceedings at the time.  
122 Police helicopters are equipped with very powerful digital cameras (nicknamed 'hellitelly') which are 
capable of discerning individual faces and tracking people whilst airbourne. 
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lines. It did seem to us from CCTV and police on the scene that they tried to find a way to ramp 
up the protest and hijack it into violence."   
O'Brien conceded that the vast majority of protestors were 'good humoured' (i.e. not violent) but a 
small minority "wanted to get involved in a violent protest and not lawful protest".  O'Brien continues;  
"We started to see a good deal more violence coming from small groups in the crowd." 
"Clear attacks on police lines, clear attacks on police by protesters and completely 
unprovoked. Then we saw a determined attack on the RBS where at least three plate-glass 
windows were broken." "There was a clear attempt to throw lighted material in that 
premises and we saw small amounts of minor thefts from the premises."  
In regards to the climate camp the claim was that at 4:40 the Climate Camp was joined by what 
police considered a 'hard core' of protestors (by which they mean those looking like anarchists) who 
had 'hijacked' the demonstration, and that missiles were thrown, leading to police in riot gear with 
batons and shields started surrounding the camp using Sec 14 of the Public Order Act 1986 re mass 
breaches of the peace, property damage and public disorder. O'Brien speaking to the BBC said 
 "The Climate Camp had been in place on a thoroughfare of the capital, a major 
thoroughfare, for almost 12 hours."  
O'Brien had originally stated that his officers would be:  
"politely and proportionately" asking campers to move on and had acknowledged they were 
peaceful.123  
"The vast majority of the campers did pick up their tents voluntarily and leave at the request of 
police. I believe we used the right sort of plan. We were polite, proportionate and pragmatic - 
and we are now where we are with a city that's open and people can get to and from work." 
On April 2nd MPS had stated in press briefings that officers had "faced high levels of violence" in 
isolated incidents throughout the day.124 I witnessed a small number of drunken and offensive 
protestors verbally dissing some police, stemming from their previous negative experiences of 
police violence and aggression. The so called 'missiles' that were thrown and scuffles that occurred 
were from the sense of frustration and irritation at so many people being forcibly detained against 
their will for hours inside a police kettle, with many wanting to leave but also a palpable sense of 
injustice at the demonstration being negated in such a violent way.  (G20 fieldnotes) 
Summing up events and before the political fallout from Tomlinson's killing, O'Brien tellingly stated: 
 "The big main issue for us was to get the world leaders to and from a very important 
summit. We then had some challenges around protest. The lawful protests had no problem. 
Even the issues outside the Bank of England, it was only a small proportion taking part in 
                                                          
123 Laville, S. & Campbell, C. (2009, 2nd April) Baton charges and kettlnig: Police G20 crown control tactics 
under fire. The Guardian. 
124 No author (2009 April 2) G20 Protests: Troublemakers 'will be tracked down', warn police. The Telegraph. 
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violence. They were trying to agitate and hijack that protest. We believe our tactics were 
proportionate and worked. The lawful protesters were the victims of them, not the 
Metropolitan Police."125  
 
5.6 Interim Conclusion 
From my direct observations of the protests, and discussions with other protestors, the highly 
aggressive and provocative police tactics at the convergence centres, but especially at the Climate 
Camp and the Bank of England, acted to deliberately raise the temperature, making violent 
confrontation more not less likely.  In part this is a direct result of the key police tactic of kettling, 
which is the partioning and isolation of a demonstration. All requests to leave were refused, 
irrespective of the reason (including serious physical injuries resulting from police violence). Much of 
the media coverage and the police's own accounts would have us believe that their actions were in 
response to an outbreak of serious protestor violence. On this account, the police's efforts were 
squarely aimed at controlling violence and disorder, as well as preventing further violence. I have 
argued that such a chronology gets the events exactly the wrong way around, that the violence was 
very largely police instigated, and appears to be as a result of prior police planning to impose the 
kettle on protestors and thereby stymie the demonstration in its entirety. The kettle is not a new 
tactic of course, and has been used on a smaller scale and at events which do not attract publicity 
(such as kettling football fans behind police lines for extended periods post-match). There are 
several reasons for this tactic, as the former Assistant Commissioner of the Met, Andy Hayman 
wrote in the Times: 
"Tactics to herd the crowd into a pen [...] have been criticised before, yet the police will not 
want groups splintering away from the crowd."126  
It was these pre-mediated tactical choices of increasingly using enclosure, segmentation and 
containment by the authorities, irrespective of the high level of violence required to maintain them, 
which acted to neutralise the tactical summit repertoire of the protestors. Containment by kettling 
relies on channelling and incapacitating protestors mobility and fluidity, if necessary, through brutal 
force. As Scholl's (2012:138) notes, since Genoa "spatial control is increasingly organised 
biopolitically."  
When mass demonstrations are contained, it also relies on the acceptance, at least tacitly, of illegal 
police violence. This is sacrificed in order to give the authorities a lasting ideological success. It 
                                                          
125 Casciani, D. (2009, 3 April, 3:50) Eyewitness: Two days of Protest, BBC News 
126 Cited in Campbell, S. (2009, 2nd April) Did the handling of the G20 protest reveal the future of policing? 
The Guardian. 
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needs to be remembered that the protestors wanted to make their voices heard and disrupt the 
G20 summit which was taking place at the Excel centre, something that they were not successful in 
doing. This crucial point gets lost in much of the academic and campaigning commentary on the 
G20. In part this is due to the reversal of the mainstream media's meta-narrative, and the ensuing 
public disquiet and wide-spread perception (deservedly) of a legitimacy crisis by MPS. I will go on to 
argue that this passing reputational damage was a price MPS were willing to pay (as well as 
financially) to avoid even a symbolic disruption of the G20. 
The other tactic employed by the police was to use the kettling practice as an intelligence gathering 
exercise, with all protestors being stopped, searched, and required to provide proof of identity 
(name and address and date of birth) and to be photographed, all of which was a condition of being 
allowed to leave the kettle. A further disturbing practice was an attempt to destroy evidence of 
police violence and malpractice by instructing protestors that they had to delete photographs of 
officers from their cameras, under the threat of seizure.127 The justification given for this was a 
'reasonable suspicion' that: 
 "The photos were intended to be used to assist in the preparation or commission of an act of 
terrorism, and must be of a kind that was likely to provide practical assistant to a person 
committing or preparing an act of terrorism." (G20 Fieldnotes).  
Not only is this practice in contravention of the official guidance from the Court of Appeal decision 
on the matter, it asserts that every protestor who photographed police officers were in 
contravention of Sec 76. 
In the next Chapter I examine some primary and secondary data from official records, all of which 
provide further doubts as to the authority’s accounts of the policing operation at the G20.  
                                                          
127 I witnessed this myself (although I was no subject to it as I did not have a camera at the time) and 
corroborated it from other protestors leaving the kettle. Other protestor reports of this practice were also 
published by Earth First!, indicating these were not isolated incidents where there was reason suspicion to 
invoke Sec 76 (2008) of the Counter-Terrorism Act makes it an offence to elicit or attempt to elicit 
information about an individual who is or has been a constable "which is of a kind likely to be useful to a 
person committing or preparing an act of terrorism."[174]. 
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CHAPTER 6: The Aftermath of Operation Glencoe: Rebuilding Police 
Legitimacy 
Thus far I have examined the evolution and interplay of protestors and police tactics, and the 
influence of these tactics on each group within the site of struggle constituted by the G20 summit. I 
have examined how the refusal of 'negotiated management' by some protestors was used to 
discredit the social movement and thereby ease its subjection to physical violence and other 
repressive measures.  
I now shift my focus to what occurred after the G20, and the range of official responses to the 
widely perceived crisis of legitimacy. I offer an alternative explanation as to why the enquiries 
occurred, and why they took the form they did. I do this because the fall-out from Operation 
Glencoe constituted a watershed moment in public order policing in the mainland UK, but one I will 
argue was largely wasted. There are a number of reasons for this which I start to explore here and in 
the next chapter. I begin with examining the main institutions tasked with addressing allegations of 
police malpractice and using data from the G20, bring to light some of their deficiencies which 
operate at the structural and policy level.      
6.1 Out of Order: Political Violence 
6.1.1 Determining the level of Police Force Used through Injuries and Complains  
One of the primary responsibilities of a democracy is for a government to report accurately on how 
often its own agents injure its citizens, and to be able to fully justify these injuries. In some 
important respects the UK fails in this responsibility, as there is no systematic or useful national 
data available that describes the frequency and consequences of police violence when it comes to 
the policing of 'public disorder'. Knowing how many protestors are injured is important because it 
allows a fuller understanding of the extent of force used by police including potentially 'life 
threatening' force. Indeed, the authorities appear overly reliant upon injured parties (or those with 
grievances) to make a formal complaint against the police or seek alternative legal remedy by 
bringing a civil case against the particular police force (I return to the inadequacies of such practices 
below).  
Whilst the news media frequently report numbers of injures to officers and citizens, these figures 
very likely underestimate the number of crowd injuries and overestimate injuries to officers.128 By 
                                                          
128 This is because news organisations merely re-report figures provided by the police, which is itself a count of 
the total number of injuries officers have sustained on that day. This encompasses any injuries recorded by an 
officer, including any accident (such as a trip getting out of a police vehicle, a bee sting, dehydration etc.) 
which is unrelated to any assault – a point that is often neglected to be mentioned.  
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way of illustration, the publicised number of injured demonstrators during the second anti-poll tax 
demonstration dubbed 'The Battle of Brixton', saw the police baton charge the demonstrator's 
picket outside HMP Brixton, officially resulting in only six injured demonstrators - the exact same 
number of injured as police officers (M. Towers, Daily Express, 21.10.1990). Direct observation of 
these events saw a sustained baton charge by an estimated one hundred police officers moving 
through the crowd and directing baton blows to the heads of dozens of demonstrators who were 
unable to flee the vicinity (Christmann, 1996). Assuming that a baton blow struck to the head of a 
protestor constitutes an injury, then the protestor injuries considerably exceeded the reported 
figures. 
As I have been arguing in the previous chapter, whilst 'law and order news' is always a site of 
contestation, structurally much mainstream (corporate) media reporting is increasingly 
'asymmetrical' in favour of the police (see also Mawby, 2010) with the police exploiting 
communications strategies in order to control the external environment in a way that privileges 
their own account and acts to buttress their organisational legitimacy. Far from being neutral 
arbiters in these proceedings, the police are partisan players. With this key point in mind we need to 
be sceptical about the accuracy of any data they provide, no more so than injured protestors at their 
hands. Those who would doubt this assertion only need to consider the police's (including MPS) 
long and ignoble track record of 'ethical compliance' in reporting data which reflect upon 
performance and organisational reputation to external authorities.129 The precise opposite however 
holds for documenting police officer injuries due to the benefits from an administrative 
infrastructure. This is incentivised in several ways; officers know they can claim sick leave or light 
duties from an injury as well as police injuries functioning as a politically expedient counter-balance 
                                                          
129 Police forces have a poor track record in fulfilling their responsibilities here, for instance, in 2014 the former 
MPS Commissioner Lord Stevens (who had run the Met for six years) testified to the House of Common's 
Home Affairs Committee that “Ever since I’ve been in police service there has been a fiddling of figures. I 
remember being a detective constable where we used to write off crimes.” Asked if this was still going on, 
Steven's replied: “Of course it is. In certain forces." "I was in a session with police sergeants nine months to a 
year ago in Cheshire talking about what their feelings were about the police service. All of them said the 
biggest scandal that is coming our way is recording of crime.” The same committee had been told that official 
crime figures were often 'massaged' (i.e. downgrading offences to less serious crimes, persuading the victim 
not to make a complaint and hence a crime record, or only recording a crime if it was solved) usually at the 
instruction of senior officers in order to improve police performance. (Barrett, D. (2014, Jan 14th) Lord 
Stevens admits police have been fiddling' crime figures for years. Telegraph). A month earlier, the Chief 
Inspector of Constabulary, Tom Winsor, had told the House of Commons Home Affairs 'The fact is in anything 
that gets measured, once those who are being measured, whose performance are being measured, work out 
how the system works, there’s an incentive, resisted by many, to manipulate the process as to make your own 
performance look good.' Home Affairs Committee (2013, December 17th) 
http://www.parliamentlive.tv/Event/Index/7056644f-645b-4a8f-9a64-6e83aeb18e64. This occurs despite 
numerous previous attempts by successive governments to stamp out the fiddling of figures and the 
existence of a statutory duty on forces to supply the Home Office with accurate quarterly crime data on 
'Home Office List Offences'. 
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to protestor injuries in buttressing the police's case of violent protestors.   
Police skulduggery notwithstanding, protestor (and those caught up in a demonstration) injury 
figures will only include those that come to the police's attention either as a direct result of their 
power of arrest, (typically recorded at the 'custody suite' under PACE), or those that receive 
treatment at the scene by the emergency services, and further, are then recorded as injured parties. 
Whilst each public order situation will differ according to a host of factors, it remains the case that 
the mass of an unruly crowd - whether they come into direct confrontation with the police or not - 
will escape arrest because police tactics will be directed at one of two primary goals; containment 
within police lines with riot shields and serials using baton blows, police canines or alternatively, 
dispersal with baton charges, police canines or horse charges, all of which occurred at the G20. 
Neither of these tactics is designed to supply a large number of arrests (even the use of snatch 
squad's only targets individuals) although some arrests will undoubtedly occur. Clearly, anyone 
sustaining an injury that avoids, or fails to be arrested, or does not receive treatment at the scene 
will go uncounted. This is not to suggest that protestors will receive treatment simply because they 
are injured however, irrespective of the cause. There were numerous examples of this during my 
G20 observations, including protestors with head wounds that were bleeding profusely from police 
baton strikes whilst inside the climate camp kettle as well as one protestor who appeared to have 
suffered a broken ankle and being refused permission to leave and seek outside medical assistance 
and told to 'elevate their leg' by police.  
Other potential data sources including as on scene emergency services such as ambulance staff, if 
available, are not always able to access those injured by the police, in part because they are often 
kept behind police cordons and come under the direction and control of the police (Bronze) 
Commander. When police imposed a kettle as at the climate camp and Bank of England, ambulance 
staff were not present. The police do have dedicated medically trained ('Medic') officers, but this 
would appear an ancillary role to that of enforcement action, as the self-same individuals can be 
responsible for dispensing violence (see Picture 8 below). As a consequence, the injured may 
(understandably) not want to seek medical treatment from those that inflict said same injury, or 
from its organisational members. Anecdotally, during my observational period I heard half a dozen 
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Picture 9: An MPS Medical Officer Wielding A Baton at the Bank of England Kettle 
 
 
6.1.2 Official responses: Placation and attrition in the complaints system  
It has been suggested that a police complaint system forms one of three pillars of accountability for 
a protestor or citizen seeking redress for police malpractice (Police Monitoring and Research Group, 
1987:6). The other two being accountability under the law and accountability to the police 
organisation (its own disciplinary and regulatory framework).130 
The IPCC received a total of 297131 direct complaints in relation to the policing of the G20 protest, 
134 of which were termed by the IPCC 'about the police use of force', here meaning allegations of 
excessive force during the G20 protests on 1st and 2nd of April 2009. It is worth detailing the 
processing of these complaints, if nothing else than to examine the very considerable process of 
attrition which is exercised in this procedure (see diagram 1 below which sets out the key decision 




                                                          
130 I do not mean to suggest that these are the only accountability structures as other forms exist (i.e. internal 
and external auditing; PCC's, external Inspectors etc.) only that these are the most directly relevant to an 
ordinary citizen or protestor seeking redress regards to police practices affecting their lives. 
131 All data supplied by the IPCC to author - personal correspondence. 
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Diagram 1: Destination and Outcome of Complaints Made to the IPCC Regards Operation 
Glencoe 
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Despite the very high level of public disquiet and official attention, it remains that less than 1% 
(0.6%) of the 297 complaints received resulted in any misconduct action by a police organisation, 
and then, only one written warning and one dismissal (as a result of the police killing of Tomlinson). 
Most complaints were rejected by the IPCC, on the grounds that they related to operational police 
tactical decisions, i.e. being forcibly kettled for 7 to 8 hours (although the IPCC passed these to 
HMIC's own investigation for 'consideration').  
Some 212 (71.3%) were passed to the police force for 'recording' (being a mandatory requirement). 
Therefore, 85 (over a quarter 28.7%) of the complaints were rejected, the bulk of which (n=69) were 
deemed not to be eligible under the Police Reform Act (2002) because the complaint related to 
something a person had not been a direct witness to or victim of (something they had seen on social 
media or TV or read in a newspaper etc.) with the remainder (n=16) failing to give consent for the 
complaint to be passed on to forces.132  Some 127 were not passed to the IPCC largely because they 
related to 'police tactics' and again were deemed outside of the scope of the Police Reform Act 
(2002) as this relates to operational policing decisions rather than an accusation of police 
malpractice. The IPCC states that the substance of such complaints were passed to HMIC’s own 
review of police tactics during the G20 demonstrations for their 'consideration'. What cannot be 
denied is that all of these complainants are effectively denied any right of redress. 
The 85 cases alleging serious assault by serving police officers were referred back to the IPCC. The 
IPCC then made a determination about whether they or the individual police force who were the 
subject of the complaint should undertake an investigation, resulting in a mere 6 independent IPCC 
investigations (or 7.2% of the original total received). The bulk of the remainder (n=62) were 
referred to as IPCC 'supervised investigations' a somewhat misleading term as the individual police 
force which is subject to the complaint then conducted the actual investigation, with the IPCCs role 
being limited to setting out what the investigation should encompass. This constitutes a very 
considerable sleight of hand as it breaches the original founding principle behind the IPCC that a 
non-police organisation should undertake the investigating. That the IPCC had publicly trumpeted 
that it 'investigated' all G20 complaint cases where there were allegations of physical assault 
similarly acts to mislead. What we are left with here is only the appearance of independence, as the 
complaints system very largely reverts back to the old discredited internal model of police 
complaints (the spectacle of the police investigating themselves) which has been the subject of long 
and 'extensive critique' (Seneviratne, 2004:333). If one accepts the "apparent pathological inability 
                                                          
132 Under the Police Reform Act (PRA), the IPCC was required to get consent from the complainant before it 
could pass on a complaint to the AA. This was changed under the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 
2011 (PRSRA), and from 23rd November 2012, consent is no longer required. 
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of police to objectively investigate their peers” (Prenzler & Ronken, 2001:157) then it is hard to see 
how this decision could be justified if one's concern is impartial and robust investigation. A further 
17 complaints were referred back by the IPCC to the police force in question to be dealt with as they 
saw fit (including rejection) or subject to 'Local Investigation'. Such local investigations are 
conducted entirely by the police force who again were the subject of the complaint, so for these 
unlucky complainants even the veneer of independence is lost. This is one of the most disturbing 
issues deriving from this analysis of the IPCC data, that the complainant does not get to determine 
who hears and investigates the complaint, despite them directing the complaint to the IPCC. This 
decision is made wholly and unilaterally by the IPCC and as is demonstrated here, in the main, this 
decision is against the best interests of the complainant if one privileges the outcome as the metric 
of interest. To do so is not an unreasonable position if one asserts that the IPCC's role for handling 
complaints is to “contain and manifest an appropriate degree of independence” (Police Reform Act 
2002, s. 10).  
Of the 'supervised investigation', some 19 were discontinued for what the IPCC termed reasons of 
'failure to cooperate rendering investigation impracticable as officers could not be identified'. This 
means that complainants stop responding ('engaging') and the IPCC consider that the investigation 
could not be progressed further. A further 6 were 'granted dispensation' (the complaint was 
officially dropped against the officer) due to loss of contact with the complainant.  Whilst there is no 
way to compel complainants to continue co-operating, these cases do suggest the IPCC requires 
more robust administrative processes that minimise such attrition.133 A further three cases were 're-
determined' and sent back to the force so that they could deal with them by way of Local 
Resolution. Four were withdrawn as the complainants decided not to proceed.  
Some 30 cases were concluded of which 8 (20%) saw the dissatisfied complainant appeal against 
the finding, with most appeals (n=6) being upheld (two were not).134 The high numbers of successful 
appeals calls into question the robustness of the original investigations (very likely Local 
Resolutions) and requires considerable determination and fortitude from the complainant, with one 
case taking 4 years to be resolved.135  
 
                                                          
133 The working practices at the IPCC see case managers responding to the mode of communication instigated 
by the complainant, and there appears to be no measures put in place to address attrition, for instance, as a 
matter of policy to request all complainants mobile phone numbers to ensure lines of communication are 
maximised (Personal correspondence to author from IPCC). 
 
135 For instance a pensioner who was violently knocked to the ground by a police officer (PN 2509, 2550) and 
who was not satisfied with the IPCC complaint procedure, appealed to the IPCC who eventually accepted that 
he had a 'legitimate grievance against the Metropolitan Police Service’. It took over two years from this ruling, 
(and 4 years in total) for MPS to agree to pay compensation of £9,000.(Peace News, April 2013, Issue 2556). 
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Of the 30 'concluded cases', 12 were passed to the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) for 
consideration as to whether criminal proceedings were necessary. Of these twelve, three were also 
passed onto the own police force’s misconduct office, leading to one officer receiving a written 
warning, for another there was no further action and the outcome in the last case was not known. 
As for the remainder, 27 were concluded as ‘no case to answer’.  
Assessing the IPCC data in this way illustrates the very high degree of attrition throughout its 
complaints system. Operation Glencoe was one of the largest policing operations in British history, 
and demonstrated the willingness of the police to use brutal violence against protestors, which 
crucially, came to the attention of a mass public. As a result, it generated an unprecedented number 
of official enquiry reports (discussed in Chapter 7). Despite this level of public disquiet and official 
attention, it remains that almost all of the complaints were either rejected, dismissed or 
discontinued. Only two cases saw any misconduct action by a police organisation, and then, only 
one written warning and one dismissal (the last being as a result of the officer killing Ian Tomlinson). 
Most complaints were rejected by the IPCC, on the grounds that they related to operational police 
tactical decisions of direction and control, i.e. being forcibly kettled for 7 to 8 hours. This 
dramatically exposes the democratic deficit which lies at the heart of British policing. Constabulary 
autonomy means that the police set the agenda and prioritise their own policy directives and 
procedures, irrespective of how far it removes them from the object of community life. These issues 
were reflected on some three decades ago by Scraton (1985:167) who at the time concluded that 
the police had achieved political autonomy at the operational level which put them "beyond 
democratic control and accountability". Little seems to have changed since then when one 
examines the main mechanisms which exists for dealing with police complaints.  
Outside of this complaints system redress remains limited to requesting judicial review of police 
practices or seeking Legal Aid and suing the police in a civil case for damages. The tort avenue is the 
only means where the complainant can hear officers having to answer for their conduct, unlike the 
complaints system where there is no such scrutiny available to the aggrieved party (Smith, 
2004:23). Even in the unlikely circumstances where police disciplinary action does ensue, the 
complainant has no right to see the disciplinary report which remains the exclusive property of the 
Chief Constable (Scraton, 1985). Whilst Ward (2002:21) found that the chances of success in civil 
proceedings are 'dramatically higher' than with the formal police complaints system, bringing a civil 
case is far from straightforward, or for many, realistic.136 The stringency of eligibility for Legal Aid 
and the potential to have to meet police full legal costs (paid for from the public purse) if the case is 
unsuccessful acts as a powerful preventive measures to those alleging excessive or indiscriminate 
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force and malpractice. It is not known whether this situation has changed in any marked way since 
the IPCC came into existence from 2004, but on the basis of the G20 as a case study, it would 
appear not. Complainants are further disadvantaged when one considers there is no routine 
entitlement to financial assistance which would allow legal advice and representation to progress 
the complaint (Smith, 2009:254). All other avenues are closed to complainants, except to protest 
and risk recurrence of the same practices they had fallen foul of by the said same organisation.   
The analysis also demonstrates that the current regulatory structure within the IPCC discards many 
complaints where the complainant was not physically present at the scene or who is not the victim, 
constituting almost a third of complaints passed to MPS (see diagram 1 above). This is a curious 
regulation for a reformed complaints system whose professed ambition is to more effectively 
address police malpractice. No more so than when considering that modern society is now subject 
to a revolution in multi-media technology, one which provides a hitherto unknown level of 
surveillance of the police and other governmental bodies, and can operate in real time. This is of 
particular importance as citizen journalism ('sousveillance' or 'watching from below') was prominent 
at the G20 demonstrations facilitated by independent media centres (i.e. Indymedia137) passing 
information onto other more mainstream information hubs. As Bradshaw (2013) has argued, we 
need to recognise that sousveillance is a form of direct action, one which aims to make instances of 
excessive and disproportionate police violence more visible to the public through a virtual (and 
physical) communications network as well as protect protestors vulnerable bodies from assault. 
Similarly, McGrath (2004:198) notes that ‘‘Counter surveillance involves using surveillance 
equipment in a way that reverses the usual vectors of power. As such, its most basic manifestation 
may be the video cameras carried at most political demonstrations, on the look-out to record any 
police brutality.’ These counter-surveillance techniques radically subvert the high visibility 
surveillance practices used by the state (notably by police 'Evidence Gatherers') designed to reduce 
activists sense of autonomy. Turning the lens back upon the authorities has the same aim, reducing 
police autonomy to engage in gratuitous and disproportionate violence by being watched and 
recorded. It is also a form of 'strategic communication'138 (Borum & Tilby, 2005) to spread a message 
after and between protest events through documenting and publicising the graphic reality of state 
violence that can be meted out to young people, women and anyone else who dissents. This can 
take the form of producing short documentary films for the world to see stemming from 
independent journalists contributing video and digital footage. This is to visualise social conflict and 
                                                          
137 In 2013 it was reported that there are over 150 Indymedia organisations (Indymedia Document Project 
2013, cited in Bradshaw, 2013:450). 
138 Borum & Tilby, (2005) distinguish this from 'tactical communication' which concerns exchanging 
operational information about police activities during a protest action in order to keep abreast of police 
tactics and gain an advantage. 
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highlight which side perpetrates violence as well as the repressive measures the authorities can use 
against protestors.139 The Guardian reported that an ICM Poll found 59% of people questioned were 
opposed to the police operation Glencoe (whereas 31% agreed it was a necessary response) (Lewis, 
2009).  
The significance of sousveillance is illustrated by the extraordinary deviant counter-measures made 
by police officers in London to instigate a form of legal repression (by deceitfully misusing Counter 
Terrorism legislation) to require individuals with cameras to delete all their photographs of any 
individual officers. A further police counter-measure was the removal or hiding of their 
identification badges as a precaution against identification and to circumvent protestor 'counter 
surveillance moves' (Marx, 2003). Overall, the G20 saw a premeditated attempt to sabotage 
material of potential evidential value as officers were aware that it could be used against their 
fellow officers, as well as bringing their force into disrepute by later posting on public platforms. 
This trend in suppressing visual documentation was also reported later at the G20 meetings in 
Pittsburgh, USA, where Bradshaw (2013:457-8) recounts how police arrested journalists and 
destroyed cameras and confiscated other media, none of which was returned. Documentation is 
not without unintended consequences though, as when a Pittsburgh university student was forced 
to pose handcuffed and on his knees as a 'trophy photo' with a group of Chicago police, who later 
received reprimands for misconduct (Chicago Police, 2009 in Bradshaw, ibid.). 
In this sense the sousveillance strategy was successful, in part because it generated the number of 
complaints despite these being later invalidated by the IPCC and raised popular consciousness. 
Clearly the issue turns on how one defines a ‘witness’ or victim. I am asserting that one does not 
have to be physically present at a scene to witness a police action which is unlawful or abusive. A 
simple thought experiment illustrates this point. For instance, a duty holder monitoring cameras in 
a CCTV suite would see, and hence in a real sense witness a scene unfolding, albeit in real time - 
although they are obviously not present at the scene. If this person were then called to later testify 
in a court of law (as a result of some happenchance where the CCTV evidence were say accidentally 
wiped) would they not constitute a material witness? Indeed, they would. This begs the question as 
to why the IPCC is labouring under such a restrictive and antiquated notion of a 'witness'. This policy 
is especially detrimental when activists established tactical communication infrastructures post 
evidence of perceived police malpractice and brutality on open access platforms as well as 
professional ‘reality TV’ documentaries which (often inadvertently) also provide an eye witness, ‘as 
                                                          
139 Bradshaw, (2013:457) cites a number of examples of this such as the police occupation of Pitt University 
during the G20 summit, titled: 'Democracy 101: Pittsburgh G20 Protests and the Police Occupation of Pitt 
University' (2009). 
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it happens’, view of the police in their daily operations. This is a crucial issue of policy, because in 
following a narrow definition of a witness necessarily prohibits any individual making a complaint 
who was not present at the scene when bringing recorded evidence to the IPCC’s attention, as they 
would fall at the first (perfunctory) hurdle - a somewhat perverse outcome.   
Three years prior to the G20, the IPCC published results from surveying public attitudes to making a 
complaint about the police (Docking and Bucke 2006).140 Summarising the findings the authors 
reported that: "More than a third of respondents believed that complaining would not make a 
difference; a third thought that they would not be taken seriously if they complained, and almost a 
third said that they did not know how to make a complaint. Nearly a quarter of complainants said 
they thought it would take too much time to complain. In general respondents who agreed with 
these statements were men, younger people, those from socio-economic groups D and E, ethnic 
minorities, and those who had been unhappy with the contact they had experienced with the 
police" (Docking and Bucke 2006:viii, see also Smith, 2013). In similar fashion, the Crime Survey 
England & Wales has consistently shown over several decades that approximately 80% of people 
‘really annoyed with the police’ do not complain (Smith, 2013:250). The post IPCC figures (2006/7) 
show the main reason (62.1%) for not complaining is ‘couldn’t see any benefit’ with nearly 4 out of 5 
(78.8%) being dissatisfied with the handling of the complaint (Home Office 2007). In line with other 
criminological research on the impact of poor police-citizen encounters on reporting behaviour  (i.e. 
Skogan, 2006; Victim Support, 2005; Wong & Christmann, 2008)141 the authors found that negative 
past contact with the police acted as a powerful disincentive to pursue a complaint. Over a third 
(35%) of those "unhappy with their contact stating they would not complain" (Docking and Bucke 
2006:vii). As we would anticipate, social movement activists would have a higher preponderance of 
negative contact with the police, so disincentivising their willingness to pursue a complaint. As 
Smith's (2013:251) review of the rather dismal outcomes attest: " Less than 5 percent of all recorded 
allegations against police in England and Wales have been substantiated following investigation in 
the last quarter-century (Smith 2006a). Even then, where a complainant has his/her complaint 
substantiated (fewer than 1000 annually since 1987), it is unlikely that the officer complained 
against will face criminal or disciplinary proceedings and is more likely to be spoken to by a 
supervisory officer.  
                                                          
140 The survey was a representative sample of 4,000 people across England & Wales, with a booster sample of 
915 ethnic minority respondents. 
141 However, attitudes towards the police appears to play a more limited role when reporting being a victim of 
crime in respect to the most serious offences (for instance having to seek medical treatment or facing 
substantial financial loss) at least for volume crime (Skogan, 1984). It may be the case that this principle holds 
for the most serious cases of police abuse and malpractice in regards to making a formal complaint - although 
this is conjecture. 
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As we have seen from the G20 complaints data, given that the prospect is so small for success it is 
not surprising that many activists do not complain about police violence and abuse of power.  This 
lack of confidence of the IPCC's abilities to undertake their role does not just come from those 
outside of the institution, but also from within. Some fourteen months prior to the G20 (in February 
2008) over one hundred solicitors, barristers and legal executives from the network 'The Police 
Action Lawyers Group' (PALG) resigned from the Advisory Board to the IPCC.142 The mass 
resignation was motivated by their "increasing dismay and disillusionment" with "the consistently 
poor quality of decision-making at all levels of the IPCC".143 Moreover, they were damning at the 
IPCC's earlier attempts to deal with such problems, which they described as "pitifully poor".144 This 
constitutes a considerable vote of no confidence from those who specialise in handling complaints 
against the police. The IPCC's own report acknowledges that its Members (drawn from government 
bodies, police bodies and complaint advocates) have 'mixed' impressions of sitting on its Advisory 
board. They found that police representative bodies expressed 'generally positive' sentiments, in 
contrast to complaint advocates groups (The Independent Police Complaints Commission) who 
'expressed concerns over the Advisory Boards usefulness' later (Nov 2007) withdrawing from the 
group.   
6.2 Interim Conclusion 
In this chapter I have made some assessment of the level of force used by police during Operation 
Glencoe from official complaints data, partly triangulated with data from Bindman's solicitors, and 
have made a determination as to how the complaints system has functioned for protestors. This 
shows very considerable attrition throughout the complaints system, which is a result of both 
structural and political deficits. Indeed, the IPCC appears to act as one of the many protective layers 
in the state's broader armoury, it primarily plays a presentational role, and in doing so lends a false 
sheen of legitimacy to upholding accountable policing.      
A further consideration is that this complaints landscape has now changed markedly due to the 
ubiquity of mobile phones with video capture and social media platforms that allow police violence 
to be recorded and relayed to a wide audience, unfiltered by corporate or state players. At the same 
time the IPCC reject all such complaints generated from this sousveillance.  Writing from a US 
perspective, Marx's (2003:384; but see also 1988; 2016) very considerable work on police 
surveillance practices has argued that counter-surveillance techniques which publicise questionable 
police practices may lead to their 'moderation or cessation'. Despite Marx's caveat ('may') this is 
                                                          
142 Davies, N. (2008, February 25th) 'Crisis at police watchdog as lawyers resign'. Guardian Newspaper. 
143 Ibid. (2008, February 25th). 
144 Ibid. (2008, February 25th) 
Page 172 of 407 
 
perhaps too optimistic. Whilst we are not discussing equals here, as there is a deep inequality of 
resources and availability of practices between the authorities and those that resist this 
surveillance,145 leaving formidable barriers in holding officers to account - at least within the current 
complaints system in England and Wales.146 As Bradshaw (2013:453) notes in reporting on the 
experiences of the anti-corporate globalisation activists' in Pittsburgh, USA (occurring after the 
London G20) "counter-surveillance techniques have yet to tame the excessive use of force by the 
police at mass actions." In part this continuation of police violence and abuses of power is assisted 
by officers utilising a number of counter-measures on the ground to frustrate activists sousveillance 
efforts, but more problematically, the current accountability structures are inadequate to bear the 
weight required of them. This is evidenced in the process of attrition which raises serious question 
marks over the ability of the IPCC to provide effective and independent oversight. Attrition occurs 
both in terms of having the complaint upheld and also leakage from the independence of the IPCC 
to the police force of the serving officer.  
In this respect the IPCC appears to be substantially replicating its predecessor, and because of this is 
losing the confidence of those representing complainants. Added to these considerations are the 
legal, conceptual and research difficulties in studying police malpractices and determining whether 
police violence is proportionate and justified. Whyte (2014) has argued that the legal system 
preoccupies itself with inter-personal violence, not institutional violence, this can also be seen as a 
failing of the IPCC, but not limited to it.  
I move on to discuss these issues in the next chapter and consider the raft of official inquiry reports 






                                                          
145 As Marx (2016:36) notes, it is a asymmetrical relationship, as citizens cannot wiretap or carry out a myriad 
of other forms of intrusive surveillance, unlike the state's agents.  
146 The three jurisdictions in the UK (England & Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland) employ different 
models to deal with complaints against the police. It is interesting to note that Seneviratne's (2004) 
comparative review of all three argues for extending Northern Ireland's 'civilian control model' to other parts 
of the UK due to the inadequacies of the English & Welsh and Scottish models. 
Page 173 of 407 
 
CHAPTER 7: Adapting to Scrutiny: The Official Responses to Operation Glencoe 
7.1 Introduction 
Whilst state violence enacted through the police has the advantage of stopping challengers, it does 
not come cost free for the police organisation or the wider authorities. The G20 illustrates that it 
can result in some loss of political legitimacy domestically (and in a globalised world with 24 hours 
news cycles, internationally as well). Images of policing of the G20 were seen to threaten the 
police's claim to legitimacy amongst some of the wider (non-activist) population. This was most 
decisively driven by a press 'politics of outrage' and a 'scandal amplification process' in agenda 
setting (especially in news print journalism) one driving a reversal of the news frame, from one of 
'police violence' to systemic 'institutional failure' (Greer & McLaughlin, 2011:280). I now explore this 
process in some depth, moving from MPS's attempts at pre-emptive community management 
through media manipulation to an analysis of the official inquiry reports and their deficiencies.  
7.2 Operation Glencoe: The Official View 
A number of public bodies with an interest in public order policing felt it necessary to examine the 
policing of the G20 summit. Inquiries usually occur to shed light on practices, rules, and decision 
making of an institution or individuals after agreement that something has gone wrong, often in 
times of political crisis. It also means identifying why things go wrong, although inquires may steer 
away from apportioning blame in favour of understanding why blameworthy actions occurred in the 
first place (Slater & Matthews, 2015:302).  
All of the five G20 inquiry reports that I examine in this chapter take this form of being investigative 
and inquisitorial rather than adversarial or prosecutorial (Roulston & Scraton, 2005:552). In keeping 
with this brief, none examine individual incidents of alleged police officer malpractice or 
misconduct, preferring to consign this responsibility to the IPCC investigations (the severe 
inadequacies of which were discussed earlier). The inquiry reports then, at one level, are curious 
creatures. The prefaces and opening introductionary remarks explicitly stress the need to rebuild 
legitimacy in public order policing (also reinforced in the names given to the enquiries), whilst at the 
same time presenting themselves as disinterested examinations into the police's operational and 
tactical measures.  One way of reading the inquiry reports then, is as a form of perception 
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management, a technique aimed at carefully altering the perceptions of a target audience to 
provoke the behaviour the sponsor wants.147  
Burton and Carlen (1979:13) have argued that the setting up of official inquiries on contentious 'law 
and order' issues operate to produce knowledge in the form of 'official discourse' that supports the 
prevailing ideological social relations. Official inquiries respond to “crises in the popular confidence 
of the impartiality of legal state apparatuses” and as such damage the “ideological social relations 
that reproduce dominant social conceptions of the essentially just nature of the politico-judicial 
structures of the state.” (ibid, 1979:13). Official discourse is seen as having a pedagogic quality 
which "seeks to redeem legitimacy crisis by the confrontation and appropriation of unofficial 
versions of discreditable episodes" (Ibid, 1979:44). Recognising that most inquiries are arbitrating 
between conflicting accounts and interpretations of events, there is a need for the official account 
to "confront, incorporate and suppress the unofficial version", here the one seen from citizen 
journalists, to over-rule them whilst incorporating other versions (Ibid, 1979:70; 76-77). Thus official 
discourse is "directed at ideological closure", and achieves this by imposing official knowledge that 
explains what has happened and repairs the state's 'fractured image' and the attendant legitimacy 
deficit it carries. On this view inquiries are neither impartial nor objective, nor are they simply 
initiated to restore public confidence in an organisation, but rather function as "routine political 
tactic[s] directed towards the legitimacy of institutions," (1979:13). From this critical perspective the 
“task of inquiries into particular crises is to represent failure as temporary, or no failure at all, and to 
re-establish the image of administrative and legal coherence and rationality” (ibid, 1979:48). In their 
rather damning conclusion, Burton and Carlen's research into official inquiries regards them as a 
device to serve and legitimate state institutions and their interests. Neither is it clear if public 
confidence is really restored at the end of an inquiry. Writing from a Canadian perspective on 
inquiries into summit policing operations, Salter & Matthews (2015:306) remind us that "Public 
outrage has a limited shelf life and tends to be centred on cases involving single individuals who 
have come to grievous harm," such as the police killing of Ian Tomlinson.  
Echoing many of Burton and Carlen's themes, Scraton (2003:16) notes how official inquiries status 
and terms of reference are "used politically to deflect criticism and strengthen public confidence." 
Often headed by the 'great and the good' by those "with a track record of dependable public 
service" they are "plumbed into the ideological ‘ways of seeing’ and political ‘ways of doing’ that 
constitute the routine expressions of civil service practice." (2003:3). Writing in the context of 
                                                          
147 Tracey, (2012) defines perception management as "actions used to convey or deny selected information to 
audiences to influence their emotions, motives, and objective reasoning, resulting in behaviours and actions 
favourable to the originators’ objectives."  
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Northern Ireland, Rolston & Scraton (2005:552) note that official inquiries into the British states use 
of military force and paramilitary policing in Northern Ireland stand at the "'sharp end of a 
continuum' where the states interest are "most in need of protection." Under such circumstances 
official inquiries are rarely free from political management and manipulation. The policing of the 
G20 summit constitutes just such a 'sharp end.' 
7.2.1 'The Difference a Death Makes' 
The first report by JCHA published in March 2009 (Demonstrating respect for Human Rights? A 
human rights approach to policing protest) was not prompted by the G20 but rather considered a 
number of "serious concerns" from its predecessor Committee, that the right to protest was being 
eroded by excessively onerous restrictions. The report considers the "balance struck in law and in 
practice between the rights of different groups involved in peaceful protest", and makes a series of 
recommendations "aimed at ensuring that the rights to freedom of assembly and expression are 
fully respected." (JCHR, 2009a:1 my emphasis). The JCHA undertook a year-long review, and took 
evidence from forty-nine individuals and organisations, including policing bodies, protestors and 
businesses and individuals who had been the targets of protests. The Committee concluded that 
there were "no systematic human rights abuses in the policing of protest" (Ibid, p.v.). Falling just 
short of a clean bill of health, the Committee did raise some "concerns" however, all of which could 
be "addressed by legal and operational changes" (ibid, p.v.). Shortly after publication, intense 
scrutiny of public order policing resurfaced as a reaction by the assorted establishment to video 
footage from protestors at the G20 which acted to bring the police's account of events into 
disrepute. The individual cases which came to the public attention were especially damaging, no 
more so than the avoidable fatality of Ian Tomlinson.  
Immediately after the death of Tomlinson and in another effort to shape and re-frame events, MPS 
publicly stated that a man had “died after collapsing”148 without any attention to how he had died, 
and later, that “officers took the decision to move (the fatally injured man) as during this time a 
number of missiles - believed to be bottles - were being thrown at them”. Much of the mainstream 
media reporting on the death focused on this alleged protestor violence, and as they had done 
earlier, merely parroted the false information directly relayed from MPS. Later, commenting on the 
events of the day and undertaking a damage limitation exercise, the chairman of the Metropolitan 
Police Federation told BBC Radio 4:  
"On a day like that, where there are some protesters who are quite clearly hell-bent on 
causing as much trouble as they can, there is inevitably going to be some physical 
                                                          
148 ‘Police clash with G20 protesters’ (Wednesday, 1 April 2009 23:53 UK) BBC News (accessed 29 May 2009). 
Page 176 of 407 
 
confrontation. Sometimes it isn't clear, as a police officer, who is a protester and who is not. 
I know it's a generalisation but anybody in that part of the town at that time, the 
assumption would be that they are part of the protest. I accept that's perhaps not a clever 
assumption but it's a natural one."149  
This is a revealing statement, as Rosie & Gorringe (2009) identify, implicit here is that if Tomlinson 
had been a protestor, then the police action would have been justified, as he would have been 'fair 
game'. As Reicher (2011) also notes, the statement reveals a police epistemology which views 
anyone in the area as a likely troublemaker, unlike decent people who would have left the area and 
gone home.  
The turning point in the news coverage came when the Guardian newspaper posted a protestor 
shot video footage which captured the attack on Tomlinson shortly before he died. This proved 
decisive, leading to more video footage emerging of the assault from different angles. It was this 
dramatic video tape which gave new credibility to allegations that many members of the public and 
also the police had formerly dismissed as merely fanciful. Skolnick & Fyfe's (1993:3) study of the US 
police's use of excessive force is applicable here. Recounting the beating of Rodney King, they stress 
it was not the conduct of the police that made the incident different from many earlier similar such 
occurrences, but the presence of a video camera! Which, unbeknown to the officers, captured the 
brutality of the beating for replay to what would otherwise have been a disbelieving public.  
Over the next few days numerous citizen journalists at the G20 protests were uploading a host of 
video clips onto social media platforms appearing to show other assaults and wanton police 
aggression directed at ordinary protestors. In analysing the news coverage concerning the G20, 
Rosie & Gorringe (2009:14-15) emphasize the 'difference a death makes' in acting to shift the 
framing of the news coverage, away from protestors to that of the police themselves. What this 
episode starkly reveals is that the police were losing their ability to ‘patrol the facts’ (Ericson 1989). 
The emergence of these news stories provoked a flood of other videos from protestors and activists 
who were cheek to jowl with riot police. This provided a rare view from within the police 
encirclement and a powerful alternative account that challenged the official police version of 
events. This rise in citizen journalism brought a 'new visibility' (Thompson, 2005; Goldsmith, 2010) 
to the G20 policing operation. The ubiquity of mobile phone cameras with video capture technology 
and the development of video-sharing platforms such as U-tube and social networking sites 
conjoined to challenge, and on this occasion, usurp the police's own efforts at image management. 
This is an instance of the police's 'uncontrolled visibility', here resulting in greater public exposure to 
police misdeeds as captured by protestors in what has been termed an informational 'cybercascade' 
                                                          
149  BBC News (8th April 2009) cited in Rosie, M & Gorringe, H. (2009) What a Difference a Death Makes: 
Protest, Policing and the Press at the G20, Sociological Research Online 14(5)4. 
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(Sunsden, 2007) driven by the Guardian newspapers original video footage publication. Such 
developments are facilitated by the growing interconnectivity of media platforms and social media 
sites (such as Twitter, Whatsapp, Facebook etc.) allowing cascades to occur rapidly producing a 
'wildfire' effect (Sunsden, 2007). Focusing on the G20, Goldsmith (2010:920) notes that "Less can be 
left out now, so that the terms on which police can show that they are, and can be held accountable 
have changed, making them more vulnerable and exposed."  
This development is important in two respects. It was the death of Tomlinson and the exposure of 
its nefarious circumstances by activists, along with journalist’s first-hand experience of being 
kettled, that turned the tone of the entire mainstream media reporting on the G20. There is an 
expectation that officers will treat all citizens with basic respect (even those whose behaviour is 
disrespectful) comply with the law and generally work for the betterment of society. That mandate 
becomes especially difficult to reconcile when video footage appears to show police aggression, 
wanton callousness, and brutality. As the HAC (2009:2) report concedes, the police's use of 
"distraction tactics (the controlled use of force against those who appear hostile) while legitimate 
according to the police rule-book, shocked the public." Indeed, this medium can be thought of as a 
relatively new form of public disclosure, when cameras are turned on the police. Whilst policing has 
always been the most visible of any criminal justice institution (Chermak and Weiss 2005: 502) it has 
been primarily based on direct experience or observation, or through 'secondary visibility' from 
publication of photographs and written narrative accounts limiting people's awareness and moral 
assessment of most policing activities (Goldsmith, 2010:914). The G20 is an instance of where this 
dramatically changed.  
I have been arguing that this development presented in a public relations debacle in slow motion, 
and the authorities with some acute anxieties. This is evident for all the inquiry reports. The JCHR 
(2009b:2) notes how "incidents and the tactics [of the police] that led to them caused considerable 
adverse comment and have the potential to seriously damage the public’s faith in the police." The 
HMIC (2009b:5) report similarly fears that what it presents as the police's 'core values' are being 
"tested and are in danger of being undermined" [...] that the police are now "very much on display 
during these events and police conduct is subject to intense levels of exposure and scrutiny." In a 
similar vein, the MPA (2010:4) authors note the 'new phenomenon' of citizen journalists which has 
"put a spotlight on individual instances of violence which can give a misleading view of an event" [my 
emphasis]. It is instructive to note that all construe this development sceptically, emphasising their 
reservations. This is equally the case with Deborah Glass (2009:161) the then IPCC Commissioner, 
who writing in the journal 'Policing' disapprovingly notes:  
Page 178 of 407 
 
"A [video] clip of police using force on protestors will bring out the bloggers rather than the 
reasoned thinkers."  
None view or welcome it as a positive advance to increase visibility where before there had been 
little, if any.  
What started out as difficult events turned into a full blown crisis management for MPS, requiring 
not reframing, but blatant falsehoods. Commander Simon O'Brien had originally argued that the 
tactic of kettling had only been used in response to protestor violence, and that peaceful protestors 
and any passers-by were always free to leave: 
 "There was no real deliberate attempt to say ‘you are all going to stay here for hours’ … 
What I saw ... at that time [towards the end of several hours of ‘kettling’] was a couple of 
hundred people who did not want to go. They had been the agitators throughout the day" 
(quoted in Laville & Duncan, cited in Rosie & Gorringe, 2009:13).   
Furthermore:  
"We were attempting to keep certain groups and individuals apart. Those who wanted to 
leave could, and those who wanted to stay and make their point, we facilitated that" (in 
Davenport 2009, cited in Rosie & Gorringe, 2009:13).  
There are a number of points to discuss in O'Brien's statement; the first is that his claims about how 
the kettling operated on the day are simply false, and are aimed to assuage the growing public 
disquiet by way of what Ericson calls ‘account ability', the "capacity to provide a record of activities 
that explains them in a credible manner so that they appear to satisfy the rights and obligations of 
accountability" (Ericson 1995: 137). As Ericson argues: 
 "Every act of publicity for accountability is also an act of selection and distortion in which 
some things are left out and some alternative formulations are ignored; every act of secrecy 
for accountability is also an act of selection in which some things are given out and some 
alternative formulations are explored."  
O'Brien's account is also to suggest the fanciful idea that kettling facilitated protest, an assertion 
that protestors on the day would be unlikely to agree with. O'Brien also uses the tactic of 'division', 
by using the media to create police imposed categories of protestor ('good dissent' from 'bad 
dissent', coming for the protest and coming for violence) within which my observations showed that 
even some protestors who desire 'good media' want to fit. Nevertheless, O'Brien fails to reveal that 
all protestors were seen as unlawful on the 1st and 2nd of April by MPS, as later betrayed by the 
policing plans published in the HMIC report. This recognition makes his claims of wanting to 
'facilitate' protest somewhat redundant. 
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The ensuing days saw the police version of events unravelling further. Rosie & Gorringe, (2009:13) 
note how the Guardian reported its journalist had spoken to many people who were far from being 
what the police had labelled 'agitators' but who were refused permission to leave cordons. In 
addition, more video emerged which continued to flatly contradicted the police's version of events. 
This was also true of the Tomlinson case, including an absence of MPS's protestors attacking police 
after Tomlinson collapsed and the ensuing efforts to resuscitate him.  
This construing of Operation Glencoe in this manner acted to de-legitimised MPS's 'official account' 
even further. A press politics of outrage was now in full tilt and mobilised to condemn institutional 
injustice and 'cover-up', creating what Greer & McLaughlin, (2011:289) term a 'swarming effect', to 
name and shame those responsible in a form of "ritualistic public punishment and humiliation." The 
various miscarriages of justice associated with the Tomlinson and Fisher cases added to the concern 
over a break down in public trust in the police. When this takes place in a climate of public cynicism, 
diminishing deference to authority, and an expanding critique of the wider institutions of the 
criminal justice system, the establishment was forced to act and the raft of different inquiries soon 
followed in its wake.  
7.2.2 Producing truth and rebuilding legitimacy: the official report findings 
Reacting to this controversy, the JCHR's issued an addendum report into the policing (on their 
earlier more substantive pre-G20 March report) Demonstrating respect for Human Rights? Follow-
up.150 In similar fashion, the House of Commons Home Affairs Committee (HCA) undertook a 
parallel inquiry, Policing of the G20 Protests, aimed at investigating "some of the wider concerns 
raised about police operational and tactical measures" at large demonstrations. Overall, they 
considered the G20 policing to be "remarkably successful", congratulating the police for their work 
whilst raising some specific issues over the use of kettling, police use of force and police 
accountability. Attesting to how serious the reputational damage was thought to be, on April 16th, 
Sir Paul Stephenson, the Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police announced an enquiry into the 
G20 policing to be led by the Chief Inspector of Constabulary Denis O'Connor, in part to "restore 
faith and trust in the police through his leadership."151 This was the most extensive review of public 
order policing tactics undertaken by the HMIC, and constitutes a significant occurrence, irrespective 
of the tasked agency, due to the 'sensitivity' of this area for ACPO and its long held resistance to this 
                                                          
150 The report is in two volumes, with Volume 2 publishing in full the witness and written testimonies. This 
second volume provides an extensive account of the G20 operation Glencoe. 
151 Cited in MPA (2010) Responding to G20, p4. 
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part of its work receiving unwanted scrutiny.152 An interim report, 'Adapting to Protest – Nurturing 
the British Model of Policing' was released in July, followed by a longer report some four months 
later in November 2009 (somewhat confusingly of the same name), which asked a wider question 
about the future direction of public order policing, one of HMIC's own construction, namely "How 
best should the police as a service adapt to the modern day demands of public order policing while 
retaining the core values of the British model of policing?".153 It was reported that the interim report 
had been delayed during the drafting process due to the MPS's mounting a legal challenge to HMIC 
criticising its interpretation of public order legislation as not ECHR compliant.154 What we see here 
then is an example of how 'recommendations' can be 'negotiated' into action before inclusion into 
the inquiry report (Slater & Matthews, 2015:309) here with the mandating organisation (MPS) 
proving especially intransigence to any reform process. Finally, in March 2010, the Metropolitan 
Police Authority's (MPA) Civil Liberties Panel also issued its own report on the G20 policing 
operation, one which overlapped the findings of HMIC but addressed what the panel felt to be "gaps 
in those scrutinies". This included reviewing a number of "longstanding issues related to public 
order policing", including balancing protestors rights with the rights of the wider citizenry not to be 
disrupted by protest. Nonetheless, the MPA Panel did accept all the HMIC report findings.  
The level of intensity of official inquiry into the G20 policing operation is then very significant. In 
total, the five reports amount to some 926 pages including 384 pages of witness and written 
testimony. As such the inquiry reports are especially valuable as a research tool, not only for the 
deliberations of the respective bodies and how these types of inquiries operate when it comes to 
public order policing, but because they contain a wealth of evidence by way of witness testimony 
from key individuals, both police and protestors who were subject to Operation Glencoe. Evidence 
comes from senior police managers (including Bronze, Silver and Gold commanders who had 
strategic and operational responsibility for the G20 policing operation) as well as those at the most 
senior level of the Metropolitan police, ACPO, as well as government, including Ministerial level. It is 
rare indeed to find senior police officers being required to give an account of themselves and defend 
                                                          
152 Newburn (1994:10) notes with disappointment the resistance amongst police forces to include 'public order 
policing' of large events in their PSI study examining what democracy means in practice for policy change in 
policing. Newburn writes that ultimately ACPO refused to grant approval for what is perhaps one of the most 
important areas of public policy, leaving the authors having to opt for the safer territory of civilianisation; the 
development of crime prevention policy; and new policing responses to sexual violence in policing.  
153 A progress report Policing Public Order on Adapting to Protest and Nurturing the British Model of Policing 
was published in February 2011. 
154 It was reported that HMIC had been forced to hire a senior barrister to defend their central 
recommendation that MPS's 'unlawful' interpretation of the G20 protests were inconsistent with Article 11 of 
the European Convention on Human Rights. The same article cites a HMIC 'source' stating there had been a 
'huge battle' with MPS, but HMICs legal advice found in their favour. Lewis, P. & Evans, R. (2009 26nd 
October) Met hired lawyers to contest the findings of G20 protest inquiry, Guardian Newspaper. 
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their tactical, operational and strategic policing decisions in some detail. Witness testimony is also 
taken from a small number of protest groups and observers attending the protest events across 
central London (I return to this balance later).  
I now provide a critical assessment of these reports, although I concentrate on HMIC's interim and 
final report considering its significance, by employing my own observational analysis and findings as 
well as the wider academic scholarship. In doing so, I do not aim to give an exhaustive summary of 
all the issues covered by the reports or to present a thematic analysis,155 rather my purpose is to 
draw out the central deficiencies in the reports. I provide a summary of the terms of reference, key 
findings and recommendations for these inquiries and reports in Table 4 (below).   
In part, I follow Gilmore (2013:86) and argue that the inquiries operate in the same sceptical way 
described by Burton & Carlen, and also Scraton. Official knowledge is imposed to repair the 
breaches in legitimacy and agency prestige, respond to political crisis, mobilise and restore public 
consent with the ultimate aim to renew political authority. I argue that despite the very 
considerable public disquiet and indignation that the scenes from Operation Glenoce caused, the 
raft of reports fail to constitute a blue-print for substantive change. It should be remembered that 
this somewhat dismal result is achieved with the benefit of considerable witness testimony and 
access to a video data record (here of an activity by a participant in the activity, or 'sousveillance') 
which situates the watcher (at least partially) at the scene. Despite this technological record, the 
reports produce knowledge which is very largely supportive of increasingly authoritarian policing 
and the prevailing political hegemony which they act to defend, whilst at the same time 
marginalising and abrogating the experience of protestors. One of the central questions I want to 
address is how the reports came to the findings that they did in light of the considerable contrary 
evidence available to them? This brings into view their claim to independence and impartiality 
which I argue is deeply problematic.  
At least part of the answer lies in there being a great deal at stake here. The reports need to be read 
in the context in which they were written, a prevailing crisis of legitimacy and authority of an entire 
agency. This is to use scandal as a conceptual tool to analyse the workings of the police institution 
and the wider systems of governance of which the G20 reports form an integral part. The police's 
organisational identity is its key resource for maintaining its legitimacy (Brown, 1997) hence 
legitimacy issues are especially salient for them (i.e. Davis & Thomas, 2003; Herbert, 2006). This last 
point is dramatically demonstrated in Skogan's (2006) work on the effects of police contacts with 
                                                          
155 Gilmore (2013) provides a thorough thematic analysis from a human rights perspective on four of the G20 
reports.  
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citizens. Analysis of these types of encounters point to the operation of an acute 'asymmetry', such 
that negative experiences of the police can be up to fourteen times more 'impactful' and hence 
deeply discrediting than positive experiences. This carries some rather stark consequences for a 
policing organisation, it means they may gain little or no credit for performing well, whereas bad 
experiences resulting from forms of malpractice and unprofessional treatment (let alone brutality) 
can profoundly influence citizen’s views and act to erode the organisations legitimacy. Given that 
most people do not have direct contact with the police, their knowledge is vicarious, deriving from 
what they learn from the media, by observation and from word of mouth (Smith, 2007:32). So, 
whilst many people believe in police legitimacy despite their lack of experience with the police, it is 
fragile and can be falsified by their experience. Prior belief in the police's legitimacy, or illegitimacy, 
is a powerful factor in what can be viewed as a causal spiral, either eroding or reinforcing legitimacy. 
In his study, The Politics of the Police, Reiner (2010) details the policies and practices that have 
helped legitimate the police, these include; establishing a disciplined organisation with clear 
standards; allowing (or creating) the appearance that the police are subject to the rule of law; 
pursuing a strategy of only using minimal force along with propagating that image; remaining 
separate and aloof from politics and political control; securing acceptance for coercion by 
emphasising the police 'service' role; and cultivating the idea that the police are accountable to the 
courts, and in some mystical way, to the British people, rather than to the state. It is these hard won 
accomplishments which are threatened, not just by the G20 operation, but by changing policing 
behaviour which such summits typically bring into view. At a higher level then, policing is not 
merely about practices on the street (the physical or material term of the occupation), it is about 
reproducing a particular symbolic order. To achieve this the institution has to situate itself within a 
dominant place culturally, and hence socially and politically (Ericson, 1989:206). This requires 
strategically organising "physical facilities, cultural sensibilities and social relations to construct 
silence about most of their activities" (Ibid., 1989:224). To paraphrase Lord Denning's156 rationale 
justifying truth being a causality in protecting English justice, the absence of this institutional deceit 
contained in the G20 reports would reveal what constitutes his 'appalling vista', it would mean that 
the police were guilty of mass violent assault, widespread misuse of their legal authority (including 
illegal detention and containment), and that they did this recklessly and knowingly and with little, if 
any, regard to their obligations to Art 11 of the ECHR.  
  
                                                          
156 Cited in Scraton (2002:17) From Deceit to Disclosure: The Politics of Official Inquiries in the UK in G Gilligan 
and J Pratt [eds] Crime, Truth and Justice: Official inquiry, discourse, knowledge Cullompton, Willan 
Publishing, 2002, pp.46-70. 
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Table 8: Key Findings and Recommendations of Statutory Agency g20 Inquiry Reports 








Vol1, HL Paper 




To seek evidence on: 
 the proportionality of 
legislative measures to restrict 
protest or peaceful assembly;  
 existing powers 
available to the police and 
their use in practice; and 
 reconciling competing 
interests of public order and 
protest. 
Findings: 
 Found no evidence of systematic human rights abuses in policing of protests but raised 
some concerns re legal and operational issues;  
 Legislation broadly protects individuals’ right to protest; 
 The government should protect and facilitate peaceful protest (unless compelling 
evidence of legitimate reasons for restrictions); 
 Acknowledge significant mismatch between perceptions of protestors and the police 
about the way in which protest is managed; 
 Found some evidence that police do not strike right balance in protecting rights of 
those protested against; 
 Not share concerns expressed in the media that s76 CTA 2008 offence criminalises 
taking photographs of the police; 
Legal changes:  
 Amend s5 POA 1986 by deleting reference to language or behaviour that is merely 
“insulting” so that it cannot be used inappropriately to suppress the right to free speech; 
 Counter-terrorism powers should not be used against peaceful protestors:  
o New guidance on the use of the section 44 stop and search powers; 
o Duty of police to act compatibly with human rights 
o Guidance be issued to address concerns about improper use of s76 of the CTA 2008 
 Repeal SOCPA (2005) to allow protest around parliament; 
 Reverse the presumption that hearings for protection from harassment injunctions 
regarding protestors are held in private. 
Operational changes: 
 Police and protestors need to Improve 'dialogue'; 
 'No surprises' policing; 
 Improved human rights training should be integrated into other police training; 
 Tasers should not be used against peaceful protestors; 
 Post protest debriefings to ensure lessons are learnt and disseminated across forces; 
 HO to consider if police contracts and disciplinary procedures pay sufficient 
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recognition to the duty of officers to act compatibly with human rights; 














Follow-up inquiry, principally 
into the policing of the G20 
summit, (with some 
consideration of other 
protests (including Tamil 
demonstrations and Radcliffe-
on-Soar Power station pre-
emptive arrest). 
Considered:   
 Police relations with 
the media 
 Communications 
between police and protesters 
 The use of close 
containment (“kettling”) 
 The use of force by 
the police 
Dialogue 
 Enhancement of advanced discussions between police and protestors, including 
nominated point of contact within every police force; 
 Consider exploring the use of independent negotiators to facilitate dialogue and 
resolve disputes between police and protestors. 
Kettling 
 Can be lawful, but only if proportionate and necessary to do so; 
 Police need to take more account of individuals circumstances, including making 
efforts to allow people to leave as soon as possible and providing facilities such as medical 
facilities, toilets and water accessible to those contained. 
Police accountability 
 There should be a legal requirement for police to wear ID numbers or to identify 
themselves when asked; 
 Ensure that any exaggerated and distorted reporting in the media can be countered 














 The policing of the 
G20 summit and police tactics 
employed 
 The sequence of 
events on 1st April 2009 
 Public perceptions, 
the legal framework and 
'police professional practice' 
 The immediate issues 
arising in protest policing 
stemming from this review 
Findings: 
 An absence of clear standards on the use of force for individual officers operating in 
the public order policing environment; 
 A disconnection between individual officer safety training and public order training; 
 A variation across forces in levels of understanding of the law and proper use of public 
order police powers; 
 Inconsistent approaches and tactics across police forces; 
 Inconsistent equipment; 
 Lack of public order command capability; 
 Out of date training and guidance; 
 Inadequate training in the law, including human rights and police public order powers; 
 Inappropriate use of public order powers; 
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 Uncertainty about the governance and accountability mechanisms best suited to 

















The report asks one central 
question, “How best should 
the 
police as a service adapt to 
the modern day demands of 
public order policing while 
retaining the core values of 
the British model of policing?" 
12 Key Recommendation to 'support and strengthen the British Policing Model': 
 Revised guidelines on the use of force, covering 'entrenching' legal principles (of 
necessity, proportionality and the minimum use of force) in training in the use of force and 
planning and control of operations; 
 Codifying national standards of public order policing; 
 Clustered force working arrangement to ensure adequate senior public order capacity; 
 More consistent, relevant and also accredited public order training (including HRA 
framework; use of force and force continuum; scenario and contingency planning; crowd 
dynamics; proportionality of tactics); 
 No surprises communication philosophy with protestors, the media and wider public; 
 Active support of the Home Office to strengthen and sustain the British model of 
policing; 
 Clarification from central government on the use of Banning Orders on processions 
and personal data gathering on protestors (including overt photography) by police;  
 Monitoring police use of stop and search powers and ensuring all officers understand 
these legal powers; 
 Clarification of precise role of Forward Intelligence Teams (FITs); 
 Reviewing ACPOs role to ensure transparency and accountability;  
 Common guidelines to ensure interventions by police authorities do not interfere with 
the independence of the police or protecting the public interest. 
  
HAC (2009), 
Policing of the 
G20 Protests, 
Eighth Report of 
the Session 2008-




Investigates some of the 
wider concerns raised about 
police operational and tactical 
measures when policing large 
scale public order events.   
The inquiry focused on: 





 G20 policing operation considered as 'remarkably successful' and congratulates the 
police for their work; 
 However, recognise some 'failings' in the operation, being:  
Kettling 
 Kettling is lawful but should be used 'sparingly and in clearly defined circumstances’ 
which should be codified; 
 Should only continue for as long as 'absolutely necessary', comfort of those contained 
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between police and protesters  
 The use of kettling  
 The use of force by 
the police 
 The use of tasers 
 
must be given 'as much consideration as possible' ; 
 Police must recognise circumstances where peaceful protestors and non-protestors 
caught up in the kettle to filter out of the contained area and leave (no blanket bans on people 
leaving); 
 Protestors to make 'every effort' to prevent being seen by police as a threat to public 
order. 
Use of force 
 Police should publicly clarify how and when they use 'distraction' techniques; 
 No use of 'untrained' inexperienced officers on front line; 
 Concern over POA s14 use - only to be applied correctly by officers and 
police/protestor agreed to 'finish' time to remove need for police 'dispersals'; 
 Police not use tasers or distance weapons in public order situations, preferable to 
invest in better training;  
 
Police Accountability 
 Officers should always wear identification numbers; 
 Greater funding to IPCC to investigate complaints in timely manner; 








To review longstanding issues 
related to public order 
policing, including balancing 
the right to protest and the 
rights of the wider citizenry 
not be disrupted by others 
right to protest. 
Findings 
 Agrees HMIC conclusion that underlying presumption underpinning police planning for 
protests should always be in favour of peaceful assembly and for police to show a degree of 
tolerance to protestors even if some commit offences; 
 Significant scope to develop public order training to reflect changing nature of protest 
and ensure sufficient capacity; 
 Need for appropriate supervision and sanctions in place to deter officers from 
behaving unprofessionally during protests, including failure to display ID; 
 Officers also need to be more transparent about the strategies and tactics they are 
proposing to use, and why, to media and public; 
 Much more should be done to ensure better engagement with the media (inc 'citizen 
journalists') to maintain public trust; 
 Better communication with protestors during demonstrations would go some way to 
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addressing the criticisms of police tactics and powers, but should consider whether some 
tactics and powers are inappropriate for use in public order situations; 
 Endorses the culture of ‘no surprises’ in the HMIC reports and feels that this would 
contribute to restoring public faith in the policing of public order events. 
Key Recommendations to MPS: 
Training and organisational learning 
 Need to understand the rights of protestors and the responsibilities of the police to 
achieve a shift in police attitudes;  
 Equip officers with the skills to facilitate peaceful protest to:  
o de‐escalate potentially violent situations; 
o communicate effectively in challenging situations; 
o contain and handle violence should it prove impossible to de‐escalate; 
 Analyse training needs and monitoring of attendance/delivery to ensure sufficient 
capacity. 
Supervision 
 Better define and communicate ‘intrusive supervision’ in a public order context; 
 Ensure all officers understand their responsibility to challenge any inappropriate 
        behaviour by their colleagues; 
 Ensure disciplinary action against officers (and supervisors) where ID is not properly 
displayed without reasonable excuse.  
Event planning - communication and engagement 
 Clear guidelines to make it easier for protestors to access the police; 
 Greater transparency in communicating policing strategies to show facilitating 
peaceful protest is a reality; 
 Explicitly tell officers in briefings about the principle of facilitating peaceful protest;  
 Police engagement with media should aim to create expectation that is conducive to 
peaceful protest; 
 Have a single officer taking responsibility for the overall communication in joint force 
operations. 
Engaging with media 
 Review its approach to news management to facilitate transparent and fair reporting 
by the media and 'citizen journalists'; 
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 Officers should be required to record when they prevent journalists from crossing 
containment cordons and the reasons for doing so.  
Command and control 
 Have sufficient numbers of Airwave handsets with sufficient capacity and capability 
available. 
Tactics and equipment 
 Emphasise in operational briefings that any use of force should always be the 
minimum necessary to resolve a situation, including use of protective clothing and equipment; 
 Officers to use their discretion to allow protestors out of containment areas;  
 Monitor and evaluate the use of counter‐terrorist and stop and search legislation at 
major public order events. 
Forward Intelligence Teams (FITs): 
 Consider the proportional use of FITs, justify and clarify their role and purpose and 
ensure they are adequately briefed, in line with HMIC recommendations; 
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My argument is this is precisely what took place and neither was this action the result of what the 
reports collectively attribute to the somewhat anodyne categories of advertent 
'misunderstandings', 'misinterpretations', mistaken beliefs, deficiencies in 'training' or some similar 
type of systemic procedural, implementation and policy failings. This is to fundamentally 
misconstrue what was happening on the ground, and the nature of summit policing operations 
more generally. Before this, I want to examine the make-up and status of the respective agencies 
conducting the inquires.  
7.2.3 Questioning the independence of the inquiry bodies 
Serious systems failings (perceived or real) within policing usually see solutions being called for 
which involve introducing some independent tier of governance, leastways the emphasis is always 
upon enhancing independence, not restricting it (Savage, 2012:95). Nevertheless, independence as 
a concept and analytical tool has been the subject of intense empirical and philosophical debate 
across a number of disciplines (Bartlett, 1993:52).  Whilst all of the organisations reporting on the 
G20 policing operation make some claim to being 'independent,' we need to introduce some 
analytical rigour to avoid a merely rhetorical usage.  
There are two limbs to the meaning of ‘independence’ in the jurisprudence of the European Court of 
Human Rights: firstly, there must not be any institutional or hierarchical connection between the 
police officer (or organisation) under investigation and the investigator, and secondly, the conduct 
of the investigation must be independent in practice (Ramsahai v the Netherlands (2007) 46 EHRR 
43). Greater importance is thought to attach to the first limb than the second, but this still leaves 
open the question of 'independence in practice'. In addition, I want to draw on Carey's (1966:48) 
work, who offers three meanings to the term independence. Firstly, the agency in question is not 
subordinate to another authority and is therefore able to provide honesty, integrity, objectivity and 
responsibility in its findings and recommendations. Secondly, there should be avoidance of any 
relationships which would likely (even subconsciously) impair objective judgement. Thirdly, 
independence requires avoidance of any relationship that would suggest a conflict of interest to a 
reasonable outside observer [my emphasis]. Taking these statements together allows us to 
consider the quality of independence as a working concept when making some determination to a 
body making such a claim.  
This claim to independence is most problematic for HMIC, whom also constitute the principal 
reporting body due to its direct regulatory function and one to which police forces are obliged to 
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adhere. HMIC is a statutory body,157 but it is not subordinate to police forces although it does have 
both strong relationships with them and its membership is largely constituted from senior ranks. In 
a real sense this is an example of the police regulating (monitoring) the police. Similar criticisms 
have been levelled at the IPCC's ability to reach objective judgements when employing ex-police 
personnel to investigate alleged police malpractice, more problematically still, when investigating 
officers come from the same force as those whom they are submitting to investigation. This 
concern becomes equally apparent when one scrutinises the membership of the 'review team', led 
by the Chief Inspector of Constabulary, Denis O’Connor (formerly Vice-President of ACPO and 
former Chief Constable of Surrey). Not only is O'Connor an appointee of the Home Secretary for his 
HMIC role,158 meaning he is handpicked for the position by the state, he is also, in effect, 
undertaking a review of his former police force, as Surrey was providing a substantial number of 
officers through the force 'mutual aid' inter-force support arrangements.159 In this respect there is a 
clear conflict of interest which operates at two levels, that of the policing organisation and also at 
the individual force level. 
Of the other ten members of the review team, at least nine are formerly senior police officers who 
helped O'Connor produce the report, leaving a remainder of one non-police person on the team (a 
human rights law barrister acting as a legal advisor).160 Consequently, at least 82% of the review 
team are police officers or former police officers. This number increases dramatically when 
considering that the team were assisted by 'High Potential Development Scheme officers' and 
'specialist public order officers' from police forces across England, Wales and Northern Ireland 
(HMIC, 2009b;217). 'Discourses of independence' also involve considerations of both legitimacy and 
effectiveness, if a body has an institutional connection with that body potentially complicit with the 
failings, this puts a question mark over their objectivity due to the distortions from associated 
vested interests (Savage, 2012:97).  
In addition, there were seven members of an 'External Reference Group', whose remit is stated in 
HMICs interim report as being "drawn from the broad spectrum of interested groups. It will include 
representation from Human Rights Groups, the Media, Academics, Government Departments and 
the Police" in order to 'test’ “the review methodology and emerging findings” (HMIC, 2009a:69). 
Clearly this is an important role, and one designed to lend legitimacy to HMICs findings and 
                                                          
157 HMIC is not a public body specified in the Freedom of Information Act 2000 although it chooses to act as if 
it were (personal correspondence to author, Stephen Wells, Head of Service, HMIC) 
158 Technically O'Connor is appointed by the Queen, on recommendation from the Home Secretary. (Personal 
correspondence to author, HMIC). 
159 Operation Glencoe constituted a large pre-planned event and drew on police officers from seven 
constabularies, one of which was Surrey. 
160 A further individual on the review team's background cannot be determined. 
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recommendations. Nonetheless, from the construction of the later actual membership there 
appears to be some notable absences when comparing this assertion to its later manifestation into 
reality. The majority of members are government insiders whose independence is similarly in doubt, 
including a Chief Constable, an ex-judge, two ex-Home Office senior civil servants (one of whom 
was a senior ex-MPS employee)161 with the remainder including a Baroness162 and two academics.163 
As I have detailed, even those appointments involving individuals from non-governmental 
backgrounds appear questionable if one's aim is to provide a number of desirable attributes such 
forums usually imply, such as providing robust, independent advice as well as drawing participation 
from the wider community of interest.164 If this were indeed the ambition, it is curious that at the 
initiation stage of the group no mention is made of any protest groups being invited. As they 
constituted 'the policed' they are the largest interested party to these proceedings and their 
inclusion would appear mandatory. The reference to 'human rights groups' is left unspecified 
although this would not necessarily incorporate social movement actors. Nevertheless, this point 
remains academic as neither was fulfilled in practice. The provision of a balanced range of external 
stakeholders is simply absent and would appear to be so by design, irrespective of the original 
promissory note contained in earlier HMICs interim report.  All in all, the 'external reference group' 
is remarkably similar to the review team, neither of which inspire confidence in being either 
                                                          
161 Mike Granatt was formerly a Director of Public Affairs and Internal Communication for the Metropolitan 
Police in 1989, and Director of Communication at the Home Office in 1994, and later senior civil servant at the 
Cabinet Office, holding senior communication posts (and press secretary to five cabinet Ministers) who also 
established the 'Civil Contingencies Secretariat (CCS)' a body designed to reform Whitehall's civil emergencies 
arrangements after 'failures in the governments communication responses to crisis'. The second, Vic Hogg 
was the Acting Director General of the 'Crime Reduction and Community Safety Group at the Home Office.  
162 Baroness Young of Hornsey is a cross-bench peer and the only person of 'diversity' on the group (being a 
black woman) this may explain her presence on the group.  
163 These are instructive choices as well, as it includes Professor PAJ Waddington, who whilst having 
extensively researched public order policing (including highly unusually with the co-operation of MPS) and in 
this sense at first blush appears eminently qualified, however, he openly admits back in his (1994) work 
'Liberty and Order: Public Order Policing in a Capital City' (i.e. London) of being 'won over' by senior Met 
officers and of his 'successful' incorporation into MPS's perspective on public order policing more generally 
(1994: 212). Indeed, during his fieldwork in the early 1990's and the poll tax demonstration outside of Brixton 
prison Waddington admits to momentarily stopping his observational study in order to go native and to help 
officers 'collect riot shields and helmets' (1994:164). As has been well established by his academic work, 
Waddington's analysis has rendered him "unapologetically partial .." producing a sociology 'for the police' 
(rather than of the police) and somewhat of a lone voice in policing scholarship, an feature he himself 
recognises (1994:212). This has continued apace during his later academic career. The second academic is 
Julian Roberts who is a Professor at Oxford and a member of the Sentencing Council of England & Wales. His 
work is in sentencing policy and practices, as well as public attitudes to the criminal justice system and has no 
background in public order policing. One would suspect that his expertise in public misperceptions and lack of 
knowledge about the criminal justice system, including the police (and how this should be rectified) and 
confidence in the criminal justice system (Understanding Public Attitudes to Criminal Justice, 2005) as well as 
his credentials from being a member of the Sentencing Council, whose 'appointing department' is the 
Ministry of Justice, facilitated his selection. In short, neither provide any critical perspective on public order 
policing, and can be seen as establishment insiders, presumably being known quantities in this respect.  
164 Stakeholder Reference Groups: A Good Practice Guide (2013) Welsh Government and Board of CHCs. 
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'external or 'independent'. As Scraton (2002:16) also identifies in his analysis of official inquiries, 
such appointment decisions are inherently political and carry considerable impact; "Who is 
appointed as chair, assessors and advisor’s forms part of a hidden discretionary process. Once 
appointed, chairs exercise broad discretion in gathering evidence and information, the conduct and 
progress of the inquiry, the selection of witnesses and disclosure of documents, the significance 
attached to evidence and its influence on findings and recommendations. There is no opportunity to 
challenge, and no accountability, concerning the decisions through which evidence has credibility 
ascribed or denied." HMIC would therefore appear to fail on Carey's second and third criteria of 
independence, resulting in both impaired objective judgement and a conflict of interest. We 
therefore cannot reasonably discount regulatory capture.  
The remaining organisations reporting on the G20 such as the House of Commons Home Affairs 
Committee (HCA) is a department select committee comprising fourteen members drawn from the 
three mainstream political parties (Conservative, Labour and Liberal Democrats) and all of whom 
are MPs. There are several different classes of players here, but it includes members of government 
who holds the coercive power of the state and for whose interests the summit is partly being 
upheld. The challengers (i.e. protest groups) are of course challenging government actors and 
aiming to disrupt the status quo, and the exercise of state violence through police action of which 
the reports in part address, has the objective of maintaining the order and security associated with 
the current power structure of which they form part. This compromises the HCA's claim to 
independence, notably for some member’s regards presenting a conflict of interest, in that Labour 
being the party of government (at that time). Such member’s attitudes could be negative towards 
the type of dissent on the 1st and 2nd of April. It also leaves open the question as to the 
governmental role in the policing arrangements for Operation Glencoe. The Metropolitan Police 
Authority (MPA) has traditionally played a scrutiny role, with the MPA's Responding to G20 report is 
authored by the smaller 'MPA Civil Liberties Panel' made up of eight members, again drawn from 
the main political parties and some independent members.  Whilst far from being outspoken, and 
accepting the core findings of HMIC, the MPA report was the most critical of the police and the only 
report into Operation Glencoe which explicitly stressed the need for appropriate disciplinary action 
against police malpractice. 
7.3 Analysis of the G20 Reports 
Each of the reports are complex documents, reflecting different mandates and preoccupations. 
Having said that, what is notable about them is what they all share, namely, their underlying 
assumptions, analytical frameworks, the tentative directions for policy reform, and their 
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endorsement and reproduction of certain significant 'organisational symbols' (McMillan, 1987:27) or 
cherished myths about British policing. What differences that do exist lie in their focus and 
emphasis rather than substantive positions or conclusions. Whilst none of the reports offer a 
complete defence of police actions, where criticism is levelled, it is always muted and off-set by 
attributing police malpractices and alleged illegality to some form of ignorance or implementation 
failure.  In chapter four I argued that the police (by this I mean MPS as an institution) had acted to 
manipulate sections of the mainstream media in a way that facilitated, expanded and defended 
their own mandate and minimised 'on-the-job trouble' (Waddington, 1998) resulting from their 
contingency plans to neuter G20 protestors. Here I argue that MPS use a series of self-presentation 
strategies of performances -'image work' - to manipulate and control inquiry member’s perceptions 
(many of whom are significant institutional actors). Many appear willing participants in this 
spectacle, perhaps in part due to their 'ideological plumbing' (Scraton, 2002:3) running a gamut of 
systemic issues such as value assumptions, bias frameworks of thought and embedded logics within 
which these institutional actors operate. In part, this can be seen by examining what is not 
entertained (discussed later, below) by those inquiries.  
In addition, police wrong doing can be easily conflated with organisational issues and inquiries can 
fail to pay proper attention to normal police practices at summit protests (Slater & Matthews, 
2015:312) or may be entirely ignorant of them. On this last point, it would have been instructive to 
know how many of the inquiry panels had ever been on a demonstration? This because stories (by 
this I mean narrative accounts) are understood by a listener in terms of their own background and 
experiences, as well as their relationship to the 'sponsor' of the story (here principally the police but 
also the authorities) as well as the wider characters named in the story (challengers and dissenters) 
(Goldberg, 2012:151). More prosaically, inquiry members need to be able to ask the right questions 
of those giving testimony, which represented a serious flaw in both panels conducting this work.  
The other difficulty with the witness’s testimony is that no comments were made under oath, 
indeed some of the police testimony contains falsehoods.  
7.3.1 Questioning the questioners: 
The purposes of the witness 'evidence' is to establish what happened and why it happened, it is to 
uncover the truth of the events, with the principle actors (the police) being viewed as 'legitimate 
agents of knowledge' (professionals). Whilst what is being communicated occurs within an 
established parliamentary etiquette, there remain competing perspectives and resulting stories 
from those perspectives, all of which diverge on the actus rea and the mens rea. In short, a conflict of 
interest situation with contested parties and accounts and one where the police are being judged. 
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However, examining the way the witness testimony is received and considered, as well as the 
questions and cross-examination posed, informs us about the form and structure of actually existing 
relationships between these parties.  
The HAC panel come across in the oral evidence as often suggestive, deferential, and at other times 
almost obsequious, for instance Winnick (MP) to Hardwick (IPCC Chair): 
 "What has been said in the last week or so, you would presumably agree that the police at 
all levels should always recognise that they are the servants and not the masters of 
communities? Mr Hardwick: I think that is a very important point. The police are the 
servants of the people, as indeed I am" (HAC, 2009:Ev5).  
 
Not only is this a leading question, which includes the questioner’s opinion statement, it also 
presents a forced choice, all of which should be avoided if one's purpose is to gain detailed 
responses relevant to the investigation (Oxburgh, et al. 2010:59-60). Whether the police are indeed 
the 'masters or the servants' is however an empirical question, it can only be settled by making a 
judgement on how they act and in whose interests, notably at critical junctures such as the policing 
of international summits (this is what makes the examination of international summits interesting, 
as they provide a litmus test for this question). At other times the panel come across as obsequious. 
An illustrative example occurs when posing a question regards the false press statement MPS 
issued on the killing of Ian Tomlinson (which failed to state the crucial point that Tomlinson had 
been assaulted by MPS officers before dying) to the Gold Commander Broadhurst, in the following 
exchange: Mr Winnick:  
"Why can you not answer yes or no? Commander Broadhurst: I need to put it in context. 
Chairman: We must allow the Commander to answer the question. David Davies: I would 
not be allowed to question a witness in this discourteous fashion" [my emphasis] placating, 
"Q384 Chairman: I think the Commander is going to give us an explanation. Commander 
Broadhurst: [gives explanation] Q385 Mr Winnick: Mr Broadhurst, can I say that if a moment 
ago I seemed discourteous, I apologise. Commander Broadhurst: You did not, sir. (HAC, 
2009: Ev48-49).  
These interviews form the central information gathering component from which the report findings 
emerge, as such their importance cannot be overstated. MPSs use of the media is a critical issue in 
Operation Glencoe, as with other critical and contentious issues the interviewees willingness to 
divulge information will be influenced by the interviewer’s ability to elicit information (Oxburgh, 
2010) 
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7.3.2 Semantic Engineering: Making Violence Easier to Live With  
The HAC (2009) report and the earlier JCHR (2009c) contain extensive unabridged oral and written 
evidence from senior police figures, and follows a question and answer format, with some cross-
examination, which as a document is revealing. It allows an examination of the ways in which police 
violence is constituted or denied, itself an insight into power relations. The dominant account 
throughout the reports pay deference to one type of language, and in doing so, generates and 
enacts particular repertoires of countermeasures. These observations are also attributable to the 
security agencies, who similarly use 'laundered language' (Brodeur, 1983: 509; but see also 1981; 
and Lee & Mann, 1979, for a fascinating discussion of the RMCP security service). 
Here I am proposing that language does not merely describe an objective reality, but acts to 
construct it, and hence constitutes a form of political power. It is an organisational language which 
carries a boundary maintenance function. To paraphrase Camus, words can come from the 
perspective of the executioner or of the victim. Not only do the words from the police resolutely 
view proceedings from 'top down' as opposed to the mass of somewhat bruised protestors 'bottom 
up', the police discourse plays a political role in structuring reality within the communication setting 
of testimony. Police witnesses employ discourses and linguistic tools (particularly euphemisms) for 
ideological purposes. For instance, violently attacking a group of (unarmed) protestors by a mass of 
police officers in armoured riot gear by charging at them and striking their (unprotected) bodies 
with batons and shields becomes 'crowd dispersal'. Kettling protestors for hours without any 
facilities, food or water becomes 'containment'. Maintaining the kettle by batoning any protestor 
who gets too close to the surrounding phalanx of riot police becomes 'close containment practices'. 
Baton strikes are categorised as 'officer personal safety training'. Punching (including in the face) 
kicking (including protestor’s shins or crotches, men or women) or batoning a person becomes 'a 
distraction blow'. Protestors being struck with a shield (be it to the face or body) is 'push-aways' or a 
'defensive push'. Striking a person with the edge of a short shield becomes 'a defensive edge'. Police 
violence in all its varied forms and severity, including lethal violence, becomes the 'police use of 
force'. Riot equipment including 'less then lethal weaponry' (extensive body armour, short shields, 
batons, CS spray etc.) is 'personal protection equipment' (PPE) or 'officer safety equipment'. The 
emergence and spread of 'riot police' (riot control units) we are told are a 'misconception', rather 
they are 'police officers who are trained in public order tactics' (Sue Sim, ACPO Lead on Public 
Order, cited in HAC 2009b: Ev26). However, in a self-serving reversal of direction to this linguistic 
logic, a thrown plastic water bottle by a protestor becomes 'a missile', and damage to property 
becomes 'serious violence'. As Eric Partridge has observed when studying the aligned field of 
military combat; "War is the greatest excitant of new vocabulary" (cited in Hughes, 1989:26).  
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These and other institutionalised euphemisms act to substitute new evasive and non-violent 
expressions that mask the very violent and unpleasant nature of their referents. They contribute to 
changing the perceptions of police actions to the inquiry panels by (re-)presenting and imposing a 
police terminology on the proceedings. This happens throughout the testimonies, one that is itself 
policed judiciously by the assorted police spokespeople who make up the majority giving oral 
evidence. Witness Sue Sim, when confronted by a HAC panel member who introduces the 
commonplace word 'kettling' in the context of what it most obviously signifies, being 'very close to 
something that can boil over', and posed as a question to her. Such terminology is swiftly dismissed, 
and Sim replies curtly, "Yes, but it is not within police terminology." (HAC, 2009b: Ev25). As with 
theological scripture, the questioner is referred to 'the police manuals’ as the authorative document 
in deciding the naming of proceedings and the one to which all should abide by. This is not simply 
the existence of specialist language (jargon) for precise meanings, it plays an important role in the 
exchanges because they actively blunt questions of sentiment towards violent action and those on 
the receiving end of it. Soon after, Keith Vaz (MP) inadvertently raises a question about the date 
'when kettling began', similarly gets short shrift: [Ms Sim:] "We do not kettle, Mr Vaz." (ibid., 
2009b:Ev25). This same linguistic creativity populates the HMIC reports as well, where it is 
presented as unproblematic to justify police tactics and propagandise their cause. Such linguistic 
techniques are not new of course, there are parallels here in neighbouring areas such as the study of 
discourses supportive of militarisation (for instance see Kis, 2014) notably with the 'nuclearisation of 
language' (Hook, 1985). Nevertheless, all such narrative logic accrues benefit to the senders of its 
message, as it both hinders lucid thinking and influences the resulting recommendations of the 
inquires, even while going unquestioned by the respective panel members who defer to its logic.  
In one sense what we are seeing in the reports is what Keane, in his study of Violence and Democracy 
(2004) has called the 'civilising' of violence, that violence can be publicly removable and is 'erasable'. 
The police have long been the purveyors of violence when controlling those marginal to society 
(Reiner, 2010) a method which was seen as a legitimate tool. But when this violence becomes a 
televisual spectacle for many to see, it takes on a different form, it disrupts a series of carefully 
crafted cherished myths about the British bobby and leads to a legitimacy deficit. These 
confrontational scenes intrude into the routines of tolerance found in modern life and destroys 
those standards and confounds the conventional order.  
This near covert adoption of 'policing language' makes the violence witnessed at the G20 easier to 
live with along with a denial of the victim. This is also a component part of the 'presentational rules' 
that exists to lend an acceptable appearance to the ways in which policing is conducted, but not 
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adhered to (Smith, 2007:43). A repertoire of explanations is used by the police as rhetorical devices 
that both neutralise and deflect blame after the act by employing a series of justifications and 
rationalisations (Sykes & Matza, 1957; Cohen, 2001). None of the report authors effectively 
diagnose and dissect the systematic ambiguity that they are constantly being confronted with 
when taking police testimony, one created by the partly formal and partly informal rule system 
which is the means by which conflicting demands are met when conducting much policing. This is 
most familiar in what Klockers (1980) has designated as the 'Dirty Harry problem',165 where police 
use 'dirty means' (read here legal, ethical or politically dubious or outright unlawful methods) to 
achieve what they consider to be a ‘just end’ goal. Such efforts are greatly enabled by the 
characteristics of policing; which mostly takes place in low visibility settings,166 where supervision is 
weak or non-existent, and where individual officers exercise a great deal of discretion in what force 
they use and how they use it. These inherent problems in police accountability have been long 
recognised by scholars, but are studiously ignored by all of the reports. Without some 
foreknowledge of these longstanding problems in policing, the right questions cannot be posed, 
and the answers scrutinised. 
7.4 The G20 Report Findings 
7.4.1 Summit Protest as a challenge to confrontation management 
Several of the reports starting point is to situate the context of Operation Glencoe within a "new 
world of protest", that we are seeing the 'professionalisation' and intensification of protest, both 
tactically and organisationally, particularly in terms of protestor motivation and commitment (i.e. 
Button et al., 2002:17). For instance, HMIC's (2009b:42) Adapting to Protest cites (the earlier 
discussed) police 'intelligence assessment' that "protest in London is undergoing not just a new 
resurgence but a reinvention with new allegiances being formed and the old foes are now working 
together, inspired by the global economic downturn." Framing the issue, HMIC (2009b:5) asks, 
“How best should the police as a service adapt to the modern day demands of public order policing 
while retaining the core values of the British model of policing?" The answer we are told is: "The 
police as a service needs to modernise its approach and be more inventive in using new 
technologies to engage with hard to reach or resistant communities." Gilmore (2013:94-96) offers a 
discussion of this same point, with the aim of refuting any such changes in protest to the level of 
'discourse' rather than of substance. Whilst I believe she is wrong on this point, leastways in the case 
                                                          
165 The naming echoes the dilemma faced by the anti-hero and chief protagonist Harry Callahan, in the 1971 
film Dirty Harry. 
166 There are a few exceptions to this such as the custody suite, which since PACE is now equipped with CCTV 
designed as an accountability measure against police malpractices and to monitor as well as safeguard the 
treatment of detainees.  
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of much summit protest for some social movements, her (rightful) concern lies in what follows 
having accepted this premise. What it invariably leads to is the depoliticising of protest and an 
attendant increase in both pre-emptive police 'disruptive' actions and coercive policing with its drift 
into further para-militarisation. All these tendencies are apparent when viewing the policing of 
international summit protests.  
What is especially noticeable from a reading of the G20 reports is that having accepted that protest 
has changed by developing tactical innovations and repertoires of contention, this issue never finds 
any thoughtful discussion. What we have is only an acknowledgement that the police are dealing 
with more 'fluid' and unpredictable protest events, ones involving non-hierarchical groups that may 
use creative forms of direct action, including civil disobedience. This is seen entirely as constituting 
a pressing challenge, itself located within a securitised discourse. Within this rigid confine protest 
takes just two forms; that of criminal (or criminally orientated) and disruptive (a breach of the 
peace) or alternatively, the peaceful expression of views on an issue. Writing on the Canadian 
experience of the shortcomings of similar inquiries (into their own highly discredited G20 policing 
operation), Slater & Matthews (2015:316) identify this very same logic when they say: 
 "It seems to us that it was foreign to them [the police] that protest could be radical in its 
content, aimed at broad systemic issues, and nonetheless not be a threat to public security. 
They did not appear to understand that concern for board systemic issues would predispose 
people who were neither criminal nor disruptive, in a legal sense, to challenge whatever they 
saw as illegitimate authority in any way possible."  
Slater & Matthews point also provides evidence for Wood's (2014) thesis that we are seeing an 
increasing 'diffusion of innovation' internationally in policing, and an enhanced sharing of 'best 
practices' through a globalised policing network of corporate and statutory actors. The 
unpredictability of organised and determined protestors and activists are typically portrayed as 
threatening, 'subhuman' and 'somehow similar to terrorists'. These globalising trends in the transfer 
of 'expertise' has seen in a hardening of the 'police identity' and the incorporation of new tactics 
which favour militarised solutions and strategic incapacitation (all of which serve vested corporate 
and military-industrial interests). These shifts are heightened where there is a 'perceived need for 
change' particularly when the police organisation feels its authority or legitimacy is threatened 
(Wood, 2014:93). 
7.4.2 Negotiating Dissent? 
The JCHR (2009a) and the HAC (2009) recommends improved communication and dialogue 
between police and protestors as a means of 'resolving misunderstandings' that lead to police use of 
force. However, in a moment of institutional capture, the HAC (2009:17) simply adopts the police 
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story and policing knowledge when it states the 'importance of communication', thus were told it is 
"in the protesters’ interest to signal their peaceful intentions beforehand", this because it would 
"allow the police to focus their energy on those groups who have identified themselves as potentially 
violent through their lack of communications: 'if they choose to engage: great. If they do not then you 
know what you are dealing with and you police in a different way'" [my emphasis]. Discussing the 
Climate Camp kettle, the HAC (2009:17) authors view the 'reticence' of protestors to communicate 
which "affected the police’s perceptions of the protest and made the use of force, unfortunate 
though it was, more likely" [my emphasis]. It is protestors therefore that need to "make every effort 
to prevent the police viewing them as a threat to public order." Such a reversal is to effectively 
blame protestors for police violence and repression.  
The HAC report's (2009b:12) discussion of communication with the Climate Camp cites Commander 
Broadbent:  
"they [the Climate Camp] will not put forward organisers because they say they are a non-
hierarchical organisation where nobody makes decisions, which then gives me huge problems 
in trying to find out, as happened on 1 April, what they intend to do and where they intend to 
do it." (HAC, 2009b:12). 
Following suit, the HAC remonstrates that "protestors did not fully communicate their intentions 
with the police beforehand [and] were those which experienced the greatest use of force by police." 
This apparent justification is attributed to protestor’s unhelpful 'ideological' concerns, rather than 
one of tactical necessity (although the ideological stance against hierarchy was indeed the case). A 
cursory examination of the 'Bronze tactical plan' for protests on 1st and 2nd April contained in 
HMICs report (2009b:115) is revealing as it indicates what MPS had in store. The Four Horsemen 
marches would be 'identified' [picked up at nearby tube stations] and then "isolated, then 
escorted/contained" before being directed to [police sanctioned] locations to demonstrate, with 
"consideration being given to the length of time they will be allowed to be at the location" justified 
by concern over "disruption to the community". Crucially, all of these subjective judgements on the 
day would be decided by the police. Initial 'detention' is justified in the plan to "prevent breach of 
the peace or other offences such as obstruction of the highways." Similarly, sit-downs on highways 
would result in "containment" and "likely arrest". Any 'spontaneous demonstrations that occurred 
would result in immediate 'containment'. It is hardly surprising then that the demonstrators on the 
1st and 2nd of April did not chose to disclose the detail of their plans.167 If protestor groups are 
perceived to be 'unpredictable' or 'uncooperative', then the police proceed with a militarised 
                                                          
167 Some members of the Climate Camp did meet with MPS, however, MPSs requirement of having an 
authorative representative or group of organisers could not be provided due to the non-hierarchical structure 
of the group. 
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strategic incapacitation approach, this is precisely what happened on the 1st and 2nd of April at the 
G20.  
The JCHR (2009b) follow-up report also stresses 'enhanced discussion', even going as far as to 
suggest the use of 'independent negotiators' to facilitate dialogue and resolve any disputes.' This is 
perhaps one of the most radical departures from current practice arising in any of the reports, but is 
not entertained in the HMIC report which reinforces the primacy of constabulary independence in 
operational decision making. 
7.4.3 Facilitating dissent? 
This last point meshes with the other principle difficulty with all the reports, their assumption that 
the police actively seek to facilitate protestor's rights through a process of constructive dialogue 
and communication. This is at best a half truth. The 'negotiated management model' holds some 
obvious attraction for the police because they can potentially reduce resource costs, minimise 
confrontation and hence the risks of 'in-the-job-problems' (Waddington, PAJ., 1993). More crucially, 
negotiated management holds the advantage of engineering greater predictability into protest 
events and therefore minimising the chances of any 'disruption'. Such 'cooperation' comes at a very 
considerable price for demonstrators though, who find themselves quickly contained/detained or 
shoehorned into 'marching to nowhere', and forsaking their main tactical advantage over a more 
reactive adversary by losing fluidity, spontaneity, and surprise. The end result assures any protest 
action is very far from being auditable or visible to the very institutions and hegemonic power elites 
they want to convey their dissent to. In the main, protestors desire to be seen and heard by the 
people who matter. Remarking on this same point from a Canadian perspective, the Ombudsman 
report into the equally controversial policing of the G20 in Ontario stated: "The whole point in 
protecting freedom of expression is to permit messages to be communicated. By creating a security 
perimeter that separated protestors from participants, the ability of protestors to communicate 
directly with those they wished to influence was infringed, if not denied." (cited in Slater & 
Matthews, 2015:306). Indeed, it was this routinisation of protesting, and the perception of its 
neutering which drove the adoption of more creative forms of dissent through 'transgressive 
summit repertoires' (Scholl, 2212:46) one which adheres more to Tilly's (2004:7) 'transgressive 
contention'.  
This most basic of points appears to be entirely lost on the inquiry authors. Indeed, none of the 
reports seriously question the police practice of widespread 'territorial incapacitation' but merely 
defer to it. The HMIC (2009b:43) report rehearses this issue in a revealing paragraph:  
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"It is important to acknowledge the significant threats which global protest may pose to a 
country’s national security, economic interests and to critical national infrastructure. In 
addition, significant obligations of protection are placed on the police in relation to visiting 
Heads of States and other high profile individuals. All these are legitimate concerns which 
cannot be ignored and may justify the police in imposing restrictions or constraints on 
individuals taking part in mass global protests. But this is an inherent part of the balance 
that must be struck between the rights of individuals to exercise the freedoms of expression 
and assembly and the rights of the wider community" [my emphasis].  
At the same time, we are told by HMIC (2009b:48) that the police act as the "primary arbiter in 
relation to decisions around protests" due to them taking " impartial decisions because they owe no 
allegiance to any particular organisation or interest and [...] they are accountable to the law for the 
exercise of their discretion." HMICs assertion that a country's national security, critical infrastructure 
and economic well-being is threatened from protests has many ramifications. This statement, 
which is in truth, at least here as presented an un-evidenced perception emanating from the police, 
acts to reshape that element of civil society as a dangerous internal threat (rather than external 
threat existing beyond the boundaries of the state). Logically then, under this guise the G20 
protestors become potential adversaries to the state's coercive apparatus. Such a position also 
suggests that methods appropriate to a state’s external threats should rightly impinge on its said 
same domestic ones. This is despite no social movement ever threatening to or attempting to harm 
any internationally protected person, indeed the only persons to have been killed at protests are 
protestors.  
Germane here is the difficulty raised by Lustgarten & Leigh (1994) analysis of national security, that 
the very non-democratic practices used to supposedly sustain internal democracy pose a serious 
threat to the actual practice of democracy. Moreover, it is difficult to see how these rights are being 
'balanced' when the reality of the G20 saw the conclusive incapacitation of protestors when the 
summit was in progress. HMICs assertion also overlooks the 'essentially contested concept' which is 
national security, and that any definition is a highly political one (Buzan, 1983). From my 
observations of the G20, and when examining pervious summit protests in other parts of the world, 
the end result of this 'balancing' of competing rights, sees the multitude have their rights 
significantly curtailed in favour of a tiny elite.   
7.4.4 Police as neutral arbiters? 
All of the inquiry reports herald a number of cherished myths about British policing and portray 
these unproblematically as if they were somehow obvious and unassailable truths. HMIC's 
(2009a:40) report similarly tells us the 'core values' of the British model are: "[...] independence, 
impartiality, discretion and accountability. It is a cornerstone of modern British policing that the 
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police, while a part of the State, is not an instrument of the Executive." Therefore, the police “must 
not take sides then for or against protesters, nor must they be seen to make judgments regarding 
the value of particular protest activity” (HMIC, 2009b:29). However, one does not need to adopt a 
reductivist or vulgar Marxist position and argue that the police operate as mere pawns of the state 
in order to question HMICs assertion of neutrality in arbitrating between state and protestors 
interests. ACPO (which is a private organisation) hold a very privileged position of influence and sit 
within the state apparatus, indeed at the highest levels of government, notably the Home Office. 
This is not mere happenchance, moreover, ACPO have also (successfully) lobbied Minister's for 
increased powers which have acted to further criminalise protest. Perhaps more importantly, ACPO 
hold responsibility for designing Guidelines in how operational policing is to be achieved across all 
'core police business areas', including 'public order policing'. Turning to Carey's (1968) earlier 
discussion of independence, such a close working relationship fails the reasonable observer test. By 
contrast to ACPO, the social movements protesting the G20 (in large part at least), lacked access to 
government and its officials, making their position weaker as they were left with fewer routes to 
seek redress in the wake of repressive police action. Giving testimony to the HAC (2009:Ev47) 
Commander Broadhurst reveals that: 
“The summit itself was a success; the world leaders came and went. I even got a personal 
‘phone call from the Prime Minister thanking us, which I think shows the level of concern 
that there was in government about the potential for disruption to the summit, and all that 
goes with it."  
Dwelling on this power imbalance makes HMIC’s assertion that much more implausible, as we are 
asked to believe that the interests of marginalised groups will be impartially balanced with those of 
a global political elite, one which carry the advantage of being championed by the institutions of the 
state and government. HMICs and the HACs contention of police neutrality also encounters a 
logical difficultly, if this were indeed the case, why did the reviews of policing at the G20 find 
worrying levels of inattention to human rights in its planning and in its execution? Why did it so 
consistently fail to apply the presumption in favour of peaceful protest (whether popular or not)?  
Rehearsing the contention that the police are not an instrument of the Executive (although 
necessarily conceding that they are part of the state) is marshalled by HMIC as the key supporting 
argument for the continuation of chief constable operational independence and to ward off any 
intrusion by Police Authorities into this sphere.168 HMICs (2009b:154-59) final report accepts the 
                                                          
168 This recommendation precedes the abolition of Police Authorities nationally and the introduction of Police 
and Crime Commissioners in 2012, although separate arrangements exist for London (as they do for 
Manchester) where the Mayor's Office for Policing and Crime appoints a Deputy Mayor who has 
responsibilities for holding MPS to account. That said, as with the old Police Authorities, this does not include 
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value of Police Authorities having a community engagement and observational role, but this is 
heavily circumscribed and only after they have been inculcated into the police perspective: 
 "it is critical that [Police Authority] members have the relevant knowledge of police powers 
and duties and the operational decision making structure" a perspective which even 
includes the significant value in police authority members gaining an understanding of the 
operational pressures and constraints faced by police commanders, as well as the 
perceptions of protesters and the public [...]” (HMIC 2009b:157).  
The final recommendation is placed on Police Authorities to develop:  
"Common guidelines [...] on monitoring public order policing to ensure the interventions of 
police authorities are informed and appropriate, protecting the public interest without 
compromising the operational independence of chief officers" (HMIC 2009b:159) [my 
emphasis].  
This issue of constabulary independence and the resulting level of accountability has been the 
subject of much criticism by policing scholars and I do not intend to rehearse this lengthy literature 
here.169 The issue thrown up by the events of the policing of G20 is not simply the need for external 
observers of large policing operations, but we are told "practical and credible level of pre and post 
operation scrutiny for large-scale public order operations without intruding on police operational 
independence or interfering with the police responsibility to strike the right balance" [my emphasis].  
Not only is the ability to ask the right questions in inquires essential, one has to be able to 
contemplate the full panoply of human emotions as well, which in turn requires an understanding of 
what policing is for and about. O'Connor's accompanying remarks to HMICs report does accept that 
some officers replaced a 'proportional reaction' with a 'reciprocal' one when faced with 'aggressive 
protestors' although this does not find its way into the reports. This is another central weakness of 
all of the reports under discussion, they never seriously entertain officer malice as a motivation, or 
consider measures which would act to robustly address this. At the same time this is one of the few 
areas where some firm ground can be established regards police wrong-doing, but instead, police 
spokesmen, unable to deny the video record confronting them, fall back on the reliable stalwarts of 
poor training, inexperienced officers, and word-of-mouth practices.  
7.4.5 Re-conceptualising International summits 
Whilst the extent to which political elite threats decide the level of repression social movements 
face is exceedingly difficult to research and hence settle in any conclusive way,170 it makes intuitive 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
operational policing matters which remain with Chief Constables. So despite the rhetoric of PCC's, 
'constabulary independence' remains very much intact. 
169 See for instance see: Chan, 1999; Lovday, 2011; Loader, 1994; Jefferson & Grimshaw, 1984; Walker, 2015. 
170 If this could be tested as an empirical proposition, then it would require the permanent shadowing of the 
higher echelons of the government, and the totality of the state security institutions, minimally the police and 
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sense that they play an important role. This is because the host government has a great deal of 
political capital invested in the summits, itself reflected in the exorbitant 'security' costs shouldered 
and the bewildering array of restrictions that the executive is willing to see imposed on its citizen’s 
protest activity. At this point it is helpful to examine Barker's (2001) work on the self-presentation of 
rulers (Legitimating Identities) as he offers a more richly dimensional account of what governments 
and rulers are doing, and for our purposes, one that can be applied to international summits.  
Summit events can be understood then as a particular type of presentational ritual and a particular 
mode to legitimate governing. Barker argues contra Weber, that the monopoly of legitimate 
coercion is not something which belongs to the rulers but something that is claimed by them, the 
success of which depends on how, where and when it is made. On this measure, one thinks of 
Ceausescu's visible uncertainty in his public performance on the balcony of his palace in 1989, for 
Barker, this is what lost his legitimacy in the act of claiming it. Barker (2001:41) argues that: "Rulers 
appear to need to legitimate their power, to demonstrate constantly by rituals both spiritual and 
secular their unique prestige, as persons authorised in a manner that ordinary subjects are not, as 
persons set apart to exercise their powers and privileges of government." To achieve this our rulers 
need to be identified as special, as different from others, and this self-legitimation is a characteristic 
activity of ruling where rulers cultivate their dramatic personalities (i.e. the signing of a treaty). 
Summit sites provide the artefacts and backdrop (ostentatious buildings, podiums, etiquette, 
portraiture etc.) the pomp and ceremony which are designed to legitimate through a 'politics of 
vision.' Leaders then are not simply acting in defence of their interests, they act in defence of their 
identity (Barker, 2001:35). This forms one part of a wider 'culture of legitimation' and one integral to 
ruling: "The legitimacy of a democratic regime rests on the belief in the right of those legally 
elevated to authority to issue certain types of commands, to expect obedience, and to enforce 
them." (Linz, 1978, cited in Barker, 2001:33). When rulers legitimate themselves they are giving an 
account of who they are, with ceremonial actions being an integral part of this identification 
process. "The action both creates and expresses the identity" [and] the "identity at one and the 
same time legitimates the person and is confirmed by the person's manner of expressing it" (ibid, 
2001:35).  
This need for legitimation extends to international government and its various forums, and 
international summits are a way that legitimation takes place in society. The value of Barkers thesis 
is to turn our attention to a much overlooked dimension of ruling, that leaders are cultivating their 
own sense of identity, one which is also sought from other international rulers, as well as justifying 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
security services and to be privy to their correspondence on all matters concerning the summit arrangements. 
Needless to say no government would ever grant such a request.  
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themselves to their subjects. This is not to deny that summits involve an 'agenda', and the business 
of negotiation on international issues, be it world trade agreements as in the WTO or otherwise 
(although most of this work is done prior to the summit itself) but to draw proper attention to what 
else they are and what their function is. They form part of a carefully crafted and massively stage 
managed event, a ceremonial action which at its heart is about how government and international 
forums can be justified to its citizens, it is a way that legitimation takes place in society. To cite the 
anthropologist Geertz (2000:142-3) "Thrones may be out of fashion, and pageantry too; but political 
authority still requires a cultural frame in which to define itself and advance its claims, and so does 
opposition to it." Challengers (protestors) to these forums and the credentials of existing rulers are 
also trying to legitimate their own distinctive identities, and the process of self-legitimation is 
similar to that of rulers.  
I have discussed Barkers contribution at length to illustrate the magnitude of what is at stake and to 
pour further doubt on HMICs claims that, given this state of affairs, they proceed with neutrality and 
impartiality when faced with a mass form of rebellion which seeks to challenge an existing regime. 
Under such conditions, and under this conflict of identities, there is an intensification in the demand 
for internal control, indeed that is what we see played out on the streets. 
7.5 Seeing Blue 
The relationship of the police to political elites and the state, and the legitimation of ruling 
identities are not the only salient factors in deciding the level of repression social movements 
experience. If HMIC's claims are correct, then the radical goals of the challenger group should not 
make any difference in how they are policed as the police do not judge protestors on this basis and 
are impartial to presenting elite group interests. There is now a corpus of previous scholarship 
(Scholl, 2012; Star et al; 2010; Wood, 2014) which suggests that the policing of international summit 
protest events in the Western world increasingly take the similar form, although there is some 
cross-national variation as well as localised differences (Davenport 2000b; Wisler & Kriesi, 1998). 
Writing from a US perspective, Earl & Soule’s (2006:159) find that having radical goals did indeed 
affect policing presence. This is a finding from US policing, but has purchase in the UK due to the 
trans-nationalisation of summit policing practices.  Whilst this should not be found, it is hardly 
surprising, as the function of policing is "ensuring the politics of stability and gradualism, most 
obviously in control operations and less so in providing emergency assistance, guidance and 
protection. The priority of control over service functions becomes evidence whenever authorities 
perceive group interest to be endangered." (Turk, 1982:164).  
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Also writing from a US perspective, Bayley's (1994:120) analysis of organised police work argues he 
primary function of policing is "the suppression of collective unrest and the regulation of 
populations, what might be called state-centred policing."171 In fact there is a fundamental 
divergence of interests, perhaps most powerfully and succinctly described by Waddington 
(1999:64); "Patrolling the boundaries of respectability—and thus reproducing patterns of 
domination and subordination, and inclusion and exclusion—is the exercise of largely invisible state 
power. Individual officers selectively exercise their discretion on the street under the guise of 
neutrally enforcing the law and keeping the peace. But the police “keep people in their place” in 
quite another, and much more visible, manner when they suppress overt dissent against prevailing 
social, political and economic conditions. Here the notion of the police as neutral and impartial 
enforcers of the law is exposed for the myth that it is; since their first duty becomes transparent—to 
protect the state, whose coercive arm they are. This exposure of the fundamental role of the police 
as custodians of the state’s monopoly of legitimate coercion can be revelatory [...]" [my emphasis]. 
This 'revelation' appears to go unnoticed when one reads through the many pages of assorted 
witness testimony and cross-questioning from inquiry members to police and state officials.  
The G20 protests were each trying to create visibility through acts of social conflict. This is only to 
recognise that the police (including other state authorities such as government, intelligence 
agencies, as well as the judicial apparatus) are powerful and purposive actors, who as such, have an 
antagonistic relationship between protestors on the streets. As Vitale (2017:197) argues, "Today, 
states portray their police forces as value neutral protectors of public safety, but in reality, states 
continue to monitor and disrupt all kinds of political activity through surveillance, infiltration, 
criminal entrapment, and repressing protest. The continued existence of these practices poses a 
major threat to any effort to change the basic role of the police, and, more broadly, to achieve the 
goal of racial and economic justice." Needless to say these are the goals the various social 
movements are pursuing.  
The police organisation itself also plays a role in structuring the form that protest policing takes, 
notably the way that threats are constructed within the police organisation and perceived by 
individual officers on the ground at demonstrations. These situational factors centre around the 
police's fear of losing control of a crowd which contributes to its use of repression and approximates 
                                                          
171 This should not be interpreted that all policing is repressive or unwanted, clearly this is not the case and 
even repressive and highly coercive policing in some deprived high crime areas can make living conditions 
that much more tolerable.  
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Stark's (1972) notion of a 'police riot.' (Earl & Soule, 2006)172. This is aided by the mass media's role 
in constructing militant protest as dangerous and criminal, as several of the reports acknowledge, 
'police officers read newspapers too.' These threat variables include property damage, 'missile' 
throwing, and confrontational tactics by protestors, which are interpreted as indicators that control 
is lost or nearly lost (for instance; Kerner, 1968; Earl & Soule, 2006). All of these threats were 
present at the G20, but what is instructive when examining the timeline of events in HMICs 
report173, is that it fails to provide context and reads more like a post hoc dramatisation, infused 
with policing terminology to drive its own self-justifying authoritarian logic.  
A further point worthy of note is that throughout the police testimony contained in the HAC 
document, and all the reports discussion, is the acceptance in describing official violence as 
provoked by or as a response to protestor violence, never as active or as initiating.  As I have argued 
previously, the police account reverses the ordering of events in some important respects. 
Moreover, even on MPSs own account of proceedings, police kettling and corralling protestors into 
'cordons' (protest pens) were imposed prior to accusations of 'protestor violence'. In addition, it 
needs to be remembered that the violence at RBS was 'performative', it was not directed against 
any person and what was remarkable about it was the constraint of the crowd. Only five protestors 
engaged in the property damage and entered the building, (far outnumbered by a scrum of press 
photographers lying in wait and who surrounded them). This is what MPS term a 'concentrated 
group of protestors acting collectively to cause disorder [...]' (HMIC, 2009a:77), is then quickly 
termed 'serious violence', justifying reinforcements of riot police, including use of police horses as 
'support'. Considering the size of the demonstrations this justification for police violence and 
kettling appears weak. More likely is that this is a post hoc justification for violent police repression, 
both because of the size of the protests, their unpredictability, and the multiple targets they had in 
mind, in the eyes of the police, and the challenge they represented to the summit - one which could 
not be conceded under any account, and hence the grasping of this opportunity.  
This 'threat approach' has been the dominant explanation for repressive protest policing, especially 
those using what the authorities consider to be unorthodox and confrontational tactics (Davenport, 
2000; Earl, 2003; Earl et al., 2003) and when insurgent challenging groups pursue multiple targets 
and goals (MacAdam, 1982). It was the result of a co-constitutive and asymmetrical relationship of 
antagonism and control between what are two opposing groups, police and social movement 
protestors. This has been a central contention of my thesis thus far and the reason for the shift in 
                                                          
172 Although it needs to be noted that Earl  & Soule's study is not specific to the policing of international 
summits but examines a far wider range of public order policing operations in the US. 
173 HMIC (2009a:76) Adapting to Protest Annex D 'Timeline'.  
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policing to a 'dual model' of strategic incapacitation (in conjunction with negotiated management), 
as well as the increasing militarisation of summit policing operations, especially towards 
transgressive social movements. Thus far, my observational study would confirm these theorists’ 
findings, notably in explaining why MPS undertook the unlawful pre-emptive police operations 
conducted against the convergence centres. But this is not cost free for the institution, violence is 
ugly and scenes showing ranks of large heavily armoured male police officers, faces concealed 
behind balaclava's, with shields and batons bludgeoning defenceless demonstrators exacts a price. 
As Cohen (1993, cited in Scraton, 2002:16) remarks, the “unwillingness to confront anomalous or 
disturbing information” extends to democratic societies. What the reports and their agencies 
largely accomplish is to reproduce 'regimes of impunity' (Duschinski, 2010). 
7.5.1 Police Skulduggery: Agent provocateurs? 
There is also some evidence that the police were using agent provocateurs' to incite the crowd 
(reported in the Guardian newspaper).174 Several men who were thought to be police officers had 
been seen throwing bottles at the police whilst being kettled, and were actively encouraging others 
to do the same, but having been recognised as police by a protestor contained in the kettle, they 
quickly left, and flashed an ID to pass through a closed police cordon (which had refused exit to all 
other protestors for approximately five hours, including several who required medical treatment). 
Whilst this needs to be interpreted cautiously, as protestors can be inclined to buy into conspiracy 
theories as well as some holding anti-state beliefs, the easy escape from the cordon raises 
legitimate questions.  Having been asked why these individuals were allowed to leave the cordon, 
and no-one else was, Commander Broadbent claimed he did not know who they are, and that there 
were not plain clothes officers in the crowd (HAC, 2009:Ev42).  
This issue was also raised with Sim (ACPO Lead on Public Order) by the HAC (2009:Ev27) panel, 
who replies evasively: "I would not accept that that was acceptable behaviour, Mr Vaz. That is 
something that I would be very positive on." This irrelevant response fails to answer the question 
posed (were police acting as agent provocateurs'?). At this critical juncture, and not having had the 
question answered, the discussion shortly after ends. At the same time both Sim and Commander 
Broadhurst had stated on record there were no plain-clothes officers among the crowd, saying it 
would have been too dangerous to do so,175 (itself a revealing remark about how senior officers 
                                                          
174 Doward J. & Townsend, M. (2009, may 10th) G20 police 'used undercover men to incite crowds'. Guardian 
Newspaper. 
175 Sim's response is she would not 'expect plain clothes police officers to be in a crowd at all' (HAC, 2009:Ev27) 
[my emphasis] whereas Broadbent is decisive in his denials: "I was obviously the Gold Commander. We had no 
plain clothes officers deployed within the crowd. It would have been dangerous for them to put plain clothes 
officers in a crowd like that. The only officers we deploy for intelligence purposes at public order are forward 
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viewed demonstrators). Some two years later this turned out to be a falsehood, with MPS being 
forced to concede they had twenty five ‘covert officers deployed to the protests for 'intelligence 
gathering' purposes', although they denied using any agents provocateur to ferment unrest.176 The 
very considerable revelations of the sheer size and scope of MPSs  infiltration into protest groups 
(sparked by the Mark Kennedy affair) attests to this, as it does to the importance of a 'high policing' 
(Brodeur, 1983) function at summit protests, notably the activities of MPSs Special Demonstration 
Squad (SDS) (i.e. Evans & Lewis, 2013; Mills, 2017).177 What is less clear is the extent to which 
infiltration was used as a counter-insurgency tactic to disrupt and disintegrate the organisations 
being infiltrated (I pick up on this is the next chapter). 
This is not a new tactic by police forces, anarchist groups have been frequently appropriated by 
agent provocateurs at other summits, Scholl, (2012:98) argues there was wide scale police 
infiltration in 2001 at the G8 summit in Genoa for instance. Police provocateurs were also identified 
at the 2007 security and Prosperity Partnership summit, identified by internet users (Truscello, M. 
(2011:287).178 More mundane is the widespread use of police informants,179 and as Marx (1974) notes 
writing from the US experience there are pressures within the police informant role which push 
towards provocation. Despite official denials there is an incentive for the authorities to have agent 
provocateurs fermenting the crowd as it provides a post-hoc justification for a forced based police 
strategy as well as serving a wider political elite interest by discrediting and undermining the social 
movement, whose justice claims get over-ridden by the narrative of 'violent protestors'. Irrespective 
of the truthfulness of MPSs claims, which must be judged sceptically,180 this does not exhaust the 
field. The growing 'hybridity' which blurs criminal offences from national security concerns and 
offences (Brodeur, 2005:805) can implicate the security services in summit protests due to the 
nature of this political environment (notably as HMIC consider summit protests to constitute 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
intelligence team officers who are wearing full police uniforms with a yellow jacket with blue shoulders. There 
were no plain clothes officers deployed at all" (HAC, 2009:Ev42) [my emphasis]. On this same point, Sir Paul 
Stephenson denied the logic of using agent provocateurs as being "wholly antithetic to everything I have 
known about policing for the best part of 34 years" (HAC, 2009:Ev42) although that is not a denial of the facts 
of the matter. 
176 Statement issued by MPS, cited in Press Association (2011, January 19th) 'Plain-clothes Metropolitan police 
officers were at G20 demonstrations', Guardian Newspaper. 
177 For instance, see: Evans, R & Lewis, P. (2013) Undercover: The True Story of Britain's Secret Police. Faber & 
Faber; Mills (2017) The undercover policing of political protest, Briefing 21(October, 2017) Centre for Crime 
and Justice Studies. 
178 Truscello, M. (2011) Social Media and the Representation of Summit Protests in Ted Gournelos (Ed.) 
Transgression 2.0: Media, Culture, and the Politics of a Digital Age. 
179 For instance, Billingsley et al. (2001:5) state that approximately one third of all crime cleared up by the 
police involves the use of informers, although this is a method which is usually kept of the public view. 
180 MPS have a long history of secrecy and subterfuge, for instance proven file shredding in order to evade 
transparency to the recent inquiry into undercover policing. 
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national security threats). The security services are also players here as are a wide variety of other 
corporate actors, although this line of questioning is not pursued by the HAC panel. 
7.6 Controlling dissent through violence: Police wrong-doing in the reports 
To differing degrees all of the inquiry reports address allegations of police wrong-doing (by this I 
mean either professional misconduct,181 malpractice or unlawful behaviour) including allegations of 
police disproportionate or excessive use of force, including baton charges and forcible dispersal, the 
practice of police officers concealing their identification; as well as police public relations strategies 
in the run up to major demonstrations. Although there are a number of dimensions to the use of 
force, ranging from type of equipment (i.e. police weapons), training, tactics, as well as methods to 
monitor such behaviour to hold officers to account (Neyroud, 2007:252). At the same time it has 
long been recognised that controlling the proper application of force is a central problem in 
contemporary policing (see for instance; Skolnick & Fyfe, 1993; Kerstetter 1985; Jefferson, 1984, 
1987; Waddington, 1992). To be lawful,182 any force used by officers needs to be necessary, 
proportionate and reasonable throughout the encounter in either 'self defence' or the 'prevention of 
crime'. In other words it needs to meet the 'minimum force' and 'reasonable force' provisions in the 
Act.  
Thornton [QC] et al's (2010:269-70) comprehensive account of UK public order law argues that 
there is a subjective and objective test here (what the circumstances are that the officer using force 
believed them to be? And, was the degree of force used, reasonable in these circumstances?), with 
courts allowing police the same margin of discretion, judgement and error as a citizen. This does 
mean that each individual officer is accountable under law for their actions, consequently, in theory 
at least, this means that officers use of force can be challenged if it was held to be unlawful. 
Nevertheless there are important ambiguities relating to 'reasonable force' in policing, but 
                                                          
181 By ‘misconduct’, I mean any conduct falling below the standards expected of an officer (i.e. misconduct or 
gross misconduct) in breach of the Standards of Professional Behaviour as detailed in Home Office Guidance: 
Police Officer Misconduct, Unsatisfactory Performance and Attendance Management Procedures. Home Office 
circular 026 /2008. London, Home Office, and any subsequent Home Office circulars. By ‘complaint’, I mean 
any report, challenge or allegation (written or oral) by any officer (or police family member) of another’s (or 
police family member) perceived or otherwise improper conduct relayed via any officially recognised channel 
(through formal Police reporting channels, to a line manager, or through the force’s confidential reporting 
mechanism etc.). This includes where available, conduct of a ‘more minor’ nature that has been dealt with by 
normal management action (as referred to in Principle 10: Challenging and Reporting Improper Conduct; Home 
Office Guidance: Police Officer Misconduct, Unsatisfactory Performance and Attendance Management 
Procedures. Home Office circular 026 / 2008). 
182 Under Section 3 of the Criminal Law Act 1967. 
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particularly in public order policing.183 This begs the question of what constitutes 'reasonable' force 
as opposed to 'excessive force', or more technically the 'reasonableness standard':  
"The court, in considering what was reasonable force, would take into account all the 
circumstances, including in particular the nature and degree of force used, the seriousness 
of the evil to be prevented and the possibility of preventing it by other means: but there is 
no need to specify in the clause the criteria for deciding the question." (Cmnd 2659, para 23, 
cited in Thornton, HHJP (QC) et al. 2010:320-1). 
As Thornton et al (2010) notes, the general principle consideration is proportionality -here, "a 
favourable balance between the actual or intended consequences of a person's conduct and the 
seriousness and immanence of the threat or damage that he or she seeks to prevent"  (Thornton, 
HHJP (QC) et al. 2010:320-1 [my emphasis]).  
The ambiguities evident in the legal doctrine have added impetus when considering policing tactics 
such as the use of containment and the manner in which force was used by officers. Despite this 
limited information on protestor injuries and the recorded police violence which proved so 
scandalous, coming to any conclusive judgement about the police's 'use of force' is bedevilled by a 
number of problems. Chief among them is the wide discretionary powers that each individual 
officer has resort to, the permissive way that legislation is drawn in the use of those powers, the 
contestability of what occurred, and the often discredited nature of those on the receiving end of 
that violence ('police property') as well as the severe inadequacies of the complaints system (which I 
have touched on previously). Not only are there fluid legal boundaries around police powers, but 
any decision as to their legality is retrospective for any protestor as there is no higher authority to 
appeal to there and then. As Lipsky (1982) argues, police officers function as street level 
bureaucrats and represent the front lines of the law married with high levels of relative autonomy.  
Writing on the subject of police excessive force from a US perspective, Klockers (1996:7) notes 
"There is no definition of excessive force that automatically renders it a form of brutality and 
escalates it to the form of a scandal." This means in practice it is especially difficult to identify what 
constitutes disproportionate or excessive police use of force (i.e. police brutality) and hence what is 
criminal and civilly liable without an investigation, and ultimately a civil or criminal case to assign 
guilt. On this subject, HMIC (2009b:114) state that proportionate means “the minimum [force] 
necessary to achieve the legitimate aim”, although this tends to move the question back on what 
constitutes 'minimum force'.  Most obviously the police are the enforcement arm of the state and 
are therefore entitled to use violence which would otherwise be unlawful (including deadly force). 
                                                          
183 As is there in 'armed policing' - see Squires P. & Kennison, P. (2010) Shooting to Kill? Policing, Firearms and 
Armed Response, Wiley Blackwell.  
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This is compounded further in the context of 'public order policing' where there can be direct 
confrontations between two opposing groups (it should be remembered that the police also 
constitute a coherent group as do protestors). This is especially so when mass containment 
practices are favoured, and mass containment is necessarily forceful mass containment.  
Scant research attention has been paid to the psychological processes engaged by both protestors 
and police during kettling, although there has been a concerted effort to understand 'crowd 
psychology' more generally to prevent disorder occurring and spiralling into violence. HMIC’s report 
makes explicit reference to this work and advocates principles informing police practice, notably the 
work of Steve Reciher.  Whilst not specific to kettling, Zimring and Hawkins (1973:136–137) highlight 
the importance of emotions to potential offending decision making; "Decisions about criminal 
conduct that are made when a person is in circumstances which provoke great emotional arousal 
may be less amenable to threats than decisions that occur when the potential criminal is less 
aroused, because very high degrees of emotional arousal may eclipse thoughts of future 
consequences by riveting all of the potential criminal’s attention on his present situation.’’ Powerful 
emotions such as anger can override rational deliberation then (Loewenstein, 1996) because such 
decision making can precede rational thought and at times supersede rational deliberation (Massey, 
2002) at least for some. One major cause of the emotion frustration is having continued failure 
towards a desired outcome blocked. The more important the goal, the greater the frustration felt 
and the resultant anger, hostility and aggression. This is evident from the swearing and gesturing 
matches by some kettled protestors with police, itself deemed protestor aggression, which results 
in an escalated force response.  Consistent with previous studies, people experience higher levels of 
self-reported anger when they are under a sense of time pressure (O'Brien et al 2003).  
Collins, (2008:377) has argued that it is the dynamics of the social situation which influences the 
occurrence of violence According to Collins, micro-level dynamics are crucial in explaining violence 
notably in the 'fog of war', in part because teams are more violent than individuals, notably where 
aggregates of combatants join in phalanxes, with each officer feeling their safety somehow 
depends on others. This is a typical occurrence in public order situations, specifically police 
containment in kettles. This finding that there is an 'interactional logic' to much of the violence at 
protests accords with my own observations, especially where 'forward panic' in hot emotional 
violence circumstances can predominate. Violence arises from situations that generate 
opportunities, where tensions build until they hit a climax, and where there is overwhelming 
strength on one side as compared to the other. The usefulness of Collins analysis is that it can 
explain the frenzy of police violence at the Climate camp 'dispersal', where the policing group 
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becomes almost out of control and seems to be incited by the weakness and vulnerability of its 
‘opponents’ (Collins, 2008:402).  
Kettling also treats everyone as the same, as trouble-makers without any heed to the different 
psychological groups which typically make up a crowd. As Reicher (2011:22) argues, kettling is the 
converse of facilitation. In doing so it draws on the old discredited crowd psychology of Le Bon, 
whilst violating the insights of the new crowd psychology, being the very same doctrine that HMIC 
claim to be converts to.  
The police claim to only use minimum force to achieve their lawful aims, but consider a 'distraction 
blow' (a euphemism for punching, kicking or batoning a person) when they are perceived to be 
'passively resisting' a police command. This takes on added impetus when considering the 
expansion of riot equipment including 'less then lethal' weapons. Police weaponry exists on a 
continuum of lethality, and ranges from impact weapons such as batons (PVC duty baton and ASP 
extendable batons, short shields, to firearms such as tasers. Police canine units dogs were also 
employed, whose bites can exert extreme force (up to 2000 psi) and lead to serious injuries and 
hospitalisation, most commonly lacerations and abrasions but also damage to nerve, vascular or 
tendinous structures as well as fractures and later, significant soft tissue infections (Adeyinka et al, 
2013).184 This is particularly the case with the 'bite and hold' policy. 
According to official police doctrine, the intended consequence of police use of so-called ‘non-
lethal’185 weapons is to cause pain and incapacitate and hence subdue those protestors who are 
acting in a violent manner or are reasonably perceived to be threatening violence, or are 
'unresponsive' to verbal instructions. Perhaps nothing better indicates quite how permissive the 
legal rules are than this, a point never critiqued in the reports. Under these circumstances the police 
can lawfully strike an individual to 'gain compliance' despite the person not trying to hit or kick 
them, or presenting any conceivable threat. The (former) IPCC Commissioner, Glass (2009) 
discussion of eroding public confidence in the police after the G20 protests in the Policing journal is 
instructive here, partly because it reveals her solution to 'the challenge' of citizen journalists 
recording officers delivering such blows (and the incumbent allegation of police brutality) as simply 
the need to better 'explain' their practice and 'engage' with the public and media. This brings into 
light what is technically lawful from what is perceived to be legitimate by the many who witness or 
later watch these scenes. Beetham's (1991:16) post-Weberian analysis of legitimacy argues that 
there are three underlying structural constraints or dimensions governing the nature of legitimacy 
                                                          
 
185 There are longstanding disagreements over the usefulness and definition of the term ‘non-lethal weapon’ 
both as used by the police and the military, see Davidson, 2009 ‘Non-Lethal Weapons’ Palgrave. 
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claims; "power can be said to be legitimate to the extent that it conforms to established rules; the 
rules can be justified by reference to beliefs shared by both dominant and subordinate, and there is 
evidence of consent by the subordinate to the particular power relation." Legitimacy deficits follow 
where there is a discrepancy between the rules and the supporting or shared beliefs, leading to 
withdrawal of consent. So irrespective of the technical legalities, many people are shocked when 
they see police officers hitting and beating protestors who are otherwise passive or remonstrating 
with them. The police use of force becomes a moral issue at this point, not simply a legal one.  None 
of the reports really engage with this issue, or venture beyond questioning what is strictly lawful, 
the acceptability of what has rarely come to the public attention is conceived as a public relations 
concern.  
7.7 Armed and Dangerous: The unaddressed issue of police weaponry 
A further issue of concern is how police weaponry is used and where protestors are being struck. 
This last critical point receives no attention from the report authors, although questions are asked 
about police shields tactics (I pick up on this issue later in the discussion). This is an important 
because there is very little medical research on the short and medium to long term effects on 
citizens injured by such force options (Adepipe et al. 2012). Force weapon selection and use for riot 
control has evolved historically, in response to both what is described as ‘weapon failure’ when 
equipment is deemed by the police to be inadequate for the task and in response to injuries (some 
serious) to police officers engaged in ‘riot control’.186 Invariably this has seen a ‘tooling-up’ and 
‘paramilitarisation’ of the police (Jefferson 1990; Kraska, 1997; but see Wright, 2000, 2007 for a 
broader analysis) and a burgeoning industry manufacturing, marketing and supplying crowd control 
weapons (Wright, 2000, 2011).187 What is notable here is that police force’s weapon selection for use 
in public order policing is far less responsive to citizen injuries than to the desired operational 
imperatives, issues which fail to be addressed in any of the reports when discussing police use of 
force and the video data showing this available to them. Despite growing concerns over the 
willingness of the police to use significant levels of force, and occasionally extreme violence, to 
contain political protest, the police in the UK have effectively lowered the threshold for which force 
can be used, whilst being provided with, trained in the use of, and routinely deploy, public order 
body armour and weaponry that would have been 'scarcely imaginable' 40 years ago (Morgan, 
                                                          
186 Telephone interview with MPS: Public Order Policing Unit personnel. 
187 There has been a massive (over 2,738%) increase in the manufacture of crowd control weapons, from 13 
companies (in 5 countries, two of which were non-European) in the 1970’s to 10 of the 15 EU countries being 
involved in the manufacture, supply or distribution of crowd control weapons in 1999, growing to more than 
369 major manufacturers, suppliers or distributers across countries (Wright, 2000:xix). 
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1989:220). Moreover, the classification of batons as a non-lethal weapon is highly questionable.188 
A similar case exists with the use of police short shields, which have been used by officers as a 
weapon to strike protestors, including using the edge of shields as impact weapons (an offensive 
rather than a defensive 'shield tactic'). As one protestors giving evidence to the HAC stated: 
 "They descended upon me with the sides of their shields on the side of my head, again just 
basically striking me with shields. Again, there was no request to move, no indication of what 
was happening or why. My girlfriend had been dragged behind me with her wrists bent behind 
her back, threatened to be broken and was pulled back behind the police line. She was then 
thrown back by officer’s head first with her hands behind her back and landed on the floor. 
Whilst this was happening I was being struck on the side of the head by the sides of shields" 
(HAC, 2009:Ev13).  
Neither did these controversial189 tactics form part of any national training or current ACPO Public 
Order Manual (being the police's own authorative guide to public order policing).190 However HMIC 
(2009a:101) still attributed this practice to the "absence of clear standards on the use of force for 
individual officers operating in the public order policing environment".  
On closer inspection this explanation is found wanting. HMICs earlier (April, 2007:17) Safety Matters 
(the subject of which is exclusively 'officer safety training', including the use of batons and shields) 
explicitly makes the recommendation191 that "forbids the use of OST [officer safety training] 
techniques other than those contained in the OST Manual" [my emphasis]. This could not be clearer 
and leaves no room for ambiguity. If using the edge of shields as a means to strike a person is not in 
the OST Manual, which it isn't, then it is forbidden to do so. Later, by way of explaining the practice 
of using shields in this manner, HMIC (2009) state that such tactics have "evolved on an informal 
word-of-mouth basis" and is “not nationally recognised and clearly involve the use of high levels of 
force by officers. This is not acceptable" [my emphasis], the HAC (2009) police spokes-people 
provide the same explanations in their witness testimony also. The frequency of this training occurs 
yearly (or in smaller blocks throughout the year) for officers (HMIC, 2007:3) so presumably officers 
would have been trained and have relayed to them from their trainers the content of HMICs 
recommendations? This makes the claimed ignorance of police personnel harder to accept as the 
over-riding explanation. It also begs the question of what does 'not acceptable' mean in HMIC's 
official capacity and in light of the police's role to uphold ECHR obligations. The answer is not very 
                                                          
188 For instance, a small number of US states classify batons as deadly weapons (Cox et al, 1987:56). 
189 The use of police shields as an attacking weapon, rather than a defensive apparatus – as the name would 
suggest – have been the subject of public formal complaints against the Police, including the more 
questionable use of the shield edges to strike protestors. 
190 Glass, D. (2009). Commissioner's report following the IPCC independent investigation into a complaint that 
officers used excessive force against a woman during the G20 protests. London, IPCC. p4. 
191 Recommendation 13, Safety Matters, (2007:17). 
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much. It refuses to recognise that some behaviour is inherently culpable and constitutes 
malpractice or 'wrong-doing', both because none of the reports make that shift in language despite 
its logical corollary, and because no indication or discussion is had which would indicate an interest 
in identifying the said individuals by any agency. Such a proactive stance is not raised by any of the 
other inquiry reports either. Given its 'forbidden' nature, and that officers would have presumably 
been trained since that recommendation had been put into effect, many of whom would have been 
present during Glencoe, HMICs argument distils down to the somewhat surprising proposition that 
officers need to be explicitly instructed not to use the edge of a shield to strike protestors with. This 
is another example of 'wilful blindness' by HMIC, as the only motive to use the edge of a shield 
against protestors, including head strikes, is the desire to inflict an increased level of pain and injury 
than would otherwise be afforded, a blindingly self-evident conclusion that is never entertained by 
the report authors.  
Rather surprisingly there is no specific set of regulations governing police officers use of batons in 
terms of how the baton is used, where upon the body it strikes, or with what force, although there is 
'guidance'.192 These decisions are left to the discretion of the individual officer, with the much 
lauded proviso that any force used needs to be proportionate, and that in principle the officer is 
responsible and answerable in law for those actions, a point offered up repeatedly by the police 
witnesses as reassurance of accountability. In practice however, this claim does not hold up to any 
serious scrutiny. As I have demonstrated from my analysis of the IPCC data, rarely if ever, do these 
cases progress to being passed to the CPS for consideration to prosecute, and in the unlikely event 
that do, rarer still do juries pass guilty verdicts.  
This situation is exacerbated by the scant research characterising police perpetrated abuse despite 
police officer's excessive use of force being classified as a form of violence by the World Health 
Organisation (WHO).193 What research there is regarding the health implications of police violence 
has remained at the margins of public health (Cooper et al., 2004) although the public exposure to 
police violence has increased dramatically. It needs to be remembered that protestors at the G20 
did not have any protective equipment which would prevent injury from police attacks, whereas 
police officers did, minimally NATO helmets (with visors) and batons and CS gas, or as with riot 
police, extensive body armour, including flame retardant suits and balaclava's (which acted to 
masked their faces). Neither are protestors able to purchase protective equipment such as body 
armour or even NATO style helmets (which would ensure protection from baton blows to their 
                                                          
192 Telephone interview with MPS: Public Order Policing Unit. 
193 Krug E, Dahlberg L, Mercy J, Zwi A, Lozano R, eds. World Report on Violence and Health. Geneva, 
Switzerland; World Health Organisation; 2002. 
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heads and faces) as the suppliers of this equipment refuse to sell to non-police personnel.194   
In order to bring some conceptual clarity to the issue of what constitutes excessive force, I will 
proceed by way of immanent critique, taking seriously the general proposition such as the doctrine 
of minimum force to uphold the law, itself premised on the claim of policing by consent. What this 
actually means is of course a politically and professionally charged issue, Nevertheless, I shall 
contend that the doctrine of minimum force does provide a baseline in measuring proportionate 
from excessive force. The harm principle is recognised in Police Public Order Training given to 
officers, which employs a RAG typology of 'green' 'amber' and 'red' target ‘strike’ zones for baton 
use which accord to likely degree of harm inflicted:  
 ‘Green zones’ refer to fleshy primary target areas (such as upper legs, torso or arms) where 
limited bruising and swelling will result;  
 ‘Amber areas’ denote where a fractured bone would likely result if struck by a baton (i.e. on 
the extremities such as a wrist or forearm), and finally;  
 ‘Red areas’ are those such as the head and neck region that constitute areas of 'last resort', 
where a fatality can follow from a baton blow.195 The MPS officer training manual states 
strikes to the head 'are to be avoided' with the accompanying warning "a blow to the head 
can cause a fracture of the skull or internal bleeding" (cited in HMIC, 2009a:60). 
These 'red' target areas clearly require a higher level of justification (and perhaps only in extremis) 
when taking seriously the principle of minimum force. Baton blows to red areas can risk severe head 
injuries as despite the protective bone covering of the skull, the brain surface can get torn and 
bruised as it bumps against the skull, and blood vessels and nerves can rip. These injuries can cause 
bleeding, swelling or fluid build-up in the head, putting pressure on the brain, sometimes causing 
brain damage.196  
These considerations take on additional importance when considering the increasing police reliance 
of kettling protestors. In these cases, time and distance factors become more important (Meyer, 
1981 cited in Cox et al 1987:58) as the distance between the officer and protestors is closer because 
protestors are pushed back together into a small space and contained within police surrounding 
serials (line formations). This increases the likelihood of a type of physical altercation where the 
                                                          
194 The reason given to me on enquiry of a purchase to one of the main suppliers was that the equipment (here 
a NATO style helmet) 'could be used against the police', this despite my credentials as a criminologist and 
declaring that my reason was personal safety when undertaking fieldwork. 
195 Personal communication; Home Office, Public Order Unit. 
196 Telephone Interview: Dr Rajiv Singh, Consultant in Rehabilitation Medicine - Acute Brain Injury Pathway 
and Head Injury Clinic, Sheffield Teaching Hospital, Sheffield. 
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officer’s ability to plan strategy is reduced, seeing them act rapidly, whilst having their own 
movements restricted by forming part of the police serial (including officers directly behind them). 
Cox et al (1985, cited in Cox et al 1987:58) earlier study argues that reducing time and distance 
factors sees a reliance on reverting to previously learned motor behaviours (prior to police training) 
such as 'clubbing', and striking at a person's head, including in an 'uncontrolled manner'.  The same 
authors also argue that police batons have the potential to cause serious and diffuse injuries to the 
head and the face (with the skeletal structures of the face being less structurally sturdy than 
neurocranial bones and therefore more prone to serious injury - this would also hold for shield 
strikes). The neck area has a lower impact threshold still, being highly susceptible to police impact 
weapons, more so if struck laterally (ibid, 1987:59-60). Whilst this is a complex area of clinical 
medicine as well as weapon design,197 the neuropsychologic evidence is clear that even mild brain 
injuries resulting from impact weapons "have the potential to create important losses for 
defendants and serious liability problems for police agencies" (ibid, 1987:60). Interestingly, having 
had even mild brain injury greatly compounds the cumulative nature of susceptibility (Gronwall & 
Wrightson, 1975, cited in Cox et al 1987:60). So those with a history of previous mild brain injury 
impairs the brains ability to recover from any future injury.  
Similarly, Heitzman (2010:405) found that the total number of blows to the head is significantly 
correlated with later executive deficits and emotional problems. This means that those who have 
experienced previous injuries in the past are more vulnerable to brain injury from any repeated 
exposure. Rather obviously such a vulnerability is not apparent to those riot police delivering blows 
and even when a protestor is bloodied with a recent head wound. As the authors note, the public 
have a very limited understanding of concussion and consequential underestimation of mild brain 
injuries ('hidden brain injuries'). This means different people will have differing degrees of 
susceptibility to the effects of head injury, one which is not available by any kind of observation. 
This is important because no officer would know about such susceptibility. The essential policy 
lesson and the practice implications are all clear, they should work to prevent officers from striking 
a protestors head in any confrontation situation, as Cox et al (1987:60-61) stress, "Important ethical 
considerations must be addressed, since it can be demonstrated with important degrees of 
certainty that head trauma from blunt instruments includes injuries ranging from death to social 
and physiological dysfunctioning." Indeed, even for the police batons appear dangerous, writing 
from a US perspective, Andrews et al (2009) report that the highest rate of officer injury sustained 
during police training (over a two-year period) pertained to baton drills and unarmed defence 
                                                          
197 There are a number of forces that need to be taken into account here, including the relative gravity of the 
baton, as well as the force applied and the direction from where the blow comes.  
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training. 198 
According to Bindman's Solicitors199 who prepared a dossier of evidence on protestor injuries 
caused by police violence from over 200 complaints they had received as a direct result of 
Operation Glencoe, over twenty related to head injuries from police violence (both baton blows, 
shield strikes and being punched in the face). This included two women claim to have been "pinned 
together" and hit repeatedly on their heads and arms with riots shields being struck whilst on the 
ground. My own observations of the G20 protests similarly saw protestors being struck with batons 
and shield (and punches) to the head and face. Whilst the true number is ultimately unknown, the 
propensity for police officers to direct baton blows to red areas is not an isolated incident in 'public 
order policing' the most notorious case was that of Blair Peach, who was struck and killed by a TSG 
officer by a baton blow to the head. Despite this fatality, it did not result in outlawing this practice. 
Of the few other documented examples in this sparse literature can be found from injuries 
sustained during the 'May Day Riots' (in 2001) and subsequent treatment at the University College 
London Hospital. Writing in the British Journal of Oral and Maxillofacial Surgery recounting their 
documented examples the consultants note that 15 persons had sustained maxillofacial (the jaw 
and facial area) injuries. Typically, this was a laceration that required closure (and one broken nose) 
however, three individuals had reported loss of consciousness and two required admissions for 
neurological observations post head injury. All of these injuries had been sustained from being 
struck by a police baton to the face and jaw area by riot police officers.  
Blunt force head traumas appear to be a feature of public order policing and this is one by design, 
not accident. It was these pre-mediated tactical choices of increasingly using enclosure, 
segmentation and containment by the authorities, irrespective of the high level of violence required 
to maintain them, which acted to neutralise the tactical summit repertoire of the protestors. 
Containment by kettling relies on channelling and incapacitating protestor’s mobility and fluidity, if 
necessary, through brutal force. Police kettling (although by no means exclusively) provides salient 
conditions for excessive police violence and abuse. That blows by batons are directed to the head, 
facial and neck areas are especially worrying when one examines the neurological evidence.  
Clearly where protestors are struck is a very important issue, and as I have been arguing is one 
important metric in judging excessive force. Despite its centrality to this critical question, it is never 
raised in any of the inquiry reports. This is a serious oversight. Whilst HMICs (2009a:58) report does 
discuss at some length 'use of force' and its many 'distraction techniques' (including using here 
'baton skills') and claims that "All the techniques used have been the subject of independent 
                                                          
198  Equating to more than two thirds of all injuries, including bruises, sprains and strains. 
199 Personal correspondence with author, Bindman's solicitors. 
Page 220 of 407 
 
medical review" citing its (2007) Safety Matters report. On closer inspection this is less than clear as 
there is no explicit discussion of whom the 'medical experts' are in Safety Matters. We are only 
offered the same promissory note by way of a vague appeal to an unspecified authority; that these 
assessments of police non-lethal weapons remain in line with the 'most current medical opinion' 
(HMIC, 2007:16). Moreover, my review of the (admittedly scant) medical evidence is at odds with 
HMICs, and identifies the very real dangers of protestors being struck in the head. This points to re-
defining batons are lethal weapons. 
What is also absent here is any discussion of individual officer culpability but also motive. Mens rea 
and officer motivation are simply a blind spot in the analysis and discussion of remedy which would 
involve bringing into view the toughening of supervision and disciplinary sanctions. I maintain that 
Operation Glencoe saw several ‘police riots’, where police violence took the form of ‘backstage 
punishment’, not as MPS claims, in response to physical provocation from protestors. This is a form 
of informal punishment for those seen as defying police authority (see for instance Chevigny, 1995; 
Van Maanen, 1978; Westley, 1970) and is exacerbated in kettling situations because as Reicher 
(2011) has argued, the crowd tend to be viewed by the police as an undifferentiated mass of 
troublemakers. Both kettling and public order policing more generally provides ample opportunity 
for officers to hand out ‘street justice’ to disrespectful citizens (Criminal Justice Commission 1997 
cited in Chan, 2000:89) who are defined as ‘deserving wrong-doers’ (Skolnick & Fyfe, 1993). This is 
to expose the morally expressive nature of police violence as punishment, one which can take the 
form of summary justice, exemplified by the police assault on Ian Tomlinson (discussed below) as 
one among many.  
This brings into view a further major omission of the reports. Absent is any discussion of police 
occupational culture which is a core cause of situationally influenced police violence at protest 
events. The wider research literature on police occupational culture200 shows that its conception of 
justice ‘deviates considerably’ from that expressed in criminal law (Chan, 2000:91). Attention in 
HMICs report is limited to the managerial culture of police organisation, which is distinctly different 
from the occupational culture of street officers.  None of the reports show a sufficient grasp of this 
insight, and are too easily persuaded by reassurances in regard to the effectiveness of police 
policies. As a US Task Force (2001:11–12) set up to examine police violence aptly stated; 
“Organizational culture eats policy for lunch. Any law enforcement organization can make great 
rules and policies that emphasize the guardian role, but if policies conflict with the existing culture, 
                                                          
200 In using the term ‘police occupational culture’, I do not mean to suggest that police culture is monolithic 
and unchanging across agencies and jurisdictions, rather I am drawing on some of the key principles from the 
research literature. 
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they will not be institutionalized and behaviour will not change. In police work, the vast majority of 
an officer’s work is done independently outside the immediate oversight of supervisor.” 
Neither was any efforts made by any of the police forces involved in Operation Glencoe to identify 
those officers using these shield tactics and to discipline them. This is a logical collorary of wrong-
doing, yet all of the inquiry reports are silent on this specific issue.  
7.8 Critical blind-spots: complicity in police wrong-doing 
One recurrent question in the policing of the G20 is the complicit role of fellow police officers to 
fellow officer malpractice, aggression and unlawful behaviour. From my partial observations of the 
G20 demonstrations, and from the official reports and scholarly literature, there is no evidence of 
any fellow officer acting to control or even challenge what appears to be clear instances of fellow 
other officer malpractice. In some instances this involves a judgement call, notably the justifiability 
of force being used, but other police actions are more clear cut, such as side shield strikes and not 
wearing ID, or as was the case for some, deliberately covering ID so as not to be identifiable or 
removing it altogether. This is not a pedantic point as all officers have a legal and professional 
responsibility (as outlined in their 'professional standards' codes of practice) as well as a moral one, 
to these types of report cases, indeed, keeping people safe, including protestors is a central role to 
the professed police mission if we judge it on this basis? Reporting transgressions is also a 
requirement of their role, it is not a discretionary one. There are ample opportunities to do this 
during the operation, by bringing the issue to the attention of a senior officer (i.e. a Sergeant) in the 
unit, or failing that, to challenge the individual officer themselves. There are also reporting 
mechanisms, including anonymous reporting systems available after the operation has taken place 
in order to bring alleged malpractice to the attention of superior officers. This issue receives little 
attention in any of the reports, and when it is raised (by police spokespeople in oral testimony) it is 
only deployed as a reassurance device to reiterate this reporting requirement as a professional 
standard for all police officers in order to quell any disquiet in the panel ('be reassured police officers 
are required to report other officer’s malpractice').  
It is instructive to consider the details of two cases where a prosecution was sought against officers 
during Operation Glencoe. Ian Tomlinson was a 47-year-old passer-by who had been making his 
way home from work through the G20 demonstrations, but was confronted with a group of 
Territorial Support Group (TSG) officers. He was struck from behind to his upper thigh (whilst his 
hands were in his pockets) from a baton by a tall, powerfully built TSG officer (Simon Harwood). 
Moments later Harwood rushes forward and using both hands violently shoves Tomlinson in the 
back, sending him sprawling to the ground. Later, it was reported that one member of the public 
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had provided a statement describing how the crowd had 'gasped' 'at the horrific sound of Tomlinson 
hitting the ground.201 Directly behind Harwood is a phalanx of other TSG officers who witness these 
two offences. Tomlinson then sits on the floor, momentarily dazed, and remonstrates with the 
officer who hesitates, then leaves him to be helped up by several demonstrators. After the assault, 
Harwood strolls over and has a casual chat with his superior. As Reicher (2011:8) also notes, there is 
no sign of reprimand, everything seems to be entirely reputable and normal as far as the senior 
officers are concerned, as is the case with other accompanying fellow officers who continue on their 
way. None of the other officers in this group assist Tomlinson in any way, they don't help him up, or 
reprimand Harwood, they nonchalantly walk on by. What happens next is of course well known, 
moments after, Tomlinson stopped responding to questions, collapsed and mysteriously died. 
Trained police medics later in attendance were unable to revive Tomlinson.  
A second graphic case which came to prominence was that of Nicola Fisher, who on the following 
day was attending a heavily policed vigil for Tomlinson, when she was slapped and struck by a 
baton. This scene sees "a tall, powerful officer, his identifying numbers covered in tape, first 
delivering an insouciant slap across the face to a diminutive woman protestor and then, with great 
deliberation, swiping her legs with his truncheon" (Reicher, 2011:6). Again, what is of note here is 
not the casual derision of the individual culprit but the behaviour of the surrounding officers. None 
of the other officers express any shock, surprise or even disapproval to these actions which occur 
right in front of them.  
Whilst both of these events received extensive coverage by the news media, official bodies and 
academics, but despite this most of the commentary (with the exception of Reicher, 2011) have 
omitted any consideration of complicity. Of course, there would be many other such examples of 
this complicity, I have just raised two prominent cases amongst many. As Graeber (2009:160) has 
noted in discussing police protestor conflict during summits, in any major protest action one is 
confronted by hundreds of things going on at the same time, and it is challenging to grasp even a 
fraction of what is occurring; "Major events might be happening twelve feet away—behind a wall, 
under an escarpment—of which you have absolutely no idea; at least, until much later, when you 
start to synthesize accounts." 
None of the official inquiry reports pick up on this issue of fellow officer complicity and questions of 
resulting liability, rather they are simply assuaged by what is misleadingly testimony from police 
spokespeople or in the other reports the issue is never raised. None ask an obvious question; how 
                                                          
201 Carey, J. (2013, August 12th) 'The Ian Tomlinson case shows why the police cannot investigate themselves', 
Guardian Newspaper. 
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many misconduct allegations or reports (written or oral) were made against the conduct of fellow 
police officers (or other police ‘family members’) during Operation Glencoe? My own Freedom of 
Information request into this (and associated matters) constitutes a substantive finding in my 
research. The answer is no officer made any such report,202 despite all the many instances of officers 
not wearing identification, hiding their identification, using excessive force, using forbidden 
methods to attack protestors with (despite their training) no officer felt it necessary to report any 
such malpractices. This includes the wider 'police family' and the many senior officers who carried 
specific responsibilities for maintaining police discipline and conduct. This issue of complicity opens 
up the question of whether and how one should respond to culpable conduct of the wider social 
group, as well as raising further questions in respect of the inaction of the police and CPS in 
attributing collective guilt. The law of joint enterprise has been expanded over recent years in the 
UK against those involved in political protest,203  as well as the inclusive areas of secondary liability 
in respect of a group of offences such as riot, affray and violent disorder (Wells & Quick, 2010:336) 
but has not been applied to state actors. Thus far my argument is that the kettling operations at the 
Bank of England and the Climate camp constituted what Stark (1972) has termed a 'police riot'. 
Moreover, the cases of Tomlinson and Fisher are suggestive of wider secondary liability. Whilst it is 
a complex and growing area of law, joint enterprise holds that a secondary party can be held liable 
for the actions of the principle offender (as a secondary assessory) where they have 'common 
purpose' (i.e. aided, abetted, encouraged, provoked) thus; "participation in a joint criminal 
enterprise with foresight or contemplation is sufficient to impose criminal liability for that act 
carried out by another participant in the enterprise" (Wells & Quick, 2010:325). Whilst the Law 
Commission has more recently (arguably) narrowed the scope of secondary liability, the issue is 
whether the accompanying officers, in the act of not reporting what could plausibly be offences, 
assisted or encouraged the offence and intended that the conduct element should be perpetrated. 
It also raises the issue of whether police officers’ current positive obligation in law to report fellow 
officer illegality and malpractice, which as I have demonstrated is (at least at times at least and in 
respect of serious violence) inoperative, should result in a lower level of secondary culpability to 
strengthen the general deterrent value which is currently lacking.  Whilst this is a striking finding, it 
does support the wider scholarly literature regards the police 'operational code' (Beigel & Beigel, 
1977) or 'blue code of silence' concerning police use of violence. Policing is characterised by 
fraternity, kinship and inclusion, with membership inferring belonging to the powerful, 'the biggest 
gang in town' (Punch, 2009:184).  
                                                          
202 Author FOI (No. 2009050000552) to MPS. 
203 Most notably in targeting those associated in 'gang' violence. 
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It is notable that the MPA (2010:15) report is the only report which questions the current disciplinary 
and sanctions regime in respect of the G20 policing. No doubt this reflects its greater degree of 
independence, although the recommendations appears in diluted form (the need for appropriate 
supervision and sanctions in place to deter officers from behaving unprofessionally during protests) 
this despite regarding it is "a key area where lessons could be learned." As the MPA (2010:15) 
authors note, HMIC's own inspection Adapting to Protest "did not consider supervision in any detail". 
This is perhaps a case of diplomatic language, as the HMIC reports produce no findings and offer no 
recommendations which are even suggestive of the need to scrutinise the current supervision or 
sanctions regime. Considering the nature of the events to which HMIC were inquiring into, this 
constitutes an extraordinary omission, although not an unsurprising one (as I have outlined in 
discussing HMIC's independence deficit). More so still when the earlier (pre-G20) JCHR (2009) 
Demonstrating Respect for Human Rights? A human rights approach to policing protest report also 
questioned if police contracts and disciplinary procedures pay sufficient recognition to the duty of 
officers to act compatibly with human rights.  
7.9 Not Accounting for One's Actions:  
Klockers (1996:13) has argued that to minimise police use of force (violence) requires any police 
agency to do three things; to monitor its use of force, evaluate the skill in its use, and educate 
officers in its skilled use. This means collecting information on every occasion where force is used 
that produces injury, especially those using police equipment such as batons and shields which can 
result in considerable physical harm to anyone on the receiving end.  
The UK police already do the first of these, as officers have a requirement to record any use of force 
information in a 'use of force log book'.204 HMIC (2009b:193) states "Police should record all uses of 
force, setting out the exact circumstances which led the police to use force and the nature of the 
force used" and this point is reiterated in the HAC (2009) report, one  mobilised by police 
spokespeople to evidence accountability mechanisms sitting at the heart of police use of force. 
There was a much cited passage relied on by successive police spokespeople in oral testimony, and 
one reiterated in the other inquiry reports, namely; "Every officer is accountable under law and fully 
aware of the scrutiny that their actions can be held open to. The decision to use force is made by the 
individual police officer, and they must account for that."  
                                                          
204 These are small booklets which contains standard information (date, time, location etc.) on the details of 
the type and amount of force used for every use of force incident, it also includes a sketch outline diagram of a 
person for the officer to draw upon to locate where a person was struck and any details of injuries sustained as 
a result of police action, as well as the context of the incident and any witness information. This record is also 
a legal document.  
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Whilst it needs to be remembered that the police are skilled at writing accounts of incidents in a 
way which does not infer excessive force or some other malpractice,205 if completed accurately, this 
still results in an audit trail which routinely records incidents. If completed, this supplies an 
important insight into any individual officer's use of force record, and one capable of flagging 
potential 'problem officers' that may be using excessive force. When linked to an early intervention 
system which can include other datum,206 this can increase police accountability and reduce 
instances of police excessive force (Walker, 2005). The importance of such procedures lies in the 
considerable evidence which documents police officers with 'performance problems' who are 
readily identifiable on the basis of the types of records (Walker, 2005:100).  
It is a notable finding from this research that MPS did not undertake any review process of these use 
of force log books (see Appendix 6 which displays a copy of MPSs Evidence and Action Book) , nor do 
they for public order policing events more generally.207 This means that neither the direct line 
manager (on the day) nor anyone in the wider organisation examines any of the log books which are 
submitted as a routine record of police force used. This does rather detract from the police's much 
cited claim that "Every officer is accountable under law and fully aware of the scrutiny that their 
actions can be held open to" [my emphasis]. This is not a routine scrutiny, not only in respect of the 
individual police operation, but more generally over their entire career. The only instances of the log 
books being 'scrutinised' is on those rare occasions when a civil or criminal case is taken against an 
officer and the log book is requested as evidence. The Harwood case is instructive here, as he had a 
history of complaints about repeatedly using excessive force (all but one of which were 'unproven') 
although the Met attempted to unsuccessfully hide this disciplinary record at the pre-trial hearings 
on spurious privacy grounds "Disciplinary records concern the private employment data of an 
individual."208 This is a further example of systematic ambiguity at the level of rule systems and 
organisational structure. The police log books appear to function more as a ‘presentational rule’ 
where the policing organisation can proclaim existence and abeyance of formal rules (all officers 
record their use of force and hence their behaviour is scrutinised and accountable) whilst leaving 
ample space for officers to follow their working rules which divulge from them. It has the merit of 
                                                          
205 For instance, see Alpert (2004) who found that those on the receiving end of police use of force had a 
different view from that recorded by officers in official reports, including being subjected to a higher level of 
force, including excessive force, than that recorded. Alpert, GP. & Dunham, RG. (2004) Understanding Police 
Use of Force: Officers, Suspects, and Reciprocity, Cambridge University Press. 
206 Most obviously records of citizen complaints against the officer, but they can include other 'performance 
data' (Walker, 2005:101-2).  
207 Author FOI (No. 2009050000552) to MPS. 
208 Lewis, P. (2012 July 20th) 'Tomlinson case: Met police tried to hide PC Harwood's disciplinary record', 
Guardian newspaper. 
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accommodating the police solution to the Dirty Harry problem, with police managers remaining 
distant, forsaking the opportunity to enquire into what could be discreditable events. 
7.10 Interim Conclusion 
It is rare indeed for a statutory body to conduct an investigation into any 'public order' policing 
operation in the UK, and to require answers about operational decision making and police tactics 
from the police themselves, rarer still for there to be five such of these exercises (notwithstanding 
their variable remits). That development goes some way to demonstrate the seriousness of the 
legitimacy crisis British policing was facing from the public outcry having seen images of what at 
times more closely resembled a 'police riot', to borrow Rodney Stark's (1972) apt phrase.  
The reports make for fascinating reading, and despite the considerable combined length, they are 
revealing in terms of how protest groups are viewed by the  police, as well as disclosing the policing 
plan that was in store for many protestors (which would have otherwise remained concealed). 
Unfortunately the reports starting point is all too frequently to rehearse a number of cherished 
myths about British policing (political neutrality, fairness, only employing minimum force, etc.) with 
HMIC being the most serious offender here, although it is characteristic of all. This is an ideological 
position, not one borne from an observation of events, policing tactics or police and protestor 
interactions on the ground.  
My analysis of the report findings shows only muted criticism of the police and the wider policing 
operation. More generally, the core police account (official violence as provoked by or as a response 
to protestor violence, never as active or as initiating, or resulting from police tactics such a kettling) 
is accepted uncritically. I have provided a number of explanations as to why this is, central being my 
interrogation of the bogus claims to 'independence' by the respective bodies - although this is found 
to be most wanting by the HMIC authors - being the primary body to effect change to police 
practice and policy. I find this independence claim to be deeply flawed, both conceptually and 
empirically, something which becomes apparent when one drills down into the make-up of the 
bodies and its incumbent 'ideological plumbing' (Scraton, 2002:3). Other explanations involve no 
small amount of 'semantic engineering' by police witnesses giving testimony, along with ineptitude 
and obsequiousness on behalf of the inquisitors. 
My study of Operation Glencoe evidences a number of serious concerns in respect to the complicit 
role of fellow police officers to fellow officer malpractice, aggression and unlawful behaviour. Whilst 
fellow officers have a mandatory obligation to report any other officer's malpractice and 
misconduct, none did (not their immediate supervising officers, their fellow officers standing beside 
them, any of the wider 'police family', or senior officers observing events from their command and 
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control room or from the helicopter with its helecam, or indeed any CCTV control room operatives) 
(obtained from my own extensive and protracted Freedom of Information requests) (see also 
Appendix 13.3). This is in the face of many instances of officers not wearing identification, hiding 
their identification, using excessive force, using forbidden methods to attack protestors with 
(despite their training). This was the case for the entire Operation Glencoe, which also subsumes 
the high profile cases of the killing of Ian Tomlinson, and also the case involving Nicola Fisher. 
Moreover, none of the official inquiry reports pick up on this issue of fellow officer complicity and 
questions of resulting liability. 
My research also identifies serious failings with the current system of police use of force overnight 
mechanisms, finding that this functions merely as a performative rule. It is one which allows senior 
officers to present the veneer of robust oversight procedures whilst disguising their wilful blindness.   
Whilst officers are required to record all use of force incidents in their log books (See Appendix  6  
for a blank copy of the document - 'Evidence and Actions Book') there is no review process of these 
official documents (nor does this occur for public order policing events more generally).209 If an 
officer is safe in the knowledge that no-one will, even in the most perfunctory manner,  review these 
official records, the accountability for using force that they are supposed to carry is surely negated. 
Like the absence of fellow officer reporting of officer malpractice and misconduct, this systemic 






                                                          
209 Author FOI (No. 2009050000552) to MPS. 
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Chapter 8: The Lead up to the 2014 NATO Summit Protests  
8.1 Introduction 
The 26th North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) Summit met in September 2014 on the 
outskirts of Newport, in south Wales, at the five star Celtic Manor 'golf and spa resort hotel.' The 
summit brought with it a series of firsts for such events, each of which populated press headlines: 
the most costly summit 'security operation' in British history (originally underestimated at over £50 
million)210; the largest policing operation in British history (seeing some 9,500 police officers drafted 
in from 27 different forces and boosted by an unspecified number of military personnel, security 
services and foreign secret service personnel); the world's biggest ever installation of temporary 
'security fencing' (at over 12 miles); a considerable military presence (armed troops assigned to the 
manor, six warships in the bay of Cardiff) and an enormous no fly zone (stretching from Bristol to 
the east to Brigend in the west, Crickhowell in the north and the Somerset cost in the south); all 
assembled for the 'biggest ever gathering of world leaders in Britain'.  
The approach taken by the police and authorities was not to allow protestors anywhere near the 
summit site or the Cardiff venue, all of which were protected by mass fortifications and an 
overwhelming security presence. Despite these elaborate and costly preparations, the anticipated 
mass protests never occurred, in part I argue, due to extensive 'protest avoidance' strategies 
undertaken by the authorities.  In the following discussion I identify and critique the burgeoning 
security apparatus revealed by the summit and examine the dialectical interplay of resistance and 
restriction, adaption and reaction, between the beleaguered activist groups and their opulently 
resourced policing adversaries. These police and security state tactics, and their interaction with 
protestors has not been adequately explored (Zajko & Beland, 2008:722). Unlike the G20 summit, 
the majority of these techniques of control did not involve direct violent repression but were 
subtler, relying on manipulating people, space and geography, with the states coercive arm always 
in view and at the ready.  
The summit resulted in momentous modifications to multi-use public settings spanning entire areas 
of Cardiff and Newport and considerable disruption and inconveniences to local people. Despite this 
imposition resembling a form of 'paranoid urbanism' it only animated occasional tensions between 
some protestor groups and the authorities, it did not result in any significant overt conflict with local 
people despite considerable encroachment and curtailment of their liberties. I unpick the reasons 
for this which in part also explains the general lack of support for the protest movements 
                                                          
210 It should be noted that this was not the most expensive security operation for a 'mega-event', which was 
the London Olympics, dwarfing all other events at approximately £1 billion (Rogers & Blight, 2012) although 
the original price had been quoted at £213 million. 
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throughout the summit. I show that the authorities have innovated tactically in their pre-emptive 
community management strategies since the G20, all of which allowed them to win the 'hearts and 
minds' of many local people as well as appropriating local elites. I decipher some of the new 
frontiers that characterise these pre-emptive efforts, including adopting multi-dimensional 
counter-insurgency practices in addition to the more established procedure of shrewd site selection 
and timing. Other procedures which proved effective was a superficial charm offensive in many of 
the presentational aspects of policing on the streets as well as some elements of the summit. 
Saturation level policing was repackaged into a 'safeguarding' mantra, using friendly smiling police 
personnel. This acted to privilege the facilitative whilst disguising the intended repressive functions, 
an attractive fabrication able to draw on cherished myths about community policing which 
frequently 'won over' local people. In contrast to the authorities calculated tactical shifts, the more 
transgressive protestors failed to sufficiently adapt or innovate, remaining insular, with their own 
counter-measures towards police spying also impairing their effectiveness. Other wider national 
and international developments (re fear of terrorism and resurgent NATO anti-Russian propaganda) 
acted to shift public political consciousness away from protestors critical perspectives and deprive 
them of a fertile recruitment base to draw upon. This difficult political  
Map 4:Showing Newport and Cardiff Sites and their Situation Within South Wales 
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terrain was also exacerbated by the transgressive wings ideological and organisational impediments 
to engage with opportunities offered from mainstream media to propagate their cause. What is 
distinctive from examining the NATO summit is how the state's role in social control of political 
dissent blurs traditional divides such as military/policing, national/international, overt/covert, one 
which targets the entire population and more closely resembles Low Intensity Operations (LIO).  
8.2 The Development of the NATO Summit Protest 
Prior to the summit commencement, protest websites, including local anti-military groups 
(branches of Stop The War Coalition, CND, Stop NATO Cyrmu, and anti-arms trade groups) and 
loosely connected anarchist and student groups (posting on Indymedia websites) were keen to 
amplify the event and their opposition to NATO. Tensions with Russia over Crimea and the prospect 
of a new cold war as well as the ongoing conflict in Afghanistan appeared to make the summit an 
obvious goal for popular protest. A series of public meetings were held in Bristol211 and 
Birmingham212 to rally support for the planned 'week of action' before and during the summit. This 
can be seen as a type of expansive 'scalar strategy' (Leitner et al., 2007:160) in turning the local 
(Newport) event into a regional and national movement to advance the anti-NATO cause. These 
were led by established groups with some high profile speakers in attendance.213 Despite these 
efforts organisers appeared to struggle against the prevailing political climate and in their efforts at 
'frame-bridging' NATO as constituting a sufficiently important issue of wide concern to attract large 
scale protests. 
Activist groups had announced three main focal points of protest: a march through Newport on 
Saturday 30th August (some five days before the summit) a 'march on the manor' on the first day of 
the summit and a 'counter-summit' hosted over the following three days (each discussed further 
below). Sparse details had been released of the official summit schedule, except that almost all of 
the events were to take place within the secure grounds of the Celtic Manor, the exception being a 
dinner at Cardiff castle on the second day. Not that this last detail needed announcing, as 
fortifications had been underway in both cities weeks in advance. In Cardiff it appeared that the 
walls of the ancient castle and the largest policing operation in the country's history were deemed 
inadequate as a defensive measure against the official bogeymen of 'terrorism' and protestors. The 
more transgressive wing of activists, some of whom attended the earlier mentioned Bristol and 
Birmingham meetings, were also planning more autonomous protest actions, some of whom 
voiced their rejection of holding negotiations with the police (NATO, fieldnotes).  
                                                          
211 'Bristol Says No To NATO' 
212 Birmingham Says No To NATO' 
213 Jeremy Corbyn, who was then a backbench Labour MP spoke at the Bristol event. 
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In contrast to the earlier 2009 G20 summit, Gwent Police, at least publicly, had appeared to 
downplay the likelihood of protestor 'trouble', although they had stated they were ready to deal 
with 'any impromptu' protests that might take place. This media line belied the reality on the 
ground though, where the pre-event preparations anticipated mass disorder. There was an 
expectation from official police sources, one periodically recounted in the media, that the 
authorities were expecting some twenty thousand protestors over the course of the three days. As 
it turned out, no such scale of protestor numbers were ever forthcoming, indeed on my estimates 
(reinforced by numerous media reports of the main protest marches) they struggled at best to 
marshal a tenth of this number. Even if this upper figure had been realised, it would still have 
resulted in a 1:2 ratio of police to protestors. As it turns out, there was considerably more police 
than protestors, approximately an 8:1 police (available) to protestor ratio for the event. The official 
justification for the size of the 'security operation' avoided reference to any such ratios, presumably 
preferring not to open a can of worms in favour of the eminently more flexible (and unfalsifiable) 
retort of 'safeguarding' delegates, local people and protestors' alike. 
8.3 Securing Distant Places 
The authorities enjoy many distinct advantages when it comes to forging spaces of social control, 
chief among these involves selecting the location for the summit and its timing. This allows them to 
strategise against previously successful protestor tactics such as decentralised blockading by 
selecting sites which are hard to reach, sparsely populated, and easily defensible (Starr et al, 2011; 
Scholl, 2012). These extensive spatial preparations were very much in evidence at the NATO 
summit, indeed more than any of the other case study sites. Site selection is just one of several 
methods where the authorities engineer 'protest avoidance' strategies in order to dwindle the scale 
of social mobilisation (Zajko & Beland, 2008). As activists choose to confront summit meetings 
spatially (as opposed to other methods such as by media, or by general education) a now well 
established process of fortification and an overwhelming security presence makes protest near the 
site practically impossible. Electing a midweek daytime schedule further frustrates the efforts of 
social movements in building alliances between diverse groups and individuals for mass collective 
action. Coinciding the summit with people's work and other commitments purposely drains the 
network of actual and potential dissenters.  
8.3.1 'The Celtic Manor'' Site 
The five star 'Celtic Manor Resort Hotel'  lay some two miles outside of Newport, in South Wales 
(see map 1 above and 2 below. As one interviewed local political representative noted when 
describing the choice of destination for the summit: 
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'It's an imposing building, stationed on a hill overlooking nearby Newport. But its better known 
to us locals as 'Colditz' due to its uncanny architectural resemblance to its namesake. It's  a 
very  masculine  building you see  [...] Matter of fact it was  designed from its very inception to 
enable high security measures to be put in place, and it's also quite off the beaten track. I've no 
doubts that is why it was chosen [for the NATO summit] [...] The owner is also very well 
politically connected, so he's known in all the right circles. That's part of it to, he knows all the 
right people. He's trusted you see ... (Telephone interviewee, Local Representative SW02). 
Over the three days of the summit 'the manor' did indeed take on many aspects of that prisoner of 
war camp, not to keep the incumbents in but to keep everyone else out. 'The Manor's' geographical 
defence comes from being surrounded by two thousand acres of parkland sitting four miles outside 
of Newport and bisected by the M4 motorway to the south and the river Usk to the north (see map 
2 below).   
Map 5: The NATO Summit Location at the Celtic manor Resort Hotel and Surrounding Area 
 
This meant the site only needed to be secured from two sides, the east and west. Despite these 
natural defences, immense fortification effort at exorbitant costs were still undertaken. The 
authorities enacted a near complete closure of the summit venue, with private contractors building 
a 'wall of steel' around the Celtic Manor grounds as well as the only two other venues delegates 
would visit. The luxury Celtic Manor hotel stands in contrast to the high levels of deprivation in 
nearby Newport, indeed many locals never considered 'the manor' to be part of Newport at all. 
Page 233 of 407 
 
'Newport people don't really consider 'The Manor' to be part of Newport. Not really (sic). It's all 
quite posh, and it's too far out, it's not part of the city to most of us.'[...] They keep saying it's in 
Newport, but it's not, not if it's there. (Telephone interviewee, Local Representative SW01). 
The official 'media centre' was also located in the grounds of Celtic Manor214 one of the many 
'restricted areas' at the summit venue open to accredited videographers and photographers under 
'escort'. Journalists spent much of their time in this security bubble, being shuttled by official buses 
from the designated media hotels to the co-located Accreditation Office and media entrance point 
at the Hilton hotel. This tactic of embedding journalists within the restricted areas further distances 
mainstream media from any dissenting voices left out on its exterior.  
Picture 10: Part of the 'Ring of Steel' Fencing Bisecting Space Between the Summit Grounds 
and the M4 Motorway (Closing off One Lane of the M4) 
 
The authorities need to strike a balance though, between presenting access obstacles for protestors 
but not so that they face insurmountable logistic issues for delegates. For these reasons the hotel's 
proximity to Junction 24 of the M4, and being close to Cardiff airport for international visitors, and 
its few access road into the site, added to its desirability. Extensive road closures were also 
instigated, officially this was to allow delegates speedier access to the venue, but effectively it 
meant previous public rights of way became private roads for the exclusive use of VIPs, their 
entourages and  attendant security.  
                                                          
214 Ministry of Defence https://www.gov.uk/guidance/nato-summit-wales-2014-operational-information-for-
media 
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8.3.2 Finding fallow ground in site selection 
The nearest protest camp (a 'peace camp) had to be established some six and a half miles away at 
Tredegar Park, and three miles from Newport centre, after local objections to a more central green 
space prevailed at a public meeting. This brings into view another criterion for selecting this area of 
South Wales, not only was the summit hotel difficult to access and easy to defend, but it is located 
in a region where many of the local population were not supportive of protestor’s activities, 
including anti-NATO protestors. From my observations this was evident from the sheer strength of 
local feeling at a public meeting, which saw over a hundred people attend to object to protestors 
establishing a peace camp on Council owned green space near a community centre in the Pill area 
of the city: 
Aug 12th: Well attended public meeting held in sports centre (n=110+), mostly local 
residents who live in adjacent properties and nearby. Appear largely hostile to the planned 
‘No NATO' activists using the park as a 'peace camp'. No headway being made by activists. 
Lots of objections cited during meeting, lots of people wanting to make points but the 
implicit undertone orientates on locals disapproving of and fearing large numbers of people 
(not local to the area) staying there, and concern over 'trouble' (stated multiple times during 
meeting) resulting from any sort of protest, as well as leaving the playing fields out of use, 
then and later (due to mess and clear up required). (NATO fieldnotes) 
Generally speaking, residents are constantly questioning that the 'peace camp' is going to 
be 'peaceful' ... [I'm overhearing this concern throughout] clearly this is not how the 
proposed encampment is being perceived. People are raising practical issues around the 
suitability of the park for such a camp, but it is this larger concern which appears to occupy 
people's minds. (NATO, fieldnotes)   
A series of rumours had been in play for sometime, one of which was that one thousand tents were 
going to be pitched on the playing fields for the peace camp. Understandably, this and other similar 
rumours had alarmed some local people who occupied the rows of small terraced properties 
buttressing all around the park. However, it was the larger issue of who the people would be which 
was what seemed to animate the concern. As one local at the meeting stated after the meeting: 
Resident: We don't want it, it's as simple as that, you're going to have people coming down 
here starting problems .. and we don't want it.' 
Interviewer: 'What problems'? 
Resident: 'All sorts of problems ... come on ... you know what their like. Things can get out of 
control.  And we want to use the park. I know I do. And how can I do that now, if this lot come?' 
(NATO fieldnotes)  
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This hostility to activists was also shared by many of the local political leaders in the ruling Labour 
party. By way of explanation, one local organiser described the political complexion of the local 
Labour party: 
'Well, they call themselves Labour, but they're not really, their 'blue' Labour. They are quite 
conservative. That's why they're  so complaint with all this ... they won't kick up a fuss, oh no...'  
[laughs]  (Telephone interview with local organiser, SW06) 
Much of the discussion at the meeting by representatives was framed in negative language, it took 
the form of 'mitigating the harms’ that any peace camp might impact locally, although a nod was 
given to the 'right to peaceful protest'. This interpretive framework was also picked up by the police, 
notably by Chris Armitt, the Gold Commander (and hence most senior officer for the NATO 
summit) who found time in his busy schedule to reinforce local people's concerns about the location 
of the proposed peace camp: 
'It's unfortunate, but it's a reality, that we can't prevent people from walking into a town 
anywhere in this country, and setting up a tent on a piece of public land. 215 
A Labour councillor who doubled as chair of ‘Pill Millennium Centre's Trust’, lead the objections to 
any camping taking place on the proposed Pill site. As she was aware, upholding such a bar 
effectively meant the peace camp could not proceed as activists would not be able to stay 
overnight.  
Neither were Newport Labour controlled council supportive of the camp at the new location either, 
sheer frustration saw protestors ending up having to threaten un-cooperative officials with 
contravening health and safety legislation in order to get them to unlock the shower facilities based 
in the park to be able to wash during the life of the camp. Eventually the council felt compelled to 
comply fearing prosecution. (NP04; NP05, NATO fieldnotes)  
The Local Labour MP had been more equivocal, 'flip-flopping' on the NATO summit, with the local 
CND putting pressure on him to oppose it, only for him to eventually come out in support.216  
'At first he was opposed to the NATO summit coming here, but, as the event got closer he 
changed, now he's in support, be it luke warm. He's completely flip-flopped on the issue.' 
(Telephone interview with local representative SW01)   
Overall there was little Labour party resistance to the NATO summit or its onerous security 
requirements being placed on local people and services. The Welsh Labour councillors and MPs 
generally ‘kept their heads down’ throughout, and complied with central governments wishes of 
                                                          
215 Armitt was interviewed by the BBC at the Manor Hotel: BBC News https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-wales-
south-east-wales-28745349 (accessed 12.8.2014). 
216 Telephone interview with local councillor (SW01; SW03) 
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championing the summit 'without much ado or fuss.'   (Telephone interview with local representative 
SW04)   
8.4 Total Policing 
Part of securitisation is about breaking previous bounds of political rules and procedures (which can 
take many forms) by using extraordinary means or emergency measures (Buzan et al., 1998:24-25). 
Not only was there a dramatic transformation to many public spaces in both Newport and Cardiff, 
but also to local services and institutions. Such extraordinary measures see the rules governing even 
some mandatory statutory services being repealed, for instance, compulsory state education is 
'suspended', contradicting the government's own stated policy regards the importance of school 
attendance. Some forty schools and nurseries in Newport closed for two days, others as far away as 
the Vale of Glamorgan were closed early due to local road closure to the public to allow their 
exclusive use for NATO and government personnel to travel more quickly to Celtic Manor. This 
included closing arterial roads through Cardiff city centre, causing significant disruption to local bus 
services, and instigating blanket no-parking zones for motorists. These previous public rights of way 
extended to pathways as well, and even preventing some local people from getting to work. Some 
critical infrastructure is curtailed (motorway capacity is reduced due to security fencing occupying 
an entire lane of the busy M4, and no fly zones are introduced banning aircraft). The usual charging 
rules for non-EEA nationals was also suspended under special powers by the Health Minister, with 
all delegates and VIPs to receive free 'emergency and necessary' healthcare on the Welsh NHS.217 
Other local critical infrastructure was simply commandeered as if the region were in a state of war. 
The usually busy (and closest) hospital accident and emergency unit closed for five days and was 
turned over for the exclusive use of delegates and the emergency services serving the NATO 
summit.218 Local people's cultural life was similarly suspended as the 'security measures' badly 
affected sporting fixtures. The local football team were unable to play for ten days at their home 
ground and the rugby team had to move their match elsewhere (with the site being occupied by 
decamping ranks of police officers). The leading university in Wales, Cardiff university, had its main 
entrance closed for two weeks, leaving it with no connection between its main buildings. In 
addition, entire areas of what had previously been public inner city space are sequestrated, 
                                                          
217 Health Minister Mark Drakeford, a position also backed by the shadow conservative Health Minister. 
Reported in Selby-WO, A. (2014, 8th July) 'World leaders at NATO summit will be treated for free on the 
Welsh NHS' Wales online http://www.walesonline.co.uk/news/wales-news/world-leaders-nato-summit-
treated-7384045 
218 Cardiff and Vale University Health Board’s statement tried to justify this extraordinary measure by 
downplaying its significance and emphasising that the closure as a “short-term measure” being taken to “help 
provide a triage and treat service in Cardiff city centre to support police and  ambulance services during the 
NATO Summit.” The health board stated it had already issued an apology to “anyone affected by these 
steps.” 
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including local landmarks and heritage sites, which were appropriated for the exclusive use of the 
visiting dignitaries (the entire Bute park is closed, as is Cardiff castle).  
What we see is how previous rules and procedures are violated by the security act, which breaks 
free of such rules, and whose governing logic is lifted above the haggling of everyday politics of 
place by a successful securitisation. At such summits securitisation has become institutionalised 
with its own formidable momentum. These procedures are legitimated through a security rhetoric 
and the politics of existential threat, a motivational foundation which escapes all public scrutiny. 
What warrants this (sic) threat profile and the scale of the security structures and expenditure are 
questions to which there is only official silence beyond the ubiquitous threat of terrorism.  
South Wales history of longstanding links to the British military also made it a desirable location for 
the authorities. Being a base for a number of UK military operations as well as a home to a sizeable 
chunk of the UK’s armaments, aerospace and ‘defence’ industry sector, leaving the ‘host’ 
population that much more amenable to pro-NATO messaging (discussed further below). 
Furthermore, the army is the seventh largest employer in Wales and there are a quarter of a million 
‘veterans’ living in Wales (Barclays, 2014:7). The ranks of those positively disposed to militarism 
grows further when one considers that the British Army has long strategically targeted young 
people from working class backgrounds and in deprived areas with low employment levels (despite 
official denials) specifically in Wales, including Cardiff (as well as some other northern cities).219 
These carefully crafted advertising messages seek out young men who are motivated to escape 
disadvantage and who are open to the deceptively stylised allure which falsely glamorises the 
serving soldiers life.220 The young, poor and naive are therefore targeted with positive military 
messages in schools and colleges, and advertising campaigns which take place across a host of 
youth based forums (such as local cinemas, television, bill-boards etc.) instigating pro-military 
attitudes. Militarism is thus more deeply embedded in some areas of the country than others, 
notably amongst the young. This hands a key advantage to the authorities early on at the summit 
planning stage. By carefully selecting their location based on its area profile they are able to dictate 
more or less challenging conditions for social movement organising. The authorities knew that 
south Wales would likely be less sympathetic to activists espousing an oppositional anti-military 
political culture, and they were right. 
                                                          
219 These practices were revealed in an MOD internal briefing document on the 'This is Belonging campaign' (a 
glossy army recruitment campaign) and despite MODs claims that  they target all socio-economic 
backgrounds. Reported in the Guardian newspaper (Morris, S. 2017, July 9th, 'British army is targeting 
working-class young people, report shows'. 
220 Ibid., 2017. 
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The clear implication from this is that the authorities investigate the local political culture and socio-
political history of an area as an important part of their site selection (other researchers studying 
summit protests in North America and other parts of Western Europe have also come to this 
conclusion, Starr et al., 2011:53). At the same time, little is known about the details of these data 
gathering activities, again, as with so much about what is loosely deemed security preparations for 
such events, these activities are in effect state secrets. Nevertheless, we can make some reasoned 
conjectures here. Within the UK context there is ample data available to them. The advent of local 
area based ‘tension monitoring’ is a sufficiently flexible institutional data gathering tool for these 
purposes and likely would be instituted in the advent of an international summit. Within this 
doctrine there is specific allowance for monitoring of ‘political extremism’, a vague and permissively 
defined category to which those favouring direct action tactics could be shoe horned into. Whilst 
these policies are squarely aimed at ‘community cohesion’ concerns, the terms of reference are 
similarly broad and pliable, such as understanding ‘local community dynamics’ which includes the 
equally amorphous 'public order' concerns finding its way in (Community and Local Government, 
2008). Thus were told, “Local tension monitoring may take specific account of activities by 
members of any political group which increase community tension” (Community and Local 
Government, 2008:24) and ‘local political situations’ and ‘local demonstrations’ can be constituted 
as exacerbating tensions (ICOC, 2010). This last point gains further traction when considering 
emergency planning preparations, specifically responsibilities under the Civil Contingencies Act 
(2004) which requires local authorities to work with ‘local resilience partners’ to “assess the risk of 
disruptive challenges and prepare to respond to the consequences” (Community and Local 
Government, 2008:15). Needless to say these processes are all police led, and would feed in to the 
routine local Special Branch surveillance of political activists, who constitute the 'political police' in 
Britain (Bunyan, 1975). None of this is new of course, and the surveillance of opposition and dissent 
is as old as the state itself, what has changed in the very considerable capacity to surveil entire 
populations (Bunyan, 2016). Machon (2005) reveals the extensive monitoring and surveillance of 
legitimate non-subversive organisations and individual members such as Trade Unions, CND, the 
NCCL, and peace campaigners, as well as Labour Members of Parliament.221  Moreover, the UK's 
counter-terrorism campaign has considerably expanded the range and scope of intelligence 
gathering in the domestic sphere under the UK's Prevent policy. 
 
                                                          
221 Machon notes that despite these practices breaching MI5's own rules, the work was justified by the agency 
arguing that it was investigating subversive penetration of these groups and not the organisations or 
individuals within the organisation (2005:46). 
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8.5 Interim Conclusion 
The NATO summit acts to reinforce the importance of careful site selection to the authorities in 
order to maximise strategic advantages. This goes beyond the defensiveness of the individual site 
and its fortification (although these are critical considerations) to encompass the wider cultural and 
political profile of the area. The authorities managed to capitalise on the historical attachments to 
the British military in South Wales, both in terms of the long-term strategic marketing and 
targeting of recruits from here into the military by the MOD, as well as the regions having some 
economic reliance upon an armaments, aerospace and ‘defence’ industry. This was intended to 
provide a broadly unsympathetic local and regional audience to the oppositional anti-military 
political culture espoused by the protestors, if not, a hoped for hostile environment. The result was 
to shrink the potential pool of dissent, ranging across an initially disinterested wider public right 
through to potential sympathetic joiners. This hostile environment was also felt in terms of the 
sighting of the 'peace camp', eventually relegated to over three miles from Newport, providing 
further advanced warning of protest actions and greater surveillance opportunities for the authority 
players. 
I now move on to consider why these strategies were successful, despite the considerable collateral 
cost to local people of hosting the summit meeting. I will argue that the strategies being employed 
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CHAPTER 9: Tactical Innovation by the Authorities: Pre-emptive community 
management 
9.1 Contested Communications 
Site selection is but one element of the preparatory work undertaken by the authorities, although 
there is little publicly available information as to what 'preparations' actually involves. A further 
critical area is establishing good lines of communication with local neighbourhoods, this is the case 
for both the police and protestors alike. Both sides compete to get their respective messages 
across, an element of which is to try and cultivate a general sympathy in advance of any upcoming 
confrontations that might be played out on the streets (Scholl, 2012:169). Communication becomes 
an important site of contestation, although for the NATO summit, a highly asymmetrical one. 
The police issued glossy flyers ('NATO Summit advance notice', see Appendix 17: Picture 61, below) 
pictured with a friendly bobby on a bike as one means to raise 'understanding' of their preparatory 
and operational measures as well as forewarning and 'explaining' resulting disruptions. A dedicated 
website also provided updated information for local people, supported by other social media 
platforms employed to propagate this. Those living closest to the manor were door-knocked for a 
'chat'222, as the police erected a temporary 10 foot high steel barrier stretching across the road and 
footpaths to block cars and people in anticipation of preventing the later intended 'Manor March' 
actually getting anywhere near the Manor hotel. Throughout the authorities benefited from being 
large institutional actors who had dedicated communication infrastructure and media liaison staff 
(both police and Newport council backed by national government) and carried the hierarchy of 
creditability to provide accurate information. This is in stark contrast to the lack of protestor 
infrastructure and meagre resources which resulted in the authorities being far more successful in 
getting their messages across. The anti-NATO coalition did run a web presence and advertised their 
events, but the activists at the peace camp lacked even an electricity supply to power this. This 
meant there was no effective media centre (partly because people struggled to charge electronic 
devices).  
9.2 Dissuasion through 'Militainment': NATO propaganda efforts  
Much of the preliminary public affairs work behind the scenes had already been done well before 
the peace camp had been decided, let alone established. Almost all of the local and national Welsh 
political and business elites openly endorsed the summit, or were at least neutralised to ensure they 
did not raise public objections or deviate from the official script crafted for public consumption - 
'Wales as obvious beneficiary' frame commentary.  The only exception to this was the Welsh Green 
                                                          
222 Information from two affected local residents, Newport. 
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party who were united in their condemnation and openly campaigned against the summit, but due 
to their marginal political position this only constituted a minor irritation. The levers and resources 
of local government were firmly in the hands of the FCO who had overall operational control.  
Nevertheless, this propagation process needed to be broadened to include a wider portion of the 
Welsh public. To achieve this end, the authorities conducted an insidiously spread propaganda 
campaign aimed to dominate local public attitudes and opinions. This was achieved through an 
assemblage of media companies and state and local agencies to enable consent operating via 
persuasion. Prior to the summit arriving a 'special festival'/ 'fun family day' was held in Newport to 
'celebrate' the NATO summit coming to the city, jointly organised by the British state and Newport 
City Council. This practice takes a key tactic of protestors such as putting on placed based events 
including 'teach-in's', music, street theatre, and other celebrations and subverts it to bolster the 
authorities cause. As protestors know, such events can have a transformative nature, providing 
people with a sense of power through collective action and a stake in contentious politics. This is 
subverted, with the aim to align the target public to state and NATO objectives, and as an outcome, 
dissuasion from any kinds of dissent. What is presented is a hybrid of persuasion and dissuasion in 
the same manner (but not form) as counter-radicalisation initiatives operate (Bratich, 2014:15).  
The virtue words and other slogans employed associates NATO with a 'festival', as it also did with 
'security', 'leadership' and 'safety', linking NATO to the value system of the target audience in 
Newport.  Operational effectiveness was achieved by adopting a successfully proven strategy taken 
from community integration events used in many parts of the UK: 
The 'festival' is advertised as a 'NATO themed family fun day'. It is culturally themed to 
appeal to people's taste buds with different foods and drink from across the twenty-eight 
respective NATO countries being offered as an enticing culinary hook to attract local 
weekend crowds. Included are items such as 'reindeer burgers' from Iceland, 'smorgasbord' 
from Denmark, waffles from Belgium and paella from Spain, which also includes having 
somewhat tenuously anchored locally by having a 'Welsh stall' with Welsh cheese and 
locally brewed beer. Beers from other NATO countries are also on offer, this has the effect 
of widening the appeal of the event to both sexes who are in evidence. The event was well 
advertised in local media and is well attended, including families taking in the sights. (NATO 
fieldnotes) 
The programmes ran ahead of the summit by some two weeks in order to resonate and bed down 
the message with the local populace. The festival was the draw which allowed multiple messages to 
be refined for different types of audiences (including by age) and different persuasion objectives. 
Encouraging attendance from the youth market was achieved by having four local bands playing, 
whereas younger children were enticed through offering face painting. (NATO fieldnotes)  
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This was only the backdrop to showcase the real message of the event, which was to sell militarism 
and the incumbent NATO doctrine. In line with established propaganda models, the framing effort 
also connects past cultural and historical events with the present through emotional and cognitive 
reasoning.  A 'Battle of Britain' air flypast by the Red Arrows was offered, handily tagging on other 
NATO aircraft in the display to underscore and further legitimise NATO; Household cavalry 
marched through the city centre and played military music. Military hardware also featured 
prominently throughout, emphasising the doctrine of military capability: 
There is an array of military vehicles and weaponry at the festival event. This is presented to 
'visitors' in order to 'demonstrate' the various equipment, with plenty of army personnel on 
hand ready to do so. Young children are encouraged to get involved, and are lifted onto 
army tanks and peer through gun sights, with parents looking on. Different generations 
have been catered for, with the army deploying an inflatable assault course (for youngsters) 
and a climbing wall (for youths), no doubt with an air to future recruitment. (NATO 
fieldnotes)  
This event can be seen as an evolving part of 'defence propaganda', one taking the form of what 
Debord terms the proliferation of 'networks of promotion and control', through every day 
entertainment and amusement, or what Bratich (2014) terms 'militainment'.  Further efforts to sell 
the NATO summit saw a public 'ceremony' concocted 'presenting' a NATO flag 'to the city' attended 
by local dignitaries from Newport Council and the Welsh government. This and other events were 
heavily policed to ensure that proceedings went to plan without undue interruption. The small 
contingent of CND protestors wanted to object to the ceremony taking place:  
'We were making our way towards the ceremony to demonstrate against the immorality of our 
City Council accepting the NATO flag. It was obvious we were a small peaceful demonstration 
but we were all stopped by the police well before we got close to the event. Everyone was, 
questioned and we had to give an account of ourselves as well as show identification. We were 
then followed by the police, it felt rather over the top. (Interview CND-01 activist) 
'I didn't count how many policemen there were accompanying us, but there were a lot. They 
said if we were protestors then they were here to 'engage with us', but it was simply 
intimidation, all that stuff about having to show ID and that [...]  they just wanted to keep us 
away from the platform, and they succeed.'  (Interview CND-02 activist) 
These public relations efforts also featured during the summit, notably charm offensives using local 
school children. A child from every primary school in Newport visited Celtic Manor for a photo-
shoot and to meet dignitaries. President Obama also made a scheduled visit to a local primary 
school in another stage managed affair which received considerable local publicity. Young children, 
it would seem, are the favoured audience for dignitaries. No doubt because they can be easily 
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manipulated, present the best photo opportunity, and are the least cognitively able to challenge 
those in power when meeting in the flesh. 
9.3 Nation branding as tactical innovation  
Wales underwent a brief process of assertive 'nation branding' premised on the official need to 
'strengthen its image' to make it more attractive for global military-industrial capital and to the 
future needs of similar securitised events. The policing of protest at the NATO summit needs to be 
seen within this wider context of global neoliberalism and the neoliberalisation of cities. Territorial 
or location branding is a means of trying to create value between territorial elites and ordinary 
individuals (van Ham, 2002:250) and an opportunity for NATO to justify its existence by winning 
people's 'hearts and minds'. van Ham (2002:253) identifies two sides of location branding both of 
which are pertinent for the summit; the external side (ostensibly generating economic and political 
advantage by attracting clients into the area and charging more for goods and services) but also an 
internal aspect, which aims to deliver a greater sense of belonging, inclusion and confidence. As van 
Ham (2002:266-7) notes: "Branding asks everyone to speak with one, coordinated voice, a common 
language to express the brand’s identity, a shared commitment to the brand’s promise. Branding 
aims to inspire people to ‘live up to’ the brand’s promise by ‘living’ the brand [...] Copying this 
commercial pattern to location branding implies that the people living in a branded country (or 
city/region) have to stick to the privileged script of their brand-leaders. In democratic countries, 
such a close coordination of a country’s message may well result in a (be it perhaps benign) 
authoritarian system." 
Lest this focus on branding appear frivolous, it needs to be remembered that (and following 
Foucault) ideas are forms of power manifest discursively (Burchell, et al., 1991). Branding strives for 
internal cohesion and consistency (in language and image) and the political elite behind such 
location branding act through this disciplinary technique to nudge local people into conformity. The 
manifest justification for this exercise was to place the territory (Wales) on the elites 'mental map', 
but this masks its true internal function, one of identity formation. Location branding is one 
mechanism through which elite norms reach the domestic arena.  
This is overtly acknowledged by the bilingual summit logo (see Figure 2 above) which exploits 
Welsh culture and history, here as superficial decorations. NATO has a powerful international logo, 
which is counter-posed with four symbols (featuring the Celtic knot, a Welsh dragon, Cardiff Castle, 
and the only specific reference to Newport, the transporter bridge - being a local landmark). These 
summoned the key brand assets of myth, folk-motif and heritage that here aptly represent Wales in 
this inter-brand marriage. These are exploited, as is their underlying nationalism, in an effort to 
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claim the loyalty of citizens through the power of language and image. These are chosen also for 
their emotive identities and mediagenic properties, to evoke an emotional tie between a distant 
and unaccountable NATO and local people. The territorial flavour of the 'country of origin effect' is 
weaved in by the accent on local produce and goods, keying into the myth and heritage of the 
location (at the summit close delegates were gifted 'goodie bags' with local Welsh produce and 
goods). 
Figure 2: The Official NATO Wales Summit Logo 
 
 
The cultural messaging ploy to appeal to Welsh distinctiveness as a separate nation in the UK was 
not without its difficulties however. There was a brief campaign by some disgruntled local political 
elites who wanted a more distinctive role for the city than the official badging allowed:  
'Well, there was some concern that the city was being side-lined by using the 'NATO Wales' 
badge [...] quite a lot of anger as it was supposed to be about Newport. That's what we were 
told. So some of the local Newport political elite mounted a bit of a brief campaign. They 
wanted the summit to be re-badged as 'NATO Newport' in recognition of what they considered 
the cities role, not 'NATO Wales'. It was a bit of a short-lived spat though because, in the end, 
many local people in Newport just don't consider the Manor to be really part of Newport 
anyway, they just see it as 'somewhere else', an elite bastion outside of the city.'  (Interview, 
local representative SW-04) 
These minor difficulties aside, the overall logic of territorial branding follows that of commercial 
branding, one which is aimed at the widest possible audience (and hence why the insistence on 
'NATO Wales' was not allowed to be overturned). Here we see vibrant coloured lamp-post banners 
adorning some of the main streets in Cardiff heralding 'welcome to Cardiff' and donning the NATO 
logo (see picture below). This signalling is for the consumption of local people however, as none of 
the VIPs or delegates ventured into this community, preferring to remain in their exclusive 
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enclosures. The 'welcome to Cardiff' message was literally meaningless in respect to the dignitaries 
it was supposedly directed at.  
Picture 11: Street Banners in Cardiff Displaying the NATO Summit Logo 
 
Picture 12: Close-Up of the NATO Wales 'Welcome to Cardiff' Street Banner (below) 
 
 
Local elected officials continually stressed the need to 'showcase security' for 'brand Wales'. What 
this is arguing for is Wales becoming a location whose strategic equity is attributable to a particular 
securitised product, one offering a protest free and disruption free venue for political and business 
elites, mimicking brands based on trust and customer satisfaction. This elite discourse sees Wales 
positioned aspirationally to be 'a master brand' in the competitive international market place of 
urbanised security. As van Ham wryly notes, marketing researchers are as interested in nationalism 
and identity as are international relations scholars. Nation branding in this instance is a political and 
social phenomenon, and the acknowledgement that territorial actors need to implement strategies 
designed to consciously use this tool to help secure their efforts in engineering a favourable climate 
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and reinforce a particular social order. In doing so the authorities are attempting to mould the 
formation of interests and identities, one openly competing for the allegiance and loyalty of their 
citizens against counter messages emanating from protest groups.  
How successful were these location branding tactics? Measuring the real life effects of such 
exercises is notoriously difficult, but the prize here is not so much requiring even the modest goal of 
affording local people to accept (willingly or reluctantly) the NATO summit on their doorstep, but 
rather the default one of marginalising counter voices, and denying them a fertile environment to 
recruit from. Location branding and its attendant festivals add to the changing tactical role of pre-
emptive state actions, one differing markedly from simple coercion. van Ham (2002:268) argues 
that public diplomacy and PR marketing are merging, and this case study suggests that states have 
realised that advanced marketing techniques have something of value to offer these types of nation 
formation efforts. It is also notable that the anti-globalisation activists failed to engage with this 
nation brand state tactic, leaving this field open without challenge. van Ham's (2002:269) insightful 
discussion of territorial branding conjectures that as a tactic it is vulnerable to being 'torn down' 
(symbolically more than literally) but no such susceptibility was evident during the Newport summit 
(I discuss the actions of the peace camp in section 7.8 below). 
 
9.4  The Political Economy of Social Control 
There has been very little research undertaken on the political economy of social control (Starr et 
al., 2011:50). Despite this lacuna, an appreciation of the costs involved can reveal some of the 
underlying power dynamics in the social control of dissent and the continuing development of the 
'security state'. The past thirty years has seen the development of an entire industry orientated to 
securing international summits and global ministerial meetings. As these various international 
forums and institutions have become increasingly contentious, so the 'securing' of their meetings 
has become a more pressing task for the states hosting the gatherings.  
The NATO summit is notable here as it represents the most expensive security operation for any UK 
hosted summit, costing over £81.2223 million (being over thirty-five percent more expensive than 
the second most costly summit, the G8 in Northern Ireland (at 60 million pounds). This was pitched 
as 'investment' in the Welsh NATO summit by the Welsh government.224 To give some context to 
                                                          
223 Ministry of Defence release 'NATO Summit Wales 2014: costs' 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/nato-summit-wales-2014-costs (accessed 25.10.17).  
224 Written Statement - NATO by Carwyn Jones, First Minister of Wales, Welsh Government.  
Page 247 of 407 
 
these figures, the summit would cost each household in Newport over £1,280.225 Even this is a 
considerable undercount, as this headline figure does not factor in the military costs across the 
three services who were active throughout the summit, and these costs are not publicly available.226 
Whilst calculating such costs is not a straightforward matter, the effective refusal to provide such 
information acts to neuter any critic (or any potential critic) to such operations on the basis of cost. 
Without basic cost data there is no means to challenge expenditure. 
Despite the official haze over the true nature of this fiscal landscape, what is clear is that the 
resulting budgets for such events in the UK have become increasingly extravagant. A trend which is 
reflected with mounting costs of G8 and G20 costs internationally from 2001 onwards (Kirton & 
Tanna, 2010).227 When costs are revealed, authorities only provide the scarcest breakdown into 
broad categories in how these monies have been spent. More detailed analysis is refused by 
claiming that the information is 'security sensitive'. Nevertheless, some revealing details emerge. 
Over three quarters of the cost (76%) was spent on deployments of police personnel (£62.5 million) 
and requiring officers to be drawn in from over half (27) of all other forces. This does not include the 
armed military personnel deployed inside the perimeter fence, the UK security services and foreign 
secret service agents (some of whom were observed in Newport and Cardiff). The FCO spent a 
further £107,000 on 'vetting and accreditation' which gives one indication of the scale of means that 
up to 2,183 people could have been required to be vetted.228 This reveals one element of the very 
considerable surveillance operation undertaken, and it should be noted that the consequences of 
failing a security check can be severe, resulting in refused of employment, at least temporarily (see 
McEvoy and White, 1998).229 Moreover, Linn (1990:50) argues that vetting procedures carry no 
                                                          
225 The bulk of the costs were met by central government, although the Welsh government declared it 
incurred £3 million costs (£2 million on 'enhancing security and resilience infrastructure', 'health cover 
arrangements' and 'co-ordinating emergency services'; £1 million on 'promotional and marketing activities', 
'military events in Newport and Cardiff'; a media reception in Newport; 'branding at key gateways in and 
around Newport and Cardiff'; 'postcards from children to the NATO world leaders, and other promotional 
activities'. Written Statement - NATO by Carwyn Jones, First Minister of Wales, Welsh Government.  
226 I have not submitted any FOI's to try and assess an estimated cost to these military operations, past 
experience with obtaining similar costings data from the MOD has resulted in them declaring that "costs are 
not calculated on an operation by operation basis [..] the cost elements that would need to be part attributed 
to a single operation are spread across numerous MOD and NATO budgets." (FOI2015/01975; FOI2016 0299).  
227 As the authors note, difficulties abound in making comparative analysis across countries due to the 
differing cost variables and methodologies in compiling costs, however, they do provide tables for 
comparative costs. 
228 Knowing the total cost spent for vetting and the individual vetting level price allows this rough calculation. 
Vetting costs derived from Freedom of Information request to the Defence Vetting Agency for minimum 
'security check' (SC) to 'developed vetting' (DV) levels respectively (£49 and £761) 
https://www.whatdotheyknow.com/request/vetting_costs.   
229 Uncorroborated accounts from local people recounted that staff working at the Manor during the summit 
who failed security vetting, or were deemed to be persons of suspicion by the US secret service, were laid off 
Page 248 of 407 
 
explicit recognition of a right to lawful protest, leaving those who do dissent open to being denied 
security vetting clearance (without explanation). This can be considered a further hidden collateral 
cost to the local population of hosting the summit. 
The costs also reflect the very considerable multi-dimensionality of these operations, which include 
(although not fully priced) policing, surveillance and intelligence gathering, communications  
operations, target hardening measures, as well as domestic military deployments across all three 
services (i.e. the extensive use of military helicopters and fighter planes flying over the summit, 
naval frigates in Cardiff harbour and Cardiff bay, and armed troops deployed within the Manor hotel 
and at other undisclosed venues). As some other social movement scholars have also recently 
noticed (Starr et al. 2011:60-1) taken as a whole, this multidimensional package more closely 
resembles a Low-Intensity Conflict (LIC) operation (or Low Intensity Warfare). As such it blurs more 
traditional distinctions between police/military, and domestic/international, warfare/peace, into an 
expanded security logic, whilst falling short of any declaration of hostilities230. Examining the NATO 
summit's institutional make-up (and its costs) also invites attention to the changing spatial 
configurations of security. These have been recalibrated, shifting in focus from national borders to 
sub-national, regional and urban scales (a trend other scholars have noted, i.e. Graham, 2004). The 
primary focus of the summit security operation was urban centred, despite the anti-missile defence 









                                                                                                                                                                                    
from work, with some being dismissed. Checks with the local Citizen's Advice in Newport were not able to 
confirm these stories.  
230 One intriguing dimension to this was the appearance of Gurkha’s marching in police uniform 
(approximately n=30) in Cardiff.  
231 HMS Duncan carries 'Sea Viper Missiles' as well as sophisticated electronic warfare systems, presumably 
brought in to defend against a potential sea launched or land launched ballistic missile attack on the venue 
site by a hostile foreign power. https://www.royalnavy.mod.uk/news-and-latest-
activity/news/2014/october/14/141014-hms-duncan-celebrates-fourth-birthday. 
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Picture 13: Militarisation of the Urban Landscape: Military Gunner Stationed on HMS Duncan in 
Cardiff Dock as Local Residents Look On. 
 
 
In part it is clear that the security planners were 'thinking the unthinkable' in their contingency 
planning and contemplating highly unlikely but what they have deemed catastrophic events 
prompted in response to increasingly novel attack strategies. For instance, the pre-planning had 
been extensive, even including a mock terrorist chemical attack in Newport to 'test' the emergency 
services responses to such a scenario. Commenting on the operation Superintendent Glyn 
Fernquest, who led the exercise for Gwent Police stated: 
"We will use the lessons learnt from the exercise to review and improve our major emergency 
plans so in the unlikely event of something like this occurring, the public of Gwent will get a 
well prepared and effective response" [And] “Hopefully the exercise didn’t cause residents any 
major disruption and we are grateful for their support.”232 
'Support' here is assumed, as are the costs to such operations, being that Newport is not otherwise 
considered a target for chemical attack from terrorists. Examining security at 'mega-events' Boyle & 
Haggerty (2009) note how the spiralling costs of such events reflect spatial, temporal; and socially 
'de-bounded' risks, all of which hazards falling into 'high consequence aversion', where worst case 
                                                          
232 Quoted in No author (2014, January, 23rd) 'Mock terrorist attack on Newport tests response', South Wales 
Argus News. 
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scenarios drive inappropriate security measures.233 The spectacle of security can also disrupt the 
circuits of consumption, as when some local bar owners in Cardiff were complaining that the 
unusually quiet bars was a result of customers being frightened away by patrolling armed police 
walking the streets, as one bar owner remarked; "who wants to go out and see that?"  
A further tactic by the authorities is to only reveal the actual costs of the event some considerable 
time after it has occurred, in the case of NATO, nearly two years later. Such a practice not only 
ensures any objections to hosting the event on costs grounds is difficult to make, but also that any 
public indignation at learning such a cost is reduced to resignation, notably when the estimated 
expenditure is exceeded. As the authorities are aware, the public have short memories, and the 
political capital is largely spent to any would be critics by the passing of time. It also makes it 
difficult to hold any spokespeople to account, as Gwent police had publicly stated policing costs 
would not exceed £60 million (an already inflated figure from the original estimate in circulation of 
£50 million as the entire budget) which they did by a further £2.5 million.   
9.4.1 Benefit Realisation? 
Officials often justify these considerable expenditures before the summits by citing the anticipated 
economic benefits, including increases to local business from tourism, the possibility of future 
investment and the international publicity the area will receive (Starr et al 2011:56). The same 
practices were evident prior to the NATO summit, with local and national political elites mobilising 
these promissory notes aimed at convincing a more sceptical local populace to the extolled benefits 
of the event. The clear aim was to generate support for the summit and quell traditional sensibilities 
in respect to the transformation and fortification of what was previously public spaces and the 
considerable costs and inconveniences which ensued (I expand on this point below in 'Tactical 
innovation by the authorities'). Despite these efforts, frequently such summits see collateral costs 
to local business from the road closure programme and fences which restrict public access. For 
instance, some local business reported a 40% reduction in trading since the security fence had been 
installed.234  
Two themes were apparent from an analysis of elite messaging advocating the NATO summit; the 
first was on the short and longer term economic benefits to Wales, in part through attracting global 
inward investment into existing industry (including the regional armaments industry) and by 
                                                          
233 There is a spiralling security cost for Olympic summer games, from the $79.4 (USD) expenditure in 1984 to 
the $1.5 billion outlay in Athens in 2004 (unadjusted prices for inflation), the resulting price per athlete 
extends from $11,627 to $142,897, (Boyle & Haggerty, 2009:261) or a 1129% increase. 
234 No author (2014, 8th September) 'Iron curtain is lowered as NATO bows out of South Wales' Western Mail 
newspaper, Cardiff. 
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attracting tourism as a result of the international press attention. Secondly, the prestige presumed 
to be bestowed by hosting a major event which required a high level of security. On this narrative, 
Wales was 'showcasing security', admirably summed up by one senior Gwent police officer: 
"It is fair to say that this is totally unprecedented [the size of the security operation]. While it's 
challenging, what a fantastic chance for us to display Wales across the globe and show the rest 
of our partners and colleagues that we are capable of delivering this on behalf of Wales."235 
[my emphasis] 
These types of statements act to reify securitisation and situate it within a nationalist frame, with a 
near imperceptible shift from something being done to Wales reconfigured into something done for 
Wales. What we see is the commodification of an earlier and successful securitising move, one which 
presents an existential threat (whilst these can of course lead to nothing as they very often do, they 
are never elaborated beyond 'terrorism' and 'protestors') to a referent object (the summit 
delegates) to an accepting audience (the governing Labour party and the Welsh Assembly, but 
aimed more broadly at local people). National security is lionised, and repackaged as a desirable, 
saleable good. The concrete materialisation of power evident in these measures (what Poulantzas 
refers to as 'condensation') is both ideological and repressive. Positioning Wales into a 'security 
brand', a serious security actor for events,  becomes a desirable end in an otherwise disorderly and 
insecure world and one which is held to benefit Wales. As First Minister for Wales Carwyn Jones 
said, the value of the publicity was: 
 “Literally incalculable. Schoolchildren will never forget the day they met Barack Obama – the 
first sitting president to visit Wales – and international decision-makers now know that Wales 
can handle epic logistical challenges."236 
Here securitisation becomes the desirable good, and was portrayed as Wales somehow proving 
itself up to the task. Jones' statement makes no reference to the substantial financial costs incurred, 
the exclusionary nature of the event, or the very substantial negative impacts to local people, as 
well as the very real dangers brought to their doorstep.  
The (un-priced) military component extends beyond the lending of some hardware, they are fully 
involved in the operations and directed at controlling domestic dissent. LIC stretches beyond these 
police and military components to include multiple governmental agencies, private contractors and 
even foreign military powers  (i.e. US marines, US air force, and in particular US secret service 
                                                          
235 Gwent Police Chief Superintendent Alun Thomas cited in South Wales Evening Post 'Wales takes centre 
stage as summit gets started' (2014, 3rd September). 
236 Wales Online, Ten ways David Cameron's time in power shaped Wales 
http://www.walesonline.co.uk/news/politics/ten-ways-david-camerons-time-11882339. 
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operatives who were 'escorting' the US president on his arrival into the UK and throughout his 
trip).237  
One element of this concerted propaganda campaign was commissioning a report produced by 
Barclays Bank, 'The 2014 NATO Summit and its impact on Wales' which was to provide the 
intellectual foundations to the local and national states economic case. Whilst dressed in the 
respectable clothes of sober analysis and facts and figures, the document is relentlessly upbeat 
throughout despite the poverty of its one data point. Rather hopefully citing the work of Deloitte, 
who examined the 25th NATO summit hosted in Chicago and estimated a total $128.2 million 
dollars of 'impacts', and by extension Barclay's assertion that the Newport NATO Summit should 
also prove similarly profitable. Notwithstanding the details of Deloitte's estimate methodology,238 
this comparison is deeply flawed as Newport lacks the services and hospitality capacity that a large 
US city such as Chicago has, as well as there being considerably fewer delegates attending. Neither 
does the estimate off-set the overall costs incurred by the wider tax payer base of hosting the 
summit (which for the UK summit would on a break-even analysis need to minimally exceed $108 
million, although this is a certain undercount re the uncosted military element and the declining 
value of sterling).239 The Barclays' report mostly consists of selected voices trumpeting the benefits 
of the summit for Wales on the basis of mere speculation, and is a roll call of vested political and 
corporate interests, including various senior personnel at the Celtic Manor (including its Director) 
being the chief beneficiary of NATO largesse. The unbridled optimism contained by the various 
selected 'boosters' in the business and political elite is only tempered by the single other data 
Barclay's bring to bear, the results of a business survey. This data has the drawback of being less 
amenable to manipulation, seeing the majority of those surveyed either disagreeing that the 
summit would bring much benefit to Wales, or thinking it merely neutral in outcome240 (Barclays, 
2014:17).  
Minimally, coming to some conclusion on this question requires a cost benefit analysis exercise, and 
thus is substantially an empirical question. On this point the FCO (who had overall governmental 
                                                          
237 It should be noted that foreign agents such as these are frequently licensed to carry firearms (i.e. what 
would otherwise be unlawful in the UK) the presumption has to be therefore that they would use them 
against people they considered a security risk on foreign soil. My FOI requesting information on the 
circumstances under which foreign agents can lawfully kill UK citizens received a refusal notice from FCO.     
238 Deloitte's study was a 'prospective estimate' (it is therefore unclear if the anticipated benefits were ever 
realised in the economy) and more worryingly, fails to off-set the actual total costs associated with hosting 
the summit from the anticipated gains of having done so. 
239 This figure is skewed by the recent very considerable fall in the value of sterling against the US dollar, 
otherwise the required dollar total would be some 15%+ higher.  
240 In response to these 'concerning' findings and as an indication of its propogandic tone, the author chastise 
their respondents by adding; "These businesses may be missing out on any potential opportunities and they 
are encouraged to take a closer look at the Summit and any legacy it may bring"  (Barclays, 2014:17).  
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responsibility for the NATO summit) were unable to say whether the indicated financial or other 
benefits were ever accrued by Newport or Wales.241 Similarly, Newport Council was also unable to 
clarify this matter, simply stating that as the event was not organised by Newport City Council "The 
questions relating to economic impact are not recorded by Newport City Council."242 However, the 
council did provide two further documents 'of interest'. The first was what they referred to as two 
2014 NATO Wales Summit 'case studies'. On examination these were a mere extension of the 
earlier propaganda exercise, each case study selected on the basis of being two direct beneficiary 
organisations; The University of South Wales (the 'host Venue' billeting over 1,600 Police Officers 
for 12 days) and the Riverfront Theatre and Arts Centre (who were contracted to undertake some of 
the outreach propaganda exercise in regards to the 'food festival' and what was more honestly 
described as "profile-raising activities for the armed forces, NATO and the Summit").243 Both of 
whom predictably wax lyrical about what a success the particular contracted service they provided 
was. That there were some organisations that received a short-term financial benefit from the 
summit is not in doubt. What is in question is the longer term benefits that were so widely claimed, 
as well as the overall cost-benefit analysis in light of the wider collateral costs (discussed below in 
section 7.7). The second document is some economic and tourism data,244 although not an 
economic analysis pertinent to our question, the data does track ten variables of interest over a 
eleven year period (2003-2014).245 Whilst later data would be needed for evidence of sustained 
impact246, even here the trend lines across the indictors show an existing upward curve line over the 
entire period, leaving our question at best unclear.   
Whether there will be a substantial benefit to the Welsh economy is an empirical question which 
can only be settled after the fact, and needs to incorporate off-setting the associated costs in 
'hosting' the summit.  Nevertheless, the authorities proved willing to engage in a concerted and 
thinly veiled propaganda exercise with the economic sphere taking a centre stage in order to sell the 
summit to local people. The pattern here is for a range of local and national political elites to make 
considerable claims for short-term and longer term benefits from such summits as a means to 
bolster support, or more minimally, deter dissenting views of local people, particularly those many 
                                                          
241 FOI FCO (FOI2016 0299). 
242 FOI Newport City Council 'Information management’ (REQ05190). 
243 Whilst labelled as 'case studies', the documents reflect the views of two individuals speaking as employees 
of the beneficiary organisations: Project Manager Gemma Savage, Head of Conference and Events at USW 
and Jason Small, Operations Manager, The Riverfront Theatre and Arts Centre. Neither do they contain any 
financial information.  
244 Global Tourism Solutions UK data, provided by Newport City Council. 
245 It is interesting to note that Newport did not provide any later data which would be able to address the 
central economic issue. 
246 The economic analysis is complex, and would need to disaggregate seasonal and other factors to identify 
the relative summit benefit.  
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negatively impacted. Once the event has been concluded, no serious effort is made to answer the 
fundamental question, did the promissory note get delivered? Neither do there appear to be any 
regulatory or accountability mechanisms when it comes to summit expenditures. For instance, the 
National Audit Office do not conduct any value for money analysis for such events on the basis of 
not recognising 'any value for money concerns' with such expenditures, as well as rather 
paradoxically arguing that their own 'limited resources' means they are unlikely to undertake such 
reviews'.247 
9.4.2 Legacy Benefits? 
Another ruse used by the authorities in justifying costs and purchase outlay in the form of a 
refurnished security state is to claim this as a 'legacy benefit' for Wales. These typically take the 
form of vague and un-evidenced claims regards to this infrastructure:   
"Most of the equipment purchased and improvements to infrastructure will be retained by the 
Welsh Government and/or public sector partners and will be used beyond the end of the 
Summit. This will help with business continuity and implementing civil contingency plans." 
[Jones, First Minister of Wales Written Statement - NATO] 
Whether new operating standards for physical security, and its related hardware of razor wire, 
higher and more steel fencing, and enhanced surveillance cameras is indeed a beneficial legacy 
remains a deeply contested point. 
Similar claims were made in the Barclay's report, despite the central assertion being flatly 
contradicted by the results of their own business survey. This inconvenient finding was studiously 
ignored in favour of reproducing the originally intended (highlighted) message irrespective of its 
incongruity in the text of the document:  
"Wales is well positioned to ensure its economy enjoys a long-term legacy as a result of it 
hosting the NATO Summit." [Barclays, 2014:23]. 
There is however, another interconnected legacy benefit which did result from the summit, but one 
not to be found in any of the official propaganda. This 'shadow legacy' (Boycoff & Fussey, 2014)  is 
the rather dejected and de-motivated protestor groups which were outmanoeuvred tactically and 
innovatively by the combined efforts of the local and national authorities.   
Other less visible legacies such as developed security knowledge and deepened practice networks, 
as well as organisational innovations which integrate civil and military modes of control, all escape 
public attention and scrutiny. The legacy for Wales of an enhanced repression ready security state is 
a questionable legacy.  
                                                          
247 Author FOI and personal correspondence with N. Sayers (Director - Financial Audit, NAO) 
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9.5  Collateral Costs 
The summit 'security operation' imposed a hermeneutic seal around the VIP's and delegates, this is 
why even roads (and airspace) were closed for their exclusive use. Starr (201160-61) recounts that 
the military planning team for the 2003 G8 in Kananaskis, Canada described their 'security 
methodology' as: 
 "Pretty aggressive stuff". We [Canadian security forces] were flying fighter planes en-masse. 
If anybody got anywhere near the meeting, they would have been shot down; same thing with 
anyone who tried to infiltrate the areas where he leaders were gathering. We made in very 
clear to everyone that we had soldiers with live weapons." 
Whilst the Canadian's are more forthcoming than their British counter-parts in describing the reality 
on the ground for such events, the same military infrastructure was in place in South Wales with 
armed troops inside the venue. A large number of armed police were also patrolling the external 
areas surrounding the venue sites and throughout Cardiff and Newport. it should be remembered 
that the British police operate a de facto shoot to kill policy, as Glass's (2010:161) (the then IPCC 
Commissioner) defensive opinion piece on the aftermath of the G20, more or less concedes 
(although this is officially denied): 
"The police shoot to stop an imminent threat to life. Every armed police officer will tell you 
though that the only way to do that effectively is to kill someone... [warming to her theme] 
The British police do not and have never shot to wound."248  
The presence of foreign security forces at the NATO summit also increases the incentive to repress 
demonstrations. Ericson & Doyle (1999:605) have argued that during the 1997 APEC summit in 
Canada, several Indonesian security forces had openly threatened to shoot any protestors who 
appeared 'threatening'. 
With this in mind, what is carefully disguised in the NATO security methodology is the imminent 
threat it presents to both protestors and local people should they happen to fall foul of these 
measures. Protesting under these conditions carries some risk of being killed should anyone 
manage to get within the vicinity of delegates, irrespective of protestors goals never being to 
threaten violence. Despite this very considerable tooling up, seeing police officers in Cardiff and 
Newport city centres carrying Heckler & Koch MP5 sub-machine guns strolling with crowds, 
stringent efforts at normalisation occurs.  
                                                          
248 These are the words of the IPCC Commissioner directly responsible for MPS and the City of London Police 
who also carries lead Commission policy responsibility for counter terrorism, firearms, and less lethal options 
and represents the IPCC on the ACPO Conflict Management and Strategic Firearms Committee. It is 
interesting to note that Glass (in the same piece) boasts that she 'successfully' completed the 'Firearms Gold 
Commanders Course', although it escapes her that in doing so she may have 'gone native'. 
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Part of this is the calculated practice of officers putting on a ‘charm offensive’. This is a longstanding 
technique in British policing, both in community patrol work where officers seek to gain local 
intelligence, but also in static guarding duties. Here the tactic is to befriend and talk to members of 
an awaiting crowd (often behind barriers) as happened in Cardiff Castle awaiting the arrival of the 
entourage. Unbeknown to the public, the officer just seems to be being nice, the real motive is to 
scan and identify any potential threats in the crowd whilst also improving opportunities to gain 
information. Smiling is a powerful adaptive social signal, for the sender, it promotes social 
acceptance and affiliation whilst moderating socially negative reactions (Schmitt & Cohn, 2001:15). 
In this usage form, smiling is then a social interaction employed to gain acceptance and compliance. 
This was very noticeable when walking around the newly fortified city centres of Newport and 
Cardiff: 
Surreal saturation policing presence in both cities in all central areas and buffer zones. 
Officers in groups of two or three on small circular patrols, or standing around in groups of 
five, six, seven chatting for extended periods to pass the time. Little to do but watch the 
world go by and keep eyes and ears. This is interspersed with firearms officers, almost 
always in pairs, submachine guns pointed down, wandering amongst the general public 
throughout key locations. Charm offensive appears to be in operation, particularly amongst 
armed officers, smiling and willing to engage in conversation with shoppers, tourists and 
locals. This modus operandi apparent across practically every firearms officer I pass. (NATO 
fieldnotes) 
Armed officers can look rather intimidating carrying sub-machine guns, but smiling and nodding at 
people appeared remarkably effective, as is waving at small children. Frequent comments by locals 
shopping in their town area were "I can't believe how many police there are!" (NATO, fieldnotes) It is 
this world of appearances though, which begs the question of what lies behind it which is not in any 
deep matter posed by those same passers-by. In fact, it became routine to witness groups of police 
officers passing each other in the streets, each taking to the opposite sides of the road in an effort 
to avoid clumsily confronting each other, quietly walking up and down smiling in an effort to give 
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Picture 14: Saturation Policing on the Streets of Cardiff: One of Many Groups of Officers Having 
a Chat 
 
This facade can quickly be shattered though: 
Three protestors approach a quasi-military police vehicle parked next to a police van in 
Newport, with five officers standing around it chatting to each other. It is an unusual sight, 
and they take out a camera to photograph the scene. The vehicle is a Jankel armoured 
Landrover (for public order’ policing). The mood amongst officers immediately changes, 
from a relaxed demeanour, smiling at local passers-by, to blocking the photo opportunity 
and aggressively warning off what is now unwanted attention. (NATO fieldnotes) 
A game was carried out which I lost count of how many times I saw and heard, with locals 
asking/guessing to police 'where are you from then?' (i.e. which force/part of country) most being 
happy to play along irrespective of the wearing nature of the unremitting same question.  The other 
tactic the police used was to introduce branded NATO light blue soft caps (like a baseball cap) (see 
picture 6 below), an innovation also used in the 2013 G8. These are perceived as less intimidating 
and also mesh with the wider event branding efforts. Whilst many officers were in riot gear (minus 
protective helmets), this too was disguised by wearing boiler suits to hide the body armour.  
These micro-interactions and light touches make big differences, notably as saturation level 
policing carries risks, and this was extraordinary saturation policing throughout the cities. This is an 
application of Webster's work in respect to the paradoxical nature of applying police power.  
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Picture 15: Police Officer in Newport with a Local - Note the Armour Plating over the boots to 
protect the foot dorsal and boiler suit to disguise the body armour below 
  
Picture 16: The Met (Firearms Officers) with NATO Caps in Conversation as Two Locals Inspect 
their Armoured Truck 
 
 
The logic is tied up in a simple paradox in using force. Bringing out robo-cop armoured riot police 
triggers the other side's defences, making it harder for protestors to compete also makes it harder 
to co-operate as people don't like to look like they are losing. So reducing the intimidation factor 
(everyone wear soft little caps despite carrying riot helmets) can assist in compliance towards 
adversaries as well as members of the public  (Webster, cited in Zajko & Beland, 2008:730). 
The coercive kernel of policing is concealed by presenting it as 'fighting terrorism' or as 'keeping 
everyone safe'. As one resident who wandered into the peace camp recounted to me when stopping 
and talking to a police officer stationed on a bridge overlooking the M4,  
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"I asked him if he was looking out for Iraq tanks? He said no, protestors." (NATO 
fieldnotes) 
Despite working hard to mask its repressive nature (I discuss this more fully later) the nature of LIC 
often involves the use of extensive surveillance, non-lethal weapons, and intense public relations 
exercises or 'psyops' to win support from local people for the policy objectives sought. This can 
include by necessity misinformation programmes aimed a domestic audience as an integral part of 
LIC, usually aimed at containment to combat an adversary (as Molloy, 2001 argues). All these were 
features of the NATO summit with the adversary constituting dissenting protestors. 
Despite a considerable number of negative impacts on local communities resulting from hosting 
such summits, local people are not consulted on the decision by their representatives. No public 
consultation was entered into before or after the event by Newport City Council to canvass local 
people's views, indicating the democratic deficit at the heart of such decisions.249 Newport City 
Council's strategy was to state that the decision of the site location had been made by central 
government.250  
9.6 Interim Conclusion 
What we see in the NATO summit is a shift in the tactical repertoire of the authorities, notably from 
a form of psychological warfare witnessed in the G20 where scare tactics linking protestors with 
disorder and violence were propagated through the media to good effect. This was not repeated, 
perhaps because it had been openly criticised by several of the inquiry reports, and doing so risked 
censure and further discrediting.  
Rather the tactical repertoire for communication shifted to a more encompassing communication 
management strategy across a number of strands; a process of 'nation branding'; promissory notes 
of bringing economic and prestige benefits to Wales in order to sell the summit and justify the very 
considerable expense; a propaganda offensive and finally, a charm offensive aimed at the local 
population. These developments indicate important tactical innovations by authority players, and in 
its multidimensional form now more accurately resembles a Low-Intensity Conflict (LIC) operation 
(or Low Intensity Warfare). One which blurs the traditional distinctions between police/military, and 
domestic/international, warfare/peace, into an expanded security logic. 
I have also argued that communication was an important site of contestation throughout and for 
both the authority and protestor players. But this was a considerably one sided affair, with 
protestors being only able to marshal even meagre resources to communicate their counter 
                                                          
249 FOI  REQ05190. 
250 Ibid., REQ05190. 
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message in the face of a well-funded multi-media strategy by the authorities, one beginning 
months prior to the summit meeting. In contrast the protestors suffered a number of considerable 
disadvantages, in part a result of the Peace Camp's lack of even basic infrastructure (there was no 
mains electricity supply to run a media centre) as well as a disorganised protestor group encamped 
and an ideologically hostile mentality to the international press. This last self-inflicted own goal 
proved disastrous, as when offered the opportunity to outline their anti-NATO argument to an 
international media arriving at the camp (on a quiet news day prior to the summit beginning) 
protestors refused to engage and were openly hostile.  
The authorities economic arguments of substantial economic benefits and legacy benefits, 
reinforced by marshalling the local economic elites to their cause, acted to mostly dissipate the 
collateral costs in the media reportage. It remains unclear whether local people who experienced 
these costs (personally and financially) felt the same. The wider media strategy was also assisted by 
careful community policing strategies on the ground, one which acted to conceal the coercive 
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CHAPTER 10: Observational Study of the NATO Protests 
10.1 Surveillance of Dissenting Bodies: Inside the peace camp: 
Details of the protest camp (or 'peace camp') had been discussed openly on protest websites 
although far more poorly advertised, in part due to difficulties in securing a site after the originally 
intended location had been forced to change. Citing the camp in Tredegar park gave little legal 
cause for any police involvement. More crucially the camp did not actually pose any threat to the 
summits progress, and so was never raided and smashed. The camps location did present many 
practical problems for activists though. The park was over six and a half miles from Celtic Manor, 
and some two miles from Newport, giving police ample forewarning and opportunity to tail any and 
all activists as they left. Several had brought camper vans which doubled as buses to transport 
activists into town, these were routinely followed by police vehicles (including unmarked police 
vehicles) (NATO fieldnotes). 
As it happens these elaborate arrangements were unnecessary due to the tiny numbers of 
protestors who arrived. My counts at the camp never saw numbers exceed two hundred at its peak. 
Despite these rather meagre numbers, the camp was joined by a constant presence of PLOs, usually 
in pairs, walking in patrol around the camps perimeter with a small contingent of officers stationed 
strategically in several police vans in the park car park (which provided the only road access route 
from the park). If any opportunity arose PLOs would assert friendliness and try and engage any 
protestor in conversation. Practically every activist spurned all such efforts, recognising this as 
nothing more than an intelligence gathering ploy by the 'soft smiley' police seeking out information 
about activist’s numbers, tactics and intentions. The true nature of PLOs covert intelligence 
gathering had long been denied by senior officers, but the denial hinges on a mere technicality. 
Accordingly, PLOs are:   
“Not tasked to gather intelligence by a police commander, [but] they may be presented with 
intelligence during the course of events”, and if so they will in turn submit this “as per their 
usual force procedure” (NETPOL, 2016). 
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Picture 17: Examples of Unmarked Police Cars in 
Tredegar Park to Tail Protestor Vehicles  
  
Picture 18: Police Van in Tredegar Park 
Monitoring Protest Camp 
 
Picture 19: Officers Stationed at Junction of Tredegar Park to Monitor Protestor Movements  
 
 
This rather fine analytical distinction allows senior officers the advantage of publicly denying police 
spying whilst benefiting from a line of intelligence closest to those drawn into 'dialogue policing'.  
By contrast, police mobile units stationed permanently in the car park were regular local officers, 
who provided back-up (not that there was any threat to PLOs from activists) and another layer of 
surveillance to tail and harass protest efforts.  
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Picture 20: View of the Sparsely Populated Protestor Peace Camp at Tredegar Park
 
As one would expect there was a constant police presence at the peace camp, but this was generally 
low key. It included PLOs patrolling the boundary, pairs of uniformed officers stationed at key 
junctions just outside the camp, and mobile units in the park car park as backup: 
The police presence fluctuates with the rhythms of the camp, with police numbers 
strengthening as the summit began and in line with the two key protest marches. It is 
noticeable that none have made any efforts to come into the camp, which would have led 
to uproar amongst activists, although they had no need to undertake such provocation. 
PLOs and officers appear content to keep to its perimeter with little if any loss to their 
surveillance capacity. (NATO fieldnotes) 
This notion of boundary and border played an important and pointlessly exaggerated role in the 
minds of many of the activists. The somewhat imaginary inside of the camp had been designated a 
'safe space', although what this meant in practice was never entirely clear and in a state of some flux 
and confusion throughout the brief life of the camp. Rules were devised and tasked out, but with 
rules comes the interpretation and implementation of the rules, along with many meetings 
clarifying who was supposed to be doing what. Whilst these plans were well intentioned, there was 
continual implementation failure: 
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Morning planning meeting at the camp: reasonably well attended (n=43). Business issues of 
the day being raised and protest action plans – the latter being open to all but some affinity 
groups meeting up after this morning meeting for private briefings. Again, the ‘policy’ of 
the camp is under discussion; [approx. 20 minutes on this] what the policy is, who is 
responsible (everyone) but admission that there are ongoing tasking and ownership 
problems: ‘The trouble is people aren’t keeping to the policy .. the people who are supposed to 
be on duty at the reception aren’t always there, so there are times when anyone can wander in. 
Look, those people who are assigned to reception need to remain and not go off doing other 
stuff .. otherwise there isn’t any point in delegating .. if you volunteer for reception that day 
then you must stick to it, right?  (NP-03, Fieldnotes) 
The concern was a real one, 'security' from police spying and a certain amount of paranoia about 
police infiltration, spurred by the now common knowledge of covert policing practices of the 
Special Demonstration Squad (SDS). Other concerns were the more mundane one of simple privacy 
(personal privacy) as well as revealing their individual identities. This last issue was similarly futile as 
the camp offered little if any privacy due to its being situated in an open park. Indeed, it functioned 
rather like a fish bowl, even the main tent was partially open to view for onlookers (see picture 15 
above). Neither did concern over staying anonymous from the authorities make any practical sense 
or warrant the considerable amount of time and energy the camp put into discussing and 
strategising this matter. The extensive CCTV in the city centre and transport hubs (amplified by BTP 
'evidence gathers' at rail stations) and ANPR systems on the main arterial roads made privacy of 
identity redundant.  
10.2  Paranoia in the Camp 
This constant surveillance presence and a pervasive suspicion and fear of police spying and 
infiltration did effect the shape and use of the camp, and ultimately, its effectiveness as a 
campaigning tool. Not all activists saw police infiltrators as a threat or a problem, but many did. This 
grew into a more pervasive air of suspicion as well as some paranoia and took a number of different 
forms. There was a tendency amongst some to openly accuse members at the camp of being a 
police infiltrator, which happened to at least three individuals I was aware of, including to myself: 
‘Look mate, no offence, but I’ve seen you before at G8, I’m not saying anything, but you 
arrived, and later we got raided. Now it may be noth’in mate, but I don’t know .. so I don’t 
really want to talk to ya’  (NP-02, Fieldnotes) 
This interchange took place as I passed by a small group of protestors sat huddled discussing the 
day’s affairs. I had been recognised from my 2013 presence at the convergence centre in London (to 
campaign against the G8 summit) which was later violently raided and smashed by MPS. There 
were details informing the raid which indicated the G8 convergence centre had indeed been 
infiltrated or informants were at work. As I had partly blagged my way in after long hours of 
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negotiating with the activists own 'security' on the door in London, understandably some of those 
same individuals now at Tredegar smelt a rat. The word spread quickly, and I found myself 
increasingly side-lined and worse, then later barred from some protest action planning meetings 
(and thrown out of one de-briefing meeting), and distanced when attending actions and marches 
(NATO fieldnotes). I was not alone: 
There is a noticeable change amongst some groups in the camp towards me, some 
conversations stop as I pass by and the rumour mill is in full swing. Broached the subject 
with NP-08; NP-12 this morning and told them what some people’s suspicions were. They 
say they have not heard this but are removed from the two central activist groups at 
camp…. I put out my university credentials and online university webpage as proof of 
identity and character in the hope that this will assuage some of the concerns. Not sure it 
will do any good. (NATO fieldnotes)   
Another person was designated a ‘suspect’ police spy today, a Canadian protestor staying at 
camp. The story I have got from several others after the Newport demo was that he had 
failed to answer to his given name at the demo, this happened several times in succession, 
raising a lot of suspicion. Later, there was an ugly scene with him being challenged 
aggressively by other protestors, resulting in a physical confrontation. Spoke to him several 
hours later, some damage to his camera from fracas (carries some expensive looking 
equipment), he is very upset, visible mark on the side of his face. Very personable type, 
pleads complete innocence to accusation. (NATO fieldnotes)   
Lots of people talking about the Canadian incident this evening at camp, with varying 
views; some showing a lot of concern over the way he was treated believing it was wrong, 
others more circumspect, still others not saying anything. (NATO fieldnotes)   
During the lifetime of the camp these concerns about police infiltration and spying grew, generating 
a number of debilitating effects. The camps responses included introducing 'security measures' 
particularly at 'Action Meetings'. This saw the sharing of operational information (the intended 
target, the type of action, when it would occur etc.) about planned actions being drastically 
curtailed as a direct result of this concern over police infiltrators or informants. This saw information 
restricted to only being disclosed in far smaller affinity groups (those smaller groups who were 
known to each other from past actions or drawn from trusted networks or got to know each other 
over the duration of the camp and trusted each other to an extent that they were reassured they 
were not an informant or infiltrator).  
This resulted in the action meetings taking a very different form from the early life of the camp. No 
longer were any planned actions openly announced, where previously activists would also ask for 
others input in regards to ideas, knowledge, and initiatives, calling openly for volunteers. The chair 
of the meeting would simply state that a number of actions would be taking place but the details of 
which were no longer discussed (chiefly if they required any element of direct action or civil 
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disobedience) rather it was announced that people would 'team up' in their affinity groups later. 
This was not a rigid restriction, so people were offered, if they so wished, to announce actions and 
ask for volunteers but this only occurred several times and was restricted to more marginal 
actions.251 Instigating closed affinity group meetings when planning some protest actions 
(restricted to trusted networks) had a disabling affect, one which frustrated larger group action 
organising and the raison d'être for the camp. Whilst police infiltration was not the only concern 
amongst protestors (being a victim of police violence or malicious arrest also featured highly)252 the 
resulting pervasive culture of suspicion and less often, open hostility, also acted to draw divisions 
between activists.   
The other area of difficulty at camp concerned visitors and the media. There had been long 
discussions at numerous camp meetings about what the media strategy should be. The camps 
regulations had settled for a kind of 'reception area' at one end of the camp, marked by a small sign, 
a few chairs and some anti-NATO leaflets and other assorted information, to which all newcomers 
were supposed to report, including members of the media. A further rule required that any 
journalist(s) would have to be 'escorted' beyond this point if they wanted to come in and talk to or 
interview protestors - a policy reflecting long held suspicions and hostility to the media (there was 
also a ban on all photography without individuals giving permission). These formal organisational 
structures suffered from poor implementation throughout, for instance, the reception area was only 
periodically manned, causing some confusion to some visiting journalists.  
The protestors main focus was planning and instigating protest actions, instituted at affinity group 
meetings at camp through consensus decision making. Given the small numbers of protestors, the 
limited wider support within the localities and the overwhelming numbers of police, all these efforts 
appeared, and were, somewhat ineffectual. One significant window of opportunity did present 
itself, when the peace camp became an interest and itself a story for the national and international 
press. Many journalists and news crews had arrived ahead of the VIPs in preparation for the summit, 
and had a day or two with little to do (and little news happening) before the main event. This saw 
numbers of journalists making the trip over to the peace camp to get a story and the protestors 
perspective. Some of these I recorded in fieldnotes: 
Conversation with several journalists today at camp reception: 
                                                          
251 For instance, one action which sought volunteers was to attend a police station and report war crimes of 
the delegates (a lone action which had been tried the previous day); another was a small scale action at a local 
Barclays bank.  
252 These reflections derive from my conversations with over two dozen protestors at camp during the course 
of my fieldwork. 
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Journalists: ‘Hello, we’re from BBC Wales, we came over yesterday to try to talk with some 
protestors here, is there anyone that we could speak to today please? Just a short interview for 
the radio?’ 
Camp Reception: ‘Oh … hang on a minute, I’ll see if I can find someone, can you stay here 
please, we don’t allow journalists unescorted in the camp.’ 
Journalists: ’What about you, would you like to talk to us and tell us why you’re here protesting 
today .. what is it that you all want to achieve’? 
Camp Reception: ‘Well, I can’t talk for others … hang on a minute … [leaves scene, shortly 
returns} no-one is willing to give an interview. 
(NATO, fieldnotes) 
All too frequently this opportunity to engage with the international media was squandered. Either 
there was no-one at the reception area, or no one was willing to talk and outline the protestors 
position to those eager to hear, whilst other activists were simply hostile. Journalists also found it 
difficult to navigate and were burdened by the rules of the camp (can we go in, who can we talk to, 
who does the escorting etc.).  
These and other similar encounters that I observed and the cumbersome regulations would appear 
to have left journalists wary of visiting the peace camp due to the hostility that they found there: 
There is deep suspicion and distrust of the mainstream media amongst the overwhelming 
number of protestors at camp. No-one seems to have any organised media strategy or be 
willing to engage with either national or foreign media to occasionally attend reception. 
Today’s morning meeting again signalled the attitude; "they distort everything” (unknown 
activist) a comment common in many other conversations. (NATO fieldnotes) 
This dogmatic position proved to be a chief impediment for the activists (although one rarely 
recognised as such). Throughout there was a failure to appreciate tight media timescales, a lack of 
confidence in public speaking and media training to be able to succinctly make a point and defend 
it, and no shortage of dogmatic naivety. The key meeting at camp to discuss the media strategy 
occurred on the Friday, at least two days too late, as once the summit wound up, the world's media 
similarly departed. Given that there was no protestor media centre at the camp, and that protestors 
had little effective movement links to other regional and national organisations, they ended up 
contributing to their own failings. The effect of these policies was to continually undermine the only 
viable method for disseminating the anti-NATO narrative that they supposedly wanted to 
propagate.  
This strategic blunder may simply reflect the particular makeup of the peace camp at Tredegar, 
their limited numbers, and the pressures on a wide division of labour and consequently some over-
reach, given that protest groups have shown increasing awareness of the power of the media. 
Unlike previous summit meetings, the convergence centre and the transgressive social movements 
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were simply too small in number to have any meaningful impact on the ground. Neither did the 
internal structure of the movement or the way they organised themselves assist them to the 
changing character and opportunity structures of the setting they found themselves in. This leaving 
the camp to its small scale actions and no small amount of irrelevance. 
10.3 The Newport March (Saturday 30th August) 
The summit as a wider protestor event had been advertised for some weeks prior and badged under 
a broad anti-NATO coalition umbrella of 'NO NATO Newport'. This was initiated by activists from a 
range of established national organisations from local affiliate groups (CND Cymru, Cardiff Stop the 
War Coalition, Newport People’s Assembly, trade unions, the SWP, anti-cuts and community 
groups working in conjunction with their national counter-parts and 'European peace'. There was far 
sparser web-traffic in contrast to earlier G20 and G8 events on openly anarchist sites, although 
several drew attention to 'Newport rising' as it was dubbed, pointing to its Chartist traditions, but 
comments sections as a proxy for interest were meagre. The discussion there was orientated 
around 'workshops, discussions and skill shares' in preparation to delegates arriving. What was 
absent was any established agenda proposing disruptive opposition to the summit or indeed a 
sense of expectation for this.  
The NO NATO Newport march was self-stewarded, with all aspects of the protest having been 
agreed during prior discussions between police and the organisers over a week beforehand. 
Therefore, the opening protest march had little potential to be confrontational: 
The march was good natured and a self-stewarded affair, sticking to the assigned route 
throughout. PLOs are in attendance amongst the demonstration, chatting where-ever they 
have a chance. Like the later 'march on the manor' it is largely a symbolic effort, with the 
pre-determined route being arranged far from the fortified summit site.  (NATO fieldnotes) 
 




Picture 22: PLOs Consult with Riot Police 
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Picture 23: PLOs Mingle with 
Demonstrators 
 
Picture 24: Riot Police Discretely in Reserve 
 
These rather tokenistic gestures had been hard won however. Interviews with two organisers of the 
march stated that gaining permission to actually hold the march had: 
'It took us months of lengthy negotiations with Gwent police around the arrangements of the 
precise route that the march would take, [such was the] ‘security 'sensitivities of the event.  
(Interview INP-03)253  
Another organiser indicated that the 'negotiation' with Gwent police was 'less of a negotiation' and 
more about accepting the police's wishes: 
'Ha, yes well ... In the end we opted for this compromised route, it was felt that it was that or 
no march at all ... to be honest, we didn't have much choice.' (Telephone Interview INP 02) 
The question remained as to whether the effort was worth the reward. There was a palpable sense 
in which the organising groups had been 'had over' (Waddington, 1998) by police guile and 
obstinacy by playing up the international security to ensure they facilitated an ineffective protest. 
But more widely by the state authority’s extensive pre-emptive arrangements, not just in terms of 
the summits location, but also, crucially, the summit timing in addition to the wider community 
management efforts. In anticipation of mass protest, the choice of a mid-week event made 
mobilisation that much more difficult, again a deliberate ploy by the authorities. Feeling they had 
little choice, the organisers had opted for marching on the weekend before in anticipation of the 
event, despite no delegate having arrived and never venturing near the manor (Interview INP-03). In 
short, what had been negotiated was a somewhat pointless 'march to nowhere', snaking around 
and through Newport with a heavy police presence at every step of the way.  
The march gathered at the centrally placed clock tower in Newport, and consisted of trade 
unions, the Socialist Workers Party (who had the heaviest presence) and anti-war groups, 
(including CND), as well as a singing choir in attendance. These were mostly an older crowd 
drawn from affiliations to these established organisations who fetishise non-violence, all of 
which were viewed as 'reliable demonstrators' by the police. (NATO fieldnotes)  
                                                          
253 Interview with two organisers of the march: (NPM02) one informal interview on the day at the march, 
another by telephone interview 8 days afterwards (NPM03). 
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The only other salient factor here is that these were not constituted of politically subordinate 
groups and due to the many SMOs present would have been able to pursue repression related 
grievances, itself constituting a check on the parameters of police indiscriminate or repressive 
action. In keeping with this low profile at the march starting point: 
There is no FITs or overt police surveillance presence and only a small number of officers in 
everyday uniform with high vis vests, along with pairs of PLOs intermingling with protestors 
and vacuuming up any information they can entice out of people. The PLOs also proceeded 
within the ranks of the demonstration after set-off, fraternising with demonstrators and 
showing a willingness to facilitate the agreed goals of the march.  (NATO fieldnotes) 
Picture 25: Marching to Nowhere: Strolling Around Newport with PLO's Embedded Within the 
Demonstration 
 
The authorities iron fist was held in reserve and out of close sight, with TSG units and Matrix units 
parked up in nearby backstreet should the police decide to exercise force on proceedings. Clearly 
nothing was being left to chance. The only marginal disturbance to this sobriety was several black 
bloc style clad protestors bussing in from the newly established peace camp, all of whom were 
unimpressed by the low general turnout for the event and demeanour. My estimate was between 
1,000-1,200 protestors as a maximum, and as the march moved off further police units joined, with 
police presence easily outnumbering protestors.   
At no point has any of the protestors veered from the agreed route, although it is being 
strictly reinforced by heavy police lines at junctions and side-roads, with more serials 
waiting in reserve. This entire event is summed well by one local journalist who remarked to 
me, "It's well disciplined" - the police's 'ground rules' were adhered to throughout. (NATO 
fieldnotes)  
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Threat based models (i.e. Davenport, 2000) assert that the extent and intensity of repression is 
directly related to the perceived threat a protest has to political elite interests. Taking this approach 
as our metric of interest, it is clear to see why the protest was not violently repressed. No delegates 
had arrived and the 'agreed route' never came close to the intended venue site (or threatened to 
'contaminate' its preparations). Neither did the size of the protest present any threat due to its 
relatively small size (compared to the far greater police presence, notably in reserve), and very 
largely constituted 'accepted groups' (Tilley, 1978) who lacked radical goals, at least by comparison 
to the more contemporary oppositional movements goals redolent in the peace camp. Despite this 
it needs to be remembered that there was a massive police presence throughout (mainly held 
tactically in reserve) which reflects structurally the political and ideological pressure the police were 
responding to considering the status of the forthcoming event.  
This description encapsulates how the police approached managing the demonstration, in tone and 
strategy. The end of the march was also orderly, without any impromptu deviations from the 
carefully agreed route and timings:  
The finale of the protest is played out by a succession of speakers addressing the crowd on 
the key object of derision. After a lengthy series of speakers, the crowd quietly ebbed away 
without incident. (NATO, fieldnotes) 
10.4 The 'March on the Manor'  
The dubbed 'March on the Manor’ was the only mass demonstration which offered some prospect 
of proceeding to where protestors at the camp actually wanted to go, a 'target of derision' 
(Waddington, 2012) although as with the previous march, a route had been arranged with police.  
The march congregated at the central cenotaph254 and there was a larger presence of 
activists from the peace camp present, although the overall demonstration was smaller in 
number than its previous weekend outing (perhaps up to 500). There was a more intolerant, 
aggressive and confrontational approach from the police at the outset and during the 
demonstration. (NATO fieldnotes) 
A deliberate tactic of police intimidation ensued, for instance: 
There is a small group of protestors getting on a bus from Newport to Cardiff in the 
afternoon (in anticipation of the evening event) who are immediately joined by twelve 
police. On reaching Cardiff the protestors split up and the police similarly split to follow the 
half dozen who then enter a town coffee shop, with attendant officers then besetting them 
by sitting in a van for an hour. Several other protestors are arrested for frustrating the police 
                                                          
254 The protestors gathered over a period of approximately an hour, at the end of which and just before set-off 
the police took down a black box (square oblong shape) which had been strapped to a lamppost, this was put 
in a camera box and then into a police vehicle. Whilst this could be an innocent device, the suspicion amongst 
some protestors was this hid a surveillance device to capture protestors' mobile phone data. No officer would 
offer any explanation as to the purpose and timing of this ('above my pay grade mate!').  
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surveillance efforts, one (on a 'public order offence') for deliberately blocking EG cameras 
overtly filming protestors, another for refusing to take off a face covering. The other tactic 
police employed was blanket stop and searches in the vicinity, with those carrying 'bust 
cards' as a potential breach of the peace. The word quickly went around at this new police 
tactic, and protestors quickly abandoned carrying bust cards, perhaps to their detriment. 
(NATO fieldnotes)  
The march was characterised by a very heavy police presence throughout, one which vastly 
outnumbered the protestors. No attempts were made during the demonstration to divert from the 
assigned route with avenues blocked by police serials and vehicles at every possible avenue.  









What this demonstrates is how the police respond to the perceived threat at protests, and the 
decisive role that police epistemology plays in these calculations (previous knowledge of protest 
groups). The increasing level of aggressiveness was in accordance with this perceived threat, one 
which was pre-emptively met through a combination of legal repression, intimidation and 
fortification. on the approach to the manor and the end point of the march, diffusion of this 'flash-
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point' was through the construction of a temporary steel police cordon cutting across the entire 
road and pavement (thereby closing off the street) (see pictures above). 
Picture 30: Here and No Further: The March to the Manor is Contained A Mile from the Summit  
 




This was  assisted by a very heavy police presence, including police overt surveillance openly filming 
protestors on both sides of this barricade. This effectively ended the march after a brief and rather 
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Picture 32: Two Police Helicopters Keep Watch at all Times on March to the Manor  
 
 
10.5 Cardiff’s 'Berlin Wall' or 'The Great Wall of Wales' 
10.5.1 The intensification of urban territorial control 
States attempt to control and defend summit spaces against contentious political actions, 
reflecting that state power is embedded territorially and in particular spatial routines (Tilley, 
2000:138). Henri Lefebvre (1991:410-11) has argued that space is: "becoming the principle stake of 
goal directed actions and struggles [...] its role is less and less neutral, more and more active, both 
as an instrument and as a goal, as a means and as an end."  
It is certainly the case that police and government actors now take spatial considerations far more 
seriously in a shift against disruptive protest tactics or 'transgressive contention' (Tilly, 2000). There 
is also concerted efforts by both these state actors aimed at protest avoidance, although these 
tactics increasingly morph into the more coercive arena of protest disruption, most notably where 
'negotiation' is not entered into by social movements and the police cannot be assured of complete 
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Picture 35: Barrier and Bollard System in Central Cardiff City Centre Approach to Cardiff Castle  
(in distance) 
 
This intensive control of space was evident in both Newport and Cardiff, which were turned into 
(perceived or real) protestor proof fortresses, couched in the official security discourse as deterring 
terrorism.  
This was organised into a 'layering' or 'buffering' of concentric circles of security radiating out from 
the central meeting venue site with outer and inner security zones. These extended deep into the 
city itself, both the shopping areas, educational venues (notably Cardiff University) but also 
recreation areas (see Picture 9 to 11 above & 12 to 14 below) and the entirely of Bute park (see 
pictures 16 to 18 below). (NATO fieldnotes)  
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Picture 36: Local Cyclists Negotiating Barriers in Cardiff
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Picture 38: Barriers for Hostile Vehicles and Protestors  in Central Cardiff 
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10.5.2 Visuals of the Secondary Physical Barriers in Cardiff 
Picture 40: One of the Many Steel Fences in Bute Park Sealing Off  Large Sections of the Park 
 
Picture 41 : Immoveable Objects: Steel Cable Fixings  Inter-Linking Concrete Bollards Attached  
to Steel Fences and to Each Other 
 
 
In traversing these newly fortified cities:  
It is central to the maintenance of these zones that they incorporate a combination of 
intensive and saturation police patrols (including armed police) enhanced overt and covert 
surveillance measures, as well as a host of intelligence gathering operations. The intention 
is to hermetically seal off the principle actors - the NATO delegates physically, visually and 
audibly from all outside this hegemonic elite. (NATO fieldnotes)  
Within Cardiff the physical inner ring was the substantial walls of the castle itself, and later in the 
afternoon the entirety of Bute park (although much of this had previously been zoned off with steel 
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fencing (see Picture 16-17 above, and 18 below) over a week in advance, restricting public access to 
the use of paths through the park. The outer second zone was the ten-foot-high steel fence 
constructed around every venue delegates visited, in Cardiff, the castle to which delegates had their 
dinner date. The third outermost physical barrier was the oval concrete bollards and steel 
retractable gates on all the approaches (pedestrian and road) to the castle. Ostensibly this outer 
layer was aimed at target hardening areas by blocking off any attack from vehicular borne IEDs, 
either being driven at speed  
Picture 42: One of Many Sealable Access Gates in the Bute Park Fence 
 
Picture 43: Steel Fence with Concrete Bollards Fortifying Approach Road into Cardiff Docks 
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into a structure, or by significantly increasing blast stand-off distances to the intended target. 
Whilst the design principles employed in the physical structures betray this intended attack vector 
and the much lauded 'terrorist threat', these measures carry a dual function. What I specifically want 
to draw attention to is the co-presence of such defensive spatial measures which act by 'co-
implication' (Leitner et al., 2008). The barriers (see picture 20 below) placed conterminously as 
tertiary fortification to the inner steel fences around Cardiff castle's walls also function. as a 
measure against protestors. This is to recognise one of the ways that the geography of security 
architecture acts to constrain social mobilisation. The authorities purposively seek to prevent large 
numbers from moving fluidly and rapidly through the city. Doing so carries the advantage of 
restricting social movements ability to innovate on the fly, or being in motion to appear 
unexpectedly in a place ahead of those trying to contain them.  
Picture 44: Visitors Traversing Barriers in Cardiff City Centre Pedestrian Shopping Area with 
Police Looking On 
 
This territorial control of space is supplemented at a still wider enclosure by the expansive 
surveillance operation with officers stationed at all transport interchanges, and on all bridges on 
arterial roads into south Wales (to spot any travelling protestors), as well as other national 
surveillances methods (such as ANPR and interlinked CCTV systems).  
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Picture 45: Steel fences and Barriers on a Bridge in by Cardiff Docks with Police Sentry
 
 
The security gates and bollards are supplanted incongruously into what had previously been public 
space. Whilst they permit shoppers to move through them, they create pinch points and bottle 
necks which order their human flows. These points are manned by police (to ensure the gate 
remains closed) and by evidence gathers, to intimidate protestors and underscore their lack of 
anonymity (through filming). As Graham (2002:589) discussing ongoing infrastructural trends after 
the 9/11 attacks: "urban flows can be scrutinised through military perspectives so that the inevitable 
fragilities and vulnerabilities they produce can be significantly reduced."  These newly formed mini 
citadels or security cage archipelagos prevent car bombers from approaching the inner security 
fencing and its protective zone, but only through constructing this immense security cage around 
entire city areas.  
Why this would be attractive to and generative of tourism is a mystery that is never broached by the 
assorted boosters captured within the various glossy brochures for the event. The vision imposed 
would appear spending money and having fun, and yet it was a bizarre spectacle which attracted 
local people and the media driven charisma around the first President of the US visiting Wales. The 
authenticity claimed of particularism and localism is lost in these simulated landscapes. This 
massive system of (un-climbable) steel fences and barricades do not simply restrict access, they 
define who belongs and who doesn't, and in doing so re-shapes social interaction and mobility.  
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Picture 46: Steel Fence Built with Concrete Bollards Protecting main Apporach to Cardiff Castle 
and Bisection the City 
 
Picture 47: People make use of the Limited Access Prior  in the Centre of Cardiff Prior to the 
Closure of the Fence 
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Picture 48: Street View of Steel Perimeter Fence Installed to Protect the Walls of Cardiff Castle 
 
 
The 10-foot steel fence encircling the perimeter walls of Cardiff Castle provided a towering symbol 
of exclusion and privilege, dubbed by some locals as Cardiff's 'Berlin Wall'. Activists wanted an 
opportunity for their demonstration to be seen by attending delegates who would be arriving by 
road, as it had in previous demonstration events, the security operation was deliberately aimed to 
deny them even this minimal requirement.  Following Ranciere, space becomes political when it is 
polemical place to address wrongs and demonstrate equality. Here, a place of encounter, to 
interrupt the naturalised order of domination by those that have no part in that order, that is to say 
those looking on.  Politics has its proper place, but only in the partitioned order of the police (Dikec, 
2005:174). 
10.6 Dinner at Cardiff Castle 
The fortification of Cardiff castle on the evening of the delegate dinner became the last significant 
opportunity to demonstrate against the summit. This was the only time that the delegates en 
masse left the fortifications of the Manor, only to be transported to another very heavily fortified 
site. Many members of the peace camp made the journey into Cardiff to attend with the intention 
of protesting as best they could, although there was an air of resignation that this would be at best 
symbolic due to their small numbers and the overwhelming police presence.  
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Picture 49: EG Officers (and group in the distance) Dispersed at key Points in Cardiff City Centre 
 
 
The securities fortifications of space and militaristic approaches were supplemented by a very heavy 
police presence throughout the city centre areas. This had a dual aim, to intimidate any protestors 
who arrived in Cardiff (in part through the use of roaming units of 'evidence gathers' to reduce any 
semblance of anonymity that a crowd may afford and to let people know they were being filmed, 
and unusually audio recorded) (see pictures 25 to 29 below) along with an intensive programme of 
policing and behaviour regulation implemented in Cardiff city centres security zones. 
The city centre takes on a panoptical feel, evidence gathers cocooned in protective units, 
mingle with the crowds and demonstrators to film and (including audibly) record any 
‘persons of interest’. This overt surveillance is used to reduce protestor anonymity as well as 




Picture 50: Police Surveil Demonstrators 








Picture 51: One of the Many Other 'EV' 
Units Openly Filming Demonstrators 
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Picture 52: BTP EV's Used to Intimidate Protestors Arriving by Train (Newport Station) 
 
This police surveillance dimension was not without its comical side, in part driven by my own 
fieldwork: 
The far right EG officer of the group is smiling (picture above) at the irony of me 
photographing him. Later that evening when the demonstration had died down I ended up 
chatting to him and some of his fellow officers (x4 EG's). They appeared keen to talk, and all 
of them wanted to get a word in during our conversation, perhaps partly because they were 
rather bored with the few, if any, demands on their time (in light of the very high level of 
police including EG's presence at the scene) and as earlier (and later) all of the officers had 
noted me filming them. We discussed the implications of their surveillance role and the 
'surveillance society' phenomenon. Each appeared to offer genuinely held views on these 
subjects. Whilst they recognised their actions as being somewhat intrusive and intimidating 
(at a push) they fell back onto techniques of neutralisation, by pointing to how commercial 
company’s actions were ‘far worse than anything they did’. They cited examples of this and 
somewhat bemoaned how the public were seemingly unaware of such practices. From our 
ensuing conversation, what the officers did not want to recognise is that the state is an 
entirely different entity to a private company and the implications of this. Notably in 
respect to how the data can be used for social sorting purposes, and the potential impacts 




Picture 53: Signalling to Protestors: BTP Officers Stake Out Newport Rail Station
 
The protest which took place in Cardiff was a rather last minute affair and involved a small 
contingent of protestors from the camp: 
Expressions of interest circulate around the camp to see if there is a willing contingent to 
make the trip to Cardiff that evening; ‘Whose going down to Cardiff’ (NP-16). This receives 
somewhat of a muted response, but some others are interested. This turns on the feasibility 
of (and affordability) of travel arrangements to get there. Not everyone has sufficient 
money for public transport, and there is a bargaining out of who can catch lifts in the several 
protestor vehicles that will driving over to maximise the camps presence. (NATO fieldnotes)  
The Cardiff trip feels much more like an impromptu affair, although a large banner has been 
brought to signal the anti-NATO message (one that is unlikely to have been seen by visitors 
to the Castle). The assorted protestors are closely shadowed by uniformed police from the 
camp and on all other available public transport routes (bus and rail). [A comical overkill 
here in respect to the incongruity of the 40 or so protestors and their ever watchful police 
trackers] (NATO fieldnotes)  
On arrival, there is a mishmash of local people and tourists taking in this unusual scene, 
interspersed with a range of other small and eclectic protest groups that have also arrived 
to protest their concerns at the Castle boundary fences. There is a very heavy police 
presence in the city centre with roaming groups of police as well as a very heavy police 
presence as the camp protestors arrived (in dribs and drabs) adjoining the barriers on the 
road overlooking the castle. Clearly they were expected, but are vastly outnumbered by the 
enormous police and security presence. (NATO fieldnotes) 
Black bodies and hoodies became the focus of police attention, not that these constitute symmetry 
with police armoured riot gear, stab proof vests, batons, tasers and full face protective helmets.  A 
little tactical game ensued, where those dressed in black, some with banners in vain hope of 
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attracting the view of any delegate who might chance a glance over (never realised)  were pursued 
by squads of riot police (still adorned with blue soft caps, with NATO helmets to hand). This tactical 
manoeuvre to prevent spatial mobility served little purpose except intimidation.  
Picture 54: Police Serials in Cardiff City 




Picture 55: Police Spotters in the Crowd  
 
 
Picture 56: Police Serials Keep a Close Eye 
on the Crowd 
 
Picture 57: Police Serials at Rear in Reserve 
Scholl (2012:100-1) argues that black bloc style protestors are an effective 'simulation' of police 
frontal and confrontational manoeuvres, the antithesis of police: "[..] a dialectical image that lays 
bare the violent character of protest policing and the unwillingness of hegemonic forces to change 
power structures so long as they can continue to control." This is despite no actions of the peace 
camp resorting to this implicit assumption.  
The crowds appeared to be waiting for the arrival of President Obama to the dinner, anticipating 
that 'something would happen' and that it was important, a spectacle not to be missed.  The 
elaborate measures put in place to provide total security reflected the mode of transport to the 
dinner. Unlike their trips to the Manor, VIPs were not helicoptered in (presumably due to insufficient 





Picture 58: Police, Protestors and Local People Await the Arrival of Delegates to the Cardiff 
Dinner Date 
 
The massive police presence reached its zenith just prior to the arrival of the main guest at the front 
entrance, President Obama (although this was not confirmed visually). At this point the ranks of 
police were significantly reinforced, seeing a tripling of numbers (with officers in the hundreds) as if 
there were some expectation that there would be a sudden charge over the roadside barriers by 
onlookers and into the steel fence separating them from the castle walls.  
Picture 59: Riot Police (helmets slung) Monitor the Awaiting Crowd 
 
The final act in this carefully choreographed play was yet another team of officers: 
Another team of officers (approximately 40) arrive to undertake a painstaking 'walk-
through' and last visual inspection of the ground prior to Obama's arrival. Each is intently 
looking down, inspecting the pavement, side by side, slow stepping along that pathway 
where the VIPs presence may venture.(NATO fieldnotes) 
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It turned out that the arrival was a swift affair, with a drop-off, and without a nod or wave to the 
awaiting crowds or protestors, the passenger entered the castle, a shadowy figure more glimpsed 
than seen, and at once, it is over.  
10.7 Concluding Remarks on the NATO Protests 
Throughout the NATO summit the authorities had used several main tactical innovations, on the 
ground dominating the space where protest events occur and by doing so, were able to exercise 
greater levels of control.  This occurred to a greater extent than the G20, and the increased physical 
control of the environment around the meeting resulted in protestors being deprived of any chance 
to show their dissatisfaction to world leaders - a direct result of pursuing a fortress model approach, 
but one which curtailed 'panic policing' or forward panic and the violent repression that 
characterised the G20.  
The NATO summit also demonstrates that the limited commitment to 'negotiated management' 
policing has morphed into a more broadly pre-emptive and precisely targeted hybrid form of 
policing. Ensuring an overwhelming security presence is a favoured model, and one that has been 
used in other summits such as the 2002 G8 summit in Kananaskis. In addition, the fortress 
urbanism, like rings of steel, even encompassing iconic buildings such as the Cardiff castle puts the 
political machinery of the summit largely out of reach. These spatial measures are reinforced by 
additional layers of protection by rivers, fences, buttressed by a considerable military presence 
(naval, army and air force).  
The NATO summit is also instructive when considering the range of police and authority responses 
to protest and more crucially, wider embryonic dissent. What we are seeing is a convergence of 
sovereign and networked powers exercising new modes of control (Bratich, 2014). The very low 
turnout for the organised (and contentious wings) of protest attests to the considerable pre-
emptive protest avoidance tactics used by the authorities which now more closely resemble low 
intensity warfare tactics (LIC). These appear in disguised form, such as the emphasis on nation 
branding. This also functions as a pre-emptive tactical measure by the authorities which carries a 
symbolic communicative character also.  
Thus far I have argued, using Barker's (2001) work on legitimation, that any 'sense-making' process 
in studying international summits requires recognising that they are, in considerable part at least, 
forums for legitimating elite identities through dramatisation and ritual. What is at stake is not 
simply the official version of 'securing the summit' but facilitating the claiming of legitimacy by the 
institutional actors taking part in the play. Rather unsurprisingly this perspective receives no official 
public discussion, certainly in these depreciative terms. The same political and ideological pressures 
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helping shape the police practices and actions are seen at state ceremonial events (such as royal 
ceremonies) in what Waddington (2012:49) in a momentary lapse of 'going native' refers to as the 
police's "professional obligation to act in resolute defence of politically significant occasions." It 
does appear in more tangential form in other jurisdictions however, for instance, from a senior 
Canadian government official tasked with summit planning discussing the 'concerns' of the 
Canadian Prime Minister's Office (PMO) about the importance of:  
"The dignity of the leaders being observed, [and] the dignity of the event itself, important 
international meetings, especially conferences." (Canada, 2001, §9.3) 
Recounting senior police preparations at the annual remembrance event at the Cenotaph in central 
London, Waddington (1994a:44-5) notes that: "Not only is every effort made to eliminate terrorist 
attack, acts of protest that would diminish the dignity of the event are rigorously prevented." 
Illustrating the extent of these measures and (later) conceding the 'infringement' on people's civil 
liberties, Waddington recounts that: "A person carrying a tin-whistle that might have been blown 
during the two-minute silence at the Cenotaph on Remembrance Sunday was ejected from the 
crowd" [and area]. (Ibid.) 
These are significant admissions because what this translates to in practice unpacks and makes 
sense of the unacknowledged key objectives for police and authority planning, the requirement of 
creating a 'dignified space' for attendees and one which stretches beyond considerations of security 
requirements which planners might identify. Zajko & Beland's (2007:726) discussion of the same 
Hughes Report in the context of political influence on the 1997 APEC summit security preparations 
fails to appreciate the full significance of this point. When protestors express grievances and 
convictions at perceived injustices, this is in part an admission that they are at the same time unable 
to correct the condition by their own efforts, and the protest action drawing attention to that wrong 
and the ameliorative steps by the target group who are held to shoulder some responsibility (here 
NATO delegates)  (Turner, 1968:816).255 At the same time the legitimacy of public order policing 
rests on using police capacity and authority to establish an 'equilibrium' between the competing 
parties of government and society on the one hand and the rights and interests of protestors 
holding the grievance on the other (Lint, 2005:180). The work done by an insistence to uphold the 
                                                          
255 This point becomes more acute when one recognises that there is no facility or mechanism for a citizen to 
participate in, or to influence, NATO's policies (strategic, operational and tactical). Neither does NATO ever 
consult with any of its many member state citizens, or citizen organisations, concerning its military policies 
and there are no future plans to do so. (FOI NATO This is a curious state of affairs when one considers the 
political hostility to supra-organisations such as the European Union and its widely perceived legitimacy 
deficit. NATO as an organisation lacks even this facade of democracy, and yet its policies are arguably more 




'dignity of the event' invariably side-lines protestors civil rights and ensures that protest is 
ineffectual. 
In the final analysis, a sufficient number of protestors must believe that their actions can carry some 
chance of success in the face of their adversaries and it is perhaps the ultimate testimony to the 
authorities that this never came to pass. It may indicate that increasingly such summit protests are 






























I have been investigating how the state responds to and controls political protest, with a specific 
focus on contentious 'transgressive' protest  at two international summits here in the UK.256 I have 
examined how the authorities and its associated 'players' achieve this control and the means 
through which it is achieved. In doing so, I have utilised concepts from repression research, 
specifically ideas of 'inhibiting strategies' (Marx, 1979) and 'action modes' (Boykoff, 2007). I have 
also drawn upon the strategic and tactical perspectives of Jaspers (2015) and Scholl (2012) to 
analyse the 'repertoires of action' and interaction that take place on the streets between the 
respective players, the authorities and their allies, the active protest groups and their allies, as well 
as the principle audiences for each other's actions (the media, interest groups, experts and 
intellectuals, bystanders and the wider publics).  In doing so I have provided a synthesis of findings 
across a range of primary and secondary data sources to come to a determination about the nature 
and form of state repression and its effects on protestors and protest movements. Whilst my 
findings are limited to these two sites and hence situated within the UK, they need to be seen 
within the context of the broader trends in summit policing in the Western world since the 
watershed protests in Seattle in 1999. My findings also build on the model developed by the two 
landmark studies of della Porta, et al. in 1998 and 2006, and cohere with more recent work (by 
Wood, 2014, 2015; Scholl, 2012, 2013; Starr et al, 2011; de Lint 2005) and repression research 
(notably Marx, 1979; Boykoff, 2006;2007; and Earl 2003; 2005; 2011; Earl & Soule, 2010).  
It needs to be noted at the outset that the rise and variety of these and other protest cycles, are 
driven by the long-term effects of socio-economic changes in the structures of capitalism over the 
last three decades. It is the shift from Fordism to neoliberalism and its attendant restructuring 
which has seen the dual effects of pauperisation of the lower classes and the proletarianisation of 
the middle classes (della Porta, 2005:35). Moreover, we have seen that since the globalist designs of 
the Clinton era have stalled, the arising conflicts which have been mediated by bodies such as World 
Economic Forum, the Organisation for economic Cooperation and Development demonstrates not 
the redundancy of the state but the continued power of the state in international political economy. 
As Oppenheimer (2000) notes in his study of the modern state, the relative informality of these 
forums and the lack of public scrutiny enables a privileging of insiders and the formation and 
perpetuation of elite interests. This has led to a growing number of disgruntled citizens to question, 
if not reject entirely, the ability of the current democratic regime to offer them substantial 
opportunities to take decisions on important matters in accordance with their needs and interests. 
                                                          
256 I have also drawn one the key incident from the third case study at the London anti-G8 protest (being MPS's 
raid on the convergence centre).  
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11.1 Key Themes From the Research  
At the outset of this study I made a forceful argument to bring the state 'back in' to policing analysis 
by examining the relationship between the state and the police and critiquing the police's 
implausible claim to neutrality in matters of protest policing. This position claimed by chief 
constables up and down the land, and their associated bodies (such as the HMIC) does not 
withstand any serious scrutiny, or indeed the history of Peelian policing (which was imported from 
Ireland to suppress political radicals), and only acts to further mystify social relations.  
The state is a structural force through which social struggles are directed, and how it mediates 
social conflicts has a vital bearing on the social preconditions of political democracy and the ability 
of challengers to crack entrenched privilege. What my analysis reveals is the state and its coercive 
arm, the police, do much to modify, delimit, and repress protest action. This is the case in at least 
two senses, one more discreet in time, the other not. The control of space at the summit site and 
the entire city vicinity (including key transport arterial routes) begins many months before any 
protestors arrive on the streets. This careful mapping and planning is geared to provide social 
control advantages through selecting large defensible locations which then undergo extensive 
fortification, including establishing 'no protest zones'. In tandem, although much less visibly, overt 
and covert surveillance, increased infiltration of protest groups and harassment towards dissenters 
occur. Closer to the summit event these authority tactics intensify, with extraordinary rules and 
laws being enforced through a massive policing presence, harassment and harassment arrests, and 
at the G20, mass media manipulation and mass media depreciation as well as considerable police 
violence. This includes using non-lethal weapons against unarmed protestors to incapacitate them, 
enacted clandestinely as a method of dispensing 'street justice' and increasing the costs of 
participation, officially allowing police to control and retake any protest spaces; and pre-emptive 
legal repression (including legal tools such as banning orders and mass pre-emptive arrests, etc.) all 
of which aids protestor demoralisation and demobilisation (Noakes et al, 2007; Wood, 2015). At the 
G20, (and later in 2013 at the G8 in London also) we see the authorities disrupt and smash protestor 
critical infrastructure, including (but not limited to) convergence centres. More generally across all 
the summit sites that I observed there is an intensive use of police surveillance practices to 
intimidate protestors, reduce anonymity at protest spaces and increase transparency and real time 
intelligence gathering. All of these tactics are strategically adapted to the prevailing conditions 
imposed by each particular summit, and interact dynamically, although not always incrementally, 
to protestor's own tactical repertoires.  
Page.296 
 
These more discrete and summit specific practices need to be considered in light of a broader and 
long-term ongoing effort by an entire secret state apparatus whose primary function is also to 
constrain, delimit and emasculate domestic political dissent. This brings into view who the state 
actors are and the relationship between them. Whilst my work only touches on this hidden 
dimension (in part because it is very difficult to investigate) the political policing practices of NETCU 
(WECTU) and NPOIU were very much in evidence in the manner that protest is now policed.257 
These policing agencies constitute one part of a larger Orwellian 'shadow government', and form 
part of a dual set of institutions consisting of intelligence, military, diplomatic, financial and 
private/corporate contractors that make most of the key decisions in what constitutes a 'national 
security state'.258 As della Porta et al. (2004; 2006) argue, the involvement of multiple agencies in 
summit arrangements including the 'intelligence services' acts to reduce accountability and external 
controls on police interventions. Indeed, they are removed from public view and operate without 
the informed consent of the governed. As others have similarly argued (Bunyan, 1981; Scraton, 
1985; Connor, 2018a/b) the British state has developed a formidable array of repressive agencies, all 
of which view any form of dissent outside a narrow frame of political activity as a threat.  
This picture of widespread state repressive activity is aimed at protecting the dominant hierarchical 
social relations from 'deep dissent' (Connor, 2018a) which challenges the distribution of existing 
wealth and power in society. Far from neo-liberalism and globalisation weakening or 'hollowing out' 
the state (be it from a supposed shift from hierarchical governance to governance through de-
regulated markets, associations and community engagement (the society-centred approach) we 
are witnessing its opposite. As Bell and Hindmoor  (2009) have argued, government remains the 
central actors in contemporary governance. The addition of a range of new administrative forms 
facilitate governance, for instance the use of 'task forces' to co-ordinate policy across government  
(Taylor, 2000), Public Service Agreements (PSA's) (James, 2004) and efforts for more 'joined up 
government' (Holliday, 2003) have seen the strengthening and enhancement of the core executive 
functions capacity.259 
                                                          
257 The presence of known senior NETCU (WECTU) and NPOIU uniformed officers were also identified at all the 
summit protests that I examined through NETPOL staff. 
258 An instructive analysis of 'double government' from a US perspective can be found in Glennon's (2015) 
National Security and Double Government, OUP.  
259 Reviewing this wider empirical literature, Bell and Hindmoor  (2009:38) report on a review of over 800 
individual studies of governance arrangements conclude that despite  greater reliance upon horizontal, 
hybridised, and associational forms of governance, these reflect "a gradual addition of new administrative 
forms that facilitate governance in a system of constitutional authority that is necessarily hierarchical" 
(Rhodes, 2007, in  Bell and Hindmoor  (2009:39). Bell and Hindmoor (2009:45) conclusion is that such 
governments and state agencies are attempting to increase their governing capacities and policy objectives by 
undertaking experiments with different relational governance arrangements. 
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These developments, along with entrenched  police paramilitarisation (in terms of equipment and 
tactics), the increasingly globalised field of policing expertise and 'knowledge transfer' with its pre-
emptive logics and a 'disruptive turn' (Wood, 2014; Christmann, 2015), the role of specialist political 
policing agencies and their allies, a permissive legislative framework and a near inoperative system 
of police governance, have reorganised and recalibrated state repression in response to those 
earlier innovative protestor tactics and strategies. What has emerged is a hybrid form of policing 
that is both 'soft hat' and 'hard hat', it neither abandons the more conciliatory 'negotiated 
management' approach or fully abdicates to the more aggressive and at times brutal 'escalated 
force' model. The escalated force approach is employed in several ways, most keenly to keep 
activists very far from the fortified summit venues and its coterminous no protest zones, both 
visually and audibly. In this sense authority’s efforts are aimed at sealing off hermetically the 
summit site and its delegates from any persons that might wish to show some form of dissent. The 
police are not only prepared to 'die in a ditch' (Waddington, 1991;1994) in order to accomplish this, 
when necessary, they engage in malpractice and illegality to achieve it on the day. This includes 
taking pre-emptive measures such as in London, during the G20, where a decapitation strategy was 
in operation, smashing convergence centres, likely due to their proximity to a range of protestor 
target sites. Here operational expediency trumps legality and civil liberties, at least for those 
labelled the 'official opposition' (Waddington, 1991; 1994). In these actions the police make up the 
rules as they go along, and have proved themselves to be prepared to break the law to which they 
are supposedly the chief custodians, as well as breach protestors human rights. The law is in effect 
eviscerated, but because this occurs behind the scenes and to 'police property' under the eminently 
pliable justification of 'preventing crime and disorder' however implausible or improbable this may 
be, such breaches are conducted with impunity. At the time and in these circumstances there is no 
external referee for the protestor to appeal to, and the police enjoy a monopoly of force (including 
lethal force) to subdue any opposition. There is no option to refuse the 'service' being provided or to 
request a different provider as the police are a coercive public monopoly. All the bruised protestor 
can do is to require 'retrospective accounting' (here through a civil suit) many months after the 
event, when tactically at least, there is nothing left to play for. The ensuing financial compensation 
to protestors (and the not inconsiderable legal costs incurred by both sides) like the legal judgement 
against the capital's chief constable, are simply a cost of doing the 'dirty work' that political policing 
requires, one met (ultimately) through the public purse. These practices continued post-G20, 




notably in 2013, where the anti-G8260 protest convergence centre in central London was similarly 
raided and smashed by MPS resulting in legal suits against MPS.261  
As della Porta & Reiter (1998:30-31) have observed, this hybridism of policing has allowed a 
continuity in policing roles, especially towards the officially labelled 'dangerous' protestor', one 
which has managed to retain the violent police actions on the street, at times redolent of Starks 
'police riot'.  
The findings from my two case studies also show the highly selective nature of policing styles used 
for different protestor groups based upon police epistemology and the claims of police intelligence. 
What we are witnessing in the UK is the adoption of a 'dual model' of 'strategic incapacitation' 
(Noakes, et al., 2005) one which employs increasingly militarised tactics and strategies which 
proactively, pre-emptively and precisely targets those groups deemed to be uncooperative or 
unpredictable. It should be stressed that this now encapsulates a large number of social movement 
actors and organisations. As the G20 illustrated, it is not simply reserved for violent protestors, but 
mobilised for any who sit on the fringes of the 'respectable' kind of demonstrator categorised 
through a partial and self serving stereotypical police knowledge. Why this is so needs some 
explanation and I have drawn on Brodeur's, (1983) critical distinction between 'high policing' and 
low policing', and Barkers (2001) work on identity legitimation as two of the analytical keys to reveal 
the inner logic driving these practices.  
This last dimension to international summits has largely escaped scrutiny by social movement 
scholars. The proper conceptualisation of such events requires a closer reflection on the role they 
play in the political life of our rulers, that they function first and foremost as a symbolic ritual to 
assert legitimacy claims. This is to take seriously Barkers (2001:2) proposal that rulers are in fact 
claim making, here a 'particular species of prestige which attaches to government'. When seen 
through this lens, international summits are 'elite parties' buttressed by pomp and ceremony, but 
one which allows rulers to make a claim about their right to rule, that they constitute being special 
people. They also allow some degree of self-assurance (including a means to assure other 
international actors present). In short, they are about legitimating ruling identities. This is to focus 
on the 'dignity of the event', masked under the oblivious 'security concerns' as the primary driver for 
police action and that of the broader state repressive apparatus. International summits are not the 
only example of this, in the UK some ceremonial events, including Remembrance Sunday and Royal 
weddings assume the same official intolerance to any potential visible or audible sign of dissent 
                                                          
260 The 2013 G8 summit took place in the isolated Fermanagh, Northern Ireland, but protests against the G8 
were organised to occur in London. Activist had   drawn up a 'hit list' of corporate and state targets that they 
wanted to organise protest actions against. 
261 Personal correspondence from NETPOL and Bindmans solicitors. 
Page.299 
 
(Waddington, 1994a:44-5). It is one which is difficult to account for from a securitisation perspective 
alone, irrespective of the risk assessment methodology and vulnerability assessment employed. 
This is the case even where one takes the security orthodoxy seriously, and comprehensively maps 
out the theoretically plausible attack scenarios (all the attack scripts) that a terrorist or offender 
may take in mounting an attack and the opportunity-blocking preventative interventions.  
My findings also suggest that the policing and security operations at summits aim to achieve a 'full-
spectrum' dominance, one which more acutely mimics the low intensity warfare tactics used by the 
military. This is most apparent when examining the spatial transformations that localities undergo 
in the run up to a summit, although this constitutes one part of a wider and deeper set of repressive 
practices employed by the authorities. The summit security operations are no longer discrete 
episodes, nor particular to the site of the 'extraordinary event', as I have been arguing, they form 
part of a far broader set of ongoing pre-emptive monitoring, intelligence gathering and disruption 
practices residing across a network of state security apparatus. This is most obviously evidenced by 
the ongoing intelligence gathering efforts (HUMIT and SIGNIT) undertaken by state authorities 
(SDP; local and national Special Branch; NETCU; NDET, in addition to MI5; GCHQ). This process has 
been driven more recently by the considerable net widening effects of the UK's controversial 
counter-terrorism policy Prevent, and the inclusion of 'non-violent extremism' into its remit. This 
vague construction of dangerousness enshrined in UK (but also EU) 'soft law’ and across policy 
landscapes is one capable of capturing entire dissenting communities. It gifts to the police an 
eminently pliable tool which can justify intrusive surveillance and all manner of pre-emptive 
repression and 'disruption' tactics, including the armed raids on critical protestor infrastructure. This 
application of a 'terrorist' label (be it in the 'pre-crime' space) to domestic dissent constitutes one 
element of the increasing militarisation of policing long recognised by scholars on both sides of the 
Atlantic. It is a mind-set which classifies protestors as similar to an enemy, construing them as an 
opposition, not a legitimate dissenting voice to be accommodated, but one to be strategised 
against and authoritatively defeated.  
This last consideration also brings into view one of the many serious oversights of the official inquiry 
reports into MPS's handling of the G20 protests. The analysis undertaken is ahistorical and 
atheoretical, and clings to a cherished illusion about institutions, that they always abide by the law 
(Brodeur, 1983:810). Neither is there any recognition that the policing model has been transformed 
and increasingly follows a militarised logic. The authors never seriously consider that this network 
operates tyrannically at these times and in these spaces, that it is premised and organised with the 
pre-emptive aim of disrupting the capacities of the dissenting network from developing. It is an 
account and mind-set situated in the clothes of 'low policing' but operates on the logic of 'high 
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policing'.  As with all political policing, its raison d'être is the protection of the political regime, and 
one which more closely resembles a ‘war of manoeuvre' (Scholl & Freyberg, 2013). Observing the 
essential nature of high policing, von Hentig states “A political police is not so much an instrument 
for the protection of society as a form of political activity through the medium of the police” (von 
Hentig, 1919: 30). This distinctly political role of the British police in the detection and repression of 
dissent is still officially denied, despite the formidable array of oppressive agencies at the British 
states disposal (Bunyan, 1977). Rather the failings of Operation Glencoe were largely attributed to 
organisational issues such an inadequate officer training and guidance, poor communication on the 
day, 'misunderstandings', 'inconsistent equipment', as well as the uncritical acceptance of MPSs 
claims about 'violent protestors' to legitimise kettling and baton charges into the crowd. The 
hazardous nature of these practices continues in the face of medical evidence which shows the very 
considerable risks of baton blows to neck and cranial areas, a persistent feature of officers’ actions 
during operation Glencoe. Reading through the reports one cannot but help be struck by the 
successive agencies resistance to pursue the line of inquiry and pronounce clearly on police wrong-
doing. This is to adopt a deviance model of policing and to recognise the antagonistic role of high 
policing, one I have argued is never seriously entertained by any of the respective agencies. In part 
this is explained by the considerable independence deficits these agencies carry, but also (notably 
those who took testimony) as well as failing to ask (and pursue) the right questions. Senior officers 
are also skilled at manoeuvring these proceedings, displaying tactical savvy even here.   
HMIC's report did contain some muted but tangible criticism to this militaristic logic however, that 
MPS failed to start from a presumption of the right to protest. Whilst this is welcome, it falls far 
short in its recommendations without a capable guardian who can champion its cause in the face of 
securitising moves typical at summit and other international events.  
My findings demonstrate the extent to which authorities have proved very capable of strategic 
adaption, both as an ongoing product of interactive learning between protestors and police on the 
streets (the longstanding practices of post-operation de-briefing sessions to harvest 'lessons learnt') 
(for instance, Waddington, 1994) as well as diffused cross-nationally, assisted by the growth of 
professional policing organisations and other alliances making networks which disseminate 
operational 'best practices' (Wood, 2014). This is a process which is influenced by external criticism 
however. It is notable that the NATO summit operation's psychops before the summit did not 
repeat the scare tactics seen at the G20 pressures (protestors were not demonised to the same 
degree at the NATO summit as they were at the G20) to a more holistic pre-emptive community 
management strategy. This included a series of charm offensives, overt military propaganda, and 
appeals to national and self-interests (in part by nation branding techniques through co-opting local 
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political and business elites as 'boosters') alongside careful site selection by central government. 
Whilst there has been very little research attention given to the political economy of controlling 
dissent, I argue that its media framing and propagation needs to be seen as one vital element of 
what Bratich (2014;16) terms 'pre-crowd control' measures, and investigated as a form of 'pre-
emptive dissuasion' (Emer & Opel, 2008) and 'consent management' (Bratich, 2007). These and 
other pre-emptive tactics acted to frustrate anti-NATO mobilisation efforts and drain existing 
support for open dissent. It also demonstrates the continued central role given to communicative 
activities, particularly strategic communication and framing by the authorities in order to exercise 
influence over local people and their perceptions. This is a ‘hearts and minds' strategy, but here 
also, wallets. It is this reach for holistic control, one stretching beyond the security ecology and into 
the wider environment (including cultural, social, economic, historical) which demarcates the NATO 
summit of particular interest and marks it with features of the authorities having adopted counter-
insurgency doctrine.  
My study also shows how police surveillance practices can have an incapacitating effect on the 
protestor groups that I observed. Whether real or not, protestors' concerns about police informants 
or infiltration at times acted to erode trust and co-operation between activists, and impair their 
ability to organise themselves and to mobilise wider support. Whilst this constituted only one (and 
perhaps relatively marginal) element of the failure to build a broader alignment, notably for the 
protestors anti-militarist message in Wales, it points to a disturbing feature for those wishing to 
challenge existing power structures.  
In summary, protests at international summits remain a critical litmus test for any state, including 
Western liberal democracies, to provide spaces where its intransigent citizens can communicate 
dissent to their rulers. On the streets at least, this remains a somewhat distant reality, if it is ever to 
be realised, there needs to be fundamental reforms to bring about a genuinely democratic and 
accountable system of policing. 
11.2 Original Contribution of this Research and Areas for Future Research 
Understanding how the state and its agencies control and repress political protest taking place at 
UK international summits provides a rich stream of themes, all of which are worthy of further 
investigation. I have discussed these in brief above, but at this juncture want to raise some 
additional areas which (to my mind) also constitute some of the achievements of this research 
study.  In doing so I do not intend to recount all my earlier points in the body of the thesis, but rather 
to flag up and build on some very specific points that I have made.   
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11.2.1 Pacifying disruptive subjects 
I present a study of state repression and political policing, and in doing so build on the work of 
others in this area and aligned areas such as 'repression research' (for instance, Bunyan, 1983; Earl, 
2003, 2004, Earl & Soule, 2010; Boykoff, 2006, 2007; Scholl, 2012; Scraton, 1985). I have 
demonstrated how state repression is changing and morphing, in part in response to tactical 
innovations by transgressive protest groups, although ultimately violent state power still very much 
remains in use. These changes can be thought of as a 'counter-insurgency infused' theory and 
doctrine, and which has important parallels with Low Intensity Operations (LIO), both of which 
seeks to disrupt and undermine support for dissent from challenger groups amongst local 
communities and the wider population. Authority players pursue 'pre-emptive dissuasion’ through a 
'hearts and minds' approach to win over the acquiescence of the population by employing a range 
of strategic communication methods, including propaganda, place and nation branding, and a 
range of other inducements and promissory incentives, all operating temporarily within a highly 
securitised environment. The key goal is not crowd control as such, but much further upstream, to 
temporarily 'dissuade emergence' (Elmer & Opel. 2008). As (Bratich, 2014:16) has noted, the aim is 
'pre-crowd control' through immobilisation towards committed activists and dissuasion for wider 
publics or potential joiners.  
This represents a fruitful area for further research, namely into how these doctrines are deployed, 
what form they take and under what other circumstances they emerge.  
11.2.2  Impacts of Covert Policing for Protestor mobilisation, de-recruitment and de-motivation  
My study has shown some of the impacts upon 'activist protestors' from covert police surveillance 
and infiltration tactics, how this can break down relationships of trust, frustrate protest organising, 
as well as deter wider recruitment efforts by existing protestors. Indeed, at times, and amongst 
some protestors, there was acute concerns shown about the dangers of police infiltration which led 
to some internal conflict and directed energies and resources to defensive maintenance practices 
indicating several of Marx's (1979) inhibiting strategies towards social movements.  
This is a difficult area to study, in part because it requires being embedded within these activist 
networks in the first place in order to gauge its relative impacts, or gaining their trust to undertake 
data gathering. 
There is also a need to further explore the impacts of policing strategies, notably aggressive and 
violent mass policing, intensive police overt surveillance practices, and police harassment and 
harassment arrests on protestor demobilisation and de-recruitment.  These policing strategies and 
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tactics need to be assessed across a range of politically involved persons (with dissent being defined 
not simply amongst activists). Doing so presents a number of methodological measurement 
difficulties, nevertheless we require a better understanding of how these tactics impact protest 
involvement and within the context of protest social networks.   
11.2.3 Studying Police Violence in Crowd Situations 
Police violence in what the police get to define as 'public order situations' is very challenging for a 
researcher to study (for reasons I rehearse in Section 3.7.6 and 3.8 in detail). Most obviously it 
exposes one to a host of serious physical risks and well as legal ones (by being perceived as party to 
'public disorder' and hence risks arrest and prosecution). At the same time the situations which put 
one in greatest peril are also those that can deliver the best vantage point in determining police 
malpractice and excessive use of force (including brutality). In particular, I have in mind here the 
RAG strike zones when officers are using baton strikes against protestors (be it in a police baton 
charges or in enforcing a police kettle), and the far higher level of justification supposedly required 
(only in extremis) when taking seriously the principle of minimum force. This requires constantly 
trying to predict trigger points and to situate oneself at a vantage point to observe (and hopefully 
record) the interactions, all whilst trying to maintain some safety. Typically accredited journalists 
covering large demonstrations stay behind police lines (and are instructed to do so) which only 
delivers one partial, and distorted, view. When violence does occur it is also unpredictable, 
therefore difficult to plan for  as a research strategy, and necessarily requires opportunistic 
sampling by attending successive demonstrations.262  I found that this was made that much more 
difficult by the suppliers of personal protective equipment having a company policy to refuse to 
supply all non-police personnel. This despite the claim that it is 'defensive equipment' and that its 
only function was for 'personal protection purposes'. However, I was informed that they did not 
want the equipment to be 'used against the police'. A curious construction which betrays its real 
dual function as offensive as well as defensive.  
Despite these dangers and difficulties there is a need to study police violence 'up close and 
personal'. Advances in camera technology (i.e. GoPro photographic devices) and others on the 
market make digital capture in cramped and volatile situations considerably easier, and the 
introduction of body-cams for officers as well as the increase in sousveillance all present important 
data sources for researchers to exploit in understanding the dynamics and excesses of police 
violence.  
                                                          
262 On the G20 case study I did not have a video-camera, only a still camera, which also later got broken. 
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11.2.4  Protestor Injuries and Police Weaponry 
My review of the sparse medical research literature on blunt force head trauma resulting from 
police 'non-lethal' weaponry also raises the urgent need for more research to be conducted in this 
area if these weapons are going to continue in use (see Section 7.7). Indeed, what research there is 
regarding the health implications of police violence has remained very much at the margins of 
public health medicine. Whilst HMICs (2009a:58) report does discuss at some length 'use of force' 
and police 'baton skills', I have found that its claim that "All the techniques used have been the 
subject of independent medical review" remains in doubt as we are only provided with an appeal to 
an unspecified authority that assessments of police non-lethal weapons are in line with the 'most 
current medical opinion' (HMIC, 2007:16). This surprising assertion by HMIC is not corroborated by 
any published medical opinion that I can find, indeed I consulted with a Consultant in Rehabilitation 
Medicine (Acute Brain Injury Pathway and Head Injury Clinic) who confirmed the opposite - the very 
real possibility of brain damage resulting from baton strikes to 'red' cranial zones.   
Furthermore, my review of the somewhat scant medical literature reveals that police batons have 
the potential to cause serious and diffuse injuries to the head and the face (with the skeletal 
structures of the face being less structurally sturdy than neurocranial bones and therefore more 
prone to serious injury). Whilst this is a complex area of clinical medicine as well as weapon design, 
the neuropsychologic evidence is both clear and alarming. Even mild brain injuries resulting from 
impact weapons "have the potential to create important losses for defendants” (Cox, 1987:60), and 
the total number of blows to the head is significantly correlated with later executive deficits and 
emotional problems (Heitzman (2010:405). As I have noted earlier, these considerations take on 
additional importance when considering the increasing police reliance of kettling protestors, where 
time and distance factors become more important (Meyer, 1981 cited in Cox et al 1987:58) reducing 
distances between police and protestors due to the tightening of the kettle contained within police 
serials (line formations). Such circumstances can result in officers reverting to previously learned 
motor behaviours (prior to police training) such as 'clubbing', and striking at a person's head, 
including in an 'uncontrolled manner'.  Given that there is no specific set of regulations governing 
police officers use of batons in terms of how the baton is used, what part of the body it strikes, or 
with what force, rather there is only  'guidance',263 with such decisions left to the discretion of the 
individual officer.  
My observational study of police violence using 'non-lethal' weaponry during Operation Glencoe, 
triangulated with data from Bindman's solicitors, attests to the practice of officers striking 
                                                          
263 Telephone interview with MPS: Public Order Policing Unit. 
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protestors in the head and face with batons (red strike zones) (as well as with shield edges) despite 
the very real dangers this presents to protestors. My conclusion should be alarming, that blunt force 
head traumas appear to be a feature of public order policing due to pre-mediated tactical choices of 
increasingly using enclosure, segmentation and containment by the authorities. 
11.2.5  Fellow Officer Reporting Practices 
My study of Operation Glencoe evidences a number of serious concerns in respect to the complicit 
role of fellow police officers to fellow officer malpractice, aggression and unlawful behaviour. I 
examined several individual high profile cases (that of the killing of Ian Tomlinson, and also that of 
Nicola Fisher) each of which saw a prosecution being sought against the respective individual (sic) 
officer who used their police baton to strike either Tomlinson or Fisher. In addition to this secondary 
data analysis I also drew upon my own more substantial ethnographic and observational study of 
the G20 demonstrations, my examination of the official inquiry reports into Operation Glencoe, and 
lastly, from the police's own official records (obtained from my own extensive and protracted 
Freedom of Information requests) (see also Appendix 11.3) to examine fellow officer reporting of 
police malpractice and lawlessness (the extended discussion  can be found in Section 7.8).  
As I noted in my discussion of these cases, both of the Tomlinson and Fisher cases received 
extensive coverage by the news media, official bodies and academics, but despite this most of the 
commentary (with the exception of Reicher, 2011) all omitted any consideration of fellow officer 
complicity. I had taken this issue up several years earlier (in 2009) in researching this particular area. 
Indeed, from my analysis of the entire Operation Glencoe, which generated extensive public 
disquiet (helped by the considerable amount of protestor media postings of showing considerable 
police violence) my study  unearthed that not one single police officer from what was then Britain's 
biggest policing operation reported any fellow officer for any breach of professional practice 
(oppressive behaviour etc.) or potential wrong-doing or illegality.264 This is despite all the many 
instances of officers not wearing identification, hiding their identification, using excessive force, 
using forbidden methods to attack protestors with (despite their training). This inaction also 
includes the wider 'police family' and the many senior officers who carried specific responsibilities 
for maintaining police discipline and conduct. 
None of the official inquiry reports pick up on this issue of fellow officer complicity and questions of 
resulting liability. In fact, this issue receives little attention in any of the reports, and when it is 
raised (by police spokespeople in oral testimony) it is only deployed as a reassurance device to 
reiterate this reporting requirement as a professional standard for all police officers in order to quell 
                                                          
264 Author FOI (No. 2009050000552) to MPS. 
Page.306 
 
any disquiet in the House of Common JCHR (2009) panel in oral testimony ('be reassured police 
officers are required to report other officer’s malpractice'). As I have argued, it is instructive then, 
that none of the panel members posed the next and rather obvious prompting question having 
been given this reassurance; namely, did they? If the panel members had, they would have learnt 
that this reassuring line ran suspiciously hollow. Indeed, to the best of my knowledge I am the only 
researcher who has asked this question despite the raft of official inquiry reports into Operation 
Glencoe.    
11.2.6  Police Log Books 
There is a further serious issue that my research reveals, and again, one which is not addressed in 
any of the official inquiry reports into Operation Glencoe or which I have seen raised by any other 
researcher. Every police officer has a requirement to "record all uses of force, setting out the exact 
circumstances which led the police to use force and the nature of the force used" (HMIC, 2009b:193) 
Despite the skill officers have in writing such reports, such a document potentially supplies an 
important record (and insight) into any individual officer's use of force record, and can be used to 
'flag' potential 'problem officers' using excessive force. When linked to an early intervention system 
which can include other datum,265 this can increase police accountability and reduce instances of 
police excessive force (Walker, 2005).  
It is then a notable finding from this research that MPS did not undertake any review process of 
these use of force log books, nor do they for public order policing events more generally.266 This 
means that neither the direct line manager (on the day) nor anyone in the wider organisation 
examines any of the log books which are submitted as a routine record of police force used. Such a 
practice evidences MPSs disregard for the long recognised problem of officers using excessive force 
in public order situations. This is the case even when Operation Glencoe caused widespread disquiet 
and the ensuing raft of inquiry reports. Neither were any of the report authors sufficiently savvy or 
knowledgeable to pursue this line of questioning and uncover MPSs wilful blindness. As I have 
argued, such log books appear to function merely as a ‘presentational rule’, one which allows senior 
officers to present the veneer of robust oversight procedures.   
11.2.7  Police Complaints Reform 
One of the necessary foundation stones for realising the possibility of having a democratic and 
accountable police force is having an effective complaints system, one which is capable of 
                                                          
265 Most obviously records of citizen complaints against the officer, but they can include other 'performance 
data' (Walker, 2005:101-2).  
266 Author FOI (No. 2009050000552) to MPS. 
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responding to public demand (most obviously after large policing operations) and capable of 
getting to the truth of events and providing redress. If not, then there can be no trust or confidence 
in the system and officials cannot be held to account. Whilst I accept that this is symptomatic of a 
set of deeper problems - most obviously the lack of direct democratic control of policing policy and 
the permissibility of officers being able to use high levels of force with weapons against unarmed 
citizens and that this is decided by ACPO policy and hence removed from public consultation or 
oversight - there still needs to be a freely available mechanism to prevent officers acting with 
impunity. These points are at their most acute because the police are enabled by statute to act in a 
way which would otherwise be unlawful for a citizen to do so.    
This study finds that despite the establishment of the IPCC the complaints system appears to be 
entirely inadequate, indeed worryingly so. The attrition rate for complaints to the G20 resulted in 
less than 1% (0.6%) of the 297 complaints received seeing any misconduct action by a police 
organisation, and then, only one written warning and one dismissal (as a result of the officer killing 
Ian Tomlinson). In light of what I directly observed of Operation Glencoe and heard from other 
protestors, this is an extraordinary outcome. There are a number of reasons for this dismal 
performance by the IPCC, all of which my analysis explores, nevertheless this headline figure and 
the higher resolution detail that I outlined presents a worrying picture of a failing system. I conclude 
that these flaws are partly structural and partly political. Structural because of the 85 cases alleging 
serious assault by serving police officers, only 6 resulted in independent IPCC investigations, with 
the remainder being referred back to the force (n=17) or 'supervised investigations' (n=62), which 
simply means that the police investigate themselves. Such a practice cannot be acceptable and 
breaches the IPCCs raison d'être that a non-police organisation should undertake the investigating. 
It should also be a matter of scandal that the IPCC had publicly trumpeted that it 'investigated' all 
G20 complaint cases where there were allegations of physical assault, which is to grossly mislead. 
The political flaws of the IPCC (lacking the will or intent to hold officers to account) have been raised 
by me and others.  
Moreover, I have never seen my figures which were derived by IPCC data published anywhere, and 
neither has this data raised any official disquiet.  This is an extraordinary outcome considering that 
Operation Glencoe received international press coverage and generated a total of five inquiry 
reports. I accept that the reports remit was not to investigate individual allegations, and on the odd 
occasion that they make reference to them it is merely to outsource the issue to the IPCC. However, 
my study maintains that there is a case for the IPCC to answer here and thus far it is one which has 
gone unanswered.    
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Part of the difficulty lies in there being no independent scrutiny of how the IPCC, or more 
problematically still, the supposedly 'supervised IPCC' investigations, or indeed force level 
investigations were conducted. In requesting these files under my capacity as a university Research 
Fellow, I was told that they could not be released due to 'data protection concerns', and that 
anonymising the documents would prove to be too time consuming.267 Whilst this last point is far 
from obvious, none of this is acceptable for an organisation which experiences an attrition rate like 
the IPCC's for Operation Glencoe, a point which should also be obvious to the IPCC. It is not beyond 
the wit of man to remedy this, what is required is the political will to do so. That it has not happened 
is because the IPCC, and the various police forces that benefit from this lacuna, have no desire for 
outsiders to examine their internal investigative processes. One remedy would be to offer 
complainants (via a simple check box) whether they are prepared to allow their complaints to 
oversight by regulated external entities (such as researchers) in an effort to ensure that they are 
properly investigated. This would remove one all too convenient obstacle that currently keeps 
interested parties in the dark. Data protection, including the recent GDPR, like secrecy itself, are 
instruments in struggles, and can all to easily function to perversely protect the state from any 
unwanted prying eyes.    
The other issue I raised, and have entered into correspondence with the IPCC over, is their overly 
exclusionary regulations, specifically the requirement for a complainant to be physically present at 
the scene for a complaint to be valid for consideration, despite the considerable rise of 
'sousveillance'. The growth in this technology through the ubiquity of mobile phone with video 
capture technology and social media platforms to upload and distribute it is one method the 
disgruntled citizen can use to monitor police (mis)conduct, increasing surveillance capacity and 
making state agents newly visible. It is one method that attempts to control police discretion in 
circumstances where legal rules are wanting. I ran a thought experiment with an operative in a 
CCTV control room to demonstrate why the IPCC rule rejecting complaints based on real time video 
data is nonsensical. My conclusion I reach is that its only function is to artificially reduce the number 
of complaints, this for an organisation whose professed ambition is to more effectively address 
police malpractice.  
My conclusion was that at each stage of the current complaints system, complainants are 
disadvantaged and there is no routine entitlement to financial assistance which would allow legal 
advice and representation to progress the complaint.268 The workings of the IPCC, and police 
                                                          
267 Personal communication with IPCC.  
268 As Smith (2009:254) notes.   
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complaints more generally, requires considerably more scrutiny from researchers, particularly in 
respect to protest policing and repression research. As Ericson, (2007:391) has remarked in his 
examination of rules in policing, rules of criminal procedure are only likely to have some effect when 
prosecution is desired. The IPCC data appears to tell a different tale. 
11.2.8 The Political Economy of Social Control of Dissent 
There has been very little research into the political economy of international summit meetings and 
the industry that has developed around them. My research into this area builds on one of the few 
other examples of this work, being Starr et al's (2011) by examining what the summit costs were and 
where these monies went. Most obviously this provides important insights into the material 
preparations and how these change over time (i.e. transportation modes for delegates), as well as 
the multi-dimensionality of these operations. It also includes examining the rising costs of the 
security budgets, and what equipment is being purchased (for instance the ongoing 'investment' in 
more robust 'security fences' constructed to fortify summit sites) or the use of military equipment 
and its purposes (employing the military and its equipment is very expensive, and the NATO 
summit employed saw all three armed forces).  Security budgets give some indication that the 
militaries are fully involved in these operations which are directed at controlling domestic political 
dissent. 
These lavish events come at extraordinary public cost, with an ever greater share of funding being 
allocated for security. There remain many questions surrounding the politics of mobilising and using 
resources and how this is justified to the wider public audiences, including the authority player’s 
media strategies, framing and messaging, and how this is layered onto the policing and security 
strategy. I have begun some of this work, in particular through examining the 'benefit realisation' 
strategies used by authorities, as well as 'legacy benefit' strategies, but there needs to be longer 
term local and regional economic analysis to more robustly test the authority’s claims through 
genuinely independent research efforts. At the moment these claims function too much as 
promissory notes, ones which are conveniently never revisited as their work is done.  
Hosting International summit meetings also brings a host of collateral costs to the locality, with 
some previously public spaces being temporarily confiscated (including some local services) and 
resembling heavily fortified war zones being but one. I have documented some of these collateral 
costs, these are real and go beyond 'inconveniences', but rather unsurprisingly, they are routinely 
underplayed by the organising authorities. They can also incur considerable local tension between 
local, regional and national government players as well as governmental departments in respect of 
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budgets and allocation - the local, regional and national political dimensions to such events are also 
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13. Appendix  
Appendix 1: Interview Schedules 










Figure A3: Interview Schedule for NGO Respondents 
















Appendix 2:Tables Detaining Conversations with Protestors (by Summit Case Study Site) 
The respective Tables below detail the protestors that I directly consulted with and had 'controlled 
conversations' during the fieldwork. In providing this information I have steered between maximising the 
protection of participants' identities whilst also maintaining the integrity of the data.   
Table A1:  Interviewed Protestors at the G20 Case Study (Anonymised)  
Protestor Location Date of Fieldwork 
G20-A01 London - Planning meeting 1 December 2008 
G20-A02 London - Planning meeting 3 January 2009 
G20-A03 London - Planning meeting 3 February 2009 
G20-A04 London - Planning meeting 4 March 2009 
G20-A05 London - Convergence centre April 2009 
G20-A06 London - Convergence centre April 2009 
G20-A07 London - Planning meeting 5 February 2009 
G20-A08 London - Planning meeting 6 March 2009 
G20-A09 South East - Planning meeting December 2009 
G20-A10 South East - Planning meeting January 2009 
G20-A11 South East - Planning meeting February 2009 
G20-A12 South East - Planning meeting February 2009 
G20-A13 South East - Planning meeting March 2009 
G20-A14 South East - Planning meeting March 2009 
G20-A15 South East - Planning meeting March 2009 
G20-A16 London - Convergence centre April 2009 
G20-A17 London - Convergence centre April 2009 
G20-A18 London - Convergence centre April 2009 
G20-A19 London – Demonstration: Climate camp April 2009 
G20-A20 London – Demonstration: Bank of 
England 
April 2009 
G20-A21 London - Convergence centre April 2009 
G20-A22 London - Convergence centre April 2009 
G20-A23 London - Convergence centre April 2009 
G20-A24 London - Convergence centre April 2009 
G20-A25 London – Demonstration: Climate camp April 2009 
G20-A26 London – Demonstration: Climate camp April 2009 
G20-A27 London – Demonstration: Climate camp  April 2009 
G20-A28 London – Demonstration: Climate camp April 2009 
G20-A29 London – Demonstration: Bank of 
England 
April 2009 
G20-A30 London – Demonstration: Bank of 
England 
April 2009 
G20-A31 London - Miscellaneous April 2009 
G20-A32 London – Demonstration: Bank of 
England 
April 2009 






Table A2:  Interviewed Protestors at the NATO Case Study (Anonymised)  
Protestor Location Date of Fieldwork 
NP-N01 Planning meeting 1 June 2014 
NP-N02 Planning meeting 2 August 2014 
NP-N03 Newport – Convergence camp August-September 2014 
NP-N04 Newport – Convergence camp August-September 2014 
NP-N05 Newport – Convergence camp August-September 2014 
NP-N06 Newport – Convergence camp August-September 2014 
NP-N07 Demonstration - 1 September 2014 
NP-N08 Newport – Convergence camp August-September 2014 
NP-N09 Newport – Convergence camp August-September 2014 
NP-N010 Demonstration - 1 September 2014 
NP-N011 Demonstration - 2 September 2014 
NP-N012 Demonstration - 2 September 2014 
NP-N013 Newport – Convergence camp August-September 2014 
NP-N014 Newport – Convergence camp August-September 2014 
NP-N015 Demonstration - 1 September 2014 
NP-N016 Cardiff September 2014 
NP-N017 Cardiff September 2014 

















Appendix 3: Submitted Freedom of Information Requests 
13.3.1 Submitted Freedom of Information Requests Concerning the G20 Summit 
 











































































































































11.3.2 Submitted Freedom of Information Requests Concerning the NATO Summit 
 









11.3.3 Submitted Freedom of Information Requests Concerning the G8 Summit 
 















Appendix 4: Freedom of Information Responses 
Here I document in chronological order my freedom of information requests made for this study, 
and responses to the requests. I have seen fit to redact the identities of correspondents, and 


























































































Appendix 6: MPS: Evidence & Actions Book (EAB) 
 
The following section of the Appendix reproduces some sections of the Police Evidence & Actions 
book, (a copy was obtained from MPS). The EAB has not been reproduced in full as this is not 
necessary for the purposes of this Appendix, only to identify the pertinent sections as relates to this 
study.  
This document is 48 pages long and comes in the form of a compact note book. Its purpose is to 
record the majority of incidents a police officer attends and to form a written record of incidents 
where the police have been called to take action (including use of force) (MPS EAB, 2010). Here the 







































































Appendix 7:Summit Flyers to Residents 
Picture 60:Police Flyer to Local People in Newport 
 
Appendix 8:Photographs from the G8 (2013)  London Convergence Centre 
and Protests 
Whilst I have only made mention of the June 2013 G8 London Summit Protests in this study in 
respect to the raid and smashing of the convergence centre, I have included some photographic 
stills from the centre prior to and post this raid in this additional Appendix (not the actual raid, 
where I was at the time outside of the convergence centre trying to get back in but blocked from 




Picture 61: PLO's at G8 London Convergence Centre 
Being Rebuffed By Protestors 
 
Picture 62: MPS Riot Police Pursuing Protestors (Post 
Destruction of Convergence Centre) 
 
Picture 63: MPS Riot Police Beset Protestors and 




Picture 64: PLOs at G8 London Convergence Centre 
Prior to centre Being Raided and Destroyed by MPS 
 
Picture 65: MPS Riot Police Beset Protestors and 
Take Notes (Post Convergence Centre Destruction) 
 







Picture 67: MPS Riot Police Surveiling Protestors and 
Taking Notes 
 
Picture 68: MPS Riot Police Follow Protestors on 



















Picture 69: Legal Observer in Carriage with Protestors 
and MPS Riot Officers 
 
Picture 70: MPS Uniformed Officers Surveilling 
Protestors and Taking Notes 
 
 
 
 
 
